How to Understand the Conflict in Mali

The nation of Mali is in a state of what we might charitably term “meltdown”. On 25th April, coordinated attacks by terrorist and insurgent groups paralyzed the country, killed leading government figures, and placed the capital of Bamako under siege. Three weeks later, the nation remains in chaos.

To an outside observer, that chaos may have seemed to spring from nowhere. But while rarely in the headlines, the Malian conflict is an ongoing power struggle that began in 2012. Key players have evolved over time, some merging into coalitions and others splitting into factions. To truly grasp the complexity of today’s escalating tensions, it’s vital to understand the four main actors in this war. What follows is a quick primer for anyone new to this most-overlooked of conflicts.

The Malian State

The independent state of Mali was established in 1960 following roughly 70 years as a French colony. It was originally part of the Mali Federation, which included Senegal, though Senegal seceded shortly after independence. More importantly for this primer, post-independence Mali suffered an eyewatering number of coups, rebellions, and insurgencies.

In 1968, the first Malian coup d’état was carried out by a group of military officers led by Moussa Traoré. He secured his power as head of state until 1991, suppressing three attempted coups. But while Mali in this era may have had fewer armed takeovers than certain neighbors, it suffered from another ill common to post-colonial nations: armed insurgency.

As across West Africa, the Malian borders were drawn by foreigners with little to no consideration for the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences between local groups. The consequences began almost-immediately after independence, starting with the first Tuareg rebellion in 1962.

Although this was crushed with grim-if-admirable efficiency by the Malian army (and its backers in Morocco and Algeria), this swift victory would in turn inspire additional rebellions, largely due to the brutality of the Malian army.

The most-spectacular of these was the second Tuareg uprising, which kicked off in 1990. At its root was frustration in the country’s north about a lack of autonomy and opportunities compared to those in the south. And while Moussa Traoré initially tried his old tactics of brutal dissent, his replacement by Alpha Konaré resulted in a government more open to negotiation. Konaré granted several concessions to the north, which led to the creation of the self-governing region of Kidal and the redirection of more resources to the area. These concessions ultimately led to a ceasefire in 1996.

In hindsight, what was most-significant about this second rebellion was the arrival of Iyad Ag Ghaly onstage. As the leader and founder of the People's Movement of Azawad (MPA), he both navigated the complex peace negotiations, while simultaneously laying the groundwork for his future role as a central figure in the regional insurgency. Although he began his career as a secular nationalist fighter, Ag Ghaly’s trajectory would eventually take a radical turn. One that would fundamentally reshape the Malian conflict in the 21st century.

In this, Ag Ghaly was helped by his time working abroad as a diplomat for the Malian state. While in Saudi Arabia, he began to move away from the secular Tuareg nationalism of his youth toward a hardline Islamist vision. So, when he was passed over for a leadership position in the newly formed National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in the early 2010s, he instead founded Ansar Dine. This group sought to impose Sharia law across Mali, creating a deep rift between the secular rebels and the rising Islamist factions.

Come January 2012, all these rebellions finally reached crisis point. The MNLA launched brutal attacks against Malian army camps in the north, with a spokesman officially announcing their struggle to free themselves from "Malian colonialism" and declaring the independence of Azawad, which included the regions of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu.

Almost simultaneously, in March that year, Ansar Dine under Iyad Ag Ghaly announced its own war against the Malian state. Only rather than a Tuareg homeland, the group’s goal was to establish an Islamic republic under Sharia law, a goal that brought it into immediate opposition with the secular, democratic MNLA.

Early 2012 saw a rapid collapse of state authority, as MNLA and Ansar Dine took swathes of land and captured cities. While the MNLA performed much of the initial military work, Ansar Dine often moved in to consolidate control. The sense of chaos only increased when the military carried out yet another coup d’état, this one resulting in the rise of interim President Dioncounda Traoré, who wasted no time bringing France into the conflict. With Islamist militias bearing down on the strategic town of Mopti in January 2013, the interim president sent an urgent request for military assistance to French President François Hollande.

The operation that followed would be like many conflicts against insurgents: characterized by immediate success, followed by a long and difficult period of asymmetric fighting. Within weeks, French forces, supported by Malian and Chadian troops, recaptured northern cities where Ansar Dine had already forced out the MNLA and established itself as the dominant faction. However, they left the MNLA in control of Kidal and did not engage in any combat against them. For the next several years, Islamists were scattered across rural areas, unable to control any urban centers thanks to the French and MINUSMA presence.

That all changed in August 2020. That month, Colonel Assimi Goita and several other military officers staged a coup against the Malian government, and set about radically remaking Mali’s foreign policy. By 2022, the French had been ousted, with MINUSMA following in 2023. In their place came the Wagner Group (later rebranded to the Africa Corps).

The arrival of Russian troops was both a curse and a blessing for the Malian junta. On the one hand, the mercenaries helped the army reconquer northern territories from the Tuareg rebels, a group the French had largely ignored to focus on Islamists. On the other hand, the focus of Russians and Malian troops on the north allowed JNIM to expand in central, southern, and western Mali. Then there were the massacres. So many civilians were butchered by Wagner and its successor group that any supporters the government may have had in the central and northern regions soon turned against them.

Nonetheless, the recapture of Kidal by the Malian army and its Russian allies initially served as a symbol of the successful "revolution" (the junta’s preferred term for its 2020 coup). It stood as proof that, despite the degrading security situation in the rest of the country, the government could still show tangible results. However, this symbolic win came crashing down last month when the FLA - the direct successor group of the MNLA - launched a joint offensive with JNIM, the successor to Ansar Dine, to recapture northern cities. While the overall result of their offensive was mixed, the rebel coalition was able to retake Kidal. Over the course of a handful of days, the junta's remaining credibility had crumbled away.

Today, the Malian junta is best understood as having one public face, and one private one. In public, it purports to be an extremely militarized governing entity that is closed off to any negotiations with insurgents. In private, it has allowed negotiations and prisoner swap deals to take place with JNIM on several occasions. It has also developed very sour relationships with almost all of its neighbors, excluding Senegal, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The junta has accused the others, namely Algeria, Ivory Coast, and Mauritania, of acting as rear bases and facilitators for terrorists like the FLA and JNIM.

While this may be true to some extent, the same could also be said about Niger and Burkina Faso, from where insurgents loot weapons to use against Malian government forces and vice versa. In September 2023, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was founded with the goal of creating a confederation of the three central Sahelian states of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Later, a joint armed force known as the FU-AES was established. It has rarely seen battle except for a few encounters against ISSP in the tri-border area of the three countries. Currently, it does not seem like it is going to be the answer to the junta’s woes.

JNIM

Jamaa'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, or the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, is more commonly known by its Arabic acronym, JNIM. Founded in 2017 as a coalition of Sahelian jihadist groups that swore allegiance to al-Qaeda, it is still led by Iyad Ag Ghaly (more on him above, for any readers who skipped ahead).

The main jihadist groups within JNIM include the Katiba Macina, which began its activity in central Mali but has since expanded into western and southern regions. Another key member is Ansarul Islam, the first Burkinabe jihadist group formed by Malam Ibrahim Dicko, who died early in his career and was succeeded by his brothers, Ousmane and Jafar Dicko. The coalition also includes the Sahara branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which acts as the leading faction due to its seniority and the experience of its foreign fighters. Finally, there is Ansar Dine, Iyad Ag Ghaly’s original group that built strong ties with AQIM early in the conflict. While other subgroups exist, these are the major players of the alliance.

While these groups were never threats to each because of their shared Islamist nature, the emergence of a new actor triggered their formal alliance: the Islamic State. As al-Qaeda-aligned groups saw their rival quickly gaining ground, they viewed teaming up as the safest option to slow the Islamic State's advance. Ansarul Islam was initially hesitant because they had decent relations with IS-Sahel and were cautious of their northern cousins affiliated with al-Qaeda. However, the death of Ibrahim Dicko, who had remained reticent about the alliance, sealed their membership. His successors, Ousmane and Jafar, maintained very good relations with Amadou Koufa, the leader of Katiba Macina.

JNIM’s ideology and methodology have noticeably evolved since its inception. While its founding factions were initially strict in their application of Islamic law, as seen during the 2012 occupation of Gao and Timbuktu where fornicators were lashed, thieves' hands were amputated, and the Hisbah (Islamic police) patrolled the streets, this has changed drastically since they were expelled from urban centers.

This shift is a deliberate attempt to rehabilitate their image in the eyes of both the local population and the international community. By showing "leniency," they hope to prevent another internationally backed offensive that might reverse their potential gains. This strategic moderation has deepened the rift between them and the Islamic State, while simultaneously drawing them closer to the secularist Tuareg rebels they once fought.

During the 2022 Ménaka offensive launched by the Islamic State against both Malian forces and JNIM, an opportunistic alliance formed between JNIM, the MSA (a pro-government militia based in the Menaka region), and the HCUA (a founding rebel faction member of what is now the FLA). This highlights a key divergence: while the Islamic State (ISSP) rarely allies with other factions, JNIM does not hesitate to coordinate with former enemies like Tuareg rebels or pro-government militias to counter their shared rival.

In July 2024, this alliance proved its strength. Despite both sides publicly denying a formal affiliation, the battles in Tinzawaten from July 25 to 27 served as a major turning point. The high-intensity clashes between JNIM/FLA militants and the Wagner PMC resulted in the worst defeat the Russian group has ever suffered in Africa, with at least 84 fighters killed and others taken prisoner. While both the FLA and JNIM engaged in an "informational war" to claim sole credit, the coordination and nearly identical footage made it clear the operation was conducted in a joint manner.

The reality of this partnership became undeniable nearly two years later on April 25th, 2026. Both groups officially announced their partnership during coordinated attacks on Kidal and Gao, resulting in the permanent recapture of the former. Simultaneously, JNIM launched surprise attacks on the capital, Bamako, killing the Defense Minister Sadio Camara, and strategic points like Konna, Sévaré, and Mopti. These operations demonstrated a high level of operational security and coordination across hundreds of kilometers.

As of May 2026, JNIM is officially active in six countries: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, with a presence in Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Mauritania. Unlike the Taliban or HTS, which are focused on a single nation, JNIM is transnational by nature. While official bodies like the UNSC estimate their manpower at 6,000 to 10,000, more grounded assessments suggest the group commands at least 30,000 fighters across the nine countries where they operate.

FLA

The Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, is a coalition of several predominantly Tuareg rebel factions based in northern Mali. Unlike JNIM or ISSP, these rebels fight for independence from Mali and, at least initially, for a democratic and secular state called Azawad. The coalition was founded in late 2024 from several factions such as the MNLA, the main rebel group, the HCUA, and the CSP, with Secretary General Bilal Ag Cherif at its head.

As an openly secular rebel group that is not recognized as a terrorist organization by most of the international community, the rebels do not shy away from maintaining ties with state actors such as Algeria and Ukraine. The relationship with Ukraine has become more prominent following the deployment of Russian mercenaries into the region. Ukrainian forces trained FLA militants in the use of suicide FPV drones, making the rebel coalition the most proficient non-state actor in the use of this new weapon in the region.

Another of the characteristics which differentiates the FLA from JNIM or ISSP is that its war is fought exclusively against Mali, rather than Niger or Burkina Faso. Despite the three countries being part of a so-called confederation, and the FLA being present near the Nigerien border, the group has distinguished itself by focusing on a single state enemy and its direct ally, the Russians.

Following the events of April 2026 and the officialization of their partnership with JNIM, the FLA shifted away from its initial principles of secularism. While still pushing for democracy and international recognition, the movement has moved toward a form of moderate Islamism that includes religion in governance. Senior officials of the group have mentioned Mauritania and post-Assad Syria as models of governance that combine Islamic principles with democracy. They do not conduct "hudud," which are physical punishments usually carried out in public, such as stoning or amputation. In this regard, they follow the example of JNIM, which previously abandoned such practices, following the models of HTS and the Taliban.

ISSP.

Finally, we get to the regional boogeyman: the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), or IS-Sahel. The Sahelian branch of the global Islamic State organization, it emerged from a splinter of the Al-Mourabitoun group, which was itself a merger of several jihadist factions active during the initial 2012 outbreak of war. A senior leader of the group, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi—who, as his name indicates, was from Western Sahara—was the first to pledge allegiance to the then-Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi with only a few dozen men.

While the province first emerged in Mali, it quickly expanded to Burkina Faso and Niger. It drew its recruits from defections of rival Islamist factions and from rural communities to which they preached. From its official recognition in 2016 until 2022, the group was technically under the umbrella of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), an IS faction primarily active in the Lake Chad basin region in northeast Nigeria and neighboring Niger, Chad and Cameroon. While this was true on paper, ISWAP did not have any tangible control over its Sahelian sister province, as every province maintains a high level of autonomy.

Similarly to JNIM, ISSP is transnational by nature. It is publicly active in three countries: Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (it previously had a presence in Benin but was forced out by JNIM). However, in recent years, ISSP has begun mass recruitment and expansion into northwestern Nigeria, a region already struggling with insecurity and a lack of state presence. By exploiting this instability, ISSP moved into the area as a protector against banditry and military abuses. For years, the jihadists fought bandits in the northwest, taking over their camps and occasionally absorbing defectors into their ranks, all while keeping these developments out of their official propaganda.

In December 2025, the United States conducted kinetic strikes against the Islamic State in Nigeria. These strikes took place in Sokoto State, across the border from Niger, further confirming the established presence of hundreds or even thousands of IS fighters recruited locally or arriving from the Sahel.

While JNIM may seem similar at first glance, there are deep differences between the two. Unlike JNIM, which is open to taking allies from secular groups or even government forces, the Islamic State is unequivocally unwilling to ally with any other faction. This rigidity has put them in a difficult position, with their closest ally being ISWAP, which supports them financially and provides fighters and expertise from northeastern Nigeria. Another difference is the consistent application of Islamic law wherever the group is present. ISSP strives for state-building and local legitimacy through strict governance. The group is also better organized and trained. Unlike JNIM, it does not use child soldiers and prioritizes quality over quantity. This is why, despite being numerically inferior, the Islamic State rarely loses battles to JNIM and has never lost territory to them for an extended period.

It is difficult to estimate ISSP’s true strength due to its extreme secrecy. The group often takes responsibility for only about half of its operations, often with a delay of several days or weeks. However, we can comfortably estimate that the group has no more than 5,000 to 8,000 active fighters, significantly fewer than the other actors in the region.

True to its "unfriendly" nature, ISSP did not participate in the joint JNIM/FLA offensive on April 25, 2026. Instead, the group conducted probing operations in Tessit, Ménaka, and Labbezanga, taking temporary control of these locations and likely looting military equipment without publicizing the actions.

What Next?

As the dust settles from the historic April 2026 offensive, it is clear that the borders drawn and the constitutions written in the 1960s continue to be the fault lines of this war. With the withdrawal of traditional international mediators and the rise of the Africa Corps, the Sahel has become a testing ground for a new era of warfare. Whether the recent alliance between the FLA and JNIM can hold, or if the Islamic State will capitalize on the exhaustion of its rivals, remains the most pressing question for the future of West Africa. For now, the only certainty is that the Malian theatre of war is far from its final act. April may have been the first time the chaos in Mali broke through to the wider global public. It is unlikely to be the last.