--- title: "Are the Houthi Rebels About to Conquer Yemen?" description: "Fronts video analysis of Are the Houthi Rebels About to Conquer Yemen, with context on conflict, defense, and security." url: https://fronts.co/videos/are-the-houthi-rebels-about-to-conquer-yemen.md canonical: https://fronts.co/videos/are-the-houthi-rebels-about-to-conquer-yemen/ datePublished: 2026-09-11T18:12:23.000Z dateModified: 2026-09-11T18:12:23.000Z author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://fronts.co/authors/simon-whistler/ publisher: Fronts image: "https://media.fronts.co/cdn-cgi/image/width=1200,height=630,fit=cover,gravity=auto,quality=80,format=auto/images/articles/are-the-houthi-rebels-about-to-conquer-yemen-727bd052.png" type: NewsArticle language: en access: members isAccessibleForFree: false tokens: 4906 --- This week, the ongoing Middle East crisis got a whole lot worse. After years of practicing threats against a vital shipping lane in the Red Sea, Yemen's Houthi rebels exploded out of containment this week in an all-out offensive to capture the nation's southwest coastline. At first, it seemed as if the Houthis had overplayed their hands. Yemen's internationally recognized government and its military may be weak, but they and their allies in Saudi Arabia had planned for that eventuality. Now, though, the Saudi-backed counteroffensive is coming apart in record time. The Houthis have taken thousands of square kilometers in just days, capturing key cities and even making their way to Yemen's critical Red Sea islands. Now, Middle East experts warning that it's only a matter of time before the Houthis might be able to institute a full blockade of the Red Sea. But before anyone tries to declare a total Houthi victory, be warned, it is far easier to break Yemen apart than it is to put it back together. And right now, we're witnessing Yemen's biggest breakdown in years. Quite frankly, there are no guarantees on where this situation will end, and everything from a Houthi conquest to a Houthi collapse is still on the table. But no matter what happens from this point onward, it's already clear that Yemen will never be the same again. it's time we discuss just where this situation is headed, and what it would mean for the Houthis to finally get what they want. At the outset of today's episode, we'd like to provide our usual caveat for fast-moving, chaotic situations like this one. Everything we discussed today is accurate to the best of our knowledge and ability as of dawn on the morning of Friday, the 11th of September, local time in Yemen. Anything that's happened between that cutoff time and the time that this episode is released won't be a part of our discussion today. But as always, you can expect an update from our team in the near future if there have been major developments. And speaking of major developments, it's worth taking a moment to reflect on our last episode on the Houthi campaign, published a mere two days ago, so that we can understand just how rapidly the situation has changed. the time that our prior episode was written, the Houthis had launched an all-out frontal assault on southwestern Yemen against a little pocket of non-Houthi territory, where Yemen's coast wraps around the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, and where strategic islands overlook the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Houthis, a proxy ally of Iran, are very interested in establishing control over the strait, where roughly 10% of all global maritime trade volume has to pass through. At the time, the Houthis were advancing in the general direction of the city of Taiz, a stronghold of Yemen's weak, Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government that's been divided and besieged for years. the Yemeni government and their allies in the country's Saudi-aligned tribal militias reacted quickly, opening a multi-front counter-offensive to distract the Houthis, cause chaos, recapture territory. Before long, Saudi warplanes were delivering airstrikes across Houthi lines as Houthi drones and missiles rained down across southern Saudi Arabia, injuring dozens. Houthis sent small but relatively powerful units in all directions, wherever they were available, and before long, the fighting had devolved into pure chaos. oh, how quickly things can change, because since the time that episode was written, the Saudi-backed, counter-offensive appears to have gone completely off the rails now there are a few reasons that their effort fell apart but the most obvious is the deeply fractured nature of coalition that saudi arabia was trying to hold together while the forces of the yemeni government can work decently well at times alongside a combination of those tribal militias we mentioned and mercenary forces that saudi arabia uses to support them they're really not cohesive enough to deal with a situation like this for the past several years saudi arabia has been focused on containing the houthis quoting expert danny citronovitz on the subject the saudis sought to buy stability support arrangements that would allow the houthi government in sonata function and gradually move toward a political roadmap that would prevent another major war end quote in practice that meant that the saudi-backed forces have been basically holding their positions for the last few years against minimal adversity then when the houthis attacked the saudi-backed forces appeared to have a clear plan for how to respond and retaliate for a couple of days they were making good progress and taking back territory so morale remains high but then well then things got complicated groups within the saudi-backed coalition stopped working with each other the houthis while far from the best fighting force on earth are much more internally cohesive and they've got a real sense for when divisions amongst their enemies provide them with an opportunity then the saudi-backed forces were also stabbed in the back by an enemy that was supposed to have been dealt with months ago viewers who've followed you many affairs for a little while or who remember back to the episodes war fronts was publishing all the way back in 2025 the before times compared to a year like this might remember that in december of last year an emirati-backed separatist group called the stc took a vast portion of non-houthi yemen pushing the saudi-backed government to the brink of collapse and coming within inches of establishing a breakaway instead saudi arabia and his allies managed to turn the tables and just as quickly as the captured all that territory the group basically collapsed and disappeared all that is they disappeared on wednesday the saudi-backed government's defense minister was traveling through the city of al-dehli forces loyal to the stc sprung into action they attacked the defense minister's convoy burned and destroyed at least one car and after a firefight they trapped the defense minister and his guards in a military camp now that camp is under siege and all roads in and out of the city have been blocked with the saudi-backed forces in tactical errors and dealing with betrayal in their back lines the huthis have managed as of the time of writing the group actually hasn't tried to capture the long besieged they've created enough pressure on the city to ensure that yemeni forces there are basically pinned unable to risk leaving the city undefended by trying to stop houthi offensives nearby in the early hours of the morning local time on thursday the huthis were able to force a combination of yemeni forces and aligned tribal militias to flee the city of haze without a fight While the city isn't particularly significant by itself, road to the coastal settlement of al-Qaqar. And when the Saudi-backed forces decided to retreat in that direction, the Houthis followed. The loss of haze turned into a route across the coastline, with Houthi forces barreling down onto the coastline, quickly establishing a foothold, then turning their attention south. Their next target was the port of Mocha, strategic vantage point where, although its port has been only minimally active in the last few years, it would be an immensely useful location for the Houthis to launch skiffs and sea drones and monitor vessels passing by in the southern Red Sea. Just like the city of Hays, Mocha fell within hours, although local sources reported intense fighting on the outskirts before the result was clear. According to journalist Maha Ali, reporting from the city of Taiz for Al Jazeera, the city fell when a group called the Yemeni National Resistance, a key Saudi-allied paramilitary, essentially broke and ran from the fight in what Ali described as, quote, a tactical withdrawal and repositioning in exchange for the Houthis' advance. But, well, we'd call the National Resistance's actions running from the fight instead of a tactical retreat because of what came next. From Mocha, the Houthis continued their push, despite airstrikes from Saudi Arabia that targeted both frontline Houthi units and convoys of reinforcements traveling from the capital city. At this point, the rest of the Houthis' attack was practically elementary. They continued heading southward along the Red Sea coast and made it to a small coastal town called Dhabab. There, the Houthis captured a key headland, a small peninsula that pushes out into the Red Sea, forming one half of the land border of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. With Dhabab captured, that side of the strait, again, where roughly 10% of all maritime trade volume has to pass each year, is now under Houthi control. Making matters worse, the Saudi-aligned National Resistance withdrew from multiple outlying islands in the Southern Red Sea as the Houthis loaded up into motorboats in hopes of continuing the blitz. continue they did, landing on the island of Parim, also known as Mayun, basically in the middle of the Bab al-Mandeb. Some reports suggest that fighting there is still underway, but as of the time of writing, it appears more likely than not that the Houthis will secure Parim in its entirety. The island divides the strait into two channels, with a narrow one that hugs the Yemeni coastline and a wider one that hugs the coast of Djibouti. But with control over Parim, the Houthis can exercise both direct control over both channels, meaning that the Bab al-Mandeb must be assumed, least for now, to be under Houthi control. one final slap in the face to Saudi Arabia, the Houthis even managed to score multiple direct long-range hits on the Saudi's east-west pipeline, a critical piece of infrastructure that was supposed to help Saudi ships avoid the Southern Red Sea entirely. situation at Warfronts, we're never opposed to criticizing Saudi Arabia's military or its geo-strategic approach to the world. Just see an episode we published, coincidentally, almost a year ago, titled "Saudi Arabia is Super Rich: Why Is Their Military So Awful?" But even for the government in Riyadh, even with their track record before now, the collapse of their anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen is stunning to witness. And as embarrassing as the whole situation should for Saudi Arabia, the pain the Houthis can inflict will be even worse. By the evening local time in Yemen, on the 10th of September, the Houthis had formally declared the conclusion of the battle along Yemen's western coast because, simply put, the Houthis now control Yemen's entire western coast. The group's leadership has tried to ease the world's concerns, claiming that maritime trade in the region remains safe, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, which was already the subject of what the Houthis have referred to as a blockade against Saudi ports and shipping. But there's going to be plenty of time for the world's defense experts to flagellate the Saudi military command for its failures. And if you'd like our team to set aside some time and really lay into Riyadh in a future episode, then let us know in the comments. We're happy to. But right now, the more important question is about what comes next. There are a lot of unknowns on the Houthis side right now, not least whether their declaration of the end of their western coastal offensive means that they plan to consolidate their control over that territory, or whether they intend to start operations against the southern coastline and particularly the city of Thais. We also don't know how the Houthis are planning to play this for an international audience. Are they going to try and create their own security regime in the Bab al-Mandeb to show that they can safeguard international shipping? Are they going to rush drones and missiles out to Prim Island and start attacking everything sight? Or are they going to do a little bit of both, stockpiling weapons but inviting the world to engage with them non-violently? answer to that question is going to be really important because for the Houthis, this entire offensive is a play for international legitimacy. Unlike other non-state actors that rely on Iran for support, like Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis are somewhat independent from Tehran's influence. They operate in support of similar objectives most of the time, but they are willing to ignore or even contradict Iran when it suits them. The Houthis are still an international black sheep. Nobody wants to recognize their claim over Yemen, especially after they spent years attacking Red Sea trade ships in solidarity campaign to show their support for Hamas in Gaza. But the group clearly believes that by controlling the Red Sea coast, and especially the Bab al-Mandeb, can make themselves impossible for the rest of the world to keep ignoring. the subject of the Houthis' complex relationship with Iran, well, that's the reason why overtures by other nations like Pakistan demanding that Iran reign the Houthis in are practically guaranteed to be ineffective. Iran does not have the ability to stop the Houthis from doing this, and nor would they want to. Between Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi control over the Bab al-Mandeb, Iran and the Houthis have the ability to throttle the global maritime trade system. And the markets clearly know it. On the 3rd of September, when the main thrust of the Houthi offensive began, Brent crude oil was bouncing between $90 and $92 a barrel. By noontime in New York City on Thursday, September 10th, the price that's past $102 a barrel, with that figure only expected to rise further in the coming days. Already, the Houthis have gained the ability to monitor the passage of trade ships and military vessels continuously as they move through the southern Red Sea. If they want, they could use their missiles, drones, and skiffs to attack merchant shipping, especially in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and both declare and enforce a blockade. If they choose to continue their offensive, cutting across the southern coast in an operation against Taiz, they'll also be able to monitor the Gulf of Aden leading into the Red Sea, providing basically continuous line of sight across one of the world's most valuable trade corridors. They'll be helped along in those efforts by their allies in Somalia, particularly the jihadist organization al-Shabaab. According to Yemeni government sources, al-Shabaab fighters were on the ground in Yemen this week, helping the Houthis with their offensive, al-Shabaab is known to be engaged in cooperation and weapons trafficking with the Houthis across the last several months at a minimum. Al-Shabaab, in turn, wields major influence over Somalia's pirate networks, which have become active again across 2026. We should be very clear, however, that the Saudi-aligned forces in Yemen might still have another trick up their sleeve. Remember back to the December 2025 Yemen crisis that we mentioned earlier in the episode, when the Emirati-backed separatist movement, the STC, took over the vast majority of territory under the control of Yemen's government. For a very brief period after their offensive, we, and the rest of the world, were talking about the STC's conquest in very similar terms. They'd forced the Saudi-backed coalition to splinter and sent them running across the border into Saudi Arabia. What happened next, however, was an equally sudden counter-offensive by the Saudi-backed forces, with sufficient force to completely dismantle the STC, and even take back territory that the STC had controlled for years prior. As embarrassing as the Saudi coalition's retreat against the Houthis may appear, we can't ignore the similarities. The retreat of those Saudi-backed militias from Hayes and Mocha, and even the Bab al-Mandeb Strait itself, could certainly be interpreted as a rout. But it could also be interpreted as the coalition using the same strategy that worked for them previously. Endure a few days embarrassment, avoid the troop losses that would come from trying to defend those cities, and then, the Houthis let off the gas pedal, take the opportunity to strike back. In fact, it could even be interpreted, as some pro-Saudi commentators have suggested, as an attempt to draw Houthi forces into areas that are more vulnerable to bombing runs. Yemen is a weird place to fight a war, for lots of reasons. And one of those reasons is that it's a lot easier to take territory than it is to hold it. Granted, of all of Yemen's fighting factions, the Houthis are arguably the best at holding territory, especially in highland areas like the ones they've just captured. But it's still much too early to completely rule out the idea of a coming counteroffensive, especially as Saudi-backed forces continued to push smaller, peripheral counteroffensives, and announced on Wednesday that they'd captured a key Houthi commander. What we can rule out, at least for now, is the direct involvement of Saudi Arabia's new mutual defense partners, Turkey and Pakistan. Although Pakistan has claimed that the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia could trigger Islamabad's involvement under the new collective defense pact between these three nations, the country has since ruled out military action. Turkey, meanwhile, has given no indication that it would provide Riyadh any support besides a boilerplate condemnation of Houthi violence. There's a much larger conversation here that we unfortunately don't have time to get into about how this is arguably a near-perfect opportunity for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to work together and prove that their collective defense agreement is a pact they're willing to enforce if it's challenged. now, though, the more relevant point is that Saudi Arabia won't be expanding its anti-Houthi coalition. the Saudis won't, then the rest of the world probably won't either. time the world tried to run an anti-Houthi mission and protect Red Sea shipping in Operation Prosperity Guardian, it was a failure. Houthis continued to attack trade ships at will. They were utterly undeterred from threatening Red Sea traffic. And in a way, the whole affair confirmed to the Houthis that they were posing the kind of threat the world would take seriously. how the situation could continue to get worse, well, there are a few possibilities that we should mention. of course, the Houthis could keep capturing territory, including the city of Thais. as mentioned, the world could just fail to take action in this situation, surrendering a second vital choke point to a rogue government that's all too happy to use it as geostrategic leverage. Third, the Saudi coalition might find that the resurgent separatist threat, the STC, is a bigger problem than they anticipated. mentioned, the STC is backed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia's chief rival in the Persian Gulf. And the Emiratis, geopolitical chaos connoisseurs that they are, might see this as a chance to destabilize and undermine Saudi interests. finally, the Houthis are far from the only dangerous non-state actor in Yemen. The country is a hotbed of jihadist activity, both from al-Qaeda and, even worse, the Islamic state. all of this chaos will give those groups a golden opportunity to make gains of their own. story short, it is still too early to declare this Houthi event as a total success. at this point, Yemen's Saudi-backed coalition faces a major uphill battle, bringing the situation under control, and the status quo in Yemen that existed before September 2026 is probably gone forever.