---
title: El Salvador Has Invaded Haiti. Here’s What You Need to Know.
description: "El Salvador has deployed roughly a thousand troops to Haiti after gang members ambushed and kidnapped four Salvadoran soldiers serving with an international peacekeeping mission. President Nayib Bukele, renowned for his aggressive anti-gang crackdowns domestically, launched the military operation threatening severe consequences unless his men are returned alive and unharmed."
url: https://fronts.co/videos/el-salvador-has-invaded-haiti-heres-what-you-need-to-know.md
canonical: https://fronts.co/videos/el-salvador-has-invaded-haiti-heres-what-you-need-to-know/
datePublished: 2026-10-29T22:00:13.000Z
dateModified: 2026-10-29T22:00:13.000Z
author:
  - name: Fronts Staff
    url: https://fronts.co/authors/fronts-team/
publisher: Fronts
type: NewsArticle
language: en
access: members
isAccessibleForFree: false
tokens: 4866
---

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In the Caribbean nation of Haiti, a coalition of gangsters is in control.

Between 70 and 90% of the capital city of Porty Prince is under the direct

command,

and this year, the gangs have been surging into the countryside,

swallowing up towns and villages that Haiti's government cannot protect.

But on the 18th of October, during one of the many gunfights that rock Haiti

each week,

the country's gangs might have made a fatal mistake.

On that day, the gangs ambushed four soldiers from El Salvador,

who were present in Haiti as part of an overstretched, undermanned

international mission trying to keep order.

Those four men were kidnapped, and they haven't been seen since.

But now, El Salvador's strongman president is pissed,

and he sent a thousand of his men to start fighting in Haiti,

bring those men home, and hunt down the people who took them hostage.

Right now, President Nighy Bicali is on the warpath,

and in the span of just a few days, he's charged into a security void

that the rest of the world was struggling to address.

The question that matters now is whether Haiti's gangs are ready to deal with

him,

or whether they've kicked the horde its nest and unleashed consequences they

won't be able to control.

Ambushion Response

Now, before we get into the brewing showdown between Haiti's gang alliance and

El Salvador's special forces,

we should take a moment to explain Haiti's broader crisis.

Basically, life has never been easy in Haiti,

but it's gotten progressively worse across the last decade and a half.

All the way back in 2010, somewhere between 100,000 and 160,000 people

were killed in a massive earthquake among the deadliest natural disasters of

the 21st century thus far.

After years of painful reconstruction, a political crisis in 2018

turned into several years of mass protests against then-President Joven El-Mo

ise,

who was then assassinated by a group of nearly 34 and mercenaries in 2021,

an alleged inside job that saw his own wife and his former acting prime

minister

charged with conspiracy in the assassination.

From there, life only got worse.

The post-COVID energy crisis hit Haiti especially hard.

The nation was rocked by an ongoing cholera outbreak,

and it was struck simultaneously with large-scale food shortages that persist

to this day.

In 2023, the country's biggest gangs decided to join forces in a federation,

one that claims to be trying to liberate Haiti and set up an alternative

government,

but one that's actually been incredibly murderous and extortive.

Haiti's ruling government always corrupt beyond compare,

utterly failed to rise to the occasion.

Instead, the acting prime minister attempted a power grab.

He was replaced by a transitional council that also attempted a power grab,

and together the Haitian elite completely lost control of the situation.

So, in 2026, suffice it to say that things are really bad in Haiti,

and the international community hasn't been much help.

Since early 2025, when Elon Musk took his bedazzled chainsaw to USAID,

global aid budgets have run critically low.

Other countries have taken their cues for Washington and scaled down their

contributions

at the same time as a whole range of other global crises have increased the

overall need for support.

The United Nations Security Council, meanwhile, approved a force in 2023

that was supposed to send thousands of global police and military personnel to

address the situation,

but that force ended up being deeply underwhelming.

It was replaced in October 2025 by a success omission,

the Gang Suppression Force, or GSF, but that, too, has failed to live up to

expectations.

The GSF is supposed to include roughly 5,500 personnel to help the Haitian

national police

and the armed forces restore order.

But right now, only around 2,000 of those troops have arrived.

Among their number are around 125 troops,

mostly airmen from El Salvador, who've been focused on operating a helicopter

unit

to bring soldiers from place to place and perform medevac duties.

It was four of those same Salvadoran troops who went missing after an ambush on

the 18th of October,

in a densely populated city of roughly a quarter million people called Coir de

Bouquet.

Located about 13 kilometers northeast of Porty Prince,

the city is one of the places that's been hardest hit by the gang insurgency,

and at the time of the kidnapping, it was known to be partially overrun by the

gangs.

And that's important to keep in mind, because on the day of the kidnapping,

these four Salvadoran airmen chose to drive their armored vehicle into a red

zone,

an area that was confirmed to be under gang control.

There, they visited a local market to stock up on supplies,

although international experts have noted that this was a highly risky journey,

in an area controlled by a particularly violent group,

Shen Mushan, near the territory of another group that's known for kidnappings,

the 400 Moizzo Gang.

Speaking to the Associated Press, Diego DeRin of the International Crisis Group

explained that the Salvadorans ended up going deep into gang territory

without the kind of security detail that you'd typically expect to see in that

situation.

After they visited the market, the Salvadorans' vehicle was attacked with

planted explosives.

It was their vehicle on fire, the Salvadorans fled the scene,

but at some point later that day, they were taken hostage under unclear

circumstances.

According to some Haitian media reports, they were taken by the Chant-Washan

gang,

though those reports are unreliable and they don't necessarily mean that Chant-

Washan

has the Salvadorans right now.

The GSF sent a helicopter to search the area, but it was forced to turn back

under fire,

and although a later helicopter offensive by the GSF and the Haitian National

Police

reportedly killed at least 18 gangsters near the area where the Salvadorans

disappeared,

they found no trace of the kidnapped troops.

By that time, of course, the president of El Salvador was already aware of the

situation,

and once it was clear that the troops wouldn't be recovered quickly,

but Kayleigh wasted no time in ordering his own military forces into action.

To give an idea of the context here,

Kayleigh is a man who has built his entire reputation as a world leader around

his crackdowns against

street gangs in his own country.

After declaring a state of emergency in 2022 that he's renewed ever since,

Kayleigh has overseen the arrests of what his government lists as approximately

90,000 people

with connections to organised crime, although independent rights groups put the

figure closer

to 120,000 or even more.

That number equates to roughly 2-3% of all adults in El Salvador.

Many of whom have been imprisoned in Bukele's notorious sea cod facility,

or otherwise shuttled into the country's opaque detention system

with little to no contact with the outside world.

Although Bukele's approach has been highly controversial,

it's regarded as a success across the Latin American right,

and he's been so successful in fact that right-wing candidates from Colombia to

Peru to Costa Rica

have all won their respective presidencies on pledges to replicate Bukele's

initiative.

So, to have four of his own troops go missing in a gang kidnapping,

in a country where authorities have failed spectacularly in dealing with

organised crime,

was a situation where Bukele was sure to respond with overwhelming force.

In a social media post discussing the kidnappings just three days after his

troops disappeared

into gang-controlled Haiti, Bukele announced the launch of a military operation

to bring them home.

In that post, he spoke to Haiti's gang leaders directly imploring them to

release the Salvadorans

alive and unharmed, and promising that if that happens, then "everything will

go back to the

way it was before the kidnapping." Otherwise, El Salvador's operation would

expand.

According to Bukele, the troops are still alive and are being held hostage,

quoting again,

"Today's attack is nothing compared to what is coming if they do not release

the four hostages

alive and do not take our words as empty threats."

Haiti's gangs, of course, are particularly interested in giving the appearance

that

they've been intimidated and gang leaders responded with videos vowing to fight

back

against a Salvadoran force. But within a day after Bukele announced his new

operation,

Salvadoran officials confirmed that the first 100 Special Forces soldiers

had already arrived on the ground. Fast forward to today, and roughly 1,000

Salvadoran troops

have deployed to the country after a series of shuttle runs from San Salvador

to Haiti on

tactical air lifters sent from the United States.

Speaker Reuters, an anonymous Haitian official, indicated that it's not clear

how long those

troops will remain in Haiti, or who will be in charge, or whether the Salvador

an deployment

might continue to grow. As of the time of writing, however, those Salvadoran

troops

do not appear to be working under the mandate of the gang suppression force.

They are Salvadoran forces under Salvadoran command.

By Wednesday, the 28th of October, none of Haiti's gangs had taken credit for

the attack on the

kidnapped troops, and the leader of the 400 Moizou gang explicitly denied any

involvement.

But after a New York Times report claimed that the bodies of the four troops

had turned up near

Porto Prince, Bukele indicated that the bodies were not those of the men El

Salvador was looking

for. The details here are rather gruesome, we'll believe it to you if you'd

like to research that

yourself, but suffice it to say that while the bodies were not easily

recognizable,

they didn't match the profiles of the missing men.

As for the GSR from the Haitian National Police, efforts are ongoing to locate

the men,

although they haven't had any known success at this time.

Line in the Sand

No matter what El Salvador's troops do next, they and their president are going

to have to

contend with a difficult reality that the fate and the whereabouts of those

four kidnapped troops

is totally unknown at this time. Of course, we can't speak to any conversations

that might

have taken place behind closed doors, and given that Bukele seems to be very

confident that his

troops are alive, there's a strong possibility that El Salvador has received

some proof of life.

But all publicly accessible reporting on the kidnappings would indicate that

right now,

there are no real leads on the troops' whereabouts, with only unconfirmed

reports even

suggesting that they're held by a specific gang within the larger coalition.

As the GSR already knows, it is very easy to disappear hostages into gang-

controlled Haiti,

especially when the gangs know to take extra precautions to get ahead of a

particularly

determined search effort. The international crisis group expert that we

referenced earlier,

Diego Durin, explained to the Associated Press, quote,

"It will be almost impossible to find them unless the gangs agree to hand them

over," end quote.

In that interview, Durin also spoke to the gangster's motivations, quoting

again,

"I do not believe this kidnapping is so much an attempt to gain money,

but rather an effort to prevent incursions into their territories," end quote.

If that's true, and the gangs aren't even asking a ransom from El Salvador,

then the plight of those troops is even more serious than it might otherwise be.

In that scenario, the gangs would have no incentive to ensure that the troops

make it back in one piece that they could be held and hidden indefinitely, or

even killed,

without informing San Salvador. Of course, those gangsters are also going up

against Nayed Bukhayli, a man who is nothing if not committed to gaining

compliance or submission

from his adversaries once he decides that that's what he wants. Looking at Bukh

ayli's crackdowns

against his own people, we can talk all day about the legality and the ethics

of the whole thing,

and that's a worthy conversation to have on another day. But the crackdowns

also speak volumes

about Bukhayli's willingness to accept risk and his willingness to make trade-

offs around the

well-being and rights of Salvadoran citizens in order to bring order and

resolve a crisis.

Put simply, it's usually a good bet for a gang to make, that by taking citizens

or even soldiers

of target country hostage, they can usually get that country to comply with

their demands

to ensure that the hostages won't be harmed. But don't be so certain when you

're talking

about Nayed Bukhayli, a guy who, we shit you not, has routinely imprisoned

people for

collaborating with the El Salvador street gangs because they made payments to

those gangs

while they were being extorted. We're not talking about people who did the ext

orting,

although they were rounded up too, we're talking about people who were the

victims of extortion

and have now spent the last several years in Secot or other detention

facilities.

Again, the ethics and legality of that choice are a worthy separate discussion,

but they indicate

a very specific willingness of Bukhayli's to accept the known acute risk and

impact of

collateral damage in order to achieve a desired result. For that reason, Haiti

's gang alliance

simply can't be sure that by holding those kidnapped troops, they're going to

be able to

deter this specific world leader. Sure, Bukhayli might have deployed 1,000

troops as an empty threat,

or maybe he's going to give the order for those soldiers to dismantle the gangs

in the area where

his troops were taken hostage using whatever means necessary. Already reports

on the ground

suggest that Salvador and troops have participated in local firefights and

otherwise begun to prove

to gang-controlled areas, even before their force was anywhere near its current

strength.

If that's how Bukhayli is planning to go about this, then the gangs may not be

able to

change his thinking even by threatening to harm the hostages or by following

through.

Bukhayli already has all the reputational and rhetorical justification that he

needs

to make the case to El Salvador that if Haiti's gangs are willing to hurt or

kill Salvador and

troops, then the gangs are in need of punishment in the same way that Bukhayli

punished the gangs

of his own country. And we should be very clear here that there are political

benefits for Bukhayli

choosing to respond harshly in this situation. By all accounts, Bukhayli

remains very popular

at home and across Latin America, but he's in a position to try and figure out

what his second

act might be. El Salvador has been stabilized. Bukhayli recently announced a

plan to screen up

to half of the people he's incarcerated for a potential early release, and

other hard-right

regional governments are getting closer to replicating the early Bukhayli magic

with planned crackdowns

of their own. If Bukhayli wants to maintain the prestige and popularity that he

's cultivated,

then he's in a unique position to try and export his anti-gang approach to a

country that is overrun

with gang violence. In doing so, Bukhayli would be stepping into a void where

the rest of the

international community has failed to show up and by taking decisive action and

wiping out the gangs

that he comes into contact with, Bukhayli can make the case again that his

approach to transnational

organized crime should be the approach to transnational organized crime. But we

'd be remiss not to

point out the limitations of Bukhayli's strategy, specifically that the

Salvadoran armed forces

aren't actually all that strong. For one thing, the public claimed that El

Salvador has deployed

a thousand special forces troops to Haiti is almost certainly an overstatement.

As of 2024,

the Salvadoran army only has 20,500 active-duty soldiers in total, along with

another 2,000 each

for the Navy and Air Force and around 10,000 reservists. The actual number of

special forces

troops in the Salvadoran military is kept secret, but the country would have to

have an extremely

unusual force composition to have a thousand special forces troops at a given

time and there's

no indication that that's the case. The country hasn't fought a war against

another nation since

the 1969 Football War against Honduras and its civil war wrapped up in 1992,

meaning that the

vast majority of its troops today are inexperienced in direct combat. Nor are

the Salvadoran army forces

particularly well equipped with only around 120 armoured combat vehicles in

total, around 70

artillery pieces and just a handful of very outdated light attack aircraft. In

Haiti,

Salvadoran troops will be forced to fight constantly in urban combat

environments against gangs that

mostly have small arms at their disposal but have proved entirely able to

conduct guerrilla-style

ambushes, battle Haitian forces in the streets and take over new neighbourhoods

with regularity.

El Salvadoran troops have a good reputation for both discipline and their track

record in domestic

deployments and international coalitions, but Bukele can't simply point them at

Haiti's gangs

and expect success. On the other hand, it's not clear that anybody is about to

stand in Bukele's way.

Any legal agreement between San Salvadoran and the Haitian government for this

troop deployment

to take place hasn't been announced or even acknowledged. If no such agreement

exists and

Salvadoran troops are operating outside the GSF's chain of commands, as they're

believed to be

doing, then El Salvador is in a very literal sense, invading Haiti. But the

Haitian government

hasn't said a word to oppose Bukele and nor are they likely to. The use of

American tactical

airlifters to ferry Salvadoran troops across the Caribbean indicates that the

US is firmly in

support of Bukele's approach and it would be a very poor political decision for

Haitian leaders

to try and fight Washington on anything. Right now, considering how precarious

their position is already.

The nation's participating in the GSF, the nations of the UN Security Council

and the

nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have all declined to come out in

opposition to Bukele.

So in practical terms, this is happening regardless of any legal questions. It

'll be up to Bukele,

it is commanders to try and figure out how to use their available forces as

effectively as possible.

The biggest question of all is one that we just can't answer right now.

What does Bukele intend to do once the matter of the four kidnapped troops has

been resolved?

If they're found or returned alive, does Bukele tell his troops to pack up and

come home?

Or does he take the kidnapping as a way to justify a deployment that he'll then

continue?

If the troops are killed or tortured or they remain missing, does Bukele back

down or continue

until they or their bodies are recovered? Or does he grow his deployment even

further in that case?

Again, we can't answer those questions right now, but we can practically

guarantee

that Bukele is thinking through his options as we speak.

And he might be the world leader we trust most to double down in a situation

like this one.

Thank you for watching.
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