--- title: "US Forces are in Colombia and Ecuador. Why?" description: "Fronts video analysis of US Forces are in Colombia and Ecuador. Why, with context on conflict, defense, and security." url: https://fronts.co/videos/us-forces-are-in-colombia-and-ecuador-why.md canonical: https://fronts.co/videos/us-forces-are-in-colombia-and-ecuador-why/ datePublished: 2026-10-29T11:00:28.000Z dateModified: 2026-10-29T11:00:28.000Z author: - name: Fronts Staff url: https://fronts.co/authors/fronts-team/ publisher: Fronts image: "https://media.fronts.co/cdn-cgi/image/width=1200,height=630,fit=cover,gravity=auto,quality=80,format=auto/images/articles/us-forces-are-in-colombia-and-ecuador-why-592ec8f1.jpg" type: NewsArticle language: en access: members isAccessibleForFree: false tokens: 4797 --- Deep in the jungles of Latin America, US soldiers and special operators are making their presence known. Across the last several years, Latin American nations have increasingly struggled to fight back against organized crimes, indicates and domestic insurgencies, groups that often blur the lines between narco-trafficking, weapons at people smuggling, and outright resistance against regional governments. But after years on the sidelines slowly building contributions of air power and intelligence support, US Southern Command has been ordered to take a much more direct role, fighting rebels and gangsters alongside Latin American forces. Two nations, in particular, have thrown open their doors to welcome Uncle Sam's arrival. Ecuador, under President Daniel Nabur, and Colombia, under recently elected President Abolado de las Brereia. For the tough on crime governments of the region, direct American support is a force multiplier, allowing their own militaries to do more, fight harder, and lean on some of the most elite special operators on Earth. For Washington, this is a chance to project power, build influence, and snuff out narco-trafficking networks at the source. But for much of Latin America, where memories of US influence during and after the Cold War are still fresh, the newest operations raise a difficult question. How much latitude will US-friendly leaders give to American forces to target transnational groups, however they please? Mounting problems The security challenges that have brought American special forces to Latin America are hardly nuanced. Across the late 2010s and the early 2020s, the region saw a rapid evolution among organized crime networks as relatively self-contained operations spread out would and began to integrate their operations. In a way, the expansion of those syndicates resembled a process of corporate monopolization as powerful companies, or in this case, cartels sought to gain direct control over their supply chains, their shipping and smuggling infrastructure, and their local security in areas where couriers have to move their product. From the Sinaloa and Jalisco new- generation cartels in Mexico to the Gulf Clan in Colombia to the Red Command in Brazil and Tren de Ar agua in Venezuela, those groups have all become more powerful and their operations have become steadily more lucrative. That, in turn, led to several overlapping changes across Latin American nations. While the blind-between organized crime syndicates and rebel groups has always been somewhat blurry, in places like Colombia or Peru, those groups began to feed off each other to a greater and greater extent. In certain factions, had more opportunities to offer their services as protection and finance their operations by getting involved in the drug trade, in human trafficking, and in all manner of other illegal enterprise. Crime syndicates, meanwhile, gained incentives to help the rebel groups remain active as they were much easier to deal with as local authorities than representatives of centralized governments. Organized crime began to build a larger presence in Latin American capitals, port cities, and population centers that happened to be useful nodes in their larger trans-shipment networks. And once they arrived, they developed extensive ties with corrupt officials and set up extortion rackets to intimidate local businesses and residents, all while increasing the region's homicide rate to roughly triple the global average, with far, far homicide rates in some places. But in geopolitics, as in life, every action brings an equal and opposite reaction. And across Latin America, voters have reacted to the growth of organized crime by electing a wave of hard, right-wing, tough-on crime governments. The Golden Boy of Latin America's rightward shift is indisputably naive Bicheli of El Salvador, who declared a national state of emergency in 2022, and has renewed it ever since, using his expanded powers to pour many tens of thousands of Salvadorans off the streets. In right-wing Latin America, Bicheli's notorious sea-core prison and his immensely powerful, but opaque detention system, are the stuff of legend. In his wake, leaders from Chile's Jose Antonio Cast, to Costa Rica's Laura Fernandez, to Honduras's Nasri Asfura, to Peru's Keiko Fujimori, have been voted into office each on the explicit, or implicit, promise that they would bring something similar. And it really should be no surprise that the two nations welcoming greater involvement from the United States are the same two nations that have tried hardest to follow in Bicheli's footsteps. The first is Ecuador under Daniel Nab oa, a man who came to power in the wake of Bicheli's state of exception, promised similar reforms, and has been, should we say, underwhelming ever since. We've published a separate episode on Naboa here, as a France exclusive for premium subscribers, like yourself, if you'd like to check that out. But for today's purposes, just know that Naboa has been trying to lead his nation out of a severe internal security crisis, where a range of gangs and syndicates about overturf, while extracting whatever value they can from the Ecuadorian communities within their reach. The other leader in question is Columbia's Abalado de Esperaire, elected in June of this year, and, as we've often been compelled to point out when we've covered de Esperaire, he appears to be such a Bicheli fan that he even styles himself the same way down to the beard and the haircut. Columbia's internal situation is a good deal more complicated, with the government trying to fight a splintered collection of rebel groups, as well as the immensely powerful Gulf clan, as well as a range of smaller, organized criminal elements. In both nations, corruption is rampant, security forces are badly overstretched, and anti-state factions are well entrenched on territory, where they can hide out without immediate fear of government intervention. Enter the United States of America, under Donald Trump's second presidential administration. Under the authority of Trump and his Pentagon chief, Pete Hegzeth, U.S. forces have run a campaign called Operation Southern Spear, tracking what the U.S. alleges are drug trafficking boats moving northward, and carrying out airstrikes that have left at least 240 people dead since the operation began in September 2025. At the same time, Trump has taken a vested interest in Latin American regime change, whisking Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife out of Caracas in January 2026, and then beginning a long, slow blockade of the island nation of Cuba. But as Trump has been expanding operations against narco traffickers and ostensibly far left-wing governments, he's also been knitting together the region's right- wing governments into a program called the Shield of the Americas. This is a combination political and military incentive designed to coordinate the region's fight against transnational criminal groups, while countering the northward flow of migrants toward the United States. For Washington, the program also has the added bonus of helping to strengthen American hegemony across Latin America to counter the expansion of Chinese influence in the region. But starting in mid-August, reports from Ecuador and Colombia in particular confirmed that U.S. forces were on the ground in greater numbers than what was known previously. Washington has been stepping up intelligence support in these nations across 20 26, even lending air support to carry out airstrikes at times. But in August, Ecuadorian officials confirmed that U.S. special forces were fighting alongside local troops as a matter of course. According to one local official speaking to the American outlet Task and Purpose, America's Green Berets, the seventh special forces group of the U.S. Army, have been especially active in the province of Esmeraldus. There, drug cartels preside over cross- border transshipman routes, where cocaine is sent from Colombia and assert their control over the surrounding region, with regular, bloody attacks against government forces and civilians. The United States hasn't revealed the sides of its Ecuador deployment, though several dozens special forces soldiers are known to be operating there, with the total number probably well upward of a hundred. In one particularly high-profile operation this September, at least 50 special forces troops assisted Ecuadorian troops in arresting over 30 people linked to the Jalisco New Generation cartel based in Mexico. Those special forces soldiers also worked alongside agents from America's Drug Enforcement Administration, or DEA, after an eight- month investigation into cartel operations that relied on Ecuador's ports. According to data from Ecuador, a full 70 percent of all global cocaine moved through those ports, typically on the way to the United States and Europe. Earlier in 2026, smaller numbers of special forces troops participated in a raid to dismantle a criminal hub on Ecuador's coast. They've also taken part in raids against insurgent training camps near the Colombian border and helped to train Ecuador ian troops in exchange programs. In Colombia, meanwhile, U.S. support looks a bit different. Colombia has a larger and more capable military of its own, with deep institutional knowledge and experience fighting a range of rebel and narco-trafficking factions in the Highland jungles. There, a couple of hundred U.S. green bores would make less of an impact, but American money goes very far, especially when it's provided in the form of direct security assistance. Just after Abelardo de la Esperaia took office, the U.S. announced a one billion-dollar partnership with Bogota as part of an effort to modernize the Colombian military. The U.S. also made sure that Colombia would host a large-scale military exercise called Southern Vanguard this year in its 41st iteration overall. This year, Southern Vanguard is much larger than in most previous years, with over 350 U.S. troops expected to make the trip. Then, in the biggest news of all, the U.S. announced a formal expansion of its military alliance with Colombia, including far greater intelligence sharing and surveillance support, as well as direct Colombian involvement in America's specific operations and new support for Colombia to build out its drone forces. Here, U.S. officials have been very careful to stress that American troops are not deployed on the ground, but Washington has sent a growing number of MQ-9 Reaper Precision Strike drones to Colombia and Ecuador. Those drones have been shifted over from Africa, despite the fact that America's Reaper fleet is shrinking quickly, with at least 45 of the drones lost over Iran in 2026. The Bigger Picture On the tactical level, the differences between America's support for Colombia and for Ecuador confirm the world's understanding of the situation in both countries. Colombia, as mentioned, is used to fighting this sort of fight, and after its last president, Gustavo Petro left office, Bogotá decided to move away from its largely unsuccessful attempts to fix its internal crisis through negotiations. Under Abelardo de Espirea, the Colombian military has been unleashed and already della Espirea has taken credit for a number of high-profile killings of senior cartel and rebel figures. In that sense, Colombia's military is a weapon for the U.S. to help point and shoot, providing the intelligence that allows Colombia to know when, where, and why take action while supplementing with drone overwatch and other capabilities that make the Colomb ians job easier. In Ecuador, meanwhile, the military and the internal security forces have had a rude awakening as their country turned from a sleepy little oasis of calm in Latin America to one of the places that's been hit hardest by the crime consolidation wave of the last decade. So, the U.S. sends its special forces troops in considerable numbers to take action against Ecuador's cartels, instead of operating strictly in an advisory role. That way, the U.S. gets to train a higher share of Ecuadorian forces at once through both osmosis and direct instruction, while also giving itself the ability to guarantee certain outcomes during important operations, since America's only units will be taking part, or taking points, if necessary. Zoom out, and the Shield of the Americas program and Washington's other associated initiatives seem to be building something of a unified architecture. The United States just recently opened a new jungle warfare training facility in Panama, where the first U.S. soldiers have started to deploy this month, with an estimated 600 troops expected to be stationed there. The new Panama facility is going to be operated by the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division, a well-regarded unit that will eventually train forces from Colombia, Honduras, and other countries. But hundreds of other soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division will be setting up a new command for Western Hemisphere operations, based out of Miami, while U.S. Special Operations troops, including the Green Berets, will be able to count on the support of U.S. forces at that Panama facility. According to a New York Times report in mid-October, that new command and training infrastructure will be combined with a new Pentagon office that was recently created by Pete Hegseth to help oversee counter-cultural operations across Latin America. Taken together, that would represent an unprecedented expansion of America's military infrastructure across Latin America in the 35 years after the end of the Cold War. As for why the United States is looking to step up its presence, that decision is likely to be the product of a combination of push and pull factors. On the one hand, the United States has been very aggressive in Latin America since Trump returned to office, from the narco-trafficking strikes to the Venezuela Operation to the blockade of Cuba. Trump and his allies have taken great pride in closing down America's onboarder and see those military operations, especially against the cartels and Maduro, as a way to fight the problems of migration and drug trafficking at their source, long before migrants or narcotics reach U.S. soil. The U.S. has placed immense pressure on countries in the region, but it sees as being non-compliant, too weak, or too unwilling to allow the U.S. to step in, like Mexico and Brazil, and thus its built incentives for smaller nations to get in line when Washington comes calling. But on the other hand, the American expansion in the region is also a response to growing demand as the recent surge of tough on crime right-wing populist leaders has shown. Latin America may not have an appetite for over U.S. intervention in favor of dictatorial regimes, like the region observed during the years of Operation Condor and other CIA-backed initiatives. But many of the region's residents do feel that their governments have to get their security situations under control by any means necessary. If partnership with the United States is a way to achieve that result, then so be it. And even better, if security compliance with the U.S. will help to protect trade relationships in an era of Trump-style tariffs against nations perceived as being less compliant, all better. With that, it's highly likely that U.S. operations will expand further in the coming years before Trump's second term concludes. As Trump himself has demonstrated many times since reclaiming office, America's 47th president sees and values a certain symbiosis between himself and right-wing Latin American presidents, whether it's Harvey A. Malay in Argentina or Nahib Bukele in El Salvador. In a political sense, a rising tide does seem to lift all boats, and Trump clearly perceives growing political benefits as he and his allies engage Latin America in growing security partnerships. Other countries are likely to welcome direct U.S. support in the same way that Ecuador and Colombia have, particularly the nation of Honduras, where U.S. troops are already engaged in training and counter narcotics work on a limited scale, and Costa Rica, where the recently elected president, Laura Fernandez, has called for U.S. troops to operate on Costa Rican soil. Costa Rica in particular doesn't have a standing military of its own, and it's had an especially hard time responding to the expansion of regional cartels on its territory for that very reason. Peru appears to be a likely candidate to expand its defense partnership with the U.S., while Chile's unpopular president, Jose Antonio Cast, may eventually abandon his cautious approach to the shield of the Americas, in hopes that a change in policy will help boost his fortunes. As for Trump, his administration may choose to double down on Latin America in the near future, especially if next week's midterm elections cede control of the Senate and the House of Representatives to the Democratic Party. Even without control of either House of Congress, the White House and the Pentagon maintain broad latitude to coordinate on security partnerships abroad, and this may be an area where Trump tries to operate, with greater impunity, to make up for the stonewalling of some of his other initiatives. All the while, skeptical onlookers across Latin America have tried, mostly unsuccessfully, to argue that these American operations raise a dangerous specter, and one that the region knows all too well, from the Cold War years, and the immediate aftermath. This is part of the world, where the U.S. has long sought to exert a level of supremacy, and Donald Trump himself has made a point of harkening back to that bygone era. The turn of phrase that Trump's administration embraced to describe his Latin American policy, the Donro doctrine, is hardly an accident, and by Washington's own mission, it represents a highly aggressive effort to reassert American dominance over the Western Hemisphere. But in trying to argue that nations and voters should oppose the U.S. in this area, critics appear to be fighting a losing battle. The ordinary people of Colombia, of Ecuador, of Honduras, Peru, or anywhere else may eventually find themselves chafing under American oversight, but right now, they're under attack by a very powerful array of cartels, rebel groups, and criminal syndicates. Perhaps they might say, it's no coincidence that those enemies grew powerful during an era when the U.S. had stepped away, and Latin American leaders had forgotten the importance of their own country's internal security. So if Uncle Sam has arrived with the resources and the motivation to see those problems addressed, then Latin American citizens and their elected leaders appear ready to cooperate.