---
title: This is the Blueprint for the Invasion of Georgia
url: https://fronts.co/videos/this-is-the-blueprint-for-the-invasion-of-georgia.md
canonical: https://fronts.co/videos/this-is-the-blueprint-for-the-invasion-of-georgia/
datePublished: 2026-11-09T20:00:00.000Z
dateModified: 2026-11-09T20:00:00.000Z
author:
  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://fronts.co/authors/simon-whistler/
publisher: Fronts
image: "https://media.fronts.co/cdn-cgi/image/width=1200,height=630,fit=cover,gravity=auto,quality=80,format=auto/images/video-library/warfronts-europe-nato-1200.webp"
type: NewsArticle
language: en
access: members
isAccessibleForFree: false
tokens: 18902
---

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If you've ever sat in a pub chatting with a friend about potential future conflicts, as warfront fans want to do, we assume, the talk will likely revolve around a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or another clash between India and Pakistan or a North Korean attack on South Korea. A war between Russia and Georgia would probably be quite far down the list, or maybe not even make it onto there in the first place. Perhaps the fact that a conflict already occurred in 2008 has led to misperceptions of the subject being old news, or maybe the fact that Georgia lacks the immediate geographic proximity to Europe of other former Soviet countries simply means that fewer people care.

Whatever the reason, the gulf between the attention given to the subject and its potential impact is vast. Because a Russian invasion or annexation of Georgia holds the potential to be a geopolitical catastrophe. We know what you're thinking, isn't the Kremlin kind of busy right now getting bogged down in Ukraine?

And to that we'd answer, well, nothing lasts forever. The ambitions of Putin and Russia's ruling elite to redraw borders and stamp Moscow's authority over its perceived sphere of influence are well documented and unlikely to go anywhere any time soon. And if the Ukraine war ends inconclusively, then the Kremlin may well be looking for an easy win.

Is such a conflict likely to happen almost overnight? Yeah, not most certainly not. But that doesn't mean Western policymakers shouldn't be worried.

After all, to blink for just a second, could be all it takes to open the door to the Russian military. And then things could get really ugly. How vulnerable is Georgia?

While the tug-of-war between the West and Russia over Georgia has been going on for some time, evidence suggests that Moscow is depressingly winning the contest slowly. Exemplifying the bloc's frustration, stalled EU accession talks with the current pro-Russian Georgian governments have seen Brussels consider revoking visa-free travel for Georgian citizens. Meanwhile over in Washington, the US House passed a bill in June 2026, targeting Russian and Chinese influence in the country.

Now, for most countries, invading Georgia would be less like a stroll in the park and more like a sprint through a minefield in clown shoes. And now you might be thinking, well, why is that the case, Simon? Well, to start with mountains covering approximately 85% of the country's territory, topography alone would be a splitting headache.

To the north, the greater Caucasus, former formidable wall with peaks soaring well above 5,000 meters, while to the south, the lesser Caucasus creates a rugged barrier. And the country's dense forests, which cover roughly 45% of its landmass, would prove similarly problematic to navigate. Frankly, any convoy's moving troops and equipment through narrow mountain passes and valleys may as well be carrying targets on their backs.

With this in mind, the Georgian Ministry of Defense, with support from the US and France, established the Saka Air Mountain Training School in 2006. By training personnel in such a brutal environment, Georgia has ensured that its forces can turn its unforgiving terrain into a defensive fortress. But while Georgia's terrain would make conquest difficult, the nation also has one glaring weak spot, its Black Sea coast.

Widsably Sea possessing a coastguard that no navy, any nation attacking from the sea, would face almost no resistance. As such, an invading force could easily launch amphibious landings targeting Georgia's flat close-door cities, such as Batumi and Poti. Another concern is Georgia's reliance on the east-west highway as the nation's only economic and military artery.

To put it simply, disrupt or control the road, and you split the country in half, cut off the capital from the coast, paralyze the economy, and heavily impede the military's ability to cooperate. Bottom X, such as the Ricote Pass and the Ricote Kitano, are particularly susceptible to being blockaded. That's not all bad news, though.

For instance, Georgia is better equipped when it comes to handling threats from the skies. With the 2008 Russian invasion highlighting gaps in air defenses, Widsably Sea recognized the need to address the situation. In 2015, a contract was signed with US French company Sales Raytheon Systems for several groundmaster 200 and groundmaster 400 systems capable of controlling air space at distances of up to 470 kilometers and altitudes of up to 30 kilometers.

This was followed by purchase of the VL Mika short-range surface-to-air missile system, and the highly advanced Israeli-produced spider-medium range system. To put the cherry on top of the cake, an agreement was reached with Poland in 2024 for the procurement of Polish-made man-portable air defense systems, otherwise known as manpads, although they have not yet arrived amid soaring demand for Polish weaponry. Pivoting to manpower, the Georgian army currently has 37,000 service members and a military budget of roughly $650 million.

That is considered small, both regionally and globally. However, Georgia does have roughly 200,000 reservists to turn to many of whom a battle tested having served in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the US-led campaigns associated with the war on terror. Relative to the country's population, this is an incredibly large number, although the speed with which this reserve would be equipped and become operational in a crisis scenario is up for debate.

There is also something to be said for Georgia's fighting spirit, with the country being renowned for its fierce motivation and warrior mentality, which has been deeply woven into the national identity over centuries of defending the homeland against massive empires. Analysts often fall into the trap of forgetting the importance of willpower, but as immeasurable as this factor is, it plays an instrumental role in influencing how conflicts pan out. There is a reason why the Taliban was able to waltz into a capital ostensibly defended by Western trained troops holding American weapons, while the Russian army is currently four years into a three-day special military operation to seize Ukraine.

The will to fight? Yeah, really, really matters. Now, to address the angry Russian bear in the room, when it comes to an invasion of Georgia, there is only one country with a realistic likelihood of undertaking such an action, and that, of course, is Russia.

Unfortunately for Georgia, many of the factors working in its favor from a defense perspective don't really apply in Russia's case. For example, Russia's occupation of South Ossetia and of Cagia achieved during the 2008 conflict nullifies the defensive impact of the greater Caucasus, because both regions sit on the southern slopes of these mountains. Furthermore, the close proximity of the South Ossetian border to the aforementioned East-West highway, which sits just 400 meters away at its closest point, is another concern.

Given the right conditions, Russian troops could sever it in the time it takes most of us to drink a coffee. Nor would Russia even need to travel far to mount an invasion via the Black Sea? While Ukraine's naval drones may have forcibly upgraded many ships and the Russian Black Sea fleet to submarines, the joke never gets old, the Kremlin is already constructing a new naval base in a Champchirae with an occupied abcasia.

In short, Russia's naval power already sits right on Georgia's doorstep, peeping through the letterbox. Georgia is also highly vulnerable to cyber attacks from Russia, which has used the country as a testing ground for cyber warfare for many years now. In October 2019, Georgia was hit by the most powerful cyber attack in its history, when thousands of Georgian websites associated with the government, the court system, media outlets, NGOs and academic institutions were simultaneously defaced.

The website's landing pages were replaced by electronic graffiti, featuring images of the pro-EU, pro-NATO, former Georgian president Mikhail Sakhashvili. With the words "I'll be back," glimmering across the screens of thousands of surprised users. Another variable to consider is the sheer disparity in size.

With Georgia being just 10% the size of Ukraine, a Russian invasion would inevitably be far simpler than the current quagmire that is Ukraine. Moreover, with the capital to B.C. sitting precariously just 40 kilometers from the borderline with South Ossetia, it would take just a matter of hours for Russian forces to steamroll to the capital and potentially decapitate the political leadership. The fact that the terrain between the South Ossetian border and to B.C. is relatively flat and open means this might be one special military operation that really does only take three days.

While all of these factors are significant in their own right, arguably the most important is the fact that Georgia isn't a part of NATO and isn't seen as being as vital to European interests as Ukraine. If the West therefore opts not to intervene in a Russian invasion, then it is safe to assume that nobody else will come to the rescue either. And if you're wondering what this could look like in practice, well, we just have to have a perfect example for you.

It's called the Russia-Georgian War of 2008. The build up to 2008, a timeline of deterioration. Now look, before we discuss the 2008 war itself, we need to quickly detour and explain how that conflict ignited in the first place.

Because it's not like Vladimir Putin just woke up one morning and declared, "Today we're Bob Georgia! Bring me my gigantic table and my war crimes bingo card!" Understanding what led to this first flare-up will help us understand what might trigger a second invasion. The TLDR version is that the 2008 war was the sudden climax to years of deteriorating relations.

By the time the first shot was fired, ties between Debilsi and Moscow had been on a steep nosedive for nearly two decades. The deterioration began around 1990 when the Soviet Union went to the great Marxist paradise in the sky. Georgia joined the other former component states in declaring independence, only for some of its own regions to attempt to break off and go their own way.

Bloody separatist wars followed in Abkhazia, then South Assisha. Georgia with a considerable degree of justification, a year's Kremlin of covert ly providing weapons, equipment and training to the separatists. While remaining legally and internationally recognized as Georgian territory, the Russian-backed separatist movements in both regions had successfully established de facto independent self-governance by 1993.

And remember that, because it's important, in about two minutes, start the clock. The next few years bumped along in a holding pattern of mutual animosity. Moscow's strong-armed Georgia into joining the Commonwealth of Independent States, while Debilsi tolerated the presence of Chechen rebels on its territory.

But the turning point came in late 2003 when tens of thousands of Georgians took to the streets in what became known as the Rose Revolution. Now, if you're familiar with the concept of "color revolutions," you'll already know the main beat zip. Following a highly corrupt election that resulted in victory for the Kremlin's favored candidate, protesters began calling for more alignment with the West, less reliance on Russia, and just generally for the ruling class to stop being such money-hungry dick heads.

The government backed down, new elections were held, and so pro-West and reformer Mikhail Sakashvili ascended to power. For the Kremlin, this was a little like-hearing that Putin's personal doctors had run out of Botox, unwelcome news in the extreme. Sakashvili promised to pull Georgia out of the Russian sphere of influence, integrate with the West, and join NATO.

Keep it to his word, Sakashvili successfully ousted the pro-Russian autocrat, Ashlan Abashide from the southwestern region of Adjara in May 2004, and successfully reasserted control over the breakaway statelet. The next major flashpoint came in January 2006, when a series of mysterious explosions sabotaged the main gas pipelines between Russia and Georgia. With temperatures dropping to below minus 10 degrees Celsius, Georgia was forced to turn to new energy suppliers, such as Azerbaijan, to meet its needs.

While no investigation ever produced a smoking gun in Kig as a Kremlin to the explosions, no one in their right mind thinks that this was anything other than hybrid Russian warfare. Things continued on this downward trajectory for the next two years. Georgia arrested Russian military officers for espionage and terrorism, so Moscow suspended all travel between the two nations.

Georgian wine was banned in Russia, and ethnic Georgians living there were rounded up and deported. But it was only in early 2008 that things really went off the rails. That February, a number of western nations recognized Kosovo's independence from Serbia, a move Putin called "illegal, ill-conceived, and immoral" while also accusing Europe and the US of having double standards.

As far as Putin was concerned, the move constituted a flagrant violation of international law. The so-called Kosovo precedent would later be used by the Kremlin as a legal and political justification to intervene in Georgia and formally recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August. But it was what happened a couple of months later at the NATO summit that, in retrospect, made war inevitable.

Today, the 2008 NATO summit is infamous. That's because it managed to look at a seemingly binary choice, should Ukraine and Georgia join NATO, and somehow land on a middle path that made just everybody miserable. QV and Bill C.

U were told that they would become members of NATO, but no action was undertaken to start that process. The result was a Russia under the impression that it had a short opportunity to intervene to stop NATO membership becoming a reality, combined with a Georgia and Ukraine that had gained no extra protection against their former overlords. It is little surprise that Georgians overwhelmingly felt that the West had left the barn door open for the wolves to prance through.

A couple of weeks later, an unmanned Georgian reconnaissance drone was shot down by a Russian fighter jet over Abkhazia. Russia's ambassador to NATO at the time, Dmitry Rog ozhin, suggested that the UAV could have been downed by a NATO MiG-29. NATO General Secretary Yab Duhub Shafer subsequently retorted, "I'll eat my tie if it turned out that a NATO MiG-29 had magically appeared in Abkhazia and shot down a Georgian drone." Following the incident, Russia rapidly built up its forces to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, prompting concerns of a looming military confrontation.

In May, Russia deployed 300 troops into Abkhazia to repair the rail network, leading to the Georgian border. The very same tracks were used just weeks later to support Russian trains and tanks rolling to the frontlines. And as if it couldn't become any more obvious what was coming, in July, a large-scale Russian military exercise was held in Russia's North Caucasus, involving 8,000 military personnel, 700 combat vehicles, and more than 30 aircraft.

The operation occurred at the same time as immediate response, another large- scale exercise comprising U.S., Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Ukrainian soldiers designed to train forces for coalition operations was happening. For those keeping score, is it basically how Russia rolls when it wants to invade a former Soviet state? Late 2021 and early 2022 were also characterized by a massive military build-up on Ukraine's border under the guise of "exerc ises" and accompanied by the Kremlin being all, like… ust… invade a peaceful neighbour?

Are you restless? You're so convinced that Russia is evil. I mean, it's not like whatever flat and silly is a slaughter innocent civilians on our gigantic scale.

Right? And all of this is worth mentioning, because if another conflict breaks out with Georgia, it's likely to start in a similar way. With staged provocations, diplomatic spats, and a military build-up that the Kremlin keeps insisting is… peaceful.

Really though, this is all window dressing for the main event, the invasion that summer. An invasion that may give us a clue as to what a future Russia-Georgian war might look like. 2008 had panned out the legacy of the Georgian war. On 7 August 2008, a warm and humid summer evening was interrupted by a surprise Georgian Persian into south Ossetia.

The invading force made it as far as the capital, Shinkwali. The attack came despite Georgian forces and separatists in south Oss etia agreeing to observe a ceasefire and hold Russian-mediated talks, just as earlier. As it transpired, Georgia, seeing the writing on the wall, had concluded that war was inevitable and that they would be better off landing the first blow.

That… was a miscalculation. While it was Georgia that shot the starting gun on the war, that did not stop Georgian officials from blaming South Ossetian separatists for initiating the conflict, citing artillery and mortar attacks in the days leading up the Georgian assault. There is a widespread consensus among analysts that the separatists' attacks were a deliberate trap engineered to provoke a military response from Georgia.

And… my word… did they ever take the bait? The first move for advantage enjoyed by Georgia proved to be short-lived. As the following day, Russia responded.

It started in the early hours in the morning when Su-24 fighter bombers entered Georgian airspace to begin the air campaign. Targeted airstrikes struck both civilian military infrastructure before Russian troops poured into Shishkavali to support separatist troops and engage Georgian forces. The fighting was characterized by a chaotic street- to-street fighting, Russian air dominance, and the widespread use of scorched earth tactics which saw ethnic Georgian villages looted and set ablaze.

Nor was the fighting confined to the area around South Ossetia. On the night of August, just one day after full-scale fighting broke out, Russian warships from the Black Sea Fleet staged landings off the coast of the breakaway region of Acacia. Thousands of troops, including naval infantry and airborne troops, landed successfully, opening a western front against Georgia.

The move allowed Russia to rapidly seal off Georgia's western coastline, with a Russian navy simultaneously setting up a naval blockade. Once the troops were ashore and advanced south, they entered the port of Poti and completely destroyed the remaining vessels of the Georgian navy right at their peers. Back in South Ossetia, it took just three days for Russian troops to overwhelm Georgian forces and retake Shishkavali.

The breakthrough came when a second wave of Russian reinforcements joined the effort, and by the 10th of August, Georgia had announced the imposition of a ceasefire, along with the withdrawal of its troops from South Ossetia. There were difficulties implementing the ceasefire, not least because Russia rejected the proposal. It took a considerable effort by then-French President Nicholas Sarkozy to broker a six-point deal to stop the fighting.

With Russian forces advancing, Sarkozy flew to Moscow to speak with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, before heading to Tabilsi to secure a reluctant consent from Saakashv ili. Although the fighting only lasted for five days, it was the first time that the international community truly grasped just how miserably Russia's post-Cold War assimilation into the western liberal international order had failed. As political analyst Peter Dickinson put it writing for the Atlantic Council, "The conflict itself was over within a matter of days, but the repercussions of the Russian-Georgian War continue to reverberate." And yeah, he wrote that before the Ukraine war started.

In terms of the direct impacts, approximately 850 people were killed, including 365 South Ossetians, 170 Georgian troops, and 65 Russian soldiers, although it's worth pointing out that a sixth of Russia's entire death toll was produced by road accidents rather than Georgian fire. An additional 100,000 people were displaced as a result of the fighting. In the end, the conflict produced a decisive military victory for Russia, which shifted the region's borders and security landscape.

By securing control over the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhaz ia, which constitutes approximately 20% of Georgia's territory, Russia bolstered its strategic standing in the region. The fact that Russia's permanent military bases and control over critical mountain crossings still endure 18 years later should be proof enough of that and proof that I'm feeling real old. If anything, the breakaway territories have since fallen even further under Russian control.

In May 2026 Putin signed the deepening Allied Interaction Agreement with de facto South Ossetian President Alan Gagliev. As a result, Russian citizens can now legally serve as officials in the region, removing the final barrier to direct Russian rule. No time was wasted in moving this process forward.

And on the 8th of June, 2026, South Ossetia's Prime Minister resigned to make way for Marat Campbellov, a career Kremlin bureaucrat who was parachuted in to take the reins a little over a week later. Gagliev then resigned as president on the 23rd to take a flashy new job in Moscow as an advisor within Putin's administration. In his farewell speech, he stated, "Today, our task is to ensure that our cherished dream comes true, to overcome the fate of a divided people and reunite with North Ossetia, reunite with great Russia." Although his words prompted Kremlin spokesperson to meet through Pascov to deny that an annexation was underway, it is hard to imagine Gagliev making things any clearer, short of standing naked atop the tallest building in South Ossetia and screaming, "Alex, me Russia!

Alex, me hard, baby!" It is important to acknowledge that the 2008 war wasn't a complete success for the Kremlin. For instance, Russia had hoped that the war would force Georgia to renounce its desire to integrate with the Western NATO. Needless to say, with events unfolding in the manner they did, public and political resolve in Georgia to resist Moscow's demands rose to an all-time high.

Debussy did not buckle, and the objective of fully integrating into the EU and NATO remains enshrined in Article 78 of Georgia's Constitution to this very day. Russian leaders had also intended for the conflict to bring about regime change. This was made clear by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and yeah, that's the same, Lavrov, who is still harping on today about Ukraine's imminent defeat.

Oh, when he told US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the height of the wars that, quote, "Sakajabili must go." While conflicts failed to achieve this, by severely damaging Sakajabili's reputation, it did tip over the first domino in a long sequence of events that would eventually culminate in him finding himself behind bars in a Georgian prison where he remains to this day. Yet even with Sakajabili removed in the pro-Russian-Georgian dream party in power, anti-Russian sentiment in Georgia today remains incredibly strong. With all this in mind, the extent to which Russia achieved its objectives demands a nuanced outlook.

For sure, Russia delivered a decisive strategic military victory and successfully used a frozen territorial conflict to derail Georgia's path to NATO. However, it fell short of the total capitulation Russian leaders dreamt of. In fact, there's evidence that the Kremlin was pretty embarrassed by how poorly its forces fared given their sheer technical and numerical advantage.

And I mean, what? The Russian military had to before me. Never.

A number of operational military flaws were also exposed, including poor air-to -ground coordination, a lack of precision-guided munitions, and a vulnerability to electronic warfare. One of the most embarrassing manifestations of Russian incompetence was the number of friendly fire incidents, which included six Russian planes being downed. Still, a victory is a victory, and one of the key factors that sealed Georgia's fate in 2008 was the lack of intervention from the west.

Saqeshvili's gamble that the US or Europe would send troops to assist the war effort turned out to be as smart as putting your entire life savings into Trump's meme coin. While you might be feeling sorry for the guy, he was amply warned against such a strategy, with rice warning Saqeshvili at a private dinner into Bilsey just one month before the hostilities quote, "Whatever you do, don't let the Russians provoke you." You remember when President Bush said that Moscow would try to get you to do something stupid, and don't engage Russian military forces? No one will come to your aid, and you will lose.

Hell of a quote. Seen in the cold light of 2026, many historians consider the western response to the Russia, Georgian war to have been a miserable strategic failure. To start with, the response was fragmented.

Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania adopted the most hawkish stance with the country's leaders going as far as to travel to Bil sey, oh well, Russia advanced. Standing shoulder to shoulder with Saqeshvili, Polish President Lech Kachinsky ominously warned in a famous speech quote, "Today, Georgia, tomorrow, Ukraine, the day after tomorrow, the Baltic states, and later, maybe it will time for my country, Poland." And yeah, Poland's warning people that Russia was up to no good, only to be completely ignored would become something of a declining future of the next two decades, wouldn't it now? In another echo of our time, a far weaker stance was taken by Germany and France, the same countries that blocked Georgia from receiving a membership action plan for joining NATO.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel rubbed salt in the wound by avoiding placing all of the blame on Russia, stating that quote, "It is rare that all the blame is on one side. In fact, both sides are probably to blame. That is very important to understand." That aged well, Angela.

So, not exactly the damning indictment of Russia's actions that Debilsi would have hoped for. While the Bush administration was a little tougher in its rhetoric toward Russia, it was not exceptionally so. And then Obama came in, wanting a reset with Moscow, and things went back to the pre-war status quo of watching Russia stomp around, bullying its neighbors, and then going all like, "Hmm, they weren't asking for it.

You know, I mean, you did see what Ukraine was wearing, right? Right?" Ultimately, the West did not impose any meaningful economic or political sanctions on Russia after the 2008 war. With virtually no lasting consequences for Russia, is anyone really surprised that the Kremlin was emboldened to move against Crimea six years later?

Georgia had essentially served as a Russian beta test of the West's prepared ness to stand in Moscow's way in the post-Soviet space, and the West flunked it completely. Good job. Good job.

Didn't come back to bite us all in the ass at all. So, we've got enough flavour of what war looked like in Georgia the last time around. But the 2008 war now took place nearly two decades ago in a very different geopolitical climate.

Obviously, a sequel wouldn't start in exactly the same way. So, what could spark a rematch? What could cause another war?

For residents in northern Georgia living under Russia's shadow, the fear of another war has never dissipated, while the two countries may not currently be at war in the traditional sense. A comprehensive hybrid warfare campaign has been playing out for years. According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, quote, "The Kremlin's emboldened military intervention and territorial occupation, economic embargoes, energy leverages, political cooperation, corruption, and information warfare." The Kremlin's objective is clear to undermine Georgia's statehood and derail the country from its democratic and economic development and Euro-Atlantic integration path, as well as entrenched Russian strategic dominance.

With Russia bogged down in the quagmire that is the war in Ukraine, hybrid strategies provide Moscow with a means to pursue long-term objectives without triggering a conflict that it cannot afford. In many ways, the hybrid warfare campaign in Georgia is having the desired effects, with the country sliding further into Russia's orbit. This can, in considerable part, be attributed to the pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream Party, which was elected in 2012 partly as a result of the fallout from the 2008 war.

For example, in April 2024, the Georgian government introduced its law on transparency of foreign influence, a move that mirrored Russian foreign agent legislation. The decision required NGOs and media outlets receiving more than 20% of their annual revenue from abroad to register as, quote, "organizations pursuing the interest of a foreign power." Aggressive censorship and online monitoring have also been introduced. In May 2026, a so-called "division for combating hate speech" was formed to monitor public communication.

Critics maintain that the unit's actions amount to state censorship with vague definitions being used to silence journalists, activists, and political opponents. Additional examples of Georgia yielding to Russia's strategic interests include the imposition of sweeping restrictions on LGBTQ+ rights, threatening to outlaw EU- aligned domestic parties, and refusing to implement Western economic sanctions on Moscow. An important consideration here is the overwhelmingly pro-Western Georgian public.

Widespread demonstrations have been held in waves since early 2023, and at the time of writing, the anti-government pro-European resistance has officially surpassed 600 consecutive days of continuous, nightly demonstrations outside the Georgian Parliament building into Bilsey. This is the longest-running continuous protest movement in the country's post- Soviet history. While the daily effort is sustained by a dedicated core group of activists, flashpoints, anniversaries, and holidays have seen large, multi-thousand-person marches erupt.

These major waves frequently explode into violence, resulting in brutal police crackdowns. Security forces heavily utilize water cannons, tear gas, pepper spray, and flash banks. Human rights monitors have documented systematic abuses, including unlawful strip searches and threats of sexual violence against female activists.

Protesters have used shields to protect themselves while throwing stones and bottles, as well as shooting off fireworks. The next Georgian parliamentary elections must be held by late October 2028. We are sure to add a tinderbox for intense protests to erupt, and there is a high risk of the vote being either manipulated or rigged.

Following the disputed 2024 election, Georgia's then-pro-Western president, Sal ome Jorah Pajivli, condemned the vote as being a "total falsification." This dance clashed with that of Georgia's Prime Minister, Iraq Lee Kobak Hidzi. He argued that, quote, "irregularities happen everywhere, in every country." The four opposition parties refused to recognize the election results, and one analysis, released as a preprint, placed the number of manipulated votes at between 90,000 and 245,000, which in a country of just 3.9 million people is quite a lot. With this in mind, there is good reason to fear a similar outcome the next time around.

If the Georgian Dream Party were to somehow lose the election or be overthrown by other means, such as a rose revolution 2.0 with a pro-Western party assuming power, the probability of a Russian invasion will absolutely skyrocket. Another key consideration is Ukraine. While there is little indication regarding a potential end date, the war just can't go on forever.

As long as Russia is fixated on Ukraine, the likelihood of an invasion of Georgia remains very low, as opening up a second front could be a catastrophic over-extension, as well as deeply unpopular at home. But if the Ukraine war ends with Putin having failed to achieve his objectives, well, let's just say the Kremlin might be looking for an easy win. But Russia decide to invade.

Expect Moscow to disguise its motivations behind some trumped-up excuse. Leading contenders include the "we're just protecting Russian citizens" argument, as well as the even more implausible denarcification narrative used on other occasions. So there's quite a few international developments that could increase the probability of a war.

The main question now concerns what such a war would look like. As is often the case with these things, it is far from straightforward. Now to pull it off.

And now for the juicy bit. Since the 2008 war concluded, Moscow has kept chipping away at Georgia. The Kremlin's dirty playbook has enabled it to make territorial gains, through what's known as "creeping occupation." As the name suggests, this revolves around constructing physical barriers such as fences and barbed wire, implementing surveillance infrastructure, and incrementally extending the border a little at a time, so little that Georgian authorities are wary about going to war over a field or a single street.

But I mean, if you do that enough times over 18 years, those little creepy gains are going to add up. Until Russia feels as prepared to launch an invasion, this policy is likely to remain the status quo. It would take generations for the policy to eventually see the border creep all the way to Tbilsi.

But as far as Moscow's concerns, it at least keeps the ball moving in the right direction. And at the same time, the Kremlin is doing something similar on the political front, slowly pushing the Georgian government to take ever more extreme positions. Social media and independent media are already being clamped down on, while increasingly draconian legislation is making it ever easier to crush protests and dissent.

Assuming this continues, the Georgian economy will become increasingly reliant on Russia for energy and trade. As the situation deteriorates, Western governments are likely to pivot from cold shoulder diplomatic warnings to imposing sanctions such as asset freezes and aid cuts. It has been a horrible process to watch up to this point.

But it is working out for Russia, but there's no guarantee this creeping approach will continue forever. Vladimir Putin might get impatient and try to speed the process up at any time. After all, he ditched the slowly but surely approach in Ukraine, so if that happens here as well, what might that actually look like?

Let's start with the nightmare scenario. The use of a tactical nuclear strike is just highly unlikely. Any such attack would carry significant risks for Moscow, namely regarding the likely reaction of the international community.

I mean, it's one thing for China or India to turn a blind eye to an unprovoked invasion. It would be quite another for them to ignore a Russia that broke the nuclear taboo. And given the Kremlin is overly reliant on Beijing, not to mention Putin's ambitions to make Russia globally respected again, launching a nuclear strike on a neighbor would have insane downside risk for potentially little upside.

Now, that's not to say there is no cynical argument for Russia using a nuke. For instance, one tactical strike would instantly dispel the whole "boy who cried" wolf vibe currently associated with Moscow's nuclear saber rattling, but still. Even the best case outcome for Putin would see Russia immediately become an international pariah.

A far more likely scenario involves Russia launching a limited kinetic invasion of Georgia, as well as that witnessed in 2008, that focuses on targeting the border regions. After all, it worked the first time, so why not try it again? Under such plans, a full-scale attack aimed at taking over the country would be assessed as overkill by the Kremlin, which would instead be content with carving out some more Georgian territory for itself.

Under such conditions, Moscow may calculate that it is necessary to again remind Georgia of the physical risks associated with the path toward Western alignment, say if Georgian dream were to lose power, or to start flirting with the West again as a hedge against Moscow. The aim would be to punish the government to such an extent that the population turns against it, similar to the years following the 2008 invasion after the initial rally behind the government ran out of steam. Of course, this would be a delicate balancing act, as going too far would inevitably rally the population against Russia.

As we've seen in Ukraine, a determined population that really doesn't want to be under Moscow's control can be a hell of a thing, and that could influence Moscow, to instead chisel away and seize another couple of regions rather than comprehensively invading Georgia. One small problem with this is the fact that now, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been usurped, there is a distinct lack of separatist movements or disputed regions left in Georgia for Russia to weaponize. But don't disregard the ingenuity of the Kremlin, something along the lines of a false flag attack or claiming that military operations are necessary to neutralize a terrorist threat could be all the justifications that Moscow feels it needs.

Remember the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine when US intelligence leaked multiple Russian plans ranging from a leak at a chemical plant in separatist territory to a false flag attack inside Russia? While any of those can be deployed in Georgia, with the goal of seizing more territory. One location that could be focused on is the Pankisi Gorge, a Georgian Valley that borders Russia's Republic of Chechnya and is populated mostly with ethnic kists of the Islamic face.

Russian media has often presented the region as a nest for terrorism, manufacturing a sense of threat. If such efforts were ramped up, Pankisi could be a prime location for a false flag operation. While we're on the subject of Chechnya, it's worth highlighting that the Republic could play a role in any Russian move against Georgia.

Although Chechnya sought independence during the 1990s, the territory is currently ruled by Ramzan Kaderov, an authoritarian despot who is fiercely loyal to Putin. Although, just a quick flag, he is reported to be terminally ill at the time of recording so he can't guarantee that he'll still be there in the near future. Anyway, with Chechnya bordering Georgia's northeast, Putin could order Kaderov to deploy his paramilitary forces, known as the Kaderov Steep, and use them as a batter ing ram.

In the summer of 2004, Ramzan Kaderov, who controlled the private militia back then, despite not formally ruling Chechnya at the time, reportedly offered to send in his men during the fighting in South Ossetia, and according to the Jamestown Foundation, quote, "The Kaderovski are clearly the best-trained, best-armed, and most battle-ready irregular forces at Russia's disposal in the North Caucasus." Although such a move does also pose a risk, as in the event that the fighting turns out to be bitter and casualties high, it is impossible to predict the reaction of armed Chechens. Additionally, with Kaderov's health deteriorating and a succession crisis looming, the territory has bigger fish to fry at the current moment. The final likely scenario is a full-scale invasion of Georgia.

Due to the far greater risks associated with such an outcome, and the considerable number of stars that must align to make it happen, the likelihood of this coming into being should be considered low. But, hey, this is what we're talking about, the country that had its ambassador to the United States declare on February the 20th, 2022 that, quote, "There is no invasion of Ukraine, and there are no such plans." "There is no innovation, and there is no such plans. We don't threaten anyone." So, should the Kremlin suddenly decide to attack its other neighbor, what would a large-scale invasion look like?

Well, similar to the months leading up to the invasion of Ukraine, we can expect mass Russian troop support and equipment movements towards Georgia. Given the country's far smaller size compared with Ukraine, this build-up is likely to be smaller in scale than that seen prior to February 2022. Russia may well attempt to disguise the process as routine military exercises.

Indeed, the practice of deception and misleading the enemy is so important to Russian military doctrine that it even has its own name, "Mascurovka", which, if you're wondering, translates to "something masked". Mascurovka proved to be highly effective in 2014, when Crimea was annexed, enabling Russian forces to capitalize on the ambiguity created and annex the peninsula largely without a fight. However, similar methods failed to up the same effect in 2022.

Even ignoring U.S. intelligence, declassifying Russian invasion plans, the sheer scale of the multi-front invasion, which involved 200,000 troops, made it hard at a mask. And the fact that Russia used these tactics so publicly, right before launching the largest European land war since 1945, makes the likelihood that anyone is suck at a second time, a serious long-shot bet, let's say. Still, we should probably expect Moscow to at least try to muddy the waters.

The Kremlin could use its control over local and social media to sow the narrative it wants and create ambiguity. The use of private military companies or PMCs instead of Russian troops could also help to keep things murky. Discerning actual physical troop and equipment movements, obscuring deployments is much harder in the era of commercial satellites.

If even a whiff of something untoward were detected by the West, it would almost certainly be publicized to deprive Russia of the element of surprise. Once all the ducks are lined up, there are several ways Russia may seek to time the attack for optimal impact. The effectiveness of getting this right was laid bare in 2014, when Russia timed the annexation to occur just three days after the end of the Sochi Winter Olympics when the international community was still distracted.

Even more important was the fact that it coincided with the emergence of a political vacuuming give. After Ukraine's pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych was ousted following months of protests. With the transitional government lacking firm control over the military and the country as a whole, Russia basically caught Ukraine with its pants down.

Similar tactics were employed for the 2008 invasion of Georgia, which began just one day before the Beijing Olympics started. And given that Ukraine was invaded shortly after the 2022 Winter Olympics concluded, one has to wonder whether international sporting fixtures aren't hardwired into the Kremlin's war-making plans. We're just saying, be careful around the LA Olympics, Georgia, OK?

In terms of the actual invasion operations, there are a range of levels available for Russia to pull in order to maximize its chances. The first thing to bear in mind is that Russia is likely to prefer a swift and decisive conclusion to the conflict. In terms of what the first move may look like, look no further than Russia's approach to Ukraine in 2022.

While you could be forgiven for assuming that the first exchange involved bullets, you'd be wrong. As noted by Microsoft, the first shots were in fact fired in cyberspace. There is good reason to believe that the same could be the case the next time around.

There are a variety of different forms of cyber-attack that could be used by Russia. Taking Ukraine as an example, the weeks leading up to the conflict saw destructive malware known as Wispagate strike government agencies defacing around 70 official websites and corrupting data under the guise of ransomware. This was then followed by large-scale distributed denial-of-service attacks, or DDoS, that targeted Ukrainian banks and government websites.

Hours before Russian ground forces crossed the border, hemetic wiper malware was deployed over the day of the invasion itself, saw Isaac Wispert strike at least one Ukrainian government network, along with a major attack on ViSAT's KA SAT satellite network as the air and ground offensives began. The tactic of cyber-attacks, accompanying kinetic strikes, continued in the months that followed. For example, when Russian troops advanced on Kyiv and Kharkiv, Ukraine's media outlets and telecom providers faced sustained cyber intrusions.

Efforts were also underway by the Russian hacking group Soundworm to sabotage Ukraine's power grid by using "indestroyer 2 malware" in April 2022, with the objective of blacking out areas in the country's east as ground forces advanced. Indeed, Russia's objectives in this space were not confined to Ukraine, with cyber-attacks also targeting dozens of other countries linked to the conflict. France, Germany, Spain, and the UK emerged as some of the most frequent targets of Russian cyber campaigns.

Accompanying these cyber-attacks were cyber-enabled information operations designed to wage psychological warfare, methods included compromising local government websites to disseminate false surrender messages and propaganda. It is highly likely that similar strategies would proceed in invasion of Georgia. Expect narratives that blame Western provocations and fabricate justifications for the intervention to emerge.

Potential examples include the "we're just here to protect Russian citizens" or "the NATO is trying to encircle us" lines. Other false claims relating to the fabrication of a genocide, Georgia striking first, or the government fleeing could also be used, among others. Outside of the matrix, Russia will, of course, have to win on the battlefield.

In many ways, with the Georgian Wall already breached thanks to the 2008 war, Russia has some strong cards to play. The occupied territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which bypassed the natural barrier that is the greater caucus mountains, would almost certainly be used to spring board the invasion. Similarly, being Georgia's capital and political centre, expect the Kremlin to attempt to pull off a modern-day blitzkrieg offensive.

A similar assault was planned when Russian forces descended on Kiev at the start of the Ukraine. That, of course, became one of the all-time legendary military f*ck-ups as a combination of stiff Ukrainian resistance and sheer Russian incompetence turned the attempted blitzkrieg into a humiliating retreat from the whole of northern Ukraine. As catastrophic a failure as the Battle of Kyiv was from a Russian perspective, though, do not expect the Kremlin to be deterred from attempting a lightning offensive toward de Blisi.

As we discussed earlier, the Georgian capital is so close to the border with South Ossetia that the journey could be made in hours. And while the narrative that Russia remains utterly incompetent is popular on social media, those who seriously follow the Ukraine war know that Moscow is good at learning from its mistakes. In other words, a repeat of the military catastrophe around Kyiv is unlikely.

Considering what the offensive would look like in practice, picture Russian jets such as the Su-34, Su-57, Su-35S and MiG-31K, bombarding to Blisi with precision missile strikes to quickly establish air superiority. This may well be accompanied by heavy bombers such as the Tupolev-TU-22M3, Tup olev-TU-95MS, and the TU-160 participating by launching their massive payloads from long distances to overwhelm air defenses. The Russian navy would inevitably play a role.

Russian ships would most likely manifest in naval assets, enforcing a blockade that cuts off all foreign aid from reaching Georgia's major ports such as Poti and Petume. This would become a far more important thing if something goes wrong and the invasion becomes prolonged as Georgia would struggle to avoid quickly burning through its ammunition, equipment and fuel. Russia's ships and submarines could also contribute more directly to the fighting by launching long-range, clear cruise missiles from the Black, Caspian seas at key targets such as Georgian command centers, airfields and radars.

On the ground, Russian tanks would rumble along the East-West Highway from South Asia. Along the way, Russian forces would likely seize a critical 400-meter bottleneck, where the road runs next to the South-Assician border, splitting Georgia in two, therefore isolating the capital from the western half of the country and the coast. Russian airborne units, known as the VDV, could attempt a rapid helicopter assault to seize key sites, including Tbilisi's International Airport and the Vaziani military base, just outside the city.

Meanwhile, special forces may be ordered to move on Parliament to capture or eliminate the leadership, clearing the way for a puppet government to be installed. Such moves would likely be made ahead of the arrival of main ground reinforcements. Practically speaking, if Russian forces successfully encircled to BC, Georgia will be in very big trouble indeed.

It is quite possible that the Georgian population and remaining military units would refuse to submit and continue to fight a prolonged grueling insurgency. They would face challenges of epic proportions. But then again, it's been done before.

Just look at how the Major Hadim made the USSR's occupation of Afghanistan effectively impossible. At Georgia's mountainous landscape and deep forests are almost as good terrain- wise from running an insurgency from Afghanistan's remote valleys and jagged hills ides. Moscow could also weaponize how Georgia's electrical grid, gas pipelines and major trade routes are heavily linked to Russia.

Cutting cross-border flows of electricity and gas could trigger rolling black outs, and an energy crisis that prevents citizens from heating their homes. While this is a terrifying notion at any time, it would be particularly terrifying if it were to occur during the freezing winter months, when temperatures into greasy can drop as low as -10 celsius or 14 fahrenheit for those who prefer their units to come with a delicious side order of freedom. As you've probably gathered by now, a full-scale invasion of Georgia would be a multi-faceted onslaught characterized by far-graded disparities and capabilities between the two sides than those seen in Ukraine.

After all, even before it first perceived serious western equipment or became a drone powerhouse, Ukraine had vast amounts of artillery and armour that it could call upon. A conflict scenario looks bleak for Georgia, but that doesn't mean they just curl up into a ball and fly the white flag. With its very survival hanging in the balance, Georgians would have no choice but to find a way to fight no matter how hopeless it might seem.

Fortunately, there are still options available to maximise their chances. Georgia's Best Chance Needless to say, a Russian invasion would be a dire, death-con-one situation for Georgia, but fortunately for Georgians, military history is littered with David vs. Galath Wars, where a superpower was humbled by a far smaller nation. Hey, just this decade, both Ukraine and Iran have humiliated far bigger nations that attack them.

The first thing to acknowledge is that the response taken by to Blici would adapt according to the situation and type of invasion faced. For example, if we see a continuation of the current creeping occupation, whereby Russia slowly engulfs Georgia like a python swallowing a deer, then the response will be very different from that scene in the event of a full -scale kinetic invasion. Unfortunately for Georgians, the current administration into Blici has responded to Russian encroachment with an ineffective strategy of appeasement and concessions.

There is little reason to believe that this will change unless the government itself changes. For some civil society groups and anti-occupation activists, the woeful response has pushed them to take matters into their own hands by conducting patrols along the border. However, as unarmed volunteers, whether their efforts can succeed in the face of Russia's overwhelming superiority remains, let's say doubtful.

As one report published by Pona's Eurasia Notes, Russia's borderisation schemes will continue as long as costs are not imposed on Moscow. If a pro-Western government takes the reins, we can expect the current policy of appeasement to be replaced with one of resistance. To be able to turn to Western nations to sanction Russia should the border continue to encroach, and greater resources could be allocated to improve border surveillance.

Other potential strategies include incentivising people to stay in bordering villages and preventing the population flight that leaves territory vulnerable to land grabs. While deploying soldiers is an option, doing so would also play into Russia's narrative that Georgia is an aggressive, Western-backed state that threatens their interests. The government could also turn to international courts to pursue strategic objectives.

Examples include winning a land theft case at the permanent court of arbitration to legally seize frozen Russian assets or using international criminal court-issued warrants to punish specific Russian leaders for their role by restricting their ability to travel. If Russia launched a military push to seize more bordering regions, we can expect to see to Bilsey request an emergency session of the UN Security Council and formally activate Western diplomatic channels appealing for support. Meanwhile, the European Union monitoring mission in Georgia would seek to document troop movements, board crossings and key incidents to prove Russia's actions to the world.

Whether or not Georgian forces robustly retaliate and defend against the inc ursion could come down to who exactly is in power at the time. Of course, for Russia to take such actions, there is a greater chance that it would be a pro-Western government at the helm, but we should still consider all angles. If a pro-Western government is in power, a robust response is more likely with the Georgian military fighting tooth and nail.

On the other hand, if the Georgian Dream party is in control, a greater degree of restraint can apply. After all, the party's political identity heavily relies on preventing a war with Russia by giving Moscow everything it wants. One example of how this could manifest is a "peace at any price" policy, whereby leaders argue that while the loss of land is tragic, triggering a massive war is far worse.

This could also culminate in the acceptance of Russian peace terms, such as formally abandoning EU and NATO aspirations, as well as recognising the occupied territories. For Georgian leaders, selling this to the population is destined to be an uphill battle, akin to a smoker summiting Mount Everest without an oxygen tank. If the Georgian government is perceived to have responded too passively, there is a strong probability that civilians would flood the streets into BC, and as such, don't be surprised if the authorities become more preoccupied with cracking down on internal unrest than handling the external threat.

It is also worth acknowledging that in such a strange situation, the government 's appeasement attempts could become so egregious that the Georgian military mutinies. The military, after all, has a deeply ingrained institutional culture of defending the homeland against foreign aggression shaped strongly by the 2008 war. If they feel that Georgia's sovereignty is being threatened by the government, orders can be ignored and a military coup could occur.

Pivoting to a scenario in which Georgia must defend against a full-scale Russian invasion, much of what we just discussed remains relevant just on a much bigger scale. In terms of what strategy Georgia can implement to give itself the best chance of making it out the other side, it's going to take considerable elbow grease and creativity. It's quite likely that Georgia will have at least some idea that an invasion is coming, so everything should be done in those weeks and months beforehand to prepare for the coming storm.

This could include diversifying supply chains, developing stockpiles and key resources, improving the population's preparedness and coordinating with international partners and organisations. In the final weeks, this strategy could shift to tactical defence, such as digging anti-tank ditches, deploying checkheadchogs, mining important locations, pre-positioning anti-tank missiles, moving back-up generators, and even preparing to blow up bridges, airstrips and tunnels. Anything that might turn Russia's stately drive toward DiBlisi into a logistical nightmare.

When it comes to the fighting itself, Georgia's best option would be to pursue a bloody asymmetric guerrilla warfare campaign. Fortunately for DiBlisi, there is no shortage of historical examples to draw courage and inspiration from. Just look at how Ukraine has fought against Russia, or how Vietnam successfully resisted the world's strongest military in the United States.

To start with, Georgia's weaponised its topography to the best of its ability. While Russia's seizure of South Asia and Abkhazia has enabled it to largely bypass the greater Caucasus, Georgia's geography still presents a number of opportunities. For instance, the Lehi Range, which connects the greater Caucasus to the lesser Caucasus and divides the country into eastern and western halves, could cause problems for Russia.

This is because moving troops and equipment from one side to the other, such as from the coast to DiBlisi, requires passing through chokepoints like the "Rick Hoty Pass". This is a bit of a wet dream that event strategies, due to the potential to block the route, whether that be through collapsing bridges, blocking tunnels or other methods. The mountains can also function as a strategic refuge for retreating Georgian soldiers.

For example, the lesser Caucasus to Georgia's south could be used should Russia take the open plains. Using the high ground to their advantage, these forces could spring ambush attacks on Russian troops, supply trucks and other convoys moving along the road. Alternative mountain retreats include Svaneti in the north-west, as well as KV-2 Shady and Russia.

If the Lehi were to fall into Russian hands, the fact that the city sits in a natural basin could work against the occupars, who would be exposed to constant mortar, sniper and drone fire from the towering cliffs. If the Kremlin wants to hold onto the city, Georgia could inflict heavy casualties. However, unfortunately for the Georgia military, history has repeatedly demonstrated Russia's preparedness to break an unprecedented number of eggs to make an omelet.

In fact, Russia has suffered more losses in Ukraine than any other major power in any war since World War II. It will take a lot for Georgia to inflict enough pain on Russia for the war to be considered to costly to sustain. Where close engagements occur, the Georgians would likely try to ensure this happens in dense urban areas where numbers matter less and local knowledge comes in handy.

Another step would be to stretch Russian supply lines to the limit. Although the two countries border each other, it would still take a considerable amount of effort to get Russian supplies all the way from the motherland to the front lines in Georgia. And don't forget, it takes just one well-aimed, shoulder-fired missile to screw everything up.

Hidden run logistics strikes, the destroyed trucks, rail lines and ammunition depots could starve Russian units of the resources they need to sustain the war effort causing supply lines to wither away. Concerning weaponry, Georgia could take a page from Taiwan's handbook when it comes to preparing for an invasion from a far superior military power. The most obvious example of this has been Taipei's adoption of the occupied strategy in which it is arming itself with a large number of cheap, mobile and highly lethal weapons intended to make an invasion too costly to attempt.

With the harsh reality being that it is impossible for the island nations to outfeed China in terms of expensive fighter jets and warships, Taiwan's government has turned to sea mines, anti-ship missiles, drones, shoulder-fired missiles and other smaller weapons. As highly mobile armaments spread across the island, the idea is to create a resilient defensive posture similar to the spiky quills and a porcupine that would put off even the hungriest of lions. It is also likely that Georgia will draw inspiration from Ukraine, which has set the gold standard when it comes to ingenuity by modifying off the shelf commercial drones and transforming them into lethal weapons war.

To go to a mirror, kind of got a feeling that Ukraine would be more than happy to lend a hand to any country standing up against Russia. We might even see Ukrainian drone operators on the ground training up their Georgian counterparts in person. When it comes to threats from the air, Georgia, which possesses virtually no modern combat air force, must somehow find a way to nullify the Russian threat, which boasts one of the largest air fleets in the world.

In all likelihood, Georgia's air force would be neutralized within the first few hours, as was the case, back in 2008. With Georgia unable to contest the skies from the air, it would instead have to do so from the ground. To achieve this, Georgia could strategically supply thousands of shoulder-fired missiles to small infantry units deployed up on mountain ridges to far down on helicopters in valleys.

Another method would be to utilize kamikaze drones to target jets on the ground. Additionally, with traditional air defense radars possessing the inherent weakness of exposing positions, Georgia would instead likely have to rely on civilian spotters, acoustic sensors, and thermal cameras. If you thought the mismatch was significant between the two countries regarding air power, the disparities concerning naval capabilities are even more extreme.

With Russia having destroyed Georgia's remaining warships in the port of Poti during the 2008 war, Tbilisi subsequently opted to disband its navy, with the focus instead shifting to the coast guard. Fortunately for Georgia, Ukraine has shown that it doesn't require a hulking naval vessel to send a Russian ship to the bottom of the Black Sea. In Kiev's case, significant success has been achieved by using naval drones, western developed storm shadow missiles, and domestic cruise missiles such as the R-316 Neptune missile, which flies low over the water-to-evade radar.

One particularly embarrassing moment for Moscow came in April 22 when the Black Sea Fleet's flagship, the Moscow, sank while being towed during a storm after being hit by two Neptune missiles the day before. It was the first time a Russian flagship had been lost during wartime operations since 1905. More importantly, Ukraine has forced most of the Black Sea feet into hiding in distant ports.

Again, this is a country that does not have a navy, and we can assume that Kiev would once again be willing to lend Tbilisi a helping hand. With all of that in mind, Georgian forces should focus their efforts on similarly mobile porcupine-esque anti-ship weapons and drones that are relatively cheap to purchase, yet pack a huge punch. The deployment of sea mines near critical chokepoints such as the ports of Poti and Batumi could also be used to devastating effect.

Moreover, with Russia currently using the occupied port of a chamshir of naval purposes, Georgia could even target ships, fuel tanks, and other infrastructure with land-based drones and artillery. Another way in which Georgia could emulate Ukraine is by taking the fighting to Russia, striking deep inside Russian territory. In addition to cultivating fear among Russians, doing so would disrupt enemy logistics, divert Russian air defenses, and project a potent deterrent.

Again, this would likely require help from Ukraine or a Western partner, but again, Ukraine might be more than happy to oblige here. The psychological aspect of warfare should also be dealt with head-on. Releasing raw footage of Russian casualties can be harnessed to lower the morale of the Russian public, while films showing the impact of Russian attacks can be used to shock and galvanize support from the West.

Just as Georgian troops fight on the battlefield, the country would also have to fight to ensure the conflict remains relevant in people's minds on the international stage. The weak support for the rebels fighting against the military hunter in Marmar, which has received relatively little international attention, serves as an illustration of the importance of shaping the narrative. Aside from the fighting, Georgia must also ensure supplies connected the country to support the war effort.

With a naval blockade and Russian air superiority more than likely, the best option would be to move supplies via land into Georgia from Turkey, a NATO member Russia really doesn't want to touch. Now, if all of this sounds extremely difficult, well, that's because it is. But remember, for Georgia, victory doesn't mean destroying the entire Russian armed forces, depending on Moscow and putting Putin's head on a spike outside the Kremlin.

Or you can dream! No, to declare victory, all to bleasy needs to do is survive. The International Response Now, the unspoken key to all of this has been how the international community will react.

And once again, that probably depends on what kind of invasion we wind up seeing. Under the current situation with the creeping border, Western intelligence agencies may opt to feed satellite imagery and mapping data to international courts, activists and monitors to ensure the situation is documented. But the fact remains that the West's hands are tightly bound by Georgia's internal politics.

For the US and its allies, offering support for a Georgia ruled by the Georgian Dream party is as close as you can get to just dealing directly with Putin itself. With the Georgian government being omitted from the July 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, the first time in years the country has been entirely excluded from the Alliance's official partner agenda, Georgia's political isolation from the West appears set to grow. Consequently, many Western support would have to bypass the Georgian government and focus on NGOs and civil rights groups.

But given that's exactly what the Kremlin is railing against, that does kind of play in Moscow's hands. Such support could be accompanied by an expansion in sanctions. Examples include freezing foreign bank accounts and enforcing visa bans on Georgian oligarchs, politicians and security officials.

Direct military intervention from Western countries is not expected under any scenario. This extends to boots on the ground, the establishment of a no-fly zone, or anything else that might escalate things to a direct conflict with Russia. But that doesn't mean Washington and Brussels will just sit back and go, "Well, what a shame.

If a pro-Western government is in power, the West would treat it as a frontline partner against Russian aggression." In this scenario, the extent of the support provided to Georgia is likely to be proportionate to how severe the invasion is. The worse the situation, the greater the support. In the worst case scenarios, the West would likely feel obliged to ramp up financial, humanitarian and even military aid.

Regarding what this would look like, the first move following an invasion is likely to involve European leaders issuing statements resolutely condemning Russia's actions. It doesn't do much in practice, but it still has to be done. Crushing sanctions targeting bank assets as well as secondary sanctions on countries such as China and Iran attempting to continue trading with Russia could be levied.

Although, with the West having already deployed its heaviest economic weapons, there is little leeway for massive new sanctions to be introduced on Russia. The EU could also unfree state grants the Georgian Territory to provide a buffer should Russia implement trade or energy embargoes. As the fighting begins, real-time Western intelligence sharing of satellite imagery an early warning day to concerning troop movements would provide Georgian forces with a critical edge.

Military aid would likely focus on weapons that can be moved rapidly, like javelins, N-laws and stinger missiles. The aim would be to fund and equip Georgia for a long-term insurgency. Georgia's defence ministry could also benefit from Western technology, such as high-tech ground sensors, thermal drones, seismic tracking and encrypted radios.

Facilitating flows of Western weapons and equipment into Georgia will be more complicated than in the case of Ukraine, which says long, open borders with four NATO member states. Like a garrison, Georgia is more geographically isolated from the West, bordered by Russia, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia could easily enforce a total air and naval blockade, choking off outside assistance before it could arrive.

Consequently, the Turkey-Georgia border will likely be the single most critical high-stakes geographic choke point of the entire conflict serving as a lifeline for Georgia. Turkey, which is a NATO member but relies heavily on Russia for natural gas, tourism and trade, would find itself in a tug-of-war. So, that's the Georgian support angle well-covered.

But would anybody be coming to Russia's aid? Well, the usual suspects might have something to say, and we mean that literally. In all likelihood, close allies such as Belarus, Iran and North Korea would issue statements falling in line with Russia's objectives.

While you shouldn't expect to see boots on the ground in Georgia from such nations, each country could play a role in supporting the Russian war machine one way or another. For example, Iran, which has built deep technical military integration with Moscow, would likely supply Russia with shipments of short-range ballistic missiles, SRBMs like the Fatah 110, as well as launches, artillery ammunition and critical drone components. Although with recent events in the Middle East taking into consideration, don't expect significant flows if the war would be brought out tomorrow.

China is a slightly different beast. Beijing is likely to maintain a policy of pro-Russian neutrality, which sounds pretty weird, right? By this, we mean it would avoid providing personnel or weapons to Russia to avoid triggering a blow-up with the West.

However, it would also support Russia diplomatically by using its veto power at the UN Security Council to block resolutions condemning Moscow. Additionally, it would act as a vital customer for Russian oil and gas, providing the financial lifeline needed by the Kremlin to bankroll the entire thing. It's also worth acknowledging that China could send weapons covertly of our dual-use goods, shell companies and other means.

Western intelligence agencies have repeatedly exposed a massive sophisticated grey market pipeline linking China and Russia. Looking at Georgia's neighbors, there's little compelling evidence to suggest either would take on the risks associated with supporting Russia. Armenia is traditionally a Russian ally within the collective security treaty organization, a sort of watered-down Russian-led BTAG version of NATO.

However, with the country's relationship with Moscow's sowering over Moscow's failure to honor its security guarantees during previous invasions by Azerbaijan, Armenia is expected to remain neutral. Georgia's other neighbor Azerbaijan, while also an ally of Russia on paper, is also likely to maintain a delicate neutrality. With Baku supplied Europe with non-Russian oil and gas via Georgian pipelines, Azerbaijan is expected to be more preoccupied with protecting its energy corridors from being compromised.

A war on the back burner. So as we end this pretty lengthy video, we've got a final note of comfort. A conventional Russian invasion of Georgia does not appear imminent or even particularly likely in the near future.

The notion that an invasion must be strictly kinetic is an outdated one. Russia is already quite content with what it has achieved, both on and off the battlefield in Georgia. Combined with the quagmire in Ukraine, it's tempting to think that Russia's leaders will look at how much they've achieved in Georgia without an invasion and conclude that launching another full-scale war would just be a waste of resources.

Unfortunately, though, it's not up to Russia's leadership whether to attack or not. The decision lies with one man and one man alone, and none of us are professional readers of Vladimir Putin's mind. Lucky us, I imagine it's quite a nasty place.

Additionally, as we hear at war fronts repeatedly drill into your well-informed viewers, can hit the fan pretty quickly in international affairs. With Tbilisi's hard-earned EU candidate status hanging by a thread, and Georgia representing the last major pro-Western corridor in the South Caucasus, there remains a lot to play for as far as Georgia is concerned. A successful Russian takeover of Georgia, whether that be soft or hard in nature, would constitute a definitive failure for Western foreign policy.

Not to the extent that a collapse of Ukraine would, but it certainly would not be pretty. After getting humiliated in Ukraine, Putin would be able to take regional hegemony over the Caucasus as a second prize. Nor would this just be what the Czechs delightfully refer to as the "potato" medal, meaning "the shit runner-up prize" for those who fail to win anything real on sports day.

The strategic significance of Russia in trenching itself in the region cannot be overstated. After all, Georgia is the central node of the middle corridor, the only viable east-west trade, oil and gas route connecting Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe that bypasses Russia and Iran. And while there is a plan underway to join mainland Azerbaijan with its "Nakhshivan exclave" and therefore with Turkey and European markets, this will become operational at the end of 2028 at the earliest.

And even then, it will initially only be trade rather than the gas pipeline that Europe needs. As such, Moscow would gain a de facto chokehold control over the oil and gas pipelines that cross Georgia, threatening EU energy security. Additionally, whatever works for Russia in Georgia, you can bet your bottom dollar that Moscow will export the same tactics elsewhere, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

Now look, we're fully aware that this analysis comes across as quite pessimistic. But it should. Georgia optimism about the country's future has been shattered and replaced by anxiety and dread.

So if there happens to be any Western leaders watching this video, the message is simple. It's not over. It's all the fat lady sings or Putin falls out of a window.

Don't repeat the same mistakes. For God's sakes, don't wait for a door to go horribly wrong for taking action. Thank you for watching.
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