---
title: "Middle East Roundtable: Strikes are Back On the Menu."
description: "Welcome back to the Middle East Roundtable, ladies and gentlemen. I am Kyle Moran, filling in today for Evan Maloney. We have credible information that Belgium, after the World Cup showing the other day, is just two weeks away now from developing their own nuclear weapon."
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canonical: https://fronts.co/podcast/middle-east-roundtable-strikes-are-back-on-the-menu/
datePublished: 2026-07-14T17:30:03.000Z
dateModified: 2026-07-14T17:30:11.000Z
author:
  - name: Fronts Staff
    url: https://fronts.co/authors/fronts-team/
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type: NewsArticle
language: en
audio: https://media.fronts.co/audio/middle-east-roundtable-strikes-are-back-on-the-menu.mp3
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---

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Welcome back to the Middle East Roundtable, ladies and gentlemen. I am Kyle Moran, filling in today for Evan Maloney. We have credible information that Belgium, after the World Cup showing the other day, is just two weeks away now from developing their own nuclear weapon.

So we've dispatched Evan to see what's actually going on over there and see if there's anything that we can report on. But I am not alone. I am joined today by...

Wilfred Miner, Africa Correspondent for Fronts.co. And, you know, hopefully one day I'll be sent out to see if Belgium is developing a nuclear weapon. After the World Cup, man, I have to imagine those reactors are firing at maximum capacity right now.

But overall, it's been quite a news cycle. Just when you think that things are dying down in the Middle East, it's really the region that just keeps on giving, especially in 2026. So overnight, depending on your time zone.

So yesterday, Tuesday, Iran fired on ships in Hormuz, transiting near the coast of Oman, as usual. Basically, this has been done to try to avoid any Iranian vessels, try to avoid Iran taking control of the strait outright. Iran wants all traffic flowing close to their own coast.

So overall, this is an attempt to sort of bypass that. Iran has said, hell no, they want to maintain as much control as possible. And so this is, I believe, the third time since the MOU was signed that they've fired on ships transiting via the coast or the coast off of Oman.

Overall, this has been a clear red line for the United States, where despite making enormous concessions through the MOU, it has been, it signed the deal so that it could get Hormuz open and flowing again. And yet here we are, once again, ships being struck in the strait and ultimately traffic dwindling to a halt. Therefore, the United States, of course, fired back at Iran, this time much bigger than the previous two rounds.

It was pretty significant. Still military targets, of course. So talking air defense systems, command and control networks, coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, you get the sense, as well as no fewer than 60 IRGC small boats in the strait.

So Iran then, of course, as can be predicted naturally, retaliated on American bases throughout the Gulf. It says it targeted 85 military institutions in Bahrain and Kuwait. Keep in mind, the United States does not have 85 military installations in Bahrain and Kuwait, nor in the entire Middle East.

So I'm not entirely sure where that creative math is coming from, but that's what they put out. And overall, it's sort of been looking like this might be heating back up. Trump is now saying that we have strikes that may be. carrying on later on today.

So, Wilfred, what is going on here? Is everything falling apart? Every time I think about the term MOU, in my head, it looks like instead of a memorandum of understanding, it feels like missiles over understanding because it feels like we've gone back to the early days of the war when there were some signs of negotiations happening and then immediately something would happen to torpedo those negotiations and then we'd be back to strikes.

So, the fact that Iran is claiming to have hit 85, hit or targeted 85 military bases in Bahrain and Kuwait and that number is way, way too high. So, something very fishy is going on. It also suggests that they might be targeting a lot more than, you know, just military installations.

From what I saw when the strikes happened, there were power outages within the countries that were targeted. So, you know, maybe we'll be looking at an event where Iran is, you know, targeting civilian energy infrastructure. I'm not saying that they are, just from the reporting that I saw.

So, that in and of itself is, you know, interesting to consider as is the fact that Trump has outrightly said that the MOU is dead and he doesn't understand why Iran is doing what it's doing, that, you know, they're not nice people to negotiate with. They're not the kind of people, you know, he's used to dealing with because, you know, Trump is fundamentally a business person. He is someone who comes from a world where words have meaning, deals have meaning, and when people say they're going to do something, they are going to do something.

And, you know, applying that to geopolitics is a little hard because, you know, when you're the bigger power, you're the more powerful nation, you can usually throw your weight around and, you know, whatever you want to be done is usually done. So, for Trump, someone who has been very comfortable throwing his weight around, to see a country like Iran, whose military he keeps claiming has been destroyed multiple times over, standing up to him, bombing ships that are using, you know, transport lanes within the state of Homo's that Iran hasn't approved of. Iran wants to control the state.

It wants to control all the ships passing through the state. So, for Trump seeing this, it's obviously, obviously making him really, really angry. So again, we're at a situation where Trump's understanding... of the Middle East is being brought into question, as is his ability to make a deal with the Iranian government, a deal that both sides will stick to, because as you can remember in the terms of the MOU, it said that Iran will come up with arrangements for ships transiting through.

What that means in practice, this is what we're trying to figure out right now. So, yeah, we're going to see what it looks like. Yeah, I have to imagine that a lot of this stems from how unclear the original MOU, the 14 point MOU was.

So when we're talking about Hormuz and whatnot, so it does guarantee 60 days of no tolls, no nothing here, but it is quite vague as well. So 0.5 and 6, or 0.5 rather, deals with this specifically. And ultimately, there's been a lot of back and forth as to what's going on in terms of violations.

So Iran previously has shown very little restraint in targeting civilian infrastructure, as well as civilian shipping, unfortunately. And I don't think that this MOU has really reined them in at all. On the question of what their defense of this is, originally they were poising this as, okay, this is a response to Israeli aggression in Lebanon.

And Israel has significantly toned down compared to where we were at the height of the strikes, although it's not zero. They're continuing to strike. So four civilians were killed yesterday, the 7th.

A mother, a daughter, and two foreign workers who were driving through Nabatea Fakwa. Ultimately, though, this isn't their justification anymore. They're basically doing this just to maintain as much control over Hormuz as possible.

So this gets to a broader theme to me, which is just how much the region can tolerate, both in terms of the U.S. as well as the Gulf as well. Because while the Gulf is certainly not exactly a military superpower here, they also are being just bombed all the time by these guys, including for stuff that has nothing to do with them. Again, many of these Gulf states were opposed to the U.S. striking run in the first place.

And Ron seems to think that this will convince various Arab capitals to kick out U.S. bases. I still think that they're pursuing this the wrong way. I don't think that it does that at all, because Iran has been so willing to sort of be a regional bully on this stuff, which is particularly ironic because of what the Islamic Republic's own officials have been saying.

So I believe it was Gali Abaf the other day who was saying, or it may have been Iragji, who said the era of bullying and extortion is over. And I'm thinking to myself, this is just so ironic. These guys want tolls to ensure, oh, sure, so we won't fire on your ships, right?

No, that is that is literally extortion. Like if you look up extortion in the dictionary, that's the example that it'll give. OK, and basically the Iranian approach to this is if you're not with us, then we're going to bomb you.

Which is quite a quite a way to win friends. Now, ultimately, depending on how much the U.S. is actually willing to back this up with force. I mean, it may, at least in the short term, win over some very reluctant converts to their side.

But I have to imagine this is going over like a lead balloon in many Arab capitals. You know what's really, really fascinating about this entire situation from an Arab capital point of view? When the MOU was signed, countries were trying to bring Iran back to the negotiating table to try and figure out, OK, the MOU has been signed, the war looks like it's over.

How do we start living together? How do we picture a post-war world where we can live right next to Iran and Iran isn't a threat anymore? And, you know, they've tried everything from, you know, giving Iran money.

I believe it's the UAE that said, you know, some Iranian funds would be unfrozen to trying diplomatic negotiations. But we've seen immediately, you know, Iran feels threatened. Their go-to is to make everyone suffer, to expand the conflict laterally.

Because, like you rightly said, they believe this will convince people, convince the original capitals that the cost of the war is too high. And then, you know, they can pressure Washington to back off. I don't know if it's a successful strategy.

I understand Iran's line of thinking. I honestly do, because, you know, when you have your economies who are billions, that, you know, put a lot of oil out, you know, they're constantly being threatened. And they come to Donald Trump and say, hey, if our economies are hurting, then the global economy is hurting. economy is hurting it comes everything comes down to the economy and you trump has you know the midterm elections to think about so it's a it's a kind of pressure that works but as a long-term play it as you said it won't win iran any friends it just keeps isolating the islamic republic it just keeps making them a pariah state because a lot of the countries being bombed have nothing to do with this it's just a sad situation exactly and i think that's a very interesting long-term dilemma that the islamic republic has so they have an incredible reputation as negotiators perhaps the best negotiating team on earth even the concessions that they are able to pull out of multiple u.s administrations is very impressive to me and i'm certainly not alone on that this is a pretty well-regarded characteristic of their country if that is their strength their weakness seems to be reading their own diplomatic interests in the region because this is just one example of a much more long-term theme that has been going on where there's a reason that the why so many in the region are so nervous about them why so many are so either hostile or less willing to partner with them than say other countries and you know they will point to the whole shia sunni divide there's something to be said for that to be honest when we're talking about leaders in the uae who have openly partnered with israel at this point i don't think that really buys as much traction as they may hope a lot of it comes down to this sort of behavior because they genuinely worry about the destabilizing force that iran is willing to set off throughout the region in their own defense and i have to imagine that this sort of thing where they're just bombing and bombing their their fellow neighbors is certainly going to exacerbate that and i also think that after having pulled off such an incredible upset victory for the mou that they're going to that they may they're on the verge of blowing it because of taking the absolute most maximalist positions possible on hormuz all this other stuff so even if they didn't get tolling in hormuz they would still be in such a better position they could do they could sell oil openly sanctions would be removed all of these things the iranian economy would be flushed with cash even for the hardliners they can use all a lot of this cash on their on rebuilding their military military but they may blow it.

And I think that's pretty indicative of sort of the broader history there. I want to add that I am one of the people who's constantly amazed by what Iranian negotiators are able to achieve. And, you know, a lot of this boils down to the fact that they have very, very capable individuals.

They have multiple PhD-level individuals within the government alone. I believe Agachi is a PhD, Gallipoff is a PhD, multiple, multiple, really, really intelligent individuals. But there's only so much they can do, you know, if the hotliners are making maximalist positions and you're making maximalist demands, as you rightfully said.

So, yeah, they, and, you know, this is something for anyone who's watched the World Cup. This is something they will be familiar with. Iran is making moves that are very similar to African teams in the World Cup.

You'll see an African team in the lead. So today's Wednesday, the 8th of July, as we're recording this. Yesterday, Argentina played against Egypt.

Egypt was in the lead for much of the match, 2-0 at one point. And then they just snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Lapses in judgment, lapses in concentration, allowed Argentina to come back and win the match 3-2.

Iran is acting in much the same way as Egypt. And, you know, many other African teams that have been in the lead at one point, and then they just seem to rest on their laurels and just give up mentally and give their adversaries a chance to score. So, yeah, it's very interesting to see Iran acting this way after the scale of victory that they achieved.

Yeah, I have to think that, ultimately, this is just part of the clash inside the system in Tehran, where there's almost three separate factions at this point, all of whom are relatively hardline, but to varying extent. So the more reformist camp who, Galibaf, perhaps, Pazeshkian, of course, Aragchi, who are more willing to do these deals than the more hardline than that circle. And then you have a great episode up on war fronts on the super, super hardliners themselves.

So you can see how this just sort of plays to their detriment on issues like this. And I think when it comes to any long-term stability with the region, having such a divided... country where, again, we don't even really know if Mustafa Khomeini is still alive or not. This is ultimately going to be a big issue because it's hard enough to have a coherent foreign policy when you have such a divided government.

But when you have a divided government, when the supreme leader is potentially incapacitated or potentially dead, I mean, that's quite an uphill battle. An uphill battle doesn't even begin to cut it. And I think this is a very natural point for us to transition to the idea that the supreme leader, the new supreme leader, Moshtaba Khomeini, might be dead.

Kyle, you have a really, really good episode about this up on Wolframs right now. Guys, if you haven't watched it, please, please check it out. Tell us about this, Kyle.

Yeah. So basically, I, about a week ago, yeah, one of five days ago, I think I wrote it like a week ago now. I basically got to the point where I was saying, okay, you know what?

It's been four months, basically, more or less, since Moshtaba had been elected, since his father had been assassinated. We have no proof of life on this guy. We have written statements.

We have alleged meetings between different Iranian politicians. And we have vague indications from people like Rubio that Moshtaba is playing more of a role behind the scenes. But when you get into that part right there, it's all coming from, he's acting through intermediaries.

We have no proof of life of this man. And his, his profile picture on X was that BBC service, BBC World News scanned it. And it was like, they rated it 100% AI generated.

So there's just, there's something going on here that's way more than just keeping the supreme leader secure. And like in the beginning, it made a little bit more sense. Because during the war, obviously, we had just, the United States had just taken out Ali Khamenei.

So obviously, the, his son was going to be a potential target as well. So when it came to that, okay, keeping this guy off the streets of Tehran, very logical step. But moving forward after that, especially after the ceasefire was announced, we still hadn't even heard a voice recording of this man.

And then ultimately, after the MOU was signed, we still have, haven't heard or seen anything from him. Now, there are indications he was injured in the report in the initial strike that killed his father. We, there's been various indications as to how severe that may have been.

But ultimately, where I land on that episode is, okay, you know what, even if he is alive, even if he is just incapacitated. I mean, this is not a part-time job with plenty of PTO, okay? This is literally the supreme leader of the country who has final say on just about everything.

And he has been just almost completely absent from the entire conversation. And I don't know how long the Iranian system can sort of stand up through that. It seems as though Vahidi has sort of insulated himself as, I'm not going to go so far as to call him acting supreme leader, but others have.

And I think that there is a case to be made that he's sort of inching in that direction, because everything sort of flows through him at this point. Right. So we're in this situation where the Islamic Republic may have sort of ended in terms of its own, its old role, where the guards were powerful, but one of many factions that ultimately reported to the supreme leader, and now are instead acting as the supreme leader leader of themselves.

I find it very interesting that the younger Khomeini hasn't been seen in public at all since all of this started. We haven't seen, you know, like you said, we haven't seen any proof of life. And on Iran's side, they're trying to defend this as him trying to be kept safe.

They want to keep him as safe as possible. There was a report that he wanted to attend his father's funeral, but, you know, the army, the intelligence, whatever you want to call it, instructed him not to, because they were afraid that Israel would attempt to assassinate him at the event, or they would use him being present there as a chance to try and find his hideout. But again, I don't buy it.

We have three other Khomeini sons who are present at this event. We had Mustafa, Meisam, and Masud. They were all present at this event.

You know, there were dignitaries from multiple, multiple countries at this event. So again, it's not like Israel or even the US would risk bombing at such an event. And then we had, we have proof that Iran is more than capable of hiding someone if they don't want them to be found.

So again, it's, the reasons they're giving doesn't really square with, you know, the facts as we know them on the ground. It doesn't really, you know, it doesn't really rhyme with what we actually know. So again, it's, it's a very confusing time, them being very secretive with his location.

And as you said, the IRGC seems to be the acting supreme leader. now, which places way too much power in the hands of people who are, in effect, some of the most brutal you'll ever see in power anywhere. Yeah, for sure. I'm sorry.

For me, the most interesting aspect of all this is how the public is taking the younger Khamenei's absence. So this was an interview in Al Jazeera. A 26-year-old gentleman by the name of Masume from Tehran told the outlet, quoting in here, my country is no longer the Iran of old, where the leader is publicly present.

Moshtaba's absence is irrelevant, but his presence is a sign of the country's security. And I now have the feeling that the former security does not prevail in my country. The late supreme leader was the meaning of Iran's power.

So his absence is really being noticed within Iran. It's something that people are taking notice of, and it might weaken the supreme leader's overall position and your standing moving forward. Yeah, on the point of security, they've been doing a very good job of keeping him safe from any microphones, any cameras, anything that may indicate proof of life here, to be honest.

It's very remarkable how just buttoned up they've been about all of it. Overall, though, to your point there, I think you're absolutely right that this is going to have, that they can sort of only do this so long because Iranians certainly notice this type of thing. Again, the supreme leader is not just some part-time job.

You know, like some countries have kings that don't really play that much of a role. Others have presidents that don't really play much of a role where it's inside the prime minister. The supreme leader is neither of those.

He has genuine day-to-day power that exceeds that of any other official in the country. He can just fire the president if he wants to. He can do all sorts of things.

But ultimately, he's also a very important figure in Shia Islam, which is a still significant factor in Iran. They have, a lot's been made that they've sort of secularized in part because of, especially younger generations, in part because of unpopularity of the Islamic Republic itself, where you almost have like the situation where if a country is officially like a strong religious, officially religious system that mandates religious participation and the country then becomes unpopular or excuse me, the regime becomes unpopular within the country, then there's sort of like this downhill effect where it turns people away from the religion itself. And there is something to be said for that in Iran.

But there are still quite a few, many devout Shia Muslims in the country. And... And...

And the supreme leader is very important in that system, theologically speaking. So this is not something that they can just indefinitely postpone. They will at some point have to answer where this guy is, what he's up to.

And ultimately, if he is dead, I mean, this is going to be by far the biggest upset of this type since the 1500s, actually. It was the last one that covered up for a dead leader this long were the Ottomans in the 1500s. So it will be quite a news story, shall we say, if it turns out he is dead.

You know what it feels like? It feels like Weekend at Barney's. I don't know if you're familiar with the movie, but it's a bunch of guys pretending their dead friend is still alive.

We've taken him out, taken him to places, but it feels like Weekend at Barney's without the fun. So if it does come out that Mushtaba has been dead this entire time, it will bring into question a lot of the decisions that whoever is acting in his place has made and the validity and credibility of their power base. But again, it's such an interesting story that might not even you.

The thing with such systems is when they want to keep a secret, they will keep it exceptionally well and they will go to really great lengths to alter reality, alter your public perception to make it seem like their version of reality is true. So we might be looking at a situation where in like a month, two months down the line, they announced that Mushtaba has succumbed to his injuries, that despite the great work of the doctors and everyone else who was around, they couldn't save him. So it will look like Mushtaba has been alive for a while, but it was actually the RGC headliners just puppeting a dead body.

Yeah, I was thinking about this myself. At this point, they almost have to roll with the story that he's been alive for a while. So I don't think you can, even in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is certainly not known for its transparency, shall we say, this is not something that you can just get away with.

So if they come out and announce JK, he's been dead the whole time, or if it leaks that he's been dead the whole time, like that would be crippling for the government's legitimacy, which is already not exactly at all time highs. So I think that half the role... with this like oh he succumbed to his injuries but at the same time like if he's been dead this long i mean i like the his body must be in not pristine shape so ultimately it's going to be quite a challenging situation for them i personally i was skeptical as to the he's dead argument until his father's funeral we the fact that he did not put out anything other than just a mild-mannered sort of statement on this is so telling to me because again there's not even a voice recording so i think at this point we should seriously be considering the possibility that he is no longer with us so i want to ask a question to you kyle as someone who watches this as closely as anyone on the war front steam and you're perhaps even more closely in some cases what do you think that if you know most abo does end up being dead they appoint you know another son of the older khamenei that's a good question to be honest i think probably not because even most abo's election was very controversial because of the hereditary side of things i think if they were to do that again it will become extremely problematic and the election of was done keep in mind in the middle of the opening rounds of the war i believe he was elected on march 8th which was exactly four months ago now so ultimately we're going to be in a situation where they would have to find somebody else i have to imagine the next election would be a little bit more open shall we say than the last one which was done under very dubious circumstances there were reports that the guards were threatening the members of the council of experts which is what is what is called there in quam where they gather to elect the next supreme leader i would love to have such a title on my resume if i may add kyle moran council of experts but my own wishes there notwithstanding they i'm not going to get into the prediction game just yet because i it's so much is changing so fast but i think they simply have to go with somebody other than another khamenei because this is just three in a row would be exceptional three in a row will really be exceptional but whoever they do go with will have the unenviable task of trying to keep together you know the base of support that they're that the revolution that the ifgc that you know the islamic republic has and i usually you default to this number, a number that was given to me by Professor Rockford White. He's a professor at Tufts, one of the most knowledgeable people on international relations that we have access to.

About 40% of the country supports the IRGC, supports the revolution, and it supports the regime in Tehran. And you could see that number, such a large number of people came out to mourn the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Kyle and I were discussing before we hit record that one of our favorite Twitter posters, Mario Nalpha, he was shocked by the sheer number of people who attended their Tollah's funeral.

He said that he felt lied to, because there's always this perception that the Iranian regime is deeply, deeply unpopular with its own people. And while it definitely is, I'm not saying that the regime is not unpopular, that it's a bastion of democracy that has an upsell of popular support. No, I'm not saying that.

But it does have a lot of people who support it. So, Kyle, how do you think they can maintain that level of support in case, you know, the current supreme leader is dead? Yeah, I think that a lot of this is going to come down to how they play their hands with the diverging factions within the regime itself that we were discussing earlier.

So when you look at who most supports the regime versus who least supports it, okay, let's start with the latter there first. So the people who least support it typically tend to be younger urban Iranians. Now, Iran is a very urban country.

I think 75% of the country lives in either urban or just outside of urban areas. So this is not some rural country by any stretch of the imagination. Some of their cities are very, very big.

When it comes to all of this, like a lot of their, a lot of that sort of crowd, shall we say, has been the most skeptical. A lot of this stems from the economy where Iranians just see no future for themselves. They see no hope for it improving.

And a lot of that comes down to the fact that for many years, especially over the last like decade, decade and a half, the regime basically made the argument, not explicitly, but more than merely implicitly, shall we say, that the Islamic revolution was so important that it demanded that Iranians tough it out. Tough it out. They suck it up.

Better days will come. But for the time being, this is the economic situation the country finds itself in. But because it has to remain strong, that this is just how it's going to be.

And so, of course, we've seen in various protests in 2021 or 2022, there was another round that was similarly cracked down on, as well as others, especially about the hijab laws in the country. None of that, nothing really changes, right? So it has long been seen as a, this is how it's going to be.

And if you don't like it, suck it up type of system. If they're able to use the MOUs, which is currently falling apart, I may add, but if they're able to use the economic relief in the MOU, as well as the relief of sanctions and all of these other things to rebuild the country economically, they would be in a vastly more secure position. But again, these very, very hardline people in the regime see only military spending, only military strengths as what can protect them.

This is inherently problematic, though, because without the January protests, I'm not sure the United States would have launched the campaign that it did. I think that was a big moment in the U.S. where it was like, wow, this government is so unpopular. And there are so many Iranians who absolutely hate the regime, that this could really, this could really have some big impact here.

So when it comes to where this all goes, some of it comes down to, is the regime willing to sort of face the fact that it is a security threat to them when they have such an enormous part of the population who has no buy-in on the electoral system, or the government system. So I'm not convinced that they are fully there yet, especially because they're pursuing these avenues that are risking losing the greatest deal that they've ever negotiated. And I think that could ultimately come back to bite them in the butt.

You and I agree on a lot of things, Kylan, and this, you know, we're in complete argument. This will definitely come to bite them in the butt. So I want to move away from this, and you'll go back to the funeral itself.

You watched it, I watched it, and it was, for me, this is one of the few times I have seen a nation mourn its leader, to the extent that it did. It was such a grandiose event. And normally, within the tenets of Islamic law, someone who dies has, should be buried by the next day, unless, unless, special circumstances, you're like in this case, with the Atola needing the entirety of the war to stop fast, and needing dignitaries to come and pay their respects.

So as part of the dignitaries coming to pay their respects, there were verses from the Quran read alongside the dignitaries, and these verses seem to be politically targeted, not just, not just, what's the right word for it, not just religiously motivated. So for example, Saudi Arabia, you know, got a verse that was very, very specifically chosen, it was Al Imran 3, chapter 3, verse 13, the passage describing the Battle of Badr, where a vastly outnumbered and poorly equipped Muslim force routed a much larger army by the will of God. It was, and I'm reading this from Middle East, they do really great reporting, especially on aspects of religion that we would have missed, because we don't have that cultural knowledge, that cultural buy-in.

So it was, this seemed like a clear reference to what many are increasingly calling Iran's victory over the US and Israel in the war. So Badr was fought in what is today Saudi Arabia in 624 AD, and the question is whether the recitation was a compliment, a taunt or both, but it's unlikely to have been random. I read generously the verse gestures at one of Islam's first victories and a shared civilizational memory between Tehran and Riyadh.

But Iran has not only survived the war, but arguably it may have emerged from it stronger with control of the Strait of Hormuz, now tantalizingly close to being a fait accompli. Saudi Arabia, however, remained quietly aligned with the US during the war, and according to some reports, even covertly attacked Iran. Read against that context, the verse takes on a new meaning.

Riyadh stayed on the sidelines, or according to those reports acted against Iran, while Israel sought to plunge the region into ruin. Iran, meanwhile, fought and held firm against Tehran's enemies. So you read in that line, the Battle of Badr, that specific verse makes it look like that Saudi Arabia is acting against the best interest of Islamic countries, of a country that has clothed itself and clothed its actions really, really tightly in the veil of religion.

So that for me was such a very interesting aspect of Ali Khamenei's funeral. It wasn't just Saudi Arabia that got the verse. Hamas and other members of the axis of resistance like Hezbollah and the Houthis and Iraq's Hashad al-Shabi and the Taliban in Afghanistan, they got verses that shared a common theme, martyrdom and unbroken pledges to God and victory because throughout this war, in one way or another, they have supported Iran.

They have been co-allies to Iran, either diplomatically or militarily like Hezbollah. Even the Houthis, even though they haven't really been as active as one would have expected, they have been a key ally and they will be a key ally if the war ever does resume to the point where Iran needs to activate all of its levers at once. So for Hamas, they got a verse describing a people who have proven true to what they pledged to God and someone who fulfilled their pledge, others waiting their turn, none of whom changed their commitment in the least.

Hezbollah's verse promised the upper hand to true believers, framing military setbacks as a part of a divine cycle in which God chooses martyrs and reveals those who remain faithful. And for the Houthis, the verse they got was a passage on loyalty, discipline and growth in the face of pressure. So all of these verses indicate that Iran was using the Quran as a diplomatic messaging tool.

And they got the same treatment, they give the same treatment rather to countries like Russia, China, India and Egypt, with China being told, God ordained this only as good news for you and reassurance for your hearts and victory only comes from God. All of these seem to indicate that Iran is a very savvy diplomatic actor. It knows what it's doing.

That for me is what I got from this. It was certainly an interesting perspective. They've long pivoted towards Islam as a way to sort of sell their foreign policy to the region.

The interesting thing, and I think a massive misstep for them, has been the ongoing attacks throughout the Middle East though. So from the outset, let's just step back for a sec. So if a country outside of the region had come in and started bombing a country in the region in any type of this scale, you would have originally expected protests, the Arab world has seen many such cases throughout the last few decades and before that as well.

But ultimately, that stems from a sense of the Ummah, the oneness of Muslims coming together, the brotherhood between them in the Dar al-Islam or the world of Islam, if you will. So where this ultimately starts to fall apart, though, is first, no such protests throughout the Arab world actually materialized. It was a very like, what's happening?

Where will this go? type of thing. Because a lot of people there were correctly worried that Iran would retaliate on them for the United States doing this. And they were vindicated in those concerns because Iran's argument that it's targeting U.S. military bases is just false.

They have targeted U.S. military bases, sure. But they have hit a lot of civilian infrastructure as well throughout the region. So they have hit apartment high rises in Bahrain.

They have hit hotels in Dubai. They have hit, they hit Doha, which has been a pretty close. Those, I'm not going to call them friends, but they've been working handedly together for years.

And it's Qatari, it was a Qatari ship and a Saudi ship, I believe, that were the ones who just came under attack in Hormuz recently as well. They even hit Oman, who had their foreign minister in Washington lobbying against this operation. And so that in and of itself is a violation of this sense of brotherhood that would inherently go with this sort of messaging.

But even worse than that from the Islamic unity side of things, if the Islamic Republic's perspective was to be vindicated, is the fact that it was ultimately American and Israeli, especially in the case of the Emirates, Israeli missiles or missile interceptors that were protecting the people of the Arab world. So this is a very uncomfortable position for them. And so when you have this sense where, okay, religiously, if you're, let's take just a regular Arab Muslim guy who thinks, okay, you know what, perhaps I'm Sunni, but, and they're Shia, but, you know, they're Muslims as well.

So I'll be on their side. But you see on a daily basis for over a month, missiles flying over your head, being launched by Iran. That's going to spend some mixed feelings throughout the region.

And it inflames those pre-existing divisions between the Sunni and the Shia. And like you said, it's such an awkward position for Muslims within the Arab world to be defended. by israel on one hand while at the same time having grown up in your regimes that have constantly demonized israel so it's a very awkward position to do to have that going on while at the same time iran continues to clothe itself in the language of islam and speaking of israel i want to move away from you the deeply religious conversation we were having this weird intersection between religion and diplomacy to a story i saw in the new york times last week that u.s officials believed israel was plotting to kill iranian negotiators that israel wanted to kill abasa gachi or mohammed galliboff in order to be real peace talks kyle what do you think of this i have just one more point to add on the religious side of things so galliboff the other day was caught on a hot mic saying that lebanon gave 4 000 martyrs for the islamic republic when it comes to that made waves throughout lebanese media and lebanon is a very unique combination so you have the numbers are contested but you have roughly a third being christian and roughly a third being shia roughly a third sunni and then a tiny druze population in the country so this message where it's 4 000 lebanese have died in the war so far and where iran is sort of championing those deaths as martyrs for their own cause is such a mask off moment where of course i mean there are many religious muslims in the country where who actually do think that the sort of pan islamic unity is important but the sense here is very clearly from lebanon's perspective that they want to use us as bargaining chips and as basically a front to absorb the bullets that they don't want that they don't want to take themselves so ultimately that sort of brotherhood from the islamic republic may not be quite as strong as they may try to portray it publicly but when it comes to the negotiators yes israel is rumored to have been trying to take them out which to be honest if they did in the middle of a ceasefire after the mou was signed i mean that would be an extraordinary escalation and we've already seen a pretty significant souring between the u.s and israel in terms of leadership at least rhetorically there was that infamous phone call which i reference i've i've written like a few go ahead i think it's kind ofו pielt I think three different scripts I've put that phone call into just because of how incredible it is for, like, what would have been acceptable even a few months ago for a U.S. president to say, where Donald Trump told Netanyahu, everybody hates you, everybody hates Israel. And I think he called him effing crazy.

I think that was in the quote as well. So certainly if Israel had moved on this, that would be an extraordinary escalation. And I have to imagine there would be even more fallout from that.

But I also wonder at a certain point, is Israel willing to just say, you know what? Screw it. We're taking a beating here anyway, diplomatically with Washington.

What else can they do and just go for it anyway? Do you think in light of the new exchange of strikes between Iran and the U.S., Israel could take the opportunity to use the strikes as a chance to take out Ghalibov or any of the other negotiators? I think it would be a mistake for them to do so, because so if you're Israel and you don't want a deal between the U.S. and Iran, the biggest thing that you could do or the biggest thing you have working for you is the hardliners, especially in Tehran, who also do not want a deal.

So letting that sort of play its course will ultimately work well for Israeli interests, because it will lead to more strikes on Iran, potentially, as well as other just sort of situations where deals just become impossible. However, if they take this move to actually strike on Ghalibov or any of these other sorts of Iranian officials, I think that would honestly be undermining their own position. Because even though Ghalibov has played an outsized role, as you can see with the death of Ali Khamenei, with Larajani and all these other regime officials who were killed, somebody else is going to step up to the plate.

I mean, there's millions of Iranians that are going to find somebody, right? So ultimately, I'm not really sure how much of that would ultimately buy them, and I think they would sort of undermine the natural division between the U.S. and Iran, because it could actually—and I want to be careful with how I word this. I'm not saying that the U.S. is going to be pro-Iran, but it may be a little less outright hostile to them if Israel takes such an incredibly escalatory step.

It's definitely, definitely something to keep an eye on over the next few weeks, just whether— Israel will decide to pull the trigger and as you said if they do it will be a strategic mistake I'll add one more thing to your point about what Israel has going for it I think all Israel needs to do for this you know MOU to fail is just sit and wait there's so much going against it already not just from the Iranian hardliners you even within the U.S. administration there are people who view this as a deeply deeply flawed deal so they just need to sit and wait and you know something will crack we've already seen you know multiple cracks happening and you know whether the most recent one sinks the MOU only time will tell but Israel has a much better chance by just sitting and waiting than you know doing anything outrightly hostile that could you jeopardize its relationship with Washington and future you know future opportunities with Washington so speaking of Israel's relationship with Washington something else that could be a pivotal breaking point is Turkey. Kyle tell us about this. Yes so this has long been on my radar.

Turkey is such a fascinating country to me because it is truly its own thing there are there are no other there's no others like it basically so Turkey has been significantly ramping up its military capabilities and they have a lot to show for it so they build a lot of drones they have sophisticated artillery systems that were originally licensed or produced under licensed by South Korea by design and then they've been producing themselves for quite some time they are a massive military exporter of munitions of all sorts shapes and sizes we are seeing this sort of come to a head here where the tensions between Ankara and past U.S. administrations including Trump's first term are sort of being reassessed because in the wake of the Iran war where the U.S. essentially failed to accomplish pretty much anything it set out to achieve so this has sort of sent some soul searching throughout Washington and U.S. opposition to Erdogan who is no saint trust me I have many criticisms myself but ultimately the questions being asked are well okay I mean is this guy really that bad in terms of American interests do we really need to be preventing them from being part of the F-35 program we have very important military bases in Turkey all of these things and trump is interestingly was saying that if it wasn't for him erdogan would have weighed in on the side of iran during the war and honestly i'm not entirely sure which side i come down on that one because it would be a massive escalation for sure i don't know exactly what form it would have taken if they had but at the same time erdogan is like so anti netanyahu that i could see him doing some form of action if that was to if trump hadn't put so much pressure on him and i honestly could see this f-35 program that he's being admitted potentially being admitted into as sort of a reward to him for staying out of it so perhaps during the war trump called up anchor and said listen as long as you stay out of this one we will reward you with being brought back into that 35 program this is also not helped by the fact that iran was firing missiles at turkey okay i cannot emphasize just about every country in the region has been shot at by iran it is it has not worked to their benefit at all there is simply no benefit to firing on turkey if you're there if you're the iranians the turks are not going to kick out the u.s it's not happening right they're they're part of nato and they use that's very vital to their national security goals and objectives so the idea that a few missiles which were shot down without any difficulty by the turks was actually going to make a difference here is just crazy to me but ultimately i do see the u.s moving in a more pro-turkey direction and i think that's going to have some pretty major implications for the region moving forward it will definitely be interesting to see you know just how all of this shakes out one of the most interesting developments that has happened you know in the past few hours just before we recorded this is the fact that secretary of defense secretary of war whatever he's calling himself this week pete hexeth cancelled a meeting that had been scheduled for today to discuss the possible sale of f-35 jets to turkey with israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu so there's two possible reasons that you know this meeting could have been cancelled either you know washington has decided not to give turkey the f-35s which you know would be a really weird move given as you rightfully said it could be seen as a reward for them not wading in on the side on the side of iran and you know given that this war doesn't seem likely be ending anytime soon. If they denied the F-35s, they could say, okay, let's step in on the side of Iran. We've previously decided not to engage and got nothing for it.

If we engage now, we get something for it. So they could be deciding not to give Turkey the F-35s or conversely, they could be deciding that, you know, this is such a perfect opportunity. We're going to give Turkey the F-35 without consulting Israel at all, which, you know, given the nature of Israel's relationship with the U.S. right now and, you know, just how high tensions are, you know, compared to other times in the past, could be a definite possibility.

Kyle, what do you think? Yeah. Ultimately, this is going to be something that comes down to who has the most to benefit from.

Because when it comes to the F-35, they were originally kicked out in the first place because of their purchase of Russian S-400 anti- or interceptor systems back in, I believe, it was the late 2010s, so Trump's first term. That was controversial at the time, and it deserved to be so. They have not installed them, though.

So, I mean, the whole thing was kind of for naught. They did it because they didn't have access to certain American or NATO interceptors, so they wanted S-400s as basically a it's better than nothing sort of thing. But I have to imagine that if they're willing to give up the S-400, I mean, that, to me, that just eliminates the reasoning behind not including them in this sort of thing.

So, when it comes to where this all goes, I just have to imagine if they are willing to return the S-400 and the U.S. does not invite them back into the F-35 program. That has to be seen as a strategic loss for Washington, even if Israel is extremely annoyed about it. Because what is the, like, what fundamentally is the argument against Turkey's F-35 program?

The argument comes down to their rivals with Israel, and that's pretty much where that ends. Beyond that, there are other legitimate concerns about Turkey. Erdogan has moved in a pretty authoritarian direction.

All of these sorts of things. F-35s do not contribute to that. It's not a part of the issue.

It's unrelated. So, ultimately, where it goes is how much does the Israel versus Turkey showdown actually impact things? And I do think, given the current... trajectory, it's more likely than not that we do let them back in the F-35 program.

But I'm going to give that a soft 60-40. So 60% chance we do, 40% chance we don't. Just because Pete Hegseth is very, very pro-Israel.

I mean, the entire, when I say it, I mean in the domestic American sense. So it's a scale of supportive of Israel through extremely supportive of Israel. So when it comes to Hegseth, he's more on the extremely supportive side, whereas Trump has been more willing to criticize them and deviate a bit.

So ultimately, I have to think this comes down to about a 60-40 shot. I will disagree. It's good disagreeing because we've been agreeing throughout the entire podcast.

Wouldn't be an episode of the Middle East roundtable if we didn't disagree on something, my friend. But I think as more of a 90-10 chance, 90% that Trump says, I don't care what you and Netanyahu and the rest of the Israeli establishment think, I am going to give Turkey the F-35 because they are in NATO. They did refuse to enter the war on the side of Iran.

And Trump feels very, very flattered by Erdogan. Trump has this affinity for strongman leaders. That's why he was writing love letters to Kim Jong-un in his first administration.

And that's why he seems to really, really like President Putin. When he was speaking after his meeting with Erdogan, he said, and I quote, so this is a report we got from Clash Reports. I like President Erdogan.

He rolled out the red carpet. He's terrific. But Bibi said rough things yesterday about Turkey and Erdogan.

So just that personal relationship between Erdogan and Trump, I think that will be the pivotal factor that pushes this into the 90-10 category for me. It's something that I see as deeply, deeply, deeply important to Trump and how he conducts his foreign policy. He always wants to have these relations with leaders like Erdogan, like Putin, strongmen.

And I think that's going to be it. Plus, we also have to discuss the impact of the upcoming Israeli elections on any relationship with Turkey. Kyle, you are our go-to guy for anything within Israel.

How do you see the upcoming elections shaking out? And how do you see that affecting this entire relationship with Turkey, the sale of the better it is? And whatever.18 sechs can kill us at the Place shepherd because we can't 35s, you know, a potential relationship with Washington.

You may have moved me slightly on that, so I may bump it up to 70-30, but I'm not quite as confident there, though, because it does have more to do than just Trump's personal relationship with Erdogan, which is solid. But as you can see from his first term, he was, I mean, Erdogan has always been pretty strongman-oriented, and that did not stop Trump from being very opposed to him. In the first term, especially as the term dragged on, as well as some other strongmen throughout the world, so Nicolás Maduro, you need to look no further than the New York prison system to see how that one went.

But when it comes to Turkey, I do think we are, as a country, as our government at least is moving in a slightly more pro-Turkish direction, so yeah, I'll bump up to 70-30 on that. But when it comes to Israel, so one of the main Israeli opposition politicians, Naftali Bennett, has been even more hardline on Turkey than Netanyahu has. So Bennett was the one who came out and said that Turkey is the new Iran, and this has been an ongoing theme within the Israeli political system for quite some time.

They are quite worried about the Turks. Some of it is legitimate. Some of it is a bit out there, in my opinion.

So Turkey has emerged as a very anti-Israel force, both in terms of opposing Israel's actions in Gaza, but also more broadly, just being quite anti-Israel itself. It has been very comfortable, shall we say, with just outright anti-Semitism. Somebody translated Mein Kampf into Turkish about a decade ago or so, and it took off.

It was like a huge seller in the country. So there is a lot of demand for this type of stuff there, and the government has been willing to play ball with it. But Erdogan very famously described Netanyahu as worse than Hitler on multiple occasions.

So they're not exactly best friends, shall we say. And I do think that moving forward, this is only going to accelerate. And that's why, when it comes to the F-35 program, Israel is going to prioritize so much, making sure that Ankara is not included.

Just how successful they'll be with that, I don't know. They have been focusing quite a bit on it, though. All right.

And with that, I'd like us to pivot to our final topic of the day. Let's check in on Lebanon and how the situation there is progressing. Again, Kyle, I'll turn to you, because you're our resident Lebanon guy.

Yeah, so it's been a bit of a... Bye-bye. Bye-bye. slower news week on the Lebanese front, which is unusual because Lebanon has been at the absolute forefront for so long.

So after the deal was signed, it's been a very slow rolling situation. So in terms of Israeli forces, it's been very limited in terms of withdrawal. This has been the concern from people opposed to the deal.

But ultimately, we're going to continue to see this play out where these pilot zones are being established where the LAF has deployed. They move in to take over. But the problem being that one of the pilot zones is actually outside of Israel's yellow line.

So the LAF has deployed to areas that the IDF did not capture. So the Israeli withdrawal is not as inherently big as the Lebanese may have hoped for. That was a big sticking point in the negotiations themselves and is a sticking point with the government there.

So the Speaker of Parliament, who is Shia, and he's part of the Amal party, which is partners with Hezbollah, but not Hezbollah itself, has repeatedly pointed this out as a potential downfall of the agreement because it enables Israel to maintain its occupation of the Lebanese South while not necessarily withdrawing from much of anywhere. He has a point to be made. But I also think that this is basically the only way that this is going to take place.

There is simply no world in which Israel is just going to unilaterally withdraw without substantial LAF presence in the South. And I do think that given just how poorly executed the 2024 ceasefire was, where the LAF sort of like disarmed Hezbollah in the South, I'm using scare quotes there, but it didn't actually get nearly as much as it should have. They're going to have to sort of earn back their stripes, shall we say, amongst not just Israel, but the broader international community, because the Lebanese country simply cannot continue like this.

You cannot have, I've made these points previously, but I'll do so just once more. You cannot have a country where twice in two years, a paramilitary organization drags the entire country into a war with its neighbor on behalf of Iran. It doesn't lead to functional governance.

It leads to massive destruction, death, all of these things. So Hezbollah simply has to disarm for Lebanon to be a serious country. And I do think the country is overall headed in the right direction.

Just how long it takes to get there, though? That's going to be a big question mark. I do agree.

I will echo your point that Hezbollah does need to be disarmed, that its presence within Lebanon is such a destabilizing, it has such a destabilizing impact that there's no progress that can be made within the country without, with them still present. It genuinely feels like they are dragging the country a hundred years back into the past with every decision that they're making and while they do claim to be representative of the Lebanese people, they're genuinely not, they do not represent the best interest of the Lebanese people, they are a proxy for Iran and that just makes Lebanon so unsafe and with that little rant out of the way, we're going to end the podcast here. Kyle, what are you watching for the rest of the week?

Well, other than the breaking news out of Belgium that we're expected to hear back from Evan on any moment now, I will be continuing to monitor undoubtedly the situation with Iran going forward. There's going to be a lot of back and forth. I just saw that apparently Trump is saying the U.S. is going to hit them again tonight, Wednesday night.

It's Wednesday morning here, U.S. time at time of recording. So when this goes live, we will probably have more knowledge on if that's going to happen. If we do, Iran is absolutely going to respond.

And this, unlike previous rounds, feels to me a bit more like escalation, whereas the previous ones were, OK, it's very tit for tat. Iran hit a ship. The U.S. can't let that stand.

The U.S. hits Iran, Iran hits Kuwait, because that's just what you do in the Middle East when somebody attacks you hit Kuwait. These poor Kuwaitis, I don't know how they wound up in this situation, but it really has become sort of like the regional punching bag. So and then everything sort of gets back to the status quo.

So this one feels different to me. The U.S. seems way more done. They've suspended the oil sale or oil waivers that were part of MOU, which is the first real action since MOU was signed that we've seen.

Unlike previous rounds where it's just Trump saying stuff, which I'm not putting much stock in, a lot of this has to do with just various domestic political stuff. So I'm the oil waiver sale being suspended, though, that is substantial. And it shows to me that this MOU is coming apart at the seams.

I agree the MOU is coming apart at the seams and very soon we'll be back to MISA. over understanding. And I think that's going to be the key thing for me to be watching this week. Depending on how it shakes out, we might go back to putting out Iran updates three times a week just because the war has resumed.

It's such a frustrating situation that peace seemed so close at one point. And now we are stuck in this escalatory cycle where Iran is desperately trying to control the Strait of Hormuz because in a way it's one of the few leverage points that they have left. And the U.S. obviously cannot let that stand.

But other than the situation in Iran, I'm also closely watching what's happening in Turkey because I find the F-35 as a system could be one of the most brilliantly engineered systems ever built. And I will be so envious of any Turkish pilot who gets to fly them. This is a bit of law for anyone who's stuck around with the podcast this far.

I almost joined the Kenyan Air Force. We obviously don't have F-35s, but I couldn't get in because I suffer from asthma. So, yeah, I was very close.

I even spent a semester in a military-aligned school that has ties to the Kenyan Air Force called Moe Forces Academy because that's how desperate I was to fly cool planes. So, anyway, we're going to end it there. For anyone who's listened to us this long, you're almost certainly a premium subscriber on France.co.

Thank you so much. We can't do the work we do without you. We're absolutely grateful.

And with that, we're going to catch you next time. For Wilfred, for Kyle, thank you so much. This has been the Middle East Roundtable.

And next week, we will hear the results of what's happening in Belgium from our dear friend, Evan. Bye for now.
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