---
title: "Due South: Mike DeAngelo of Critical Threats Talks Sudan"
description: "ladies and gentlemen good morning good evening good afternoon whenever and wherever you're listening to us from this is the dear south podcast with me wilfred minor africa correspondent for fronts.co and all associated properties and today i am joined by michael d'angelo from the critical threats project mike introduce yourself hello wilfred how are you thank you for having me on the show thanks happy to have you tell the people a little about yourself yeah so i'm an africa analyst at the critical threat project at the american enterprise institute american enterprise institute is a think tank based in washington dc so at critical threats we're basically a unit within ai or the american enterprise institute and what we do is we focus all on open source intelligence analysis of you know various national security threats based in the u.s we have two teams the iran team and the africa team so of course i'm housed under the africa team working mainly on you know the horn of africa specifically so what we focus on is we look at you know great power competition salafi jihadi threats maritime security anything affecting you know security and political or driving security and political developments within africa and for me within the horn of africa especially vis-a-vis you know u.s interests we collect all the open source on open source intel on that we analyze it and kind of distill it into you know helpful information for you know u.s policymakers but also our audience extends beyond the u.s european african policymakers as well journalists and just people who are generally interested in the topic thanks mike that's pretty comprehensive and you perfectly encapsulates why i love having folks from the critical threats project on due south for anyone who's keeping score mike is our third guest from critical threats we've had liam carr twice and we've had yale forward once and yeah mike is number three so yeah batting three for three perfect thousand i'm happy happy how this is good mike with your focus on the on the horn of africa i want to start today's conversation by talking about sudan sudan sudan now for anyone who is listening to due south and is unfamiliar with the situation in sudan first of all welcome you to be someone who's listening to the podcast for the first time. And yeah, let's give them a very brief overview of the situation in Sudan. Mike, take it away."
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canonical: https://fronts.co/podcast/due-south-episode-2-meltdown-in-the-middle-east-2/
datePublished: 2026-07-14T17:30:03.000Z
dateModified: 2026-07-14T17:30:13.000Z
author:
  - name: Fronts Staff
    url: https://fronts.co/authors/fronts-team/
publisher: Fronts
image: "https://media.fronts.co/cdn-cgi/image/width=1200,height=630,fit=cover,gravity=auto,quality=80,format=auto/images/articles/due-south-episode-2-meltdown-in-the-middle-east-4975f883.png"
type: NewsArticle
language: en
audio: https://media.fronts.co/audio/ctp-mike-deangelo-talks-sudan-mixdownmp3.mp3
tokens: 16196
---

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ladies and gentlemen good morning good evening good afternoon whenever and wherever you're listening to us from this is the dear south podcast with me wilfred minor africa correspondent for fronts.co and all associated properties and today i am joined by michael d'angelo from the critical threats project mike introduce yourself hello wilfred how are you thank you for having me on the show thanks happy to have you tell the people a little about yourself yeah so i'm an africa analyst at the critical threat project at the american enterprise institute american enterprise institute is a think tank based in washington dc so at critical threats we're basically a unit within ai or the american enterprise institute and what we do is we focus all on open source intelligence analysis of you know various national security threats based in the u.s we have two teams the iran team and the africa team so of course i'm housed under the africa team working mainly on you know the horn of africa specifically so what we focus on is we look at you know great power competition salafi jihadi threats maritime security anything affecting you know security and political or driving security and political developments within africa and for me within the horn of africa especially vis-a-vis you know u.s interests we collect all the open source on open source intel on that we analyze it and kind of distill it into you know helpful information for you know u.s policymakers but also our audience extends beyond the u.s european african policymakers as well journalists and just people who are generally interested in the topic thanks mike that's pretty comprehensive and you perfectly encapsulates why i love having folks from the critical threats project on due south for anyone who's keeping score mike is our third guest from critical threats we've had liam carr twice and we've had yale forward once and yeah mike is number three so yeah batting three for three perfect thousand i'm happy happy how this is good mike with your focus on the on the horn of africa i want to start today's conversation by talking about sudan sudan sudan now for anyone who is listening to due south and is unfamiliar with the situation in sudan first of all welcome you to be someone who's listening to the podcast for the first time. And yeah, let's give them a very brief overview of the situation in Sudan. Mike, take it away.

Yeah, so the current situation on the ground in Sudan is Sudan's essentially split into two parts, divided between east and west, essentially. So the Sudanese armed forces, which is the Sudanese military controls, the eastern part of the country and parts of the central of central Sudan as well. So that's the most populous part of Sudan.

It includes the capital Khartoum. And it's where much of Sudan's industry and population is based. And it's also where the Nile River Valley is.

Whereas the rapid support forces, which is a paramilitary group that was formerly part of the Sudanese government, but then split off, hence causing the current civil war, the RSF controls, you know, Western Sudan, basically. And Western Sudan is, you know, a lot of kind of empty desert type space. But it's a significant chunk of territory that the RSF holds.

And they've been able to consolidate control of it within the last year, and essentially impose a de facto partition upon Sudan. And they've even established some parallel governance efforts, which I'm sure that we will talk about later in terms of, you know, the validity of them and how effective they've been at doing so. But nonetheless, Sudan is essentially at a state of a de facto partition right now, with the city of El Obed in central Sudan, as being kind of the hinge, or where the main front lines are all, you know, based around.

And El Obed is basically smack dab right in the center of Sudan. It's currently controlled by the Sudanese armed forces. But the rapid support forces are, you know, have attempted multiple times and are currently attempting to pressure it and likely preparing for, you know, some kind of offensive on El Obed, which has been the headlines recently, and I'm sure we'll, we'll get into it more.

But yeah, so since the war has started, basically, it's, you know, momentum has, you know, changed hands a few times at the start of the war, you know, the rapid support forces actually controlled Khartoum, and a lot of eastern Sudan, but then, and as well as, you know, parts of western Sudan as well. And we're besieging many population centers within western Sudan that the Sudanese armed forces still held. But as the war progressed, you know, the Sudanese armed forces, they were able to conduct kind of groundbreaking offensive in 2024, late 2024, that yielded a lot of results in early 2025 and mid 2025, which has basically established the front lines to where they are now.

Whereas the RSF has been able to consolidate their control over all the population centers in western Sudan. So yeah, that's Basically, the situation now, there have been a few developments since then that are notable, both on the main front lines and on the peripheries as well. But for the last year or so, especially along the main front lines, the conflict has been a relative stalemate, I would say.

And yeah, that's a perfect description of the situation that we're witnessing in Sudan right now. It's a stalemate between the RSF and the SAF, with neither side able to really gain a definitive edge. So, Mike, let's start with the city of Elevate.

It's a city that you've just mentioned in your description of what is happening in Sudan. It's a city that my colleague, you know, the editor-in-chief of All Front's Properties, Morris, covered in a video recently. And it's a city where it seems very likely that a catastrophe is going to happen should the city fall to the RSF.

Before we even talk about Elevate, I want to briefly mention another city that fell to the RSF and a catastrophe happened, the city of El Farsha, where the city started off with a population of about 250,000 people. And it fell to the RSF, to the paramilitary group, in late October last year. Between October and December, so many people were killed that Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab was saying they could see blood, blood from space, basically, just bloodstains, giving you an idea of how many people were killed.

And, you know, people aren't just killed. Some were sold into slavery. Some are still missing.

Some were buried alive. And by the time UN investigators were going into El Farsha in December, the city was, for all intents and purposes, a ghost town. So, Mike, do you see something similar happening in Elevate?

So, and this is, of course, is all contingent upon the RSF taking El Obeid, which we can talk about whether, you know, I think that's realistic. Actually, let's start with that. Let's start with that.

Yeah, great. Do you think they will be able to take the city? I personally think it's unlikely, at least in the short term, that they will be able to take the city.

Now, what the RSF, their approach around Elevate, everyone, you know, the headlines are dominated. You know, people are making it seem like there's an imminent offensive in the works because the RSF has redeployed forces to the outskirts of Elevate on multiple fronts and are effectively besieging or partially besieging the city. And most notably, They've, you know, drastically increased the amount of drone strikes on, you know, both on civilians, but also on, you know, critical infrastructure, particularly fuel depots, whether they be, you know, in El Obeed itself or on the, you know, supply lines leading into El Obeed.

So they're effectively imposing a partial siege on El Obeed. So their approach in that regard, I actually see it as being somewhat similar to El Thasher from, you know, military wise. And that they're almost pursuing kind of a death by a thousand cuts approach.

So they'll kind of, you know, encircle El Obeed and keep the pressure on, you know, really pressure those supply lines, continue conducting drone strikes, basically pursuing, you know, war by attrition. And then, you know, you'll start to see the ground offensives, you know, take force and they might start trying some probing along various front lines. They surround the city from the north, the south, and the west.

So you'll start, you know, probably start to see some movement on all of those fronts in terms of them probing. But at the same time, you know, El Obeed is a significant, significantly, you know, it's an operational objective for both the SAF and the RSF. It's the SAF's headquarters for all of central Sudan.

And it's, you know, a significant priority for the SAF to, you know, retain control of El Obeed. Because if they lose control of El Obeed, then all of a sudden the roads to, you know, to eastern Sudan, the most populous part of Sudan, are relatively open in a way. So it's, for that reason, I think that the SAF, you know, they've already concentrated a vast number of forces there.

They've really enhanced their defensive posture. They've built a berm around the city that Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab has, you know, documented. It's about, like, 30 miles of, like, a berm slash, like, trenches, you know, defensive fortifications around the city.

And they've also, you know, increased their own drone strikes on RSF positions outside the city. And meanwhile, the RSF has its own capacity constraints as well. What we've seen recently is you've seen a good amount of defections from the RSF.

Because at the end of the day, the RSF is this kind of loose coalition of, you know, militias, many of them kind of tribal clan-based militias. So they're not really united by any ideology in particular. So basically, you're dealing with a lot of competing interests within the RSF.

And therefore, that's just capacity constraints for them, especially in light of, you know, recent defections. So all this is being said, I don't think it's likely that the RSF is going to be able to take LOB in the short term. And I don't think... there will be like this massive decisive battle for LOB in the imminent term.

That being said, if they are able to continue this pressure and effectively besiege the city, they're able to continue that at a certain point, those defenses from the SAF can start to weaken. And then you might see kind of this larger battle taking place. So militarily, I think that the situation is similar to El Fasher in that way.

El Fasher, there was an 18-month siege that the RSF conducted before they actually captured the city. So if the SAF can't gain control of the perimeter of LOB and kind of clear the RSF out of these areas, I think you'll see kind of a similar status quo take place. All right.

So let's assume for a moment that the strategy that the RSF is employing, death by a thousand cats, besieging the city and trying to weaken the supply lines, trying to isolate the city's defenders, and you basically rain down hellfire using drones and whatever the capacity that they do have, let's assume for a moment that it does fall. Do you foresee a situation where the death toll reaches the same as El Fasher? Do you foresee it becoming as violent a situation?

Or do you think the RSF will be able to temper the worst of their excesses, given the international pressure that they received following the fall of El Fasher? Yeah. I think that relative to El Fasher, you would not see the same situation kind of play out.

So for a variety of reasons, but that's not to say that it, you know, there wouldn't be massive, you know, abuses committed. I think that, you know, and throughout this war, whatever population center the RSF has taken, there have been abuses against mass abuses against civilians carried out. So that will likely, very likely happen.

But on the scale of El Fasher, there are some key differences here. So the first one being that in Darfur, which is where El Fasher is located, there were some significant kind of ethnic components. Whereas, you know, the RSF is not only made up of, you know, Arab tribes, there's also non-Arab tribes involved as well.

But the RSF leadership and whatnot comes from, you know, these kind of Arab tribes. They're, they were the gingerweed were the precursors to the RSF. And many people know the gingerweed because they were the ones that committed the Darfur genocide back in, you know, the early 2000s.

So anyway, there's a significant kind of ethnic component to the Darfur conflict in particular. And what you saw when the RSF, you know, took the city of El Fasher is you saw, you know, the main, the Arab dominated RSF committing these mass atrocities against the majority non-Arab population of El Fasher, basically continuing this trend that we've seen for decades now of the RSF and it's, you know, the groups that preceded it committing these kinds of atrocities, you know, ethnically motivated. In El Obed, you don't have the same ethnic dynamics.

You know, that being said, there are still tensions, of course, but you just, you just don't have a similar, you know, ethnic composition there. So I don't think you would see the, you know, ethnic violence, ethnically motivated violence on the same scale if the RSF takes the city. The second key thing is that El Fasher was completely encircled by the RSF from all directions.

And there was not a clear way for civilians to escape the city. The best they could hope for was going through territory controlled by the RSF and escaping to neutral territory controlled by another armed group. That was about roughly 60 miles away from the city and having to traverse through RSF territory to get there.

Whereas in El Obed, for example, while the road leading east to the east away from El Obed towards eastern Sudan, the population centers there, it is, of course, being struck by RSF drones heavily. The RSF doesn't really have a ground presence there. So basically, there is kind of a route for civilians to escape El Obed if it gets to a point where, you know, they need to do that.

So for that reason, I don't think it would play out similarly to El Fasher. That being said, though, I just want to hone in on this. Based on the RSF's past, you know, history in this war, it's really their MO to go into cities that they've captured and, you know, commit these, you know, indiscriminate targeting of civilians and whatnot.

So I think you can expect mass atrocities to happen, probably not quite on the same scale as El Fasher. All right. That's a really good answer.

And it was something I hadn't thought about because I was working under the assumption that the situation in El Obed was similar to the situation in El Fasher in terms of the scale of the siege and just the capabilities that the RSF had to inflict violence and harm upon the communities around. So let's move on from the situation in El Obed to something that you wrote about in the most recent edition of your... of the Africa report from Critical Threats, the situation with the sanctions. Tell us about that, Mike.

Yes. So the U.S. has imposed multiple rounds of sanctions on both SAF networks and RSF networks since the start of the war. And in the most recent Africa files section on Sudan, on these sanctions, it kind of created a chart listing the sanctions that the U.S. has applied to both the RSF and the SAF.

And you can see that in terms of the number of sanctions, it's somewhat equal, basically. But the most recent rounds of sanctions, I think, are notable because basically the situation is that the SAF does not see the RSF as a legitimate actor and is therefore pursuing a complete military victory over the RSF and is unwilling to negotiate with the RSF so as to not confer legitimacy upon the group. So they're pursuing a total military victory and will not negotiate barring an RSF surrender and demobilization.

So that's the context. And this is why and this is how the sanctions are applied to that. The SAF has responded to past sanctions against it.

They obviously don't agree with them. And they almost see the sanctions, not almost, they see the sanctions as equating themselves, the SAF, with the RSF, which they view as an illegitimate terrorist organization, basically. So what you have in this current round of sanctions is, yes, you have sanctions on both RSF and SAF networks.

The sanctions on the RSF networks, though, they're not being directly applied to any RSF officials or any of the RSF's key backers, aka the United Arab Emirates or Emirati-based companies, et cetera. They're being applied to a mercenary network that is mostly based in Central and South America. That's facilitated by the Emiratis.

But still, the sanctions were applied specifically to these Central and South American actors. So these kind of like mercenaries have played a key role for the RSF, specifically Colombian mercenaries, including in the Battle of El Fasher. They serve as drone operators and other key combat roles.

But nonetheless, you can say they're relatively periphery or peripheral actors. So the sanctions were not directly applied to RSF officials or directly like kind of RSF-linked folks in the Emirates. The sanctions on the SAF, on the other hand, were applied to subsidiaries of the largest defense company in Sudan, which is controlled by the SAF and responsible for equipping and arming the SAF.

And on top of it, there were another separate round of sanctions related to the SAF's use Yeah, you know, Michael, but we're going to be the same thing. You know, let's just try to get a little bit, but I'm going to start SAF's use of chemical weapons. The U.S. basically said that they're going to try to cut the Sudanese government off from any international financing, essentially.

So these are, you know, these are pretty bold actions by the U.S., you know, targeting the SAF. And especially if you compare it to the sanctions that were just applied to the RSF, it is likely that the SAF will perceive this as the U.S. being biased against the SAF and the U.S. kind of favoring the RSF and by extension the United Arab Emirates, which, you know, in my opinion, I think that will only that will cause the SAF to draw even further away from engaging in any kind of U.S. sponsored or internationally sponsored peace processes because they don't view the situation as, you know, being balanced. That's a very interesting perspective because one of the things that, so to give our audience a little bit of context, a little while ago during the worst of the violence in Al-Fasha, I had a sit down with a Sudanese ambassador to Kenya and he basically said something that you've just said nearly word for word that the SAF does not consider the RSF to be a legitimate actor and would not negotiate with them, would not give them the legitimacy they were seeking through the negotiating table.

So, and obviously there's an element of the UAE here and we will get to it in a moment. So, to see the U.S. impose sanctions that feel a lot harsher, just, you know, from first glance, because I have this table pulled up and I wish this was a visual podcast. I would have it, you know, on the screen for our audience.

So, if you're listening to this and you want to see what that table looks like, it's on the Critical Threats website. It's part of the Africa report and you will, we can hopefully share it on the Warfront's homepage as well just so that you can have an idea of what this is. But the sanctions do feel a lot harsher on the SAF than the RSF.

So, Mike, in your view, do you feel like the U.S. and your other international parties that are trying to mediate an end to this conflict view the RSF as a legitimate actor? One thing that's important to note on the U.S. side and on the international side is that, you know, the RSF is pursuing parallel government's efforts. They've set up a parallel government for the territory that they control in Western Sudan.

And they've taken steps to institutionalize that personally, I think are mostly, it's like a government on paper, if you will. And that practically speaking, it's not much of a government. But nonetheless, though, you know, they're doing this for a very specific reason to gain that international legitimacy.

So they're currently in steps to establish a national army. That's, you know, their, their phraseology there, as well as setting up financial institutions, appointing a cabinet, etc, etc, all these, you know, state building efforts, the international community in the US have said that they will not recognize those efforts. So they don't see the RSF as a kind of legitimate governor, governor of Sudan, or of any part of Sudan.

That's important to note. That being said, they view the dealing with the RSF, and almost, you know, pursuing talks with the SAF and the RSF, with them being on a somewhat equal footing, they view that as a necessity, just because the war is directly pitting the RSF against the SAF, and neither side has been able to get the upper hand. So I don't think the US and the international community see another way to go about it.

Aside from, you know, putting them both on equal footing in any potential peace talks, because they know that if they if they don't do that, they know that the RSF won't accept that. But at the same time, they are doing that, and the SAF, you know, isn't accepting it. So they're, they're kind of in a no win situation.

And another thing that's important to note is that, you know, the United States and other international actors, you know, they've recognized the Sudanese government, which is led by the SAF, as being the, you know, it's the internationally recognized government of Sudan. But that being said, they haven't definitively sided with the Sudanese government and the SAF in the war, because of, you know, we can get into the history of Sudan and whatnot. But there's a lot of past history there that is preventing the US and international actors from, you know, definitively siding with the SAF and the Sudanese government in this war.

So they're, they're trying to pursue talks, placing them, the RSF and the SAF on equal footing, out of necessity. And unfortunately, it's the conflict is just in a situation where it's, it's a no win situation where they can do that, but then the SAF is going to be unhappy. But then if they pursue peace talks, you know, kind of with the RSF on a lesser footing, the RSF won't accept that either.

So it's, it's a no win situation. And no win situation is absolutely right. Just, it feels insane to me as someone who covers the situation in Sudan for a living, that the crisis has gotten to a point where And it is just a little bit moreover at whether they have the pain because they have had some of their disability.

And for the international community, that feels like the only alternative that they do have to place the SAF, which is the army of Sudan, is a representative of the Sudanese government as a whole, on the same level as a paramilitary group whose roots are in one of the worst groups in Sudan's history, a group that committed a genocide for Christ's sake. So it does seem like a really, really insane situation. So you've touched on this a little bit in your past answer, Mike.

One of the reasons that Washington is very hesitant to throw its weight behind the SAF is the group's ties to Islamists. And today, I think this was today or yesterday, Radio Dabag in Sudan, a Sudanese outlet, had a story about Washington warning of further sanctions against Sudan's Islamist movement. Let's talk about that a little.

Tell us about the Islamist movement. Tell us why Washington is putting sanctions on them specifically. Why they seem to be pissing Washington off so much.

The root of the Islamist movement in Sudan, basically they acquired power when the former dictator of Sudan, Bashir, Omar Bashir, came to power in the 1980s. And ruled for about 30 years until he was overthrown by the SAF, RSF and others on the basis of a wide civilian movement against his governance. But he basically saw the Islamists as key partners that would help him govern.

So he brought them into the folds, into his government. And, you know, at various points within his 30-year rule, you know, Sudan, you know, Islamist rule in Sudan was implemented. And the U.S. was always dissatisfied with that situation.

And there are ties, you know, there is such a thing as the, you know, the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan. And the U.S. has never looked favorably upon the Muslim Brotherhood. And then when you add on to the fact that various Islamists in Sudan had connections to, you know, various Salafi jihadi groups.

And if we remember correctly, Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan in the 90s, for a good part of the 90s. The U.S. has never looked favorably upon the influence of Islamists in Sudan. Now, more recently, basically, the Islamists...

The U.S. has accused the Islamists of having ties with, of course, the Muslim Brotherhood, but also Iran as well, which is a key geopolitical adversary, key strategic adversary for the United States. So that, of course, is just kind of adding on to the grievances that the U.S. has against the Islamists incident. And what the U.S., the U.S. believes that the Sudanese armed forces, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who is also the leader of the Sudanese government, the U.S. doesn't believe that the SAF has done enough to basically kick out the Islamists, the Islamist holdovers from Bashir's government and prevent them from continuing to wield influence and gaining influence.

Again, the government, the U.S. believes that Iran has not done enough to control that issue. So because of that, because of all these past grievances and the ties, the ties with Iran, the U.S. has come down very hard on the Sudanese government and the SAF, as well as these various Islamist groups, some of which play a key combat role for the SAF. And we can talk about that more if you want.

Yes, I do want to talk about that a little bit more because the help that the SAF got from the Islamists is something that was critical for them to be able to take back Khartoum. So how does the SAF square that circle of trying to make Washington happy while at the same time keeping its allies? Because there was a story in the FDD, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, by Maria Moaba, one of the research analysts, that the SAF was turning away from Iranian weapons in the hope of courting Washington.

So there is a sense within the SAF that Washington is an important ally. They want to keep Washington happy. But at the same time, they have a more important ally on the ground beside them that they don't want to piss off.

And you will get back to the idea of defections in a moment, because if they piss them off, we're looking at a situation where these guys can defect, go to the IRSF with all the information that they do have. So how does the SAF square that circle? That is the question.

So basically, the SAF has seen, you know, these Islamist militias have played, especially like a good example is the Al-Bara bin Malik Brigade, which the U.S. has directly. sanctions and designated as a terrorist organization actually for both civilian targeting ties with iran islamism etc you know these groups as you mentioned have played a key role on the ground for the saf they helped take back partum and you know especially in eastern sudan played a key combat role so because they played this key role and are very well equipped and have a lot of you know a lot of manpower basically the saf has been very slow and has kind of moved in fits and spurts to try to kind of rein in their influence at first when the u.s began applying pressure on the saf to rein in these militias i think that the saf was pursuing kind of more symbolic measures to do so kind of hoping to play both sides and do okay if we take these symbolic measures we'll satisfy the u.s while also you know keeping these combat capabilities that these islamist militias have keeping those you know in play for us but the u.s persisted and demanded more and i think what you've seen slowly over time is the saf you know again it's still not some of these measures are still symbolic and have not been implemented but the saf has tried to rein them in either by kind of pulling them off of you know certain frontline positions and also by trying to kind of morph them into the official kind of saf infrastructure basically you know trying to integrate them into the saf essentially so they've tried to pursue that these islamist militias have not agreed to do so some have but many of them haven't specifically regarding the alber albara bin malik brigade some of the leaders actually it's reported that they've fled sudan because you know they were refusing to integrate into the saf and then you know they were obviously worried about the consequences of not doing so they were forced to flee sudan sudan so basically it seems like what the saf is doing now is they're definitely trying to you know please the us in that regard i think some of these militias are still in play on the battlefield for sure but the saf is trying to reign them in actively and seemingly is willing to limit their combat and sacrifice their combat capabilities in order to kind of satisfy the us in this it's been a slow process it seems like that's the direction it's moving in but that could always change so i have two follow-up questions on that the idea of integration is extremely funny to me because that is one of the things that sparked this entire crisis the rsf did not want to be integrated into the you know the main saf so How successful will integration be now? And not just in terms of giving the Islamist militiamen SAF uniforms and telling them, you are an SAF soldier now, but in terms of the ideology behind these Islamists. That is one of the things that Washington has indicated that it has a problem with the ideology itself.

Yes. So how successful will integration be when it comes to trying to root out an ideology that is so deeply rooted in these individuals? And then second, how much of a loss is it for the SAF when it comes to combat capabilities, when they're forced to, one, divest from Iran, and two, tell their Islamist partners, hey, you have to take a back seat so that we please Washington.

So in terms of how successful the integration would be, I think a lot of it is dependent on the resources that the SAF is willing to devote to the process. The SAF is resource constrained right now. You know, they're fighting a war on multiple fronts here.

And, you know, it's not like they necessarily have the upper hand, you know, as we discussed, the conflict has been in a stalemate. So in terms of international financing, they're also trying to govern the populous parts of Sudan that they do control and having trouble receiving international financing to help rebuild some of the shared infrastructure, all while the RSF is continuing to target key infrastructure. So the SAF is very resource constrained right now, and they're in the middle, the midst of a war on multiple fronts.

So I don't believe that they have, that they will devote the resources that they would need to devote to integrate these militias properly into their ranks. So second off, in terms of how much of a loss are the militias, and as I said, it's hard to assess which ones are still, you know, currently on the battlefield and which, you know, role they're playing exactly. But, for example, the Albar bin Malik Brigade, I believe that the State Department, I could be off on the numbers here a little bit, but I believe the State Department said that they have at least 15,000 fighters, if not more than that are, you know, very well equipped.

So, you know, if those fighters are not on the front lines anymore and not involved in combat, that's a very significant loss. The Albar bin Malik Brigade is the biggest one, the strongest brigade, but there are others as well that number, you know, in the thousands. you know, if you start taking them off the battlefield, you know, in terms of manpower, that's a significant loss. In terms of the support from Iran, you know, for a variety of reasons, mainly because Iran has been very preoccupied itself, you know, in recent years, the support for Iran has kind of steadily for the SAF, you know, Iran was supplying drones and other, you know, weaponry to the SAF.

That support has steadily decreased over the course of the war. The SAF is not reliant on Iranian weaponry. Other drones it gets now, it uses drones from Turkey, mostly.

So in terms of divesting from Iran, I think that already has happened. And I don't see that as being much of an issue for them anymore. All right.

So it's not much of an issue for them. And we can't really tell how big of a loss the manpower is right now. Because again, we're not really on the ground, we don't have that kind of insight.

So I want to go back to something you said before, that the SAF used chemical weapons. And that is a really, really big red line for Washington. So according to a report I'm looking at from ADF magazine, honestly, they do some really good work.

Go check them out if you've never checked them out. ADF magazine, African Defence Forum. So I'll read this, just, it's a brief line.

International observers are accusing the Sudanese Armed Forces SAF of using banned chemical weapons against the paramilitary RSF, based in part on recent video evidence from a 2024 attack on a military base and oil refinery north of Khartoum. RSF fighters occupied the base in Gari and the nearby Al-Jayili oil refinery at the time of the September 2024 battle with the SAF. At the time of the battle, the RSF had held the oil refinery since April 2023, and the SAF recaptured it in January 2025.

So videos from the attack showed a cloud of green, yellow gas spreading across the ground and rising into the air. And a week later on the 30th of September, the RSF reported that SAF warplanes released bombs containing toxic gas near the oil refinery. So this is a chlorine attack, plain and simple, plain as day.

So one, why did the RSF, why did the SAF feel desperate enough to reach that point of using chemical weapons, despite the backlash that comes with that? And two, have the RSF at any point used chemical weapons? So in terms of why the SAF chose to do so, it's... it's a bit befuddling to me.

Before the latest round of sanctions that I recently wrote about, the U.S. had already sanctioned the SAF for chemical weapons use. The U.S. did not release any evidence, though, that it had proving that the SAF used chemical weapons, but the report that you referenced, and I believe the bulk of the investigation was done by France 24 with all the video evidence and whatnot, kind of conclusively proved that the SAF did in fact use the chemical weapons. Why they did so, I'm not a tactical military expert here, but perhaps they saw it as a way to secure the area from the RSF without destroying the key infrastructure that was in the area, perhaps.

I guess if you drop, say, barrel bombs into the area, that has a high risk of destroying the key infrastructure. I don't know if dropping chemical weapons would spare the infrastructure, but perhaps that's just the first thing that pops in my head. As to why else they would use it, I don't know.

It seems like a massive risk, something that you can't cover up either, something that will get found out and that you will get punished for, and they have gotten sanctioned for it. And I think that's actually, in terms of the international perception of the conflict, the chemical weapons are a reason why the international community has not sided with the SAF and the Sudanese government, why they're so skeptical of that side, of the SAF side, because of the use of, you know, the use of chemical weapons is just a significant data point that the international community cites when, kind of, withholding their direct support for the Sudanese government and the SAF. So, yeah, in terms of why they used it, I do not know.

It seemed like a massive risk, and I, yeah, and they paid for it. For me, it's so baffling to see the SAF resort to something with so much risk. As you said, it could have been because they wanted to maintain the infrastructure.

They didn't want to lose that, and you, at the same time, have to still fight the SAF over it. So, from a tactical perspective, I sort of understand it, but, you know, from a humanitarian lens, and, you know, maybe this is why Al-Buran and the rest are the ones making the decisions, and, you know, I am here sitting comfortably in Kenya speaking to you, Mike, and instead of making those decisions, I don't think I would, no matter what, I would be in that. position to see a chemical attack is justified. So I want to go back to one more question that I had just asked.

So when speaking with the Sudanese ambassador to Kenya after the attack on El Kwasa, after the city had fallen, he claimed in his statement that the RSF had used chemical weapons against the SAF. I tried as much as I could. I looked through as much open source info as I could.

I have yet to find any information of the RSF using chemical weapons. Have you seen anything along those lines at any point? I've seen the accusations.

I have not seen any definitive evidence that would link the RSF to chemical weapons use. I always like to say, this is something our team says at warfronts, that the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. But it's such a weird accusation to make when there's so much that the RSF has already done that's negative, that you can clearly point to if you want something to blame them for.

If the Sudanese armed forces wanted something a lot more credible, they could just point to what happened in El Fasha. Then you try and deflect from legitimate criticisms of their use of chemical weapons by saying that the RSF did it as well. We can't be waging wars by saying, but he did it fast.

That's childish, honestly childish. So I want to move away from the idea of chemical weapons back to the story on defections. So this is something we covered on warfronts.

I honestly cannot remember when at this point, but there were several major defections from the RSF to the SAF that, you know, happened earlier this year and have significantly changed the shape and, you know, the face of the battlefield. So the first guy that we have to talk about is Abu Akla Keikal, who, you know, was a former military intelligence officer and, you know, was the RSF's main, main guy in an attack on El Gazeera State. So the SAF said Keikal defected in October 2024 because of the RSF's destructive agenda.

And, you know, well, that will be a really, really nice story to see someone who was involved in some of the worst atrocities realize that, hey, this shit is really, really bad. It's, it doesn't really. Peace. with the facts on the ground so just a quick note on kcal he's shifted allegiances a lot he started off with the ecf went to the irsf and then back to the saf he seems like an opportunist so that isn't the kind of guy whose conscience would be affected by whatever he's doing and he wasn't the only defector there's other guys who jumped ship as well but let's start with kcal what did you make of his defection and you know he defected alongside his shield forces i believe yeah the shield forces yes yep and a lot of people are saying it's a big blow considering the amount of intelligence he had mike tell us about it yes so i do believe it was a significant defection so basically some background on the sudan shield forces in particular so we talked extensively earlier about how the saf uses you know islamist militias but at the same time it also has a you know assortment of non-islamist militias on its side as well so the sudan shield forces were one of those significant ones or are one of the significant ones the numbers on them vary it seems like they probably have a couple thousands fighters but yeah so when keichel defected to the saf he brought his troops with him and all of a sudden he became a key part of the saf's offensive in eastern sudan that began late 2024 and really heated up into 2025 and led to the saf taking back al jazeera state including wad madani which is a major city there the sudan shield forces played a key role in that offensive in al jazeera state in defeating the rsf so the defection was significant in terms of his motivations for doing so again as you said he has switched sides many times and he's it's seemingly seemingly an opportunist and now he is he is valued by the saf because they see him as a as a key partner he's been on the front lines since then his forces have been deployed to blue nile state which is the south which is on the border of ethiopia it's the southeastern front of the war and we can talk more about that because that's been an interesting development since early 2026 but then he's also been on the his forces have been on the front lines in kordofan which are the main front lines around lob as well so yes significant defection his motivations unclear could definitely see them being opportunistic though given the amount of times that he has switched sides i definitely see him as an opportunist and of course i'm not going to say that is his definitive reason for defecting but just given given his history it seems like the most likely reason the other guys who defected however seem to be less motivated by opportunism and you know any sort of want to make the most of the opportunities rather than a serious dislike of how himeti hamdan dagallo the leader of the address f was treating musa hilal the gentleman who i think calling him a gentleman feels really really disgusting who used to lead the janja weed way back you know during the genocide the guy who literally picked the dagallo up and you said i see something in you propped him up as a leader and now the bee thing that they have so much bad blood between them tell us about this one mike yes and i think that this the whole situation with the recent defections from the rsf really kind of shows how fractitious coalition is the scf's coalition is very fractious as well as shown by relying on people like keichel and the albar albar bin malik brigade and the student shield forces but the rsf's coalition is you know i would say probably more fractitious than the safs so in terms of the recent defections there was basically a power struggle within the rsf the rsf came down hard on musa hilal because you know he had been he had distanced himself essentially from the rsf and for the listeners musa hilal is you know former former janjaweed militia leader who basically has he holds territory in the darfur region him and the clan associated with him so and the rsf came down hard on him because he wasn't supportive enough of the rsf and essentially had aligned with the saf at a certain point but was still staying neutral in the conflict from his base in darfur so you know him the rsf had kind of this uneasy seeming understanding of you know neither of them would interfere with the other and then that all changed the rsf essentially the one the hardliners within rsf decided to side you And, you know, went into the territory that his forces held, and they conducted a drone strike targeting Musa Halal directly, killed multiple members of his family, and also, you know, went into his, the main town that his forces control and are based in, his headquarters, we can say, and, you know, committed an assault on it, basically.

He had to flee to SAF territory. And basically, this kind of unleashed this, these inner tribal or inner clan tensions within the RSF, because he, a significant amount of people from his clan that had fought under him, when he was, you know, a Janjaweed leader, they are now key fighters within the RSF. And, but their loyalty is mostly still to him.

So when they saw the RSF leadership, you know, trying to take him out, you know, that caused significant, you know, disillusionment among some, some key commanders. They defected for other reasons, too. But that was seemed to be the straw that broke the camel's back.

And they chose to, you know, defect as a result. So basically, all that summed up is basically to say that, you know, the RSF, they present themselves as being this, you know, unified command, cohesive, etc. And yes, Hamedi is the leader of the RSF, and his family is in the key leadership, and then members of his clan, his tribe are also, you know, they make up the leadership of the RSF. But the fighters that compose the RSF are not necessarily aligned with, you know, everything that Hamedi wants to do, or anything that, everything that the RSF leadership wants to do.

And this is an example of that. There are, there are, there are some tensions, whether they be inner clan, inner tribal, or also just general power struggles that have caused people to defect. Those, those fractious relationships within the RSF, lead me straight to my next question.

Because, as we've mentioned multiple times throughout this podcast, the RSF has attempted to establish its own parallel government, something that they did, that they launched while in Nairobi. I have so many feelings about that, and the role that the Kenyan government is playing in propping up the government, the RSF, rather. So, I just want to take a moment to discuss this parallel governing structure that the RSF is attempting to establish, because If the RSF cannot keep its own commanders in check, right, if it's still struggling to deal with Hilal, someone whose heyday has passed, his crime has passed, Hilal is an old man.

This isn't to say Buran and Mehdi are young men either. They are gentlemen in their 50s. Hilal is, if I'm not mistaken, in his 70s, almost 80.

So if the RSF is struggling this much to contain its own fighters to prevent defections, because it did do a lot after these defections happened to try and stem the flow of defections. But if the RSF can't even do that, can't even stop its own soldiers from defecting, then how can it establish a governing structure? Because when I look at it looks more like the kind of patronage system we see in South Sudan than an actual governing structure.

What do you make of it? Yeah, so an issue that they've run into is because the war is at somewhat of a stalemate now on the battlefield, you know, the patrons' networks are constrained in a way. They're not necessarily expanding anymore.

So the resources to, you know, basically pay off, you know, all these different or keep all these different factions satisfied. The resources are a little bit constrained. So, yeah, so these cracks are definitely starting to form.

I think that part of the reason the whole parallel governance process has been so slow on their side was is because of the fractious nature of the coalition. The RSF originally set up this pair or announced this parallel government, you know, I believe it was about a year ago, maybe a little bit more than a year ago. And it's like just now that they've, you know, kind of filled out the cabinet, the cabinet, quote unquote.

And it's just now that they're talking about, you know, establishing a formal like security structure. And they've moved to establish, you know, certain financial institutions. But it's been slow moving on their part.

And to be honest, on the ground, too, within Darfur, you know, there have the RSF has struggled to keep control of their areas and to provide, you know, security in these areas. In certain areas, including there have been I've seen reports from Niala, which is the RSF headquarters and basically their de facto capital. In Niala, there's been a bit of lawlessness that I've seen, just, you know, general criminal activity.

That the RSF. RSF has not been able to get under control, as well as in other areas too. And then on top of that, you've seen, you know, more, even more so than the clashes we just talked about between the RSF and Musa Halal's forces, you've seen other kind of like clashes between, you know, different clans, different tribes within Darfur that the RSF has also kind of been unable to effectively contain.

So to answer your question, they have been able to establish a governance structure, but it is based on patronage. And, you know, naturally, the governance structure, its cohesiveness, cohesiveness is limited by the factitious nature. And if the patronage networks are no longer expanding, then you know, eventually you kind of deal with an issue where people, people might get more dissatisfied and defect accordingly.

So the RSF I don't, I don't know if I would take it this far, but I could see a situation in the future where the RSF's coalition is essentially a house of cards in a way. And it could collapse upon itself. Not to say that the whole organization would collapse and that they wouldn't be able to fight anymore, but I could see a situation in the future in which their capabilities are significantly affected by, by these internal disputes, especially if the support from the United, the external support from the United Arab Emirates, which I'm happy to talk more about, especially if that starts to dry up a bit, then I think you'll see some, I think you could see some significant, significant infighting.

And we will, we will get to the, to the support that the UAE gives them in a minute, but I just want to explore that idea of your, the parallel governing structure basically being a house of cards because, because I find it very interesting. The main reason they established this parallel governing structure was so that they could have legitimacy in, you know, in the eyes of the international community. The fact that they're struggling this much to even fill out their cabinets, to set up a security structure, you know, things that would be expected for government to have on day one.

Those are the very basics, the bare minimum, the fact that it's struggling this much to even get that off the ground is just emblematic of everything that is wrong with the IRS. If they're not a governing force, they are still, for all intents and purposes, a militia force. That is all you, I will personally ever see the IRS as, and you, I know as analysts, we are not supposed to really put our own perspective into things, our own. biases, but I can't help but be biased against the RSF simply because they are some of the worst fighting force I have seen personally.

So let's take a moment away from that and go back to the idea of where the RSF announced their government. They did it in Nairobi. And as you mentioned, they've taken the town of Nyala in Dafu as their capital.

So a while ago, there was a meeting that Hemeti chaired and it was billed as a meeting of the RSF's government and they claimed that the meeting was held in Nyala. But analysis found that they couldn't have held it in Nyala simply because of the brand of water bottle that they were using. It was a brand called Keringet that you can only find in Nairobi and it will be really difficult to, well, not only in Nairobi, just in Kenya in general, it will be really difficult to move it from Kenya all the way to Sudan, all the way to Nyala, because who in their right mind would move a bottled water there?

You'd rather move guns. You'd rather move other kinds of weaponry. So the fact that the RSF was claiming that the meeting was being held in Nyala and it was actually being held in Nairobi was fascinating for us.

Have you, did you see that? Is that something you're familiar with, Mike? Just generally speaking, I've seen that, you know, Nairobi, it's interesting that, and I'm not an expert on the Kenyan government and their security posture or their, their general posture and strategic aims, but they've seemingly tried to present themselves as being this, you know, these groups that are not really welcome anywhere else.

And another example is in Somalia, right? They're, they are hosting the Somali Future Council opposition coalition. They allow the Somali Future Council to travel to Nairobi and, you know, have these important meetings and whatnot away from Somalia.

So yeah, Kenya in a way has almost, is trying to present itself as this mediating force. That being said, it seems like they've, it seems like they've gone above that a little bit and are conferring a level of legitimacy upon the RSF as a movement, which I, which I find to be fascinating. And also too, we've seen suspected Emirati. weapons shipments, flights, go through Kenya on the way to Chad, which then suspected they go into Darfur from there and supply the RSF.

So that's just another kind of interesting data point on that regard. In terms of Kenya's role, yes, they're trying to present themselves as this international mediator, but it does seem like they are conferring a level of legitimacy upon the RSF and at the very least are allowing the Emiratis to, you know, use Kenya as a node in their supply lines to the RSF. This is something I have actually spent a lot of time with because again, I live in Kenya, I have seen all of this play out.

It's not just Kenya being used as a node, it's the fact that this was a report from Bellingcat and a local news outlet called Nation in Kenya. Kenyan weapons were found in Sudan, in places that were being used by the RSF. So it's not just that Kenya is being used as a node, but they're actively aiding the RSF while, as you said, trying to play mediator.

And, you know, it's something that the SAF has pointed out. The relationship between Kenya and Sudan had deteriorated so much that at one point they were not even importing tea from Kenya anymore. It's something that just kept getting worse and worse.

They even recall the ambassador and the current ambassador used to be the charge of their affairs. He was the only person left. So it's a very, it's just a very interesting situation given my personal proximity to all of this.

So Mike, you and I have gone a little bit over time. So we usually try and shoot for these episodes to be about an hour long, but I am really enjoying the conversation. And like I told your teammates on the Africa team, I'd love to have you back here to continue this conversation.

But before we hop off, I have one final thing to discuss with you. So there was a report in the Guardian that basically said the UK chose to ignore all that's happening within Sudan to maintain a close relationship with the UAE. And it's something that a lot of countries seem to be doing.

So Mike, walk us through that. Yes. And I can, I can speak on this from, you know, the US perspective as well.

Well, it seems as if, well, first off, I just want to say in terms of the external support aspect. So, let's get started. of the war. The UAE is the RSF's indispensable backer.

The RSF would not be in the position that it is today without the support of the UAE. UAE supplies key weaponry, equipment, including drones, which have played a massive role in the war, an increasing role, too. The Egypt and Turkey have supplied the SAF as well, but the UAE is by far, I think, the most influential external actor in this war, and they're on the side of the RSF.

So the U.S.'s biggest contribution to the peace process in Sudan is convening the Quad Forum, which consists of the U.S., Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. And the U.S. has convened this forum. They've chosen these actors.

One, Egypt and the UAE obviously have very clear sides, you know, Egypt back in the SAF, UAE back in the RSF. Saudi Arabia leans towards the SAF, supports them politically, has not really provided military support, at least publicly. And the U.S. is seen as being, you know, relatively neutral.

So the U.S. has convened this forum because the U.S. has, you know, correctly identified these countries play a significant role, have significant leverage on both sides. And especially recently, for this war to, you know, get to some kind of endpoint, the first thing that needs to happen is external support needs to be cut. Because then the RSF in particular, but also the SAF, they're going to be forced to make certain decisions on the battlefield and probably eventually come to the realization that there have to be some kind of negotiation.

So cutting external support is the, you know, the first aspect of this. Now, the U.S., on the other hand, while they've convened this forum and this Quad Forum, you know, is meant to address, you know, this question of, you know, external support in theory, along with sponsoring talks, you know, in Sudan as well between the Sudanese actors, the U.S. has been unwilling to pressure the Emiratis publicly and also ISIS, you know, I suspect privately has been unwilling to significantly pressure the Emiratis to cut this external support because the UAE is, you know, such an important ally for the United States in the Middle East. So the Trump administration in particular has made the UAE really a kind of like a cornerstone country of its, you know, strategy in the Middle East.

And I think the administration feels that it can't pressure the Emiratis. on the topic of its support to the RSF and it can't like, I guess, substantively leverage them in a way that would cause them to cut their external support without sacrificing the bilateral relationship with the US and the UAE. My colleague Liam and I disagree on that and we've written op-eds about it and we have another one hopefully coming out soon. So I encourage everyone to take a look.

We don't know which outlet it will be in yet, but looking forward to seeing that come out. But we disagree on that. But that being said, I think that the US is just really unwilling to even remotely put its bilateral relationship with the UAE on kind of unsure footing and cause tensions with the UAE over Sudan, unfortunately.

And I think that they know that the UAE really values, really sees Sudan as a priority and its support for the RSF is a priority. And I think that basically, essentially the UAE cares more about supporting the RSF than the US cares about helping to bring this conflict to an end. So when you have that situation, the US is unable to use the leverage that it does have to cut external support.

The MRIs are simply going to keep supporting the RSF. So now going to the question, the report that you mentioned about the UK choosing to, reportedly choosing to ignore intelligence on L. Fasher.

You know, L. Fasher, the international community, many others, you know, the situation on L. Fasher was not, it was not, let's just say it was predicted, right?

This was very well established that the RSF was going to commit massive crimes against humanity, probably genocide. The UN has basically called it what they did in L. Fasher genocide.

This was clear that this was going to happen from the moment the RSF took L. Fasher. It was warned about in the months leading up to it.

And I think that, you know, the UK, it would certainly make sense that the UK chose not to act definitively to address this because that it felt like it's bilateral relationship with the UAE would be put at, would be, you know, put at stake. And extending to the US, I would not be surprised if, you know, based on everything that I just said, the US felt similarly that if it really used the leverage that it would have needed to address this issue and to get the Emiratis to cut support and for the RSF to, you know, not carry out its plans, that it would have sacrificed its bilateral relationship. That does not seem... out of the question to me i think that's very much a possibility yeah it's it generally seems like you know for all the major powers the calculation between ending this war in sudan that just doesn't match up to the bilateral relationship that they have with the uae and you know it's something that the uae is extremely willing to leverage just to make sure that they get their way also we can't we can't really talk about the uae and the trump administration without mentioning world liberty a crypto venture that you know world liberty financial rather a crypto venture that was started by the trump family and i believe one of his allies who's currently in cabinet the name escapes me but you know uae national security advisor shake tanun bin zayed purchased a 49 percent stake in the company for about 500 million dollars and this gave the trump family a lot of cash up front so with these close financial connections i don't ever foresee a situation where you the trump administration will be willing to endanger the relationship with the uae i think that's a very fair point to point out and i certainly i it's difficult for me to believe that the business interests that the u.s writ large and then you can especially apply that to the current administration the business interest that they have with the uae i would find it hard to believe that those interests do not influence the decision-making calculus on you know pressuring the uae to cut support to the rsf i would find that hard to believe but yeah and on that note on the things we find hard to believe mike we're gonna end it there yeah and you will definitely be back on this podcast at some point in time because yeah i feel like you're the critical threats folks and i have so much to discuss every time we are together yes indeed yes where can people find you where can people find your work yes so of course we're housed at the critical threats project website so you can look us up on critical threats dot org but if you want to specifically go to the africa file page you can go to critical threats dot org slash analysis slash africa dash file hopefully people got all that but you can also just say critical threats project africa file on google and you'll see the africa file landing page where you can really see all of our work including you know each africa file and then also the special editions as well i'd also recommend that people read the report that Liam Carr and I wrote and published back in late February, right before the Iran war started, actually, it came out like four days before the Iran war started.

It's called Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa. And that was published directly by the American Enterprise Institute or AEI. And that basically covers, you know, the entire dynamics and fragmentation within the Horn of Africa.

Highly recommend reading that. I think it's a very comprehensive overview. And in that, yes, we talk a lot about Sudan, but we also talk a lot about Ethiopia, which is a key, I would argue, the hinge state in the region that's driving many of the developments, and Somalia as well, and Egypt's role and all the middle powers, Saudi Arabia, UAE, etc. And then lastly, you can also find me on LinkedIn, just Michael D'Angelo.

And then on Twitter, at Mike D'Angelo 25. All right. You've heard where to find Mike, you've heard his reading recommendations.

And I honestly can't believe we've done an entire podcast on the Horn of Africa. I know we were going to do a lot of Sudan forecast stuff today. But I honestly can't believe we've gone the entire episode more than an hour, 10 minutes.

And we haven't mentioned Ethiopia once until the very end. Yes, indeed. Yeah, as a general point, Ethiopia has become very involved in the Sudan war recently on the side of the RSF.

So that is something that I would be happy to come back and talk more about. Oh, you and I will definitely have to talk about Ethiopia again, because all the signs are pointing to another war, another Tigray war starting up once Ethiopia can sort out its fuel situation. So that is something we will definitely have to sit down and talk about, as well as Ethiopia's wider role within the Sudanese war.

So we have so much to talk about. Michael, thank you so much for coming on this podcast. And for our listeners, if you've made it this far, you're probably a premium subscriber to Fronts.co.

We couldn't do the kind of work we do without your help, without your support, without your financial generosity. We don't take it for granted. We are absolutely grateful.

So yeah, with that, we're going to end it here. Mike will be writing for Fronts.co at some point in the near future, and he will be back on this podcast at another point. So yeah, you will definitely see and hear more from Mike at some point.

Thank you so much for being with us. Thank you so much for letting us be part of your day. Bye, and have a lovely rest of your day.
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