Due South: Talking Mozambique with Peter Bofin from ACLED and Tomas Queface from Zitamar News

Ladies and gentlemen good morning good evening good afternoon whenever and wherever you're listening to us from this is the due south podcast with me your host wilfred minor and today i am joined by peter boffin from acled the armed conflict location event data project an organization which monitors conflicts around the world and you're someone whose work

Has been very instrumental in shaping how i understand the conflict in mozambique the crisis happening there with the islamic state and just in general the entire situation i am also joined by tomash kifasi who is a journalist with zitma news he is zitma news is acled's partner in mozambique and they work together on an almost daily basis so again another

Brilliant individual and for our regular listeners you'll know that we normally have one guest on the show this is the first time we're having two guests so this is a really really big honor for me peter and tomash please introduce yourself good day wilfred and thanks for having us on the podcast yes my name is peter boffin working with acled and i'm

Speaking to you from tanzania from dodoma the capital i've been working on with acled on analysis of the conflicts in mozambique since maybe late 2020 which is not long after acled started a conflict observatory called at the time caboli gado and which is now known as the mozambique conflict monitor and we've been doing that in collaboration with zitma news

An independent news outlet from mozambique and working closely on that with them our colleague tomash kafesi who's who's on the call with us we bring out through the mozambique conflict monitor we bring out we were bringing out fortnightly reports that's that's going to become monthly which analyzes developments in the conflict over that period and alongside

And zittemar news well without we couldn't do that without the collaboration of zittemar news and zittemar news also have their own reporting which is published through their own website yeah hi everyone and thank you very much for inviting me to this podcast it's it's a really pleasure pleasure my name is tomash kafasi i'm based in capital of Mozambique.

I've been working with Zitamar News since 2020 and since then we have been working in collaboration with ACLED in monitoring the conflict in northern Mozambique, particularly the Kabul province. Zitamar has been collaborating with ACLED on drafting the Fortnite updates.

We used to also publish monthly. Zitamar has been writing and updating our readers on subscription based about the capital gap situation, but Zitamar also covers the economic, political, and social situation in Mozambique. We mainly publish in English for our English audience.

Our main targets are diplomats, ambassadors, business people, and so on. Thank you. All right gentlemen, thank you so much for agreeing to be on this podcast.

So let's start with a general overview of the crisis in Mozambique because sadly not a lot of people know what is going on in the country. The last time we covered Mozambique on the warfront's main channel, we got about 160,000 views, I believe, give or take a few thousand.

So it wasn't one of our most popular videos just to show how little attention it generated compared to other coverage of situations in, say, Iran or the Ukraine war.

So as part of this, we want to change public perception on it. We want to really inform the public what's going on. So gentlemen, if you could briefly take us through the crisis.

Who are the main actors? Why are they attacking and what the government is doing? Gosh, that's a big one.

But I think it's the insurgency itself kicked off in 2017 in the province of Capa del Gado, which is in northern Mozambique, bordering Tanzania and by the Indian Ocean.

It started with a sort of small group of quite radical Muslim fundamentalists who were networked with similar-minded individuals and networks across East Africa in Tanzania, into Kenya and even into DRC and probably a little bit in Burundi as well.

So, and you had people from all those countries involved in the in the inception of the insurgency. in 2017 and i was observing it from tanzania at the time where we had a proto insurgency if you like about 200 kilometers north of caba delgado which was put down quite well effectively should we say by the tanzanian forces tanzanian government through a

Through a combination of different measures and i kind of expected something similar in mozambique which was which to be honest was a country i didn't know much about and i was kind of surprised that the conflict sort of grew and grew to the point where by 2021 the insurgents had who already by that stage had a relationship with islamic state international

Were close to taking control of a few districts of caba delgado province and then that sparked international intervention from a multinational force from the southern african development community which only stayed for just about maybe two years or less and then and then more importantly and intervention by the rwandan rwandan military forces primarily the

Rwandan defense force but also the police and that was that was kind of successful in pushing back the insurgents degrading their logistics reducing their numbers but what we've seen in the that they arrived in 2021 but what we've seen particularly since 2024 is that the insurgents have really quite quite quite cleverly quite strategically regrouped

Reposition themselves behaving in quite different ways so they're really quite embedded in parts of the of the province even though you have a continuing significant sort of rwandan force as well as the house government's military the defense armed forces of mozambique so it's it's become it's attracted intervention primarily because of the natural gas

Resources offshore which are to be processed into liquefied natural gas for export in a project known as mozambique lng which is right in the northeast of the province not far from the border with tanzania and that is really what prompted international event intervention what has prompted a lot of sort of strategic interest from europe from the states even

From russia and china And it's also, as Tomás knows much better than me, it's a province that's rich in other natural resources, graphite in particular, rubies, and gold.

So this is the position we're in. Tomás, would you like to... Yes.

Well, the government of Mozambique have been trying to find the solution to this conflict, I think, since 2017. But Mozambican government have been opting for the military solution, which has been ongoing for almost nine years now.

The Mozambican government firstly deployed the police because it attempted to deal with the insurgencies with an approach of suggesting that, well, this is a criminal activity.

But I think around 2018, 2019, the Mozambican government then deployed the military to deal with the situation. And since then, I think 99% of the Mozambican government continues to believe that the conflict will be solved militarily. But different researchers and analysts have pointed out that, well, there may be other factors pushing the conflict.

Some of them deal with economic and social aspects. As Peter pointed out, Cabo Delgado is one of the richest provinces in Mozambique in terms of minerals. But in terms of development, it is actually one of the poorest.

Cabo Delgado is something like 2,500 kilometers distant from Maputo. So when you ask people in Maputo about the conflict in Cabo Delgado, I think because of the distance, but also because of the lack of information about the conflict itself, many people are not aware of what's going on.

And this is a problem because there's going to be a little solidarity with what's going on in Cabo Delgado.

But this is also part because of the Mozambican government in creating some sort of blockage in terms of information related with the conflict. I think thanks for the work of Zitamar News and Acclet, we have been able to monitor and get a sense of what's really happening in the province of Cabo Delgado.

Zitamar News and Acclet have a network of reporters documenting the situation, and that has been a huge value in terms of getting access to what's going on in the province.

Zitamar News and Acclet to help out. Also, we have been relying on the Islamic State claims and very little for the government of Mozambique. As I point out, the government is not really interested for people to really know what's happening in the province.

Obviously, for different reasons, the government doesn't want to show its weakness in terms of how it's dealing with the conflict militarily, but also in terms of governance, because the situation in Cabo Delgado overall suggests some weakness in terms of how the government has been managing not just the conflict, but the development situation of the

Province overall.

Yeah, I'll stop here. All right.

That is a very comprehensive overview of the entire situation, the crisis happening in Cabo Delgado. So I want to go back a little. The entire conflict started in 2017.

And as Peter mentioned, these were a group of radical individuals who had been radicalized by elements from Kenya and Tanzania. And as someone who is based in Kenya, that is something that hits very close to home because we have dealt with Islamic terrorism for a very long time.

We've had massive, massive issues, including an attack on a mall in Westgate that kills hundreds of people.

So, Peter, Tomash, what can you tell me about the radicalization, the radical elements that came from Kenya and Tanzania? How did they connect with the folks in Mozambique? How did they radicalize them?

It's interesting. Yes, you being in Kenya is quite quite a good hook for this. You'll be familiar with Sheikh Abudrogo, who was assassinated, I think, by the authorities in 2012 in Mombasa.

Now, he is still a very influential figure across East Africa. And particularly in Cabo Delgado, where his recordings of his lectures and clips, short clips of his lectures circulate widely, continue to circulate on social media, on all platforms, TikTok, Instagram, Facebook. It's everywhere.

And these networks have always been quite strong along the coast.

Essentially, Islamists with a radical interpretation of the Qur'an that will lead them to reject secular government, any sort of secular service. such as health, education, elections, and there's plenty of Albert Robert clips where he's calling on the participation elections as being haram or taboo.

And this ideology, if you like, was not strange in Cavadol Gatto.

It probably became very prominent around 2012 and developed further through 2017.

And this is where it's quite interesting that you have local activists that you had across East Africa, along the coast, even as far west as Kikohoma and Tanzania, who, if you like, campaigned locally against education, trying to get more children into madrassas and out of government schools. And this was happening in Cavadol Gatto as well, not unusual.

But as they were able, in Cavadol Gatto, they were able to take advantage of very weak government structures, a very poorly developed economy, very much that the northern Mozambique is very much completely forgotten by Maputo. It's so far away, 2000 Londres, as Tomáš tells us.

And that's had real, real impacts, where this sect that never really became much more than a sect in parts of Tanzania and in Kenya, was really able to develop to the point where it was able to take up arms in 2017.

So we did a report that partly covered these issues that we published recently.

And one of the things that came across strongly as I was researching it was that you still have some of those activists, such as Faridah Soleimani, who's the military leader of the insurgents, now known as Islamic State of Mozambique, who had a sort of pre-insurgency background as a sort of Islamist activist at community level.

There's another guy called Mahmoud al-Saha, who has a similar background.

And they're now active still militarily with Islamic State of Mozambique and are aligning their own positions a little bit more tightly with that Islamic State. You can see that in some of the messaging that they've been taking to communities.

And you can also see it in the way that this has been that Islamic State itself through its central media. is amplifying the role and the progress of islamic state mozambique so it's quite makes it quite a more alarming situation in that the group is much smaller than it used to be it's just around 300 probably maximum 300 fighters at the moment compared to

A couple of thousand in 2021 but they seem to have strengthened their ties with islamic state mozambique and are also because as i said sam's leaders have roots as let me say social activists and they are now able to through a combination of coercion and other means able to try to develop relationships with some coastal communities that allow them to develop

If you like a quite a significant area of influence for themselves along the coast yeah no i think peter covered it mostly but i will add that yes the insurgents mozambique have been i think since 2017 trying to bridge links with different groups in the region but also in drc in particular what i've been seeing the connections is that drc i think represent

Some sort of a place where the insurgents in mozambique get operational support as it was pointed out in the report insurgents mozambique started deploying ideas which has become now one of the most important forms of attacks but some important way of preventing security forces from reaching islamic state dominant areas i think this support definitely comes

From the drc which has been quite significant but then when we turn for somalia for example the support that has been coming from there is mostly financial which islamic state has been able to maintain themselves in mozambique through this important support but then if we if we talk about the links with the islamic state international i think the

Communication side has been also quite key in terms of communication islamic state central has been providing with the audience with the claims about the islamic state mozambique attacks it has been quite a few times that the insurgents in mozambique you have been taking the lead in terms of communicating with the audience.

I think that particular factor has become more of a task of the Islamic State International. And definitely with Tanzania, I think the relationship, not just between the insurgents, but also the population of Kabul al-Ghadi in particular has been quite significant.

I think the people of Tuara and Kabul al-Ghadi have been sharing both social and economic ties for such a long time.

But also, I think at the beginning of the insurgents, the Tanzania nationals also played a very key role in establishing this movement in Kabul al-Ghadi. And obviously, one of the ideological leaders of the insurgency is the Tanzania. So the links, I think, are quite more strong.

So Islamic State in Mozambique have been maintaining themselves through the relationship and the links with all these countries and the networks of groups all over the region. I mean, in Eastern Africa, but also in Central Africa. All right.

So we've talked a lot about how the Islamic State Mozambique is deepening its ties with the Islamic State International, with the groups in DRC, those in Somalia. But one thing we haven't spoken about yet is how a group of radicals from Mozambique actually developed these links with the Islamic State.

Because for our audience who might not know this, who might not be as familiar with the crisis as the three of us, at some point during its early years, the group we're calling Islamic State Mozambique was known as Al-Shabaab, although it had no relation to the Somali group of the same name.

So, Peter Tomash, I'll let you guys talk about that in a little bit. But I just want to mention something, to go back to something that you said earlier about Sheikh Aboudrogo.

He is such a polarizing figure within Kenya because there are those who claim, government sources included, that he was a terrorist leader participating in terrorism financing and even had a role to play in the 1998 twin embassy bombings in Nairobi and Jerusalem.

It's generally a figure that the government considered it right to eliminate.

And there are those in the Kenyan coast who believe that he was a genuine religious teacher and the government targeting him was just... them being anti-islam so again a very polarizing figure and the fact that his teachings have been recorded and they are still being played all the way down in mozambique hundreds of kilometers away it just goes to show the

Extent of his influence so a kenyan reporter david ochami once said that he had the oratory prowess of hezbollah leader has nasrallah someone who speaks nearly as well as julius caesar mark antony you know any legendary generals you can name and that he had the logic of egyptian ideologue yusuf al-qadrawi someone who is well very well respected within

Islamic circles for his knowledge of the quran his ability to argue so seeing sheikh abu rogo within those named alongside those names just goes to show you the kind of influence that this individual had so peter tomash back to the main question at hand how did a group you know that was initially referred to as al-shabab a group that you just emerged in 2017

From a group of radicals how did that evolve into the islamic state abu rogo is a quite a good jumping off point for that because islamic circles in east africa can be quite ambiguous you don't necessarily have islamics you don't have sort of islamic state affiliated networks and al-qaeda affiliated networks so for example it's it's pretty clear that abu

Drogo had ties with al-shabab in somalia but he's also held up as a as a critical voice by those more associated with islamic state particular citizen drc or in mozambique so there's there isn't how a our group moves towards affiliation the exact steps for that are not clear but it's definitely certainly not difficult to get in touch with them through sort

Of social networks if you use them correctly to get in touch with these international networks not difficult at all the insurgents in mozambique were at least by 2018 publicly reaching out to islamic state mozambique through to islamic state through through videos and essentially stating that they're they're they're mission to be affiliated with the islamic

State and how exactly they do that i'm not sure to be honest i'm not sure anyone really knows but they now have that there's now clear lines of communication we tend to see those most clearly through the islamic state's reporting of incidents in mozambique and as tomash mentioned earlier that they're they're they're one of our teresa most reliable sources

For what's going on in mozambique essentially when they put out a claim for an event you can be pretty 90 sure that has happened their their claims are really quite reliable even down to the numbers of fatalities that they report etc which is an area in which you often find exaggeration but they're off they're usually very accurate in their in their fatality

Reporting as well as well as the basic facts of events as to when and where they happened in terms of what the relationship involves it firstly involves becoming part of the propaganda ecosystem which that's the most obvious part of it where you see that the events claims coming out for islamic state mozambique and the occasional videos produced by islamic

State on behalf of about their activities in mozambique there is some evidence of financing through the what's what's known as the al-karnar office in inverted commas in somalia through which a lot of funding for islamic state across the continent has been running and that there's documented evidence of hundreds of thousands of dollars being moved into

Mozambique but no one really has a clear idea as to how much is flowing and no one's too sure whether it's still flowing after the significant operations undertaken by the u.s bundland forces and the united arab emirates against islamic state mozambique over the last couple of years that's that and there's there's also been financing through islamic state

Affiliated networks in south africa about which less is known the i think possibly the worrying element at the moment is there's the extent to which islamic state mozambique is really becoming a bit more self-sufficient through raising finance from roadblocks and kidnapping essentially blocking commercial and also private traffic on the roads and only racing

Vehicles and passenger you once significant ransoms have been paid of hundreds, sometimes thousands of dollars, and also through trying to control the artisanal gold mining sector in parts of the province, particularly in the south of the province, through which they're making amounts of money that we can't really estimate, because it's a very opaque

Business, even sort of legitimate artisanal mining is a bit opaque, it becomes more opaque when Islamic State is involved, so we can't really say what amounts are being made, but they're certainly executing control over some small scale mining operations.

So in some ways it's becoming more independent, but again there's evidence that came from directions from Islamic State centrally.

Another element of the relationship has been in technical advice, and the clearest example of that is the development of IEDs, improvised explosive devices, which I think they started using I think in 2021 Tumash and they're still using to this day, and quite effectively as a means of sort of defending the areas that they try to control.

Yes, I think it's also important to mention about the Mozambican students who went to Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Somalia around 1990s and 20s to study in those countries, but then when they returned to Mozambique, they become, they began preaching a Salafist interpretation opposed to the Sufi-influenced Islam, which has been long established in northern

Mozambique.

And also, so these Mozambican students who went abroad for religious education and came back to Mozambique radicalized, sometimes indoctrinated or even militarily trained in Tanzania, Sudan, and possible DRC.

I think that gave the movement doctrinal and personal contacts abroad that were well established before the conflict began in 2017. And I think you mentioned, yes, Abu Rogo.

I think this has also been documented that some of his followers relocated to southern Tanzania and possible build ties with this group that returned back from Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and then they build this movement that became militarily in that. 2017 i think also added some sort of context on how these groups in mozambique established relationship with

Different movements international and special around the region i think it's all there's also one thing you remind me of tomash is that if you picture so those parts of east africa that are predominantly muslim sort of capital gado has got about the southern margins of it and it's also been was firstly completely neglected by the portuguese and has continued

To be sort of neglected by maputo it's so it's very sort of isolated undeveloped province and one expression of that under development is the weakness of islamic civil society so for example in tanzania you have very dense rich networks of muslim organizations everything from schools clinics all sorts of sort of religious umbrella bodies that can it can seem

A bit chaotic and it can seem a bit noisy but there's evidence that there was that elements of muslim civil society pushing back against radical ideology and the development of nascent armed groups has actually was actually a key part of a key element in how tanzania was able to quell the development of such groups in the country and you don't really didn't

Really have that in and you still don't in northern mozambique you don't have that's a sort of rich that rich environment of civil society organizations like that are able really at community level to counter these type of ideologies and the development of these type of groups so it's also been critical yeah you've mentioned tanzania twice now when it comes

To being able to defeat a nascent ideology that you could grow into something really really dangerous what else did tanzania do write that mozambique hasn't done yet you know when it comes to defeating the early early stages of such groups other than having a robust muslim civil society organizations that could counter the development of such ideologies you

I think Peter is on mute.

Pardon me, yes. The role of Islamic civil society in Tanzania is worth stressing. I'll give a specific example of it.

There was in Tanga, which is not too far from Mombasa in Tanzania, there is a religious leader there called Salim Barayani, who's a very significant public figure, runs schools, hospitals, even a teacher training college, and is a very significant Muslim public intellectual that you see on YouTube and also through his live lectures, particularly at Tanga and

Elsewhere in Tanzania.

Now, around 2012, he was associated with Abu Dhabi by some UN investigators. That's sort of what seemed like compelling evidence that he was involved in networks supporting Al-Shabaab.

And he's, but no action was ever taken against him, and he seems to move away from those networks. And I asked a Darussalam sheikh whom I knew back in the 90s as to why this might have been. And he didn't hesitate why this change might have occurred, and he didn't hesitate when he answered.

He said it was other religious leaders in Tanga took him aside and firstly explained to him that the theological underpinnings of his position were not sound. So in a sense, sort of defeated him intellectually, if you like.

But also pointed out to him that you are a significant public figure with networks of schools, hospitals, etc. And if you continue like that, you will lose all of this.

It's gone. Your impact, your influence is gone. And that's a credible explanation, can't prove it.

In terms of the state, I think they've been good at, in Tanzania, they're good at both the carrot and the stick, at times quite brutal approaches to quelling insurgency.

So for example, between 2015 and 2017 in Pawani region, in a couple of districts about 100 kilometres south of Darussalam, you had this proto-insurgency... where local officials and police officers were being sort of assassinated by a small armed group.

But there were potentially hundreds of youth mobilised in sort of rural camps and living quite a millenarian lifestyle.

And that was put down quite brutally and likely hundreds killed in the process. But there was at the same time a lot of engagement with religious leaders.

Sometimes it's as simple as giving access to resources or allowing groups to operate within communities as long as they only go so far and don't tip over into any type of sort of insurgent type of activity.

So it's been quite a delicate balance. The Times has been quite crude. But it has also quite sort of cleverly taken into the very wide political temper that the ruling party CCM always tries to maintain.

And again, I think maybe the Mozambican authorities have maybe not been so deft politically at bringing people in, locking people off, establishing sort of effective and inverted commas, their security operations.

Yeah, there's potentially, I don't want to say they should go down the same route, but there's certain things that Tanzania did that seem to be effective. So there are lessons for Mozambique to learn from the Tanzanian model.

Tomas, I want to direct the next question over to you.

There's been a lot of discussion on this podcast and, you know, in so many other channels that the northern part of Mozambique has been significantly underdeveloped, that, you know, the south, Maputo, has generally favoured areas that, you know, they're more concerned about, that, you know, are more politically weighty for them than the north, than, you

Know, places like Cabo Delgado.

So what role does this play when it comes to you influencing people to join groups like the Islamic State Mozambique?

And is there an element of tribalism in all of this? Mozambique has got a central government, central in the sense that most of the important decisions about different issues all over the country are taken in Maputo and when the place is farther from Maputo.

Mozambique has got a central government, central in the sense that most of the country are taken in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the

Sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the

Country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense that most of the country are in the sense then it means that development will also

Be low, so that's the case of Cabo Delgado.

Yes, as you mentioned, Cabo Delgado is a very rich province. We have two billionaire projects going on in that province. I'm talking about Total Energies and Exxon Mobile-led projects related with LNG, but plus we have Ruby, we have a Cira company which is also exploring graphite in Cabo Delgado.

So besides all the immense resources, the province of Cabo Delgado is one of the poorest ones, and the worst of all is that the local population in the province is not embedded within the economy of the province and the country. Why is that? Because Cabo Delgado lacks a number of infrastructures.

We're talking about schools, universities, meaning that even local people, they do not even work in most of the companies and projects in the province because they do not have the basic skills for that. So companies like Total Energies, Montepressure B Mining mostly have to hire people outside Cabo Delgado.

And that is a problem because people feel neglected, feel that they are not part of the economy of the country, they're not enjoying the province, the benefits.

And the worst of all, since most of the people also get involved in artisanal mining, artisanal mining have been cracked down by the government, especially because artisanal mining has been developing around concession areas.

And there is a sense that the government is benefiting or at least providing so much protection to these multinational concessions rather than the local people. I think this is one of the key elements why the Islamic State have been successfully able to radicalize local people, particularly Muslim people.

Yes, there is at any dimension of the conflict, because Cabo Delgado is divided between the Moani population, which are majority Muslim living in the coastal Cabo Delgado, where Islamic State have got so much influence. But then there is also on the west of 380 roads, the Makondi dominated the Frelimu. Frelimu have been ruling in Mozambique since 1975.

And there is a sense in the provinces that they control... The economy, the political, the government of Mozambique, and there is this feeling that they are the ones benefiting from the conflict. And also, if we look at the map of the conflict, the Makondi-dominated area, which is Muayda district, have been spared of violence, I think, since 2017.

So there's a sense that the Islamic State is not attacking these Christian-dominated Makondi areas, mostly because they enjoy a lot of protection, and they're not allowed, the insurgents are not allowed to operate into those areas. So yes, this, the ethnic dimension is quite significant.

The United Nations recently updated the number of displaced people in Cabo Delgado, and put it on around 600,000 people, and most of these people are Muslims, and people in southern Cabo Delgado.

We're talking about Nkwabi, Ishiwuri, and possible Metuji area. These areas also don't enjoy much protection as those people living in Makondi areas or Makondi Plateau.

So, yes, so just to sum up, yes, there is this feeling that the Muslims are not benefiting, but the overall population in Cabo Delgado are not benefiting because they are seen as not having the skills to work in different mining projects.

But also because the government of Mozambique is centralized in Maputo, very little resources that are, and the revenues that are collected in Cabo Delgado do not return back to Cabo Delgado. And obviously, the Islamic State has been exploiting these vulnerabilities to retreat more and more people.

And one last aspect is that the protection of the majority Muslims is not also very significant.

I think Peter mentioned it in the beginning, security is more significant in the northern Cabo Delgado, where the LNG projects are located, but also in the Christian majority, Makondi people.

But then the areas where the Islamic State have got so much influence, which is Makumiya, Musimba, the Praha, and Kisanga, they do not have much of the local militias, we call them local force, but also security forces are not quite present. So these are somehow abandoned.

And then the lack of infrastructures and the state presence in those areas allowed the Islamic State. it to enjoy much influence in those areas yeah i think i think my concern that from what you raised tomash is that we may be we may be seeing not may i think we are seeing a sort of a two-tier capital ghetto emerging where you have the that part the like the

Northern most northern part of the province where the liquefied natural gas project is being driven forward by total energies being very heavily protected by very strong rwandan force and just over 100 kilometers to the south this these much less protected communities majority muslim which are now having to live sort of with islamic state muslim being in

Their midst and that's i think that's potentially dangerous for the yeah future stability of the province i think that's a really good point for us to jump off to discussing the approaches that the government has taken to you know bring down the situation to calm down the situation because earlier on you guys mentioned that mozambique believes you know that

The conflict can be solved militarily you know there's been a multi-force intervention from the southern african development community and more recently from rwandan forces so how effective has that been and are those forces perpetuating the feeling that there is a two-tier security system within mozambique where on one hand the there are places that get

That level of security like the liquid natural gas liquefied natural gas processing plants and the you know the maconde community and you know there are places that don't get that level of security i think there's i want to acknowledge some progress first because if you go back to 2017 8 2018 19 and 20 the mozambique the mozambique state's response is pretty

Chaotic it was being led by the police it was it involved the wagner group at one stage for a brief period then you had a small sort of south african private military company slash mercenary environmental protection specialists the dark advisory group working with the police and then i think early 2021 control was eventually given over to the army and that's

Remained stable ever since that's a positive of development.

So at least when you had the more serious interventions from SADC and the Rwandans, at least they had a clear interlocutor with the military, one that they could probably relate to a little bit more easily. So that's maybe been positive.

And that's also given having the military leading response has at least led to other sort of strategic partners having some sort of a docking point where they can provide support, say, in the way that the European Union is providing training support to the Mozambican military.

But it's possibly the progress being made there is maybe not as great as it should have been, as the Mozambican military was quite weak to begin with.

In terms of numbers, no one's too sure how many there are, but there's not many, which are poorly equipped, very out-of-date equipment and very, very poor internal systems in terms of everything from sort of purchasing distribution of food to payment of salaries to command and control.

So a little done, but much to do. But I think Tomas might be able to speak more insightfully on this than me. Tomas Mishra- Yes, I think Peter said most of it, yes.

I don't think I have much more to add on this. Tomas Mishra- All right, then with not much more to add on that, I think it's time to get to the main event. And the main reason I actually contacted you guys, other than the fact that I genuinely do love speaking with you guys about what's happening in Mozambique.

Again, I think it's an issue that deserves a lot more coverage. And I genuinely love speaking to people who are actually on the field, contributing to our understanding of the situation.

So on the ACLED website, Peter has a new report with your contribution from Tomas on preaching coercion and sectarianism, how the Islamic State is building a stronghold in Mozambique.

This is one of the most interesting reports. And I have been a very long-time reader of Peter's reports. The first time we met, Peter and I, we met again online, as most of my meetings happen, we spent about an hour and a half just nodding out on the situation in Mozambique.

So the first time we met, we just talked and talked. And again, this is a report that I think is very important. For me, one of the most important lines in the report is the part on the leadership changes is in the Islamic State Mozambique.

So between 2022 and 2023, there was a change in group leadership, ISM leadership and its structures have always been However, we know that IS Central, this is the Islamic State Central African province, was advocating for a change in the group's approach, which came with a change in leadership.

The insurgent's most prominent military commander, Von Omar de Machude Omar, attended a meeting in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where he faced criticism from the Islamic State for the tactics pursued in Mozambique.

Omar was advised that in the areas under their influence, they stop killing civilians and start charging fees to those who want to live in the areas.

The contact came at a time when an Islamic State figure with Jordanian nationality, Hitham Alfar, was visiting East Africa. Alfar likely contributed to the IS's increasing influence on ISM. The Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique, FADM, killed Operational Commander Omar in August 2023, and Farido Soleimani took his place.

Farido is from Mosimboa de Praia, as was Omar, and he still has family in the town. So for me, that was personally the most interesting part of the report, but I'll let Peter and Tomash tell you guys a little bit more about the report before we go into the details and the specifics.

Yeah, I think what we were trying to do with the report was just to describe what we thought we had been seeing over the last couple of years of this shift in the group's behavior.

They used to be very indiscriminate in their violence, with a very high level of actions targeting civilians directly, and they're still like that. They're still awful. But we noticed that their behavior seem to be changing in one particular area that stretches across two to three districts along the coast.

It's to the south of the currently being built LNG plant. It's a predominantly Mwani, sort of culturally area, predominantly Muslim. Some of the current leaders sort of come, some of the current leadership come from that part of Capital Gado.

And they stopped, they seemed, well, we'd noticed it, but they'd stopped really directly targeting civilians in that area and seemed to be using what we used to call hearts and minds approach in those areas.

Trying to develop ultimately coercion, more collaborative relationships with communities that would allow them to operate. operate more freely and they've been somewhat successful in that so you now have this odd situation where you have this quite a large area that stretches it's about 120 kilometers long and it stretches from the coast in inland about 50

Kilometers to the main highway running north south through the province and they where you have they have their main base where just what day is it monday over the weekend and last week there were again military operations to try and take their base that don't seem to have been successful it's not the first time it's been tried so you have their main base

You have them sort of moving around that area not freely but with some freedom of movement and you also have sort of deployments of rwandan troops there you have deployments of military troops all in this area and while sort of islamic state mozambique sort of members are sort of behaving quite differently to civilians there than they behave to civilians

Elsewhere in capital gather province sort of exemplified in a quote that we use in the beginning of the report for which you have to thank colleagues in dw portuguese service for their reporting where where a coastal villager a young man said that it was he actually would be happier to meet a group of insurgents on the road than to meet the mozambican

Military because he'd probably be treated better by them i think he literally said his heart would be in his mouth if he met the mozambican military but not so much if he if he came across a group of insurgents who would likely to be less aggressive within that area so it's a very complex situation that's emerging and again this is just you know 100

Kilometers so south of this very sort of heavily fortified lng plant so it's quite a complex political political puzzle that mozambique still faces yes i think one of the key points that the report also discuss about is how islamic state in mozambique have been changing its post posture especially since 2023 when the former leader of the insurgents ibn omair

Was killed during that time the insurgents was very aggressive both towards the muslim and the christian populations The killings and beheadings were quite frequent everywhere, but yes, from 2023 until now, as Peter was explaining, the way that the Islamic State Mozambique deals with the Muslim and the Christian population is quite different.

I think the key aspect is that the beheadings have reduced significantly, and attacks and killings in areas where Muslim populations are predominantly attacks on villages and communities and people have reduced significantly since insurgents are trying to establish this long-standing relationship.

But then things start changing when the Islamic State moves to areas where dominated by Christian or Catholic people. I'm talking about the west of 308 Road, which is an area that represents some sort of a boundary between the Muslims on the east and the Christians on the west.

But also, the south of Cap Delgado is also predominantly Christian people, which insurgents, when they move to those areas, we tend to see a little more aggressive behavior, not in the sense of behaviors, but at least burning the houses and killing a few people.

As today, as we are recording this podcast, we received a report about an insurgents activity in a place called Litamanda, which is a Makondi-dominated area in Makomiya district, in which the Islamic state behavior to men, this has been quite common in Christian areas, but not in Muslim areas.

And then in Muslim areas, yes, they have been acting in some way of like sectarian. They have been carrying on activities like preaching in mosques, discouraging cooperation with the Mozambican state and forces, and portraying the conflict as between Muslims and non-believers.

So, yes, this has been the approach of the Islamic state.

But as I was pointing out, if we compare the past and before 2023, now we are seeing that, yes, even the killings on the Christian-dominated areas have reduced, and instead the insurgents have opted to collect money, throw ransom, but they have also been moving around the mining areas, and that has been also playing a very key. most important thing have

Beenudes like it is a lot of others.

And we took the range of the cases, and we were interested in it. aspect in reducing also the number of displaced people if we also compare the number of displaced people years ago and now the situation is different now we don't see much of displacement because of insurgents because insurgents are no longer more brutal as they used to be but that doesn't

Mean that insurgents have lost ground or became weak it's just the way that they've been dealing with the local people in kabbalah so the islamic state mozambique province has significantly changed its approach to terrorism within mozambique so what i want to talk about is what kind of impact is this having on the civilian population we already have that

Quote from the beginning of the report from the young gentleman who said he would rather interact with you know insurgents on the road rather than soldiers so what kind of impact is this having on civilian communities are we seeing a gradual acceptance of the islamic state are we seeing them being more willing to listen to the message that the islamic state

Is spreading or and are we seeing a gradual shift towards the islamic state trying to establish you know its own version of a caliphate in mozambique i think they have managed to build some legitimacy much of that built on fear some of that built on familiarity over the years i mean that villager if he was a fisherman he would be definitely be more at risk

Of death from the mozambican navy shooting up fishing boats off the coast of capital ghetto which they do quite regularly but he would also be at risk of having his boat hijacked by islamic state mozambique for ransom to be paid by the boat owner using mobile money systems which is another another part of this conflict which is a bit interesting whereby the

Sort of financial backbone of the organization is running through through his run through mobile mobile money networks but that's another matter so it is kind of called between between between two bad options and quite often the military can present you know deadly option whereas the islam state mozambique may at worst just hijack więks boat and his catch

And you force a significant payment from the from the from the boat owners for its return so it's it's not it's it's not an easy relationship that communities have with them with the insurgents but it can it can sometimes seem the better of two not very good options put it that way there wasn't there was more to go please yes no definitely i think one of the

Things that have been undermining the mozambican security forces is the lack of adherence to human rights principles i think this has been one of the problems for the mozambican security forces since 2017 and that explains why the people in kabul al-gadu have not been collaborating mostly with the security forces in tackling the islamic state fighters even

Local forces we have different local forces in capital that but the most important ones are the makondi or the christian local force and the inna parama militias which the population trusts more than the mozambican security forces but also we have the rwandan forces who also enjoy a very good perception from the people exactly because the rwandans have been

Behaving quite good with locals and then if we now have the islamic state also becoming less brutal the population will always choose the less evil i think the evil force at the moment in kabul al-gad the most one is the mozambican security forces because even when they arrest people of suspicions of being islamic state collaborators the populations complain

That these people when they arrested they never come back i think that does not help the image of security forces and that's why also populations do not collaborate with them in terms of vigilance and reporting ism movements the situation in mozambique reminds me of the situation in mali which i covered for warfronts a little while ago where i basically made

The argument that mali has adopted a shoot fast counter insurgency program and it seems that mozambique has done the same thing a shoot fast counter insurgency insurgency program that seems to be alienating of its own citizens and you were pushing them into the hands of the terrorists from the Islamic State Mozambique and on the other hand from Rwanda so not

Terrorists from Rwanda rather just you know the security forces from Rwanda just to make that clear Peter this is something you and I spoke about in our very first conversation and I want to bring it back it's something from your earlier reports a feeling among you know Mozambican security officials that Rwandan officers Rwandan soldiers Rwandan police just

The Rwandan security establishment within Mozambique within Cabo Delgado was not necessarily pulling its weight and that they were averse to battle is this you know still a situation that we're looking at right now yeah I think that's still the case Tomas mentioned two people being beheaded today or yesterday at a place called Lita Manda and there's there's

There's a Rwandan Defence Force outpost not far from there I know there's Rwandan Defence Force outposts there's three or four along that highway the M380 that Tomas mentioned that's sort of 50 kilometers in from the sea marking sort of the border of their area of influence and they're also on the sea border side as well but they're not taking a very

Proactive approach to taking on Islamic State Mozambique why that might be we really can't know but there's various sort of possibilities behind this firstly maybe a reluctance to get involved in what could be quite a brutal fight that happens really at community level and that has sort of political ramifications domestically from Mozambique that potentially

Rwanda doesn't want to really get too pulled into that's understandable secondly Rwandan Defence Force is possibly quite stretched anyway between their operations in DRC and then the various multilateral missions they're involved in as well as another bilateral mission in Central African Republic I believe so they're they're they're quite stretched so and

That affects everything from sort of supply of materiel to where you're putting your sort of best troops and I think it's clear also that their their number one priority is just making sure that the LNG project can go ahead and that's never been stated clearly but it's quite clear When Paul Kagame, one or two months ago, speaking to Genevryk, said that

Mozambique was behind in its payments during Rwanda, and he stated very clearly that this was a matter for the Mozambican government and the oil companies to sort out how to pay for their presence.

Being the clearest sort of statement, yeah, that their purpose is to protect the LNG project. So sort of killings, which in some contexts you could describe as isolated killings or movements and activities of the Islamic State and Mozambique in rural areas that don't directly affect the LNG project are not going to get priority, basically.

And maybe they see the insurgency as being successfully contained, even if it may remain an issue for some years.

I think it probably will. Tom, would you like to add anything? Yeah, just to say that when the Rwandans arrived in Mozambique in 2021, they were quite aggressive in the successful restore some of the territories that were under Islamic State control back to the government of Mozambique control.

But I guess since 2024, 25, the Rwandan forces have not been quite aggressive in addressing the Islamic State threat, especially in areas outside the LNG area and the main villages and towns in Cabo Delgado. But I think that explains why the Islamic State has some sort of free movement.

The reason for that different attitude from the Rwandans, well, can be explained in multiple ways.

One way is what Peter said about the lack of payments by Mozambican government to the Rwandan forces or to the Rwandan government. That's one thing. But then the government is also keen to see the Mozambican security forces leading the counterinsurgence efforts in Cabo Delgado.

Because in Mozambique there have been these questions about protecting sovereignty, but also discussions about when the Rwandans will remain in Mozambique. And then there is a pressure that says that it's Mozambique who should control and deal with the insurgents, not the foreign forces.

And yes, there is this feeling that the Mozambican government wants the Mozambican forces to... to be on the forefront i guess that's why on the offensive to recapture the islamic state's stronghold in the catupa forest in central capital god has been led by mozambican forces and then when you see also in terms of fatalities in these clashes and

Confrontations with islamic state you see most fatalities on the mozambican side yes that explain explain somehow this situation all right so i want to move on from that idea of the rwandan forces to something else you mentioned before we go back to the content of the report itself the idea of mobile money and how it's it has allowed the islamic state

Mozambique province to really diversify its income sources you move away from the traditional income sources that it was depending on you from the islamic state proper that were being funneled through the office in somalia through being more sufficient so in mozambique there are currently three main electronic money institutions just for audience that may

Not be as familiar with how money moves in mozambique so the three systems are mpesa a system which began in kenya emola and mcash so tomash we'll start with you tell us how these systems are enabling the islamic state mozambique province to diversify its funding sources and we'll be a little brief on this because i covered this on the on the website

France.co after having a wonderful wonderful conversation with peter this again was our first conversation where we spent an hour just nodding out on how money moves through mozambique so again just a brief overview so that we can give our audience an idea of you know the situation as it is on the ground yes this is actually one of the most controversial

Issues in mozambique because obviously mozambique cannot control or have much control for example on the international side of funding to the islamic state in mozambique but mozambique also cannot control the crypto the cryptocurrency transfers to mozambique and so on but the electronic money or mobile money is a different thing because it's a system it's a

System that is governed by mozambican mobile operators so the mozambican authorities can have much more leverage in controlling or monitoring this source of transactions just to give an example for you to open an mpeza or a mall account in mozambique you must have you must register with your ID, and also when you want to withdraw money, you have to withdraw

That in an agent, and you should show your phone numbers and some of your details.

So it's a system that the government of Mozambique can have control on it.

But then the Attorney General, when he was speaking in the Parliament at the end of last year, yes, he reported that the government is aware that the insurgents are asking ransom through this electronic money, but they've been unable to identify or arrest people involved in this scheme, which is very, very questionable.

Yes, but since early last year, insurgents have been able to raise a lot of money through ransom, especially in main roads and also in cost, through the fishermen.

The Islamic State have been kidnapping people and releasing them after paying ransom. I think paying to the Islamic State through mobile wallets is much easier, especially because it's very difficult to take a cash to the forest, to the bush, and these have been playing in favour of the Islamic State.

But the fact that they've been continuing to use this system suggests that they are not being limited by the state authorities, and I think they find this way much better and more flexible.

Obviously, the authorities have to work hard on it because it's very easy for the authorities to know where the money is coming from, where it's going, where it is being withdrawn. So, yes, if the Mozambican government is not doing anything on this front, it again reveals weakness or at least lack of interest on eliminating this Islamic State income source.

Peter, please add some more detail to this because our conversation on this was one of the most insightful I've ever had.

So, we'd love to have your thoughts on this. Yeah, no, the mobile money situation is interesting. I mean, as both of you know, you can't get a mobile money account in East Africa without government-recognized photo ID, a photograph, your signature on an electronic signature pad.

You know how agents operate, the agents of the mobile money companies. They're closely monitored by the companies themselves. So, any sort of large transfers and payments should really be quite visible.

So, it's really... it's it's kind of it's kind of it's revealing the double-edged sword of mobile money now i've been meaning and i haven't done this unfortunately i've been meaning to see how kenya got this under control as i'm told that kenya was able to has been able to limit the use of mobile money systems by armed groups whereas it but in mozambique

There really isn't that doesn't seem to that doesn't seem to have happened so yeah you'll be sort of hijacked at the side of the road you either have the money in your own account or you call your employer you call your relatives and you know within an hour or so there'll be very large sums of money hundreds of thousands of dollars flowing into mobile money

Accounts somewhere in mozambique and that presumably the accounts they flow into if they want to avoid detection then those accounts should be sort of abandoned and new accounts set up once the money has been withdrawn or maybe they just don't fear of being called they're not closing the accounts either way it's it's it's a very difficult sort of financial

Sector governance issue that was mink is faced with and really if they if they don't it's it's certainly going to that they're not going to be able to undermine the insurgency at all right so i might i might be able to add a little bit of context to the idea you just brought up peter about how kenya was able to deal with mobile money transfer flows going to

Terrorist organizations because you i remember i brought this up in our conversation so from what i have been able to see the government has been very strict on prosecuting whenever non-terrorists or you know anyone who can be proven to have terrorist links withdraws money from a mobile money agent without the government issued id because what they often do

Is you register numbers you register fake numbers and go withdraw money from mobile money agents and once you know the government figured that out they were very quick to stop the whole practice be very efficient when it comes to prosecution there's also been you know a lot more government integration with the main mobile money service provider safaricom the

Provider of mpesa there's been a lot of government integration with safaricom they have an officer from the Directorate of Criminal Investigation, who is specifically tasked with being a liaison point between Safaricom and the broader security agency.

So those are some of the steps that the government has undertaken to ensure that even if mobile money transfers will reach the terrorists, it's not as bad as it could be because it was really, really intense. But I am very much looking forward to seeing your research on it.

It's a topic I have been thinking about a lot since our last conversation. So let's go back to the report and specifically how Islamic State Mozambique messages and media is being amplified by the broader Islamic State, specifically in their weekly Al Naba newsletter. Tell us about this.

Yeah, Al Naba is a newsletter that comes out every Thursday. It covers mostly attacks and other incidents and other violent incidents that different Islamic affiliates have been, Islamic State affiliates have been involved in over the previous week. Quite formulaic.

It's very systematic in some ways, quite a sort of very professionally systematically run publication. But they, over the last, since maybe 2022 or 2023, they've been highlighting their sort of nonviolent outreach to communities in Mozambique and Mozambique, much, much more so than they do for any other affiliate over that same period.

So this approach of sort of hearts and minds that there's some evidence that there was a demand for this from Islamic State centrally, before I was killed, back in 2021, sorry, 2022, I think, at these meetings in Tanzania in Tanzania and DRC.

And this seems to be amplified over the years since, right through it to this year. There's only one such report this year, but they're continuing into 2026, where they are also sort of sending out this message that they're taking this dual-track approach of both violence and sort of community outreach in some areas in Mozambique.

You don't see that for DRC at all.

The affiliate in DRC is very different. It has appallingly high levels of violence directed to civilians. You don't see that with Islamic State in Somalia, where you were there in some quite an isolated group and maybe plays a different function in the network of affiliates.

Yeah. so yeah it's quite unique and also at community level you see efforts by the insurgents in Mozambique to catch their message in a sort of Islamic State framework which isn't a million miles away from what the sort of pre-insurgency sort of community level activists were demanding in their sort of Abu Drago inspired activism in the years prior to 2017

But there's definitely a clear sort of convergence of interests that you can see through the messaging at both community levels and internationally as well Tomás anything you'd like to add no thanks I'm good with Peter's response all right perfect so I am just seeing gentlemen that we have been on this call for about an hour 40 minutes for our listeners it

Will most likely be an hour 25 at this point so one I'm sorry for keeping you much longer than you they agreed upon hour and two I want to ask the final question what can the Mozambican government do to end this insurgency because even if the group is not pursuing as violent a strategy as it was in the beginning when you know it was killing constantly and

Displacing people it's still a major threat this is a group with about 300 people as Peter mentioned 300 members and it's still you know being considered this big of a threat that you were featuring it on the podcast so how can Mozambique address this we've seen here Maputo has tried the military method and it's not working what would you guys suggest as an

Alternative in the beginning of this month the president of Mozambique president chapel huge instructions to dialogue with the government so he said he called on the fighters to lay down their the weapons and enjoying the national dialogue that is taking place in Mozambique I think I think that appeal will not be welcome for the insurgency but obviously

Dialogue I think it's key to end this conflict not just dialogue but also bringing back development and employments to young people in Cabo Delgado but going back to the dialogue the government has not given incentives for the insurgents to leave the bush and join the families the society why is that government have not for example stated a program for

Disarmament and reintegration of fighters Also, there is no such some sort of amnesty or anything that will give security guarantees or warranties that the insurgents, at least those who have not been violent, that they will be not be killed or arrested.

So there's no such a program, but also there's no psychological programs or programs that will rehabilitate insurgents so that they can go back to their communities.

And also, the platform that the President Chapo mentioned is a political dialogue platform that was created to address the post-election violence that took place in Mozambique in 2024, and most of the reforms that are being discussed in that platform are mostly related with the reforms to the Constitution, to the election law, and the independence of

Electoral bodies.

So there's no such a way that the insurgents can join that platform, because to begin with, there's no mediators, there's nothing.

So the government cannot just say that they're interested in dialogue when they're not creating conditions for such, but obviously, I think internationally, there are multiple partners that are interesting in supporting Mozambique in that direction.

And then finally, as I mentioned, development is quite good, it's important that Mozambican government bring back to the people the resources, the money, in terms of, in the form of employment, well-being to the people of Cabo Delgado, so they will not be persuaded to join the insurgents.

Peter, what about your views, how do you, how do you think this ends?

Well, I think Tomas has covered a lot of it there, and there's, it's, it's, none of, none of that is a quick fix, unfortunately, because of the decades upon decades of underdevelopment in northern Mozambique, some fake, that sort of, sort of, sort of, for Lima and the Mozambique state really needs to address.

And some of those, those, those, those issues are weaknesses within itself.

So this will be decades.

I think that the important thing is that there are lessons to be learned from Kenya, for example, about how mobile money was tackled from Tanzania about, sort of combining sort of an iron fist with, sort of sort of more subtle political methods of addressing these these dynamics none of the quick fixes but yeah at least at least there are solutions and

Approaches from the neighborhood that can be learned from all right with that with the other lessons that mozambique can learn from its neighbors we're going to end the episode here gentlemen so final thing please tell the people where they can find your work in case they're interested your social media handles how can people find you yes zetamar can be

Reached by zetamar.com we are on x from twitter facebook linkedin and yes we have our own website which is zetamar.com thank you yeah and i think if people search for the mozambique conflict monitor that should bring them to the right page of the aclid website and acliddata.com also includes excellent work from colleagues working on kenya somalia ethiopia

And west africa who are also dealing with these dynamics like jalalegita cho and henny and saibia so yeah it's plenty to chew on there and for our listeners this is you know a sneak peek at something we were planning for the future but peter and tomash will be contributing articles to the fronts.co website we're really really excited to have them you know as

Part of our contributing team there are individuals as you've had throughout this podcast with so many insights such great intelligence on all of this yeah we're just really happy to have them and with that ladies and gentlemen we're going to close out the podcast if you've you've been with us this entire time thank you so much for listening the crisis in

Mozambique deserves as much attention as possible and again we're really appreciative thank you so much for being with us peter tomash thank you so much have a lovely day and yeah we are going to end it there i will see you in the next one you