--- title: "The Taliban Won Afghanistan. Now They're Fighting Each Other" description: "The past few weeks have seen all manner of major incidents in multiple warzones across Africa and Asia. So, you would be forgiven for having missed the latest developments in Badakhshan - a border province of Afghanistan that sits in a key position between Pakistan, China and Tajikistan." url: https://fronts.co/article/the-taliban-won-afghanistan-now-theyre-fighting-each-other.md canonical: https://fronts.co/article/the-taliban-won-afghanistan-now-theyre-fighting-each-other/ datePublished: 2026-08-27T14:55:35.000Z dateModified: 2026-08-27T14:56:24.000Z author: - name: Paweł Wójcik url: https://fronts.co/authors/pawe-w-jcik/ publisher: Fronts image: "https://media.fronts.co/cdn-cgi/image/width=1200,height=630,fit=cover,gravity=auto,quality=80,format=auto/images/articles/the-taliban-won-afghanistan-now-theyre-fighting-each-other-ceb0ffdf.png" type: NewsArticle language: en tokens: 3989 --- The past few weeks have seen all manner of major incidents in multiple warzones across Africa and Asia. So, you would be forgiven for having missed the latest developments in Badakhshan - a border province of Afghanistan that sits in a key position between Pakistan, China and Tajikistan.  For a few days, a battle raged in this beautiful, desolate land. And while it was ultimately resolved by mediation, it highlighted a looming problem for the Taliban. One triggered by a potent mix of domestic and international crises that threatens to split their own coalition wide open. Since the fall of Kabul, the anti-Taliban effort has struggled to maintain relevancy and strength, amid a slow and meticulous centralizing of power in the hands of Pashtun-oriented senior leadership - a group that is also strong on the other side of the border in Pakistan.  But Badakhshan shows the limits of that centralization. The recent battle was, effectively, an internal fight, with the antagonist a [Taliban commander](https://amu.tv/250171/) of Tajik ethnicity, hinting at bigger problems that may be coming down the line. As the Supreme Leader has started shuffling around non-Pashtun Taliban members -  influencing local power balances and the old division of spoils - a certain amount of bitterness has begun to set in among other ethnicities, as they slowly realise the promises that enticed them to join the movement in the first place may in fact no longer apply.  The commander in question - [Juma Khan Fateh](https://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=5682&task=view&total=5263&start=2208&Itemid=2) - is a controversial figure, whose conduct is on the more-radical side of an already-radical movement. To the extent that one could argue his profile would be more suited to Islamic State Khorasan - the local chapter of the group which has become infamous in recent years for daring terror operations throughout Asia and Europe, including the Moscow concert attack in [March 2024](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0j5lx75vg3o), the [Kerman](https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-reveals-afghan-origin-of-islamic-state-kerman-attack-retaliation-options-limited/7439236.html) bombings in Iran the same year, or the [Abbey Gate bombing](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/08/fourth-anniversary-of-the-attack-at-abbey-gate-2025/) during the hasty American withdrawal from Kabul. Fateh seems to be a fan of cruel conversions to Sunni Islam, and has targeted members of the local Shia populations - a big deal in a nation with relatively large Shia minorities like the Hazaras. In the Afghan context, he is perhaps best understood as an old school warlord, of the type the Taliban’s victory was meant to have snuffed out. Tajikistan accuses him of smuggling alcohol and drugs, the Chinese of torture and forcible conversions of its citizens, while Iran obviously takes a dim view of someone keen on brutally eliminating Shia believers. The Taliban’s centralization of authority (and thus the gradual withdrawal of local income streams) is likely what triggered Fateh’s rebellion. Ultimately, mediation from the Chief of staff of the Emirate’s army allowed him to remain alive and well, despite his actions causing casualties among the Taliban ranks. In choosing negotiation, the Taliban is playing with fire. Fateh may well decide later on to defect to - or silently support - rival groups, all of which would be only too glad to inherit his contacts, and happy to turn a blind eye on whatever he does locally as long as their interests converge. Don’t be too shocked if you read in a few months’ time that he’s defected to the Islamic State: currently the Taliban’s number one domestic enemy, and filled with former members of other jihadist organizations from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. **Challenges Multiply ** Remarkably, this mini civil war wasn’t the only major event to take place in Badakhshan this summer. Just last month, the [whole district](https://thekabultribune.com/en/0010227) in Yaftal e-Paeen fell briefly to a newly announced group of insurgents calling themselves Homeland Guard. While the Taliban reestablished control in short order, it still marked the first time another group proved itself capable of seriously challenging them in any part of the country. That’s not to say there are no other anti-Taliban groups out there. In Afghanistan today, there are multiple groups of varying strength that could be included in the broader banner of an anti-Taliban insurgency. Some trace their origins back to the fallen Republic, while others are descended from various warlords and their clans.  Among these, the most-famous is certainly Ahmad Massoud, the leader of National Resistance Front (NRF). Together with the Afghan United Front (AUF) and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), the NRF represent some of the most-significant opposition to the Taliban in the entire country. For its part, the AUF - under former general and known anti-Al-Qaeda hunter Sami Sadat - declared war on the Taliban just this month, before calling on NATO to support it in its fight against Kabul’s new rulers. While the group so far seems to only be targeting positions in the province of Kandahar (despite its presence being also notable in Helmand and Badghis), it’s part and parcel of the growing instability we’re seeing across the country. One in which insurgents appear to be taking advantage of a Taliban distracted by bigger crises, like the ongoing war with Pakistan. This is being compounded by mistakes from a central leadership that’s growing increasingly hardline and factional. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Leader based in Kandahar ordered a reduction in the size of ministries and number of security forces around the Kabul-based offices, which are seen as too linked to the Haqqani family. That’s the same Haqqanis the US spent decades of effort to degrade for running a suicide bombers enterprise, but which in the new Afghanistan are seen as the Taliban’s “moderate” wing. The leader of Haqqanis, Sirauddin Haqqani, has even gone on record, frequently stating his discomfort over how Afghanistan is run and critiquing the gender apartheid policies ordered from Kandahar. Of the 4,000 members laid off from administrative positions, 1,000 were from [Badakhshan](https://kabulnow.com/2025/12/administrative-downsizing-taliban-dismiss-around-4000-fighters/) - a fact that undoubtedly added to the dissent and unrest now gripping the region.  Haqqani himself, alongside the defense minister and director-general of intelligence, were also clearly [unhappy](https://www.afintl.com/en/202608143519) with how the Taliban proceeded with the unrest in Badakhshan, seeing the uncoordinated actions taken by deputy head of intelligence as a major risk. Given that Haqqani is heavily involved in major negotiations concerning tribes and movements all over Afghanistan, is trusted by even non-Pashtun ethnic groups, and has just come back from dealing with a [crisis](https://x.com/HashteSubhDaily/status/2091890653374361879) concerning tribes fighting in Paktika and Khost provinces, the lack of coordination seems doubly bizarre. Enough so that it might suggest some hidden motives, including that the Badakhshan operation was likely a conscious decision by the Taliban’s Supreme Leader to sideline rivals from the opposing camp. **Outside Actors** And then there are the outside actors who have a vested interest in watching the Taliban fail. To be fair to the group, the post-2021 Islamic Emirate has invested heavily in showing the world it would like to be a part of the international community, rather than a tribute act to its previous incarnation as an international pariah pre-2001. Kabul has made a point of establishing [official channels](https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-taliban-deportations-afghan-dissidents-fear-persecution/) with western countries, such as Germany, which has started deportations of Afghans on its soil and cooperated with the Taliban on their citizens' departure. Outside the West, [Russia was](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n4wely9do) the first to recognize the Taliban regime as Afghanistan’s legitimate government, while [China](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/five-years-taliban-diplomacy-recognition-without-concessions) has become one of Taliban’s biggest backers. However, this international outreach has come with its own problems. In the Islamic world, Beijing is best known for oppressing Muslims within its own borders, with the slow erasure of the Uyghurs being the most-glaring example. It hasn’t been long since especially punitive policies “disappeared” [millions](https://www.reuters.com/world/blinken-says-genocide-xinjiang-is-ongoing-report-ahead-china-visit-2024-04-22/) of Uyghurs into so-called reeducation camps, and the Taliban is taking a big risk by ignoring this… especially as the Islamic State is making opposition to China one of its calling cards. Earlier this year, the group bombed a [Chinese restaurant](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yvqx22dyvo) in Kabul and is busy targeting Chinese interests not only in Afghanistan, but also Tajikistan and Pakistan. Speaking of Pakistan, Islamabad is emerging as one of Kabul’s biggest headaches. This began in October 2025, when Pakistani fighter jets were sent to Kabul for the first time to bomb what is de-facto a sister organization of the Afghan Taliban - the Pakistani Taliban, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Both organizations are basically two sides of the same coin, with their Pashtun ethnicity the main glue holding them together, as both wish to unite the Pashtun territory long split between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Initially, the Taliban promised Islamabad, via mediators like Turkey and the UAE, that they would rein in their Pakistani wing. However, a series of massive bombings and [military campaigns](https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-balochistan-coordinated-attacks-bla-baloch-separatists/a-75737955) in Pakistani cities by multiple Pakistani Taliban groups and Balochistan nationalists killed all hope of a deal. By February this year, the situation had deteriorated so badly that Pakistan launched an air war against Afghanistan at more or less the [same time](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c621g086ek4o) that the US and Israel began bombing Iran. Since then, a new reality has emerged in which Islamabad appears to have taken a leaf out of Israel’s playbook, and conducts periodic airstrikes to “mow the lawn”, aiming to degrade groups it considers a risk to its statehood, while also going back to its long-term practice of supporting rebel groups aiming to topple the government in Kabul. The difference is that, this time, the government they hope to topple is one of the groups they previously supported. For years, Pakistan was a sanctuary for groups hostile to the American-supported Afghan government, with ISI, its powerful intelligence service, [accused of straight up](https://www.propublica.org/article/us-officials-equate-pakistani-spy-agency-with-terror-groups-in-leaked-docum) harboring figures like Osama bin Laden. That this has led to Islamabad now fighting a war against its erstwhile allies in Afghanistan has resulted in not a little bit of schadenfreude among certain analysts.  Nor is it just Pakistan that is investing in anti-Taliban activities. Massoud, the main leader of the armed opposition in Afghanistan today, recently appeared with honors at the [state funeral](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ozzRvt9JAs) of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on February 28th. The appearance of an anti-Taliban fighter at his funeral - albeit alongside official representatives of the Taliban itself - has inevitably raised questions about potential support from Tehran. The oppression of Shias in provinces like Herat, and the Talibans’ inability to protect property belonging to Hazara citizens, may be a factor in the IRGC’s decision to open channels with a man otherwise known for his commitment to Afghan democracy and regular appearances at European summits.  The upshot of all this is that Afghanistan appears to be on the brink of yet another series of internal crises and bloodletting. The economy - which has always been desperate under the Taliban - is now being so badly buffeted by Pakistan’s strikes and the global turmoil unleashed by the closure of Hormuz that it might as well be classified as ‘catastrophic’. Millions of children remain unable to eat, or get to schools to receive a proper education. And with the added pressures of new groups rising up against Taliban rule, we can probably expect things to only get worse.  For a short while after the Taliban took power in 2021, there was a faint hope that, at the very least, life might become more stable for ordinary Afghans. It now appears that this was unduly naive. By all appearances, Afghanistan is now sliding back to its natural state of instability… with all the misery and bloodshed that implies. <!-- generated-faq --> ## FAQ ### What triggered the recent conflict in Badakhshan province? A recent battle in Badakhshan was triggered by Taliban centralization and the shuffling of non-Pashtun members. Supreme Leader moves to place senior leaders in key positions provoked Tajik commander Juma Khan Fateh to clash with the Taliban. His revolt highlighted the limits of attempts to centralize authority and the growing ethnic tensions within their coalition. ### Who is Juma Khan Fateh and why is he significant? Juma Khan Fateh is a Tajik Taliban commander known for radical conduct, including cruel forced conversions. He has targeted local Shia populations, and is accused by Tajikistan of smuggling and China of torture and forced conversions. The article notes his profile might better suit the Islamic State Khorasan than the Taliban. ### What did the Homeland Guard accomplish in Badakhshan? Homeland Guard briefly captured a whole district in Yaftal e-Paeen just last month. The Taliban regained control quickly, but it marked the first time another group proved capable of seriously challenging Taliban rule anywhere in Afghanistan since they took power. ### Who leads the main anti-Taliban armed groups? The NRF, AUF, and AFF represent significant armed opposition, with Ahmad Massoud leading the most famous group. General Sami Sadat's AUF declared war on the Taliban this month and called on NATO to support it, though it is so far only targeting positions in Kandahar province. ### How did Taliban leadership changes fuel recent unrest? The Supreme Leader ordered cuts to Kabul-based ministries and security forces, which are seen as too linked to the moderate Haqqani family. He laid off 1,000 people from Badakhshan alone, adding to regional dissent and unrest in the process. ### Why is there tension between Haqqani and the Supreme Leader? Sirauddin Haqqani has publicly criticized gender apartheid policies and how Afghanistan is run. His helicopter flights over Kabul offices were seen as a major risk by the defense minister and intelligence director, with Badakhshan operation suggesting a move to sideline rivals. ### How has Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban changed? In October 2025, Pakistani jets bombed the Pakistani Taliban, and by February, Pakistan launched sustained airstrikes. It now conducts periodic strikes and supports rebel groups to topple the Taliban, despite years of harboring jihadists against the previous Afghan government. ### Why might Iran support anti-Taliban fighters? The IRGC may be opening channels with Massoud due to Taliban oppression of Shias in Herat and failure to protect Hazara property. Massoud appeared at Ayatollah Khamenei's funeral, though this happened alongside official Taliban representatives. <!-- /generated-faq -->