--- title: "Inside Iran's Quest to Crush the Kurds. And More." description: "Fronts video analysis of Inside Iran's Quest to Crush the Kurds. And More, with context on conflict, defense, and security." url: https://fronts.co/videos/inside-irans-quest-to-crush-the-kurds-and-more.md canonical: https://fronts.co/videos/inside-irans-quest-to-crush-the-kurds-and-more/ datePublished: 2026-08-21T16:30:10.000Z dateModified: 2026-08-21T16:30:10.000Z author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://fronts.co/authors/simon-whistler/ publisher: Fronts image: "https://media.fronts.co/cdn-cgi/image/width=1200,height=630,fit=cover,gravity=auto,quality=80,format=auto/images/articles/inside-irans-quest-to-crush-the-kurds-and-more-7c65df21.jpg" type: NewsArticle language: en access: members isAccessibleForFree: false tokens: 4867 --- Welcome back to The Briefing Room, the weekly show that turns the spotlight on the important yet overlooked stories shaping our world. I'm Simon, and this week, that spotlight is shining straight onto Somalia, where, apparently not content with multiple ongoing wars and insurgencies, a series of political power grabs by the beleaguered nation's leader now threaten a whole new civil war. After that, we're motoring across the African continent Cameroon, where a 93-year-old autocrat hasn't been seen in public for over 70 days. We ask if he's just getting some well-deserved R&R, or whether the Cameroonian government is now enacting a real-life tribute to weekends at Bernie's. But first, we're traveling to Iran, where a war-with-in-a-war is escaping the world's attention, as Tehran engages in a campaign to crush the Kurds. As always, thank you for subscribing. It's subscriptions that help pay for this content, covering more obscure topics, as well as allowing us to cover niche stuff over on the main channel. And now, let's get stuck into Iran's Kurdish side quest. devolving East crisis is centered on a small handful of critical flashpoints. Strait of Hormuz, key bases and infrastructure around the Persian Gulf, the southern end of the Red Sea, and, of course, Iranian soil. But on the periphery of this conflict, Iran has another score to settle. And on Monday, Tehran made clear just how far it's willing to go to scrub another long-term rival off the face of the earth. That was the day when, in the early morning hours, a pair of Iran's fastest kamikaze drones smashed into the office of the Prime Minister of the region of Iraqi Kurdistan. of his semi-autonomous regional government since 2019, Premier Masur Bazani is one of the most interesting figures in Middle Eastern politics. He joined the Kurdish Peshmerga at age 16, bought in battles against Saddam Hussein's government, and was educated in post-revolution Iran, London, and Washington, DC. He's well-connected with US political and military leaders. He played a key role in the battle against the Islamic State in the 2010s, and he's collaborated closely with US forces during all sorts of Middle East operations, including in these most recent hostilities against Iran. Although Iranian Kurdish militants never actually pulled the trigger on a ground invasion of Iran, those militants hung out mostly on Bazani's territory and would have used his region as a base of operations. In fact, given that Bazani is the head of state of the only truly semi-autonomous regional government left standing after Turkey's peace deal with the PKK and the reintegration of most of the Kurdish-led Syrian regional government of Rehava, Bazani is one of, if not the, most powerful figure in the Kurdish diaspora. Luckily for Bazani, he wasn't present in his office when it was struck on Monday by a type of jet-powered Iranian drone known as the Hadid 110. Stealthy, able to fly at over 510 kilometers per hour and packed with 30 kilos of explosive payload, the Hadid 110 is able to hug the ground and hide within the landscape in a form perfectly optimized to penetrate American and allied air defense systems. Practically speaking, the Hadid 110 is the drone Iran uses when it wants to make absolutely sure that a payload reaches its target and causes maximum damage when it arrives. For that reason, it's difficult to say whether Iran may have intended its strike as a warning to Barzani, given that the strike took place in the early hours of the morning. Iran may have had faulty intelligence that Barzani would be there, or it may have chosen a nighttime attack to try and avoid air defenses. So for that reason, we have to exercise some caution in interpreting the message Iran wanted to send. But Barzani's officers weren't the only facility struck, and in this case, the contrast is rather telling. Iran also struck the home of the man who leads Iraqi Kurdistan's Regional Security and Intelligence Agency. According to the Kurdistan Counterterrorism Service, nobody was killed or injured in the strikes. In a statement after the fact, Barzani was quite transparent about where the strikes had come from and called Iran's attack a threat to his region's stability. But, as Barzani pointed out himself, the strikes weren't much of a surprise. Instead, they were the latest Iranian escalation in a campaign that's been going on for a while now. As part of the US and Israeli campaign against Iran on the 28th of February, Iraqi Kurdistan has been targeted by a total of over 1,000 Iranian drones and missiles, some launched by Iranian proxy militias elsewhere in Iraq, but most of them launched from Iran proper. Dozens of people have been killed and over 150 injured, according to the media group Rudor. Many of those attacks target the Kurdish regional capital city of Abil, although the rest have been spread across a wide geographical area. Barzani and his political allies have largely tried to bring the temperature down, working with Baghdad to try and find solutions where the federal government can use its closer connections with Tehran and mediate on Iraqi Kurdistan's behalf. As for Iran's motivations, well, those are hardly a surprise. Iraqi Kurdistan, as we mentioned, is home to large numbers of Iranian Kurdish fighters and their families who've long since been pushed off of their home soil. Although Iranian Kurdish militias haven't yet engaged Iranian forces directly on the ground, or at least not in any way that's become public knowledge, Iran sees those militias as a real threat. If they were to take up arms and try to advance into Iran, they could split the attention of the Iranian military while relying on local support from a Kurdish minority population in the northwest. Iraqi Kurdistan is also the location of significant U.S. military assets, meaning that through its attacks on Erbil and other areas, Iran has been trying to hit American forces. As of roughly a week before the attack on Barzani's office, the U.S. had announced that its final troops would have been pulled out of Iraq by the end of September, marking a deadline that's now just six short weeks away. It would be reasonable, of course, to wonder just why Iran would attack Iraqi Kurdistan in that case, since an attack on Barzani, a close U.S. partner, could conceivably convince the U.S. to remain. But Iran seems to have calculated. that if the U.S. is still pushing forward with its Iraq withdrawal, even despite the wider war ongoing in the Middle East, then that withdrawal is probably important enough to Washington that it wouldn't be reversed for Barzani's sake. And that strategic calculus speaks to a broader problem in Iraqi Kurdistan right now. Iran is waging, or it's essentially a side campaign in northern Iraq, at a time when global powers are already leveraging as much military force, as much diplomatic pressure, and as heavy a load of sanctions as they possibly can against Iran. So that begs the question, can the rest of the world meaningfully punish Iran for launching these sorts of strikes against a longtime Western partner in Barzani if all the tools that could conceivably be used to punish Iran have already been deployed? Right now, it seems as if Iran believes that the U.S. and Barzani's other international connections won't do anything to save his skin. And if they're right, then Barzani and his allies will have to choose to either try and resist on their own, get in line. Iraqi Kurdistan, on its own, does not have any tools at its disposal to meaningfully punish Iran. Perhaps in a different world, these same Iranian Kurdish forces could pose enough of a threat to deter Iran from future strikes. But those forces have already made clear that they'd rather not enter this conflict, even if they're getting bombed anyway. up, we turn to the nation of Somalia, where an ongoing political crisis of President Hassan Sheikh Mohammed, or HSM, and his refusal to step down from his post threatens to tip the entire country into an even worse state of chaos than usual. Over the last couple of weeks, the Somali crisis has mostly faded from international headlines, but this week is very much back. That's because of a confrontation that took place Monday, when in the overcrowded, vulnerable city of Baydoa, federal forces battled for hours with an opposition faction that's intense on bringing HSM down. The situation in Baydoa has been worsening for many months now, in a flashpoint that's accelerated Somalia's larger breakdown. The city is located in Somalia's south-west state, where, in March, the then-president of south-west state, Abdi-Aziz Laft-Gharin, said that he would be working with the federal government in Mogadishu. If it succeeded, that would have put south-west state in the same position as the breakaway region of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland, both in the Somali north. Unsurprisingly, Mogadishu did not take kindly to the idea of another Somali regional government going rogue, and HSM and his forces decided to nip the idea in the bud while they still had the chance. Back in March, Mogadishu seized control of the city of Baydoa after an intense battle, causing Laft-Gharin to resign from his post and be replaced with a hand-picked Mogadishu-friendly alternative. Since then, the situation in Baydoa has been even more tense than usual. The city is home to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people, and it's a hive of both anti-Mogadishu frustrations and international relief operations. But until now, it been mostly stable as Laftagarin and his loyalists went elsewhere to lick their wounds. over the following few months, the plight of Southwest State dovetailed very neatly with the rest of Somalia's crisis. that crisis, HSM has attempted to overstay his mandate as president, but has unintentionally inspired Somalia's disjointed, partially-exiled political opposition to come together and resist him. After his ouster from Southwest State, Laftagarin traveled to Nairobi, Kenya, to plead his case with many of Somalia's most important exile political figures, and he's been largely successful in getting those exiles to align with the larger anti-HSM movement. But what Laftagarin hadn't done until now was try and retake Southwest State by force. seems to have been what happened on Monday when, according to the Federal Somali Ministry of Defense, loyal to HSM in Mogadishu, the city of Baidu came under attack by opposition forces in the pre-dawn hours in the morning. Using alleged vehicle-borne explosive devices, the opposition militants managed to push their way into the city, engaging federal troops in intense street clashes for several hours. Laftagarin himself didn't appear to take part, although that's hardly a surprise. At age 61, Laftagarin has never been a soldier or defense figure in Somalia, other than in his duties as the regional head of state. forces, however, did claim to have captured the city, shortly before Mogadishu claimed that they'd been driven out. At the time of writing, federal forces do appear to be in control of the city. the true death toll from the clashes has not yet been determined, and neither side's accounts should be seen as reliable, Somalia's defense ministry indicated that around 30 attackers were killed. was this the only confrontation brewing in Somalia this past week. The northern autonomous region of Puntland is also navigating a tricky situation after the regional Puntland government seized three military bases that were previously controlled by the Puntland Security Force, which, despite its confusing name, is actually aligned with the Somali federal government. Essentially, it's a rival force that Mogadishu has been using to try and reassert control, ostensibly through operations that are by Puntlanders for Puntlanders. In their recent takeover, Puntland's regional government managed to overrun a key headquarters in the large city of Galcaio, population over half a million. There, some 161 pro-Mogadishu fighters were arrested, while others fled into a nearby area controlled by a pro-Mogadishu state government. Puntland has accused Mogadishu of using the base and the fighting forces stationed there to try and funnel weapons into the city, potentially undermining Puntland's control or laying the foundation for a local revolt. Two other important bases have been captured without resistance within just the first half of this month. With those takeovers, it's become abundantly clear that Puntland is gaining in power and may soon have the force required to fully consolidate control over its own territory, setting itself up as the most likely region to host a much larger opposition campaign. Both of these developments come at a very concerning time, as the African Union Stabilization and Support Mission in Somalia, better known as OSUM, has accelerated its handoff defense responsibility to the somali military put simply this is not a great idea even at the best of times somalia's military is slowly improving and it hosts some tip of the spear units that are very highly skilled but on balance it's nowhere near the fighting strength required to keep control over the country it's also dealing with two regions that are essentially outside mogadishu's control and preparing to face further threats from opposition forces in other regions all the while recent developments would indicate that the jihadist insurgency al-shabab is gaining in confidence over the last several months al-shabab has stepped up its attacks and its quieter infiltration efforts around the outskirts of bogadishu itself it also appeared to carry out what was basically a contract killing in mogadishu on behalf of yemen's houthi rebels in a special insurgency crossover episode power hour that nobody needed so al-sam is retreating from somalia and federal forces are being asked to keep control by themselves at a time when puntland is walling itself off al-shabab is coming closer to its ultimate target baidoa is under serious threat and hsm's claim to his presidency remains paper thin for our final story today let's turn our attention to the central african nation of cameroon to ask the question that many within the country have been asking for weeks now where exactly is the president since 1982 cameroon has been ruled by one man paul beer a bureaucrat who rose to prominence under president ahmadu ahido ahido ahido appointed beer as prime minister in 1975 and when the former resigned from the presidency beer took over since then cameroon has effectively been the paul beer show as he promoted those who were loyal to him eliminated dissent and consolidated power in october last year at the ripe young age of 92 beer won an eighth term in office securing 53.66 of the vote compared to the 35.19 that his former ally turned rival isa chiroma bakari received bakari and beer's other opponents called the results fraudulent and despite a brief wave of protests and violence paul beer was sworn in on the 6th of november and at first his schedule continued as normal he received the vice president of equatorial guinea for a state visit delivered his traditional new year's speech met the pope and even spared some time to meet with the deputy commander of u.s africa command and then in june the public appearances stopped on the 7th of that month beer left the capital yayunde with his wife chantal beer and a handful of government officials for what his office described as a brief private stay in europe he hasn't been back since now this isn't the first time that beer has disappeared from the public gaze he vanished for about three weeks in 2004 about 40 days in 2020 and 42 days in 2024 in fact beer disappears so often that the cameroonian people often call him the remote control president This one, however, is his longest public absence. time we're recording this, on the 19th of August, will have been absent for 73 days, or roughly 20% of the year. And that absence has raised a very important question. ruling the country with Beer gone for so long? its part, the government insists that Beer is still in charge, even if he's away. Minister of Communications, René Emmanuel Sardi, that Beer was in good health and working from Geneva, adding that reports to the contrary are a pure fantasy and malicious manipulation aimed at destabilizing opinion. nation's higher education minister agreed, telling the press that Beer was meticulously following the file submitted to him by his aides, wherever he was. to the government's credit, there was a decree issued on the 3rd of August reshuffling the military's high command. Cameroonian constitution gives the president the sole power to appoint military officials, so the fact that this decree was issued was meant to convince the general public that the president was still alive and working. However, many observers are still not convinced that this isn't a Cameroonian rehash of Weekend at Bernie's, or Weekend at Mushtaba's, for those following Iranian politics. nothing short of a public appearance by the president will convince them otherwise. still leaves the question of who's the country unanswered. that's a really important question, because whoever is running Cameroon right now will most likely be the one running it when Paul Beer attends the big dictator's convention in the sky. Which might be sooner rather than later, given that, you know, he's 93 years old. person who should be running the country is Prime Minister Joseph Nogute, the nominal head of government. However, Beer has concentrated so much power in his hands that the Prime Minister has a largely ceremonial role. Complicating matters is the fact that in April, the Cameroonian Parliament overwhelmingly approved a constitutional amendment to reintroduce the position of Vice President, who, according to the bill, will automatically assume the presidency if President Paul Beer dies, resigns, or becomes incapacitated. Given the importance of the position, and the fact that Beer is, as we keep emphasizing, 93 years old, observers expected that it would be filled relatively quickly. But it hasn't been. because the country is in a high-stakes version of succession that is seeing everyone from the president's children to officials from the ruling party jockeying for the position. of the names in contention include senior government officials like Ferdinand Ngo Ngo, the influential Secretary General of the presidency, Paul Atanga Inge, the Minister of Territorial Administration, and the Finance Minister, Louis-Paul Matase. While these are formidable candidates in their own right, most observers expect the role to go to either Frank Beer, the president's son with the late former first lady, Jean-Irene Beer, or to Frank Hertz, the son of the current first lady, Chantal Beer, who is often referred to as "Madame President" because of the significant influence she wields. Whoever ends up as Vice President will have an unenviable challenge ahead of them, as they will be inheriting a nation that is dealing with a host of crimes. crises, including a separatist war in the English-speaking parts of Cameroon and increasing attacks from insurgent groups like Boko Haran. As to whether they choose to actually tackle those crises, or instead to spear off to Europe for extended stays in luxury hotels, that's a subject for a future video.