--- title: Turkey Has an Israel-Greece Problem description: "Fronts video analysis of Turkey Has an Israel-Greece Problem, with context on conflict, defense, and security." url: https://fronts.co/videos/turkey-has-an-israel-greece-problem.md canonical: https://fronts.co/videos/turkey-has-an-israel-greece-problem/ datePublished: 2026-10-24T17:30:03.000Z dateModified: 2026-10-24T17:30:03.000Z author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://fronts.co/authors/simon-whistler/ publisher: Fronts image: "https://media.fronts.co/cdn-cgi/image/width=1200,height=630,fit=cover,gravity=auto,quality=80,format=auto/images/articles/turkey-has-an-israel-greece-problem-6b037d74.png" type: NewsArticle language: en access: members isAccessibleForFree: false tokens: 4066 --- A few years ago, the economists were at a front-page piece featuring an Israeli flag barely hanging on amid an intense windstorm titled "Israel Alone." Given the isolation that Jerusalem was then facing due to the Guards Award, the argument was that if Israel didn't change course, it would end up flying solo. Fast forward to today, Israel seems to have found some new company, and this time around, some of them have F-35s on order. Greece, as well as Cyprus, have spent years moving closer to Jerusalem, even as much of the rest of Europe moves away, largely driven by mutual concerns about what their neighbor, Turkey, is up to. And back in August, Athens put its money where its mouth is, signing off on a three billion-year-old Israeli head-offense network called the Achilles Shield, built in part using the same system's Jerusalem uses to defend itself. Netanyahu, in signature style, is presenting this as an anti-Turkey alliance, which is one of the few things that Ankara is in complete agreement with Jerusalem on. But it's worth asking whether this alliance is actually real or whether Netanyahu has been overselling it. Going shopping For most of the last few decades, Greek head-offenses have been somewhere between mediocre and possible, let's say a solid B-minus. They started to bolster this around the turn of the millennium, with American Patriot batteries first making an appearance, and later with Russian S-300 systems that proved to be rather controversial. In recent years, though, Athens has been taking things way more seriously, and a big part of that is an account of their next- door neighbor. Disputes between Greece and Turkey are as old as time, but they've been heating up over the last decade or so to the point where they've come and comfortably close to actually shooting at each other. Greek officials recorded 25 Turkish airspace violations in a single day this August, including seven F-16s, two of them armed, with Greek fighters scrambling to intercept them. All of this has obviously made Athens quite nervous and pushed the country ever closer to an ally that is also growing uneasy about Erdogan. Israel Greece began leasing Israeli Herundrones in 2020, signed a $1.65 billion deal a year later to overhaul Greece's military pilot training and signed a $400 million deal for Israeli spike missiles in 2023. But all of that paled in comparison to the much more creatively named Achilles' shield deal back in August, which was finalized for a modest 3 billion euros. The deal covers a multi-layered system, so it's less one specific weapon and more a combination designed to seriously improve Greece's air defenses. At the top level is Raphael's David Sling, which handles mid-range ballistic and cruise missiles, and is the same system the Jerusalem has been using to shoot down in bound Iranian missiles. Beneath that is the Barakim X for medium-range targets, and then the Spider, which is Raphael's truck-mounted launcher for whatever else is able to get past the first two. And no, that's not me mispronouncing the name of the French Defense Company. Raphael is a real, separate Israeli company, so no need to break me in the comments. Beyond the actual hardware is a new AI-assisted National Command Network for it to run on, which is designed to merge what Greek radars pick up with data coming in from the Air Force's jets. The basic idea there is to get Greece's radars, fighter jets, and air defense batteries all to talk to one another, rather than operate as separate systems. Athens has not been the only one in Europe moving towards Jerusalem, though even as most of the continent has been headed in the other direction. Cyprus has joined Greece in shuffling closer to Israel, probably helped by the fact that over a third of the island has been occupied by Turkey for half a century. As part of that, Cyprus began buying a considerable amount of Israeli equipment. By the end of last year, these relationships were starting to look less bilateral and more like a regional alliance. The trio held their 10th tr ilateral summit in Jerusalem last December, where they signed a new action plan for 2026 that included joint exercises, special forces training, and regular strategic back and forth. Since then, they've also added plans for a maritime cybersecurity center in Cyprus and agreed to close a cooperation over shared critical infrastructure and emergency response. Now, none of this means that they've suddenly created a bit of radian data or anything like that. There is no mutual defense clause for one thing, but even still, it's hard to see this as anything other than the trio moving closer due to shared anxieties about a rising Turkey. The alliance, of sorts, hasn't been limited to just the military either. The trio have spent years trying to link themselves together through projects essentially designed to work around Turkey. The East Mediterranean pipeline, for example, was supposed to move Israeli and Cypriot gas into Europe via Greece, while the great sea interconnector would do the same with electricity. Neither of these went according to plan. The pipeline effectively died and the cable project remained stalled amid Turkish objections over where it crosses the Mediterranean. It's also the geopolitics of it, although the point is what these projects signaled, that the three would keep looking for ways to connect themselves without going through Turkey. Now, that would be worth paying attention to on its own, given Turkey's increasing importance in the region, but is especially so given the cratering relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem. We've covered that showdown extensively here at Warfront, describing it as "the Middle East's new Cold War", and this increasingly looks like one of the blocks that's forming around it. Netanyahu has been less subtle about his plans, talking about what he calls a hexagon of Allied states, naming India, Greece, and Cyprus, while also gesturing to unnamed Arab and African countries, and most likely referring to the UAE and Samaliland. All of this might sound good if you're in Jerusalem, and perhaps more like a nightmare if you're in Ankara if this alliance is actually taking hold, that is, but there are genuine questions as to just how real the whole thing is. Friends With Benefits Now, when it comes to formal alliances that aren't worth the paper they're signed on, look no further than Saudi Arabia and friends. Not so long ago, Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, which some analysts likened to an Islamic NATO. Long story short, that alliance has not aged particularly well. The Houthi rebels in Yemen, who had already reignited their conflict with Saudi Arabia back in July, escalated to full-scale war levels within weeks of the alliance being signed. Neither Pakistan nor Turkey covered themselves in glories stepping up to help. As Riyadh's airport was being bombed, the two spent weeks dragging their heels, and even now aren't being open about how much they really help out. So, when it comes to this supposed anti-Turkey alliance forming in the Mediterranean, complete with military training, hardware purchases, and all the political rhetoric from leaders against Ankara, you can imagine, we have to be careful when discussing how real it is or isn't. Ankara, for its part, certainly believes it's a problem. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fedan described what the three were up to as an effort to encircle Turkey, as well as an anti-Islam alliance. That said, some nuance should be injected into the rhetoric here. If Greece was able to fight itself in a shooting war with Turkey tomorrow, there is nothing requiring Israel to far so much as a strongly worded press release in Ankara's direction. Reports did surface late last year that the three were considering setting up a 2,500-man rapid response force, but the plan was never confirmed, and Israeli officials quickly pushed back on the idea. Beyond that, there's no joint command structure, like NATO uses as a backbone. That doesn't mean the whole thing is built on smoke and mirrors, though. Greece, Cyprus, and Israel are clearly building something more tangible than a collection of arms deals and the occasional friendly summit. Their military training exercises alone show that, and the recent move towards their defence systems, coordinating with one another, takes that to a new level. So, to an extent, Ankara isn't imagining the emergence of a new alliance, nor is it imagining that said alliance is largely built around not liking Turkey. In some ways, the fact that this stops short of a real defence pact is exactly what makes it so tempting for Athens and Nicosia. They've gotten their hands on some of the best Israeli military technology on the market, and are now privy to whatever intelligence Mossad is picking up on the Turks, all while not needing to sign up for any kind of defence agreement with Israel. That last point would be an advantage for any government, given just how often Israel has been attacked over the years. But it's made all the more relevant, given that Israel is currently occupying portions of Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon, while also technically still fighting Iran. For Israel though, the benefits are a bit more complicated. It has one some new friends, which at a time of growing isolation in Europe isn't something to ignore. And as the designer of these systems, its economy is also getting a boost. But beyond that, Jerusalem has a little else to show for it. While outright war between Israel and Turkey remains quite unlikely, if things did come to a head, there's very little chance that Greece or Cyprus would actually come to Jerusalem's aid. Greece would be under enormous pressure from the rest of Europe not to let any Turkish-Israeli conflict drag Athens in and risk the continent having to take a firm stance on something for once. God forbid. The Cypriots have the added complication of living on an island already part occupied by Turkey. Were they to attempt to join Jerusalem in a war against Ankara? Well, you can see how things might go south rather quickly. This situation becomes even less reassuring for Israel when you zoom out beyond the trio and towards Netanyahu's proposed hexagon. A few of the other countries have genuinely good relations with Israel, namely India and increasingly the UAE. But neither of them would be particularly inclined to take action to support Israel if push came to shove. India would risk all-out war with Pakistan while the UAE has actually spent the last few years improving relations with Turkey, including expanding economic and defence cooperation with Ankara. Realistically, the hexagon alliance seems to be a collection of countries Netanyahu can point to and say, look, they're with us, with how much else to back it up. But just because this isn't a full-blown alliance yet, doesn't mean it never will be one. It may yet turn out that this was merely the groundwork for something a lot more durable. Turkey holds the keys. If there's one thing that you can count on when you're dealing with the Middle East, it's that things are never quite what they seem. So, will this alliance actually hold together? Well, from where we're sitting, the answer likely has more to do with Erdogan himself rather than either Netanyahu or Mitzotakis. Israel can offer weapons, intelligence and an unlimited supply of commerce, but it still can't manufacture the one thing that has done more than anything else to push the three closer together – Turkey's foreign policy. Erdogan puts Ankara in somewhat of a strange position, because elsewhere in the region, he has played his cards quite well. Bond before the war with Iran, Turkey had been positioned itself as one of Netanyahu's loudest opponents, closing its ports to Israeli ships, repeatedly calling Israel's leader worse than Hitler, and going so far as to cut trade with Israel outright as a way of showing that what Ankara said had teeth. Syria has only strengthened Ankara's hand. Turkey backed the rebels who ultimately took Damascus in 2024 and has since built such a close relationship with the new government that Israel now views Damascus as essentially a client state of the Turks. Netanyahu has increasingly started describing the alliance as a radical Sunni axis, essentially depicting Turkey and its allies as the Sunni equivalent of Xi'i to Iran with its proxy forces across the Middle East. To Turkey's west, though, things have been way more of a headache for Erdogan. Ankara and Athens actually managed a fairly impressive detenteance after 2023, and that continued up to this year. The word "continued " there, though, is past tense, because 2026 has just been kind of that sort of year. One of the things that seems to have helped set off this recent escalation has been that great sea interconnector-electric project we mentioned earlier. The project has been sitting half-roading since 2024, but Greece announced back in early August that it had intended to get things rolling again, and from there, it was all downhill in the Aegean. The very next day, Turkish aircraft and drones crossed into airspace claimed by Greece 17 times, with armed F-16s involved and one successful Greek interception, bringing the whole thing way too close for comfort. It really does have to be said that at least part of the warming of ties between Athens and Jerusalem is downstream of all this, even if some of the negotiations between the two happened before tension started rising with Turkey again. The potential for future escalation is a real driving force on the Greek side. Without Turkey, though, you'd be hard-pressed to find an issue bringing the two together. Greece is hardly an enthusiastic partner for Netanyahu. In a Pew Research study earlier this year, only 30% of Greeks had a favorable view of Israel, and a separate Greek poll found that only 20% of the country reports feeling closer to Israel than Palestine. The Greek left has wasted no time slamming Mitzotakis for this either. On the other hand, Greece doesn't particularly need to like Israel, much less Netanyahu personally in order to love their weapons systems. Cyprus is in a similar position given the whole occupation thing. If Turkey is able to revive the detente with Greece, cool its jets in the Aege an, literally, and avoid giving Nicosia any reason to panic, there are plenty of natural hurdles stopping either country from getting too close to Jerusalem. But if tensions keep rising, the political cost of getting closer to Israel will no longer outweigh the benefit of owning Israeli weapons. However, things develop from here, and Kara is also ensuring that it won't be caught off guard. Turkey is currently pouring billions into its own steel-dome head-fence system, some of which has come online already, with the rest expected to follow in the years to come. Meanwhile, it's gone ahead with the development of its own Karan fighters, and has already ordered 20 euro fighters from Britain and is in conversations with Washington for another batch of F-16s to help modernize its ageing fleet. The one remaining hole here is pretty massive, the F-35, and Kara has spent years trying to get back into the US programme, and while that started looking more promising over the summer, the effort seems to have stalled out recently. For some context here, this isn't even about getting a leg up on their regional rivals. Israel is in the process of expanding its F-35 fleet to roughly 100, while Greece is on track to receive 20 of its own later this decade. And that brings us right back to where we started, with the economist cover story describing Israel alone. In a broad sense, their argument still has a point Jerusalem has managed to alienate much of Europe. But here, there very clearly are exceptions to the rule. Thank you for watching.