Briefing Room 03.10.2025

Welcome back to The Briefing Room, our subscriber-only show. Thank you special person that is to regular warfronts what Celine and Julie go boating is to regular cinema, a sign that those watching it are the sort of uber-nerds who can't get enough of the obscure and the undervalued.

And speaking of obscurity, this week we're diving into two important stories in the Sahel that have been mostly overlooked, but which may hold the keys to the region's future, as well as that of the NATO alliance.

Alongside that, we're taking a quick detour to Colombia to check in on Bogota's brave or well-possibly foolish plan to negotiate peace with the country's largest drug cartel. And just before we begin, a quick note of thanks to our subscribers. Without your support, these sorts of in-depth videos on obscure topics just wouldn't be possible.

Now, let's get into it. On the 22nd of September, the UK-based outlet Middle East Eye published a bombshell exclusive initiative that completely slipped under the world's radar. Turkey would be deploying troops to Niger.

The troops, commandos, and special forces who had previously served in Iraq and Syria are meant to assist the army with training as part of the fight against the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda-linked insurgents. Now, you'd probably think, what's so special about Turkey training Nigerian troops? Such deals happen all the time.

And to answer that question, we need to mention two key facts. One, the Nigerian army overthrew the government in 2023. And two, they quickly kicked out American and French forces before accusing Paris of training terrorists.

These are the kinds of things you do when you want to signal to the world that, in the immortal words of Taylor Swift, we are never, ever, ever getting back together. This means that Turkey, a member of NATO, is currently working with a government that hates the guts of its NATO allies. Which forces us to ask, why would Ankara break away from its allies?

What does it gain from this partnership? And conversely, what does Niger gain? Let's start with the last question.

For the Nigerian governments, this was a pretty easy decision. After kicking out France and the US, Niame needed new security guarantors. Initially, Russia seemed like the obvious choice, swooping in first with the Wagner Group and then the Afrika Korps.

However, Moscow's attempts to fight an insurgency in neighboring Mali have floundered, and there's little to suggest that Niger was offered anywhere near enough. According to Ibrahim Abdule, a researcher at the Beirut International Graduate School of African Studies, Niame was forced to look elsewhere, and Ankara emerged as an attractive alternative.

Quoting him here, Turkey, with its developing defense industry, growing interest in the Sahel region and independent foreign policy, has become an ideal partner for Niger.

End quote. Beyond training and technical support, the deal gives Niger access to modern weapons, including drones and ammunition, which it desperately needs to fight the insurgents. So, that's Niger's rather straightforward goals, but what about Ankara?

The short answer to that is Turkey Seam. to be using this partnership as part of an ambitious geopolitical strategy. Liam Karp, an analyst at Critical Threats, believes that Ankara hopes to turn Niame into its hub for engagement in West Africa.

This is backed up by a recent report from Turkey's intelligence agency, MIT, which identified Niger as a strategic investment, part of a plan to revive what it calls the heritage of Ottoman Turkey in Africa.

This plan has dovetailed with growing anti-French sentiments in West Africa, which have left several countries in need of a new security partner. By sending troops, Turkey is protecting its strategic investment and signaling to those governments that, hey, we can be as good, if not better, than the French. Laughing in British.

Turkey already plays a major role in the region's security as one of the leading drone suppliers, but if it's successful in Niger, then its foothold would grow, opening up new opportunities, including access to the region's mineral wealth.

When Niger kicked out the French, you see, it also revoked the operating license of French nuclear fuel producer Arano at one of the world's biggest uranium mines. In effect, this meant that Niger's uranium reserves, considered to be the highest grade in Africa, were up for grabs.

Russia has already made a play for the uranium, dangling the possibility of building a nuclear power plant in the country. Although the plan may never materialize, since this is Russia we're talking about here, it shows how far Moscow is willing to go to secure Niger's uranium.

While the Nigerian government seems to prefer working with Russia, Turkey has quickly positioned itself as a dark horse in this race.

Bloomberg reports that in July 2024, Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister Haqqin Fidan and Spy Chief Ibrahim Kalin, visited as part of Ankara's efforts to secure access to uranium. Although the outcome of that meeting is not publicly known, it underscores how serious Ankara is about competing with Moscow.

The deepening ties between Niger and Africa as a whole and Ankara have also offered Turkish President Erdogan tangible benefits back home.

He has leveraged these partnerships to pressure African governments into closing Gulenist schools and replacing them with institutions run by the state-backed Marif Foundation. This is part of a long-standing campaign against exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen, who he blames for the failed 2016 coup attempt.

Erdogan has also used expanding trade with Africa to funnel contracts and investment opportunities to those close to him, because of course he has.

This is most evident in the defense industry, where arms sales and mercenary deployments have directly benefited Erdogan's allies, including his son-in-law, who runs the Bakar Defense Drone Company. Zooming out, and we see that Turkey's deepening engagement in Niger exemplifies a broader transformation, reshaping global power dynamics.

From the United Arab Emirates' growing footprint across the Horn of Africa to India's increasing infrastructure investments on the continent, middle powers are expanding their influence in ways that would have... been unthinkable a decade ago, and Africa is embracing them because they are perceived to bring fewer colonial burdens and more flexible

Partnerships that are less demanding than what's usually expected by the West.

And while that may be less good for ordinary Africans, just witness the sheer number of civilians slaughtered by the UAE-backed rapid support forces in Sudan, it suits their governments nicely. The question now then becomes how will traditional powers react to this new era of multipolar competition?

One thing is certain, Africa is no longer just a battleground for great powers, but the proving ground for ambitious new ones.

For our next story, we turn our attention to Colombia, where the country's most powerful drug cartel, the Gulf Clan, is reportedly in decline. Now, before we pop the champagne bottles and celebrate, we need to throw out a caveat here.

This claim needs to be taken, with a pinch of salt large enough to clog the arteries of a blue whale, because it was made by a government official negotiating a peace deal with the Gulf Clan.

If it's true, and that is a big if, it represents the best shot that Colombia has had to dismantle an organization that has terrorized the country since 2001. So, because we've made a career out of fighting the cloud in every silver lining, we have to ask, is this claim true? Is the Gulf Clan really going to make a deal with the government?

What happens if they do? And perhaps most importantly, if the Gulf Clan is weakening, what fills the vacuum that they leave behind? Because, well, history has shown us that in Colombia's drug trade, one cartel's decline leaves the door wide open for the next one to pop in, put its feet on the table, and generally make itself at home.

Let's start with the first question. Is this claim true? Answering this is going to require a bit of context.

Although the Gulf clan is the largest drug cartel in Colombia, it has recently suffered major blows, including the arrest and subsequent imprisonment of its top commander, Dario Antonio Suga. After his arrest, the group splintered into two factions, one led by Chiquito Marlo and the other by Gonzalito.

Second, since coming into power in 2022, President Gustavo Petro has pursued a policy of total peace, an ambitious strategy where Bogotá seeks to negotiate with all of the country's armed groups with the belief that dialogue, rather than sheer military force, offers Colombia its best chance at ending decades of violence.

Although this plan has had some early successes, including a ceasefire with the National Liberation Army, or ELN, one of the country's most powerful insurgent groups, analysts, including the Council on Foreign Relations, have pronounced it dead following a spate of high-profile failures, including advances by ELN in January, which saw them capture swathes of

Territory near the Venezuelan border.

And this brings us to our third point. This is the second time that Petro's government has tried to negotiate with the Gulf clan.

The first attempt in 2023 failed after the Gulf clan broke a ceasefire. Now, with this context in mind, let's get back to one of our- original question, is the Gulf Clan in decline? And the answer to that is… we don't think so.

We say this not just with the benefit of hindsight, but by looking at the group's actions. Throughout September, the Gulf Clan has been fighting the ELN for control of the south of Bolivia, a hotspot for illegal gold mining and coca-growing.

According to Gerson Arias, a researcher at the Ideas Per Peace Foundation, these attacks are part of an expansion plan that Gonzalito's faction of the Gulf Clan has been implemented since at least 2022.

A group in decline doesn't expand its territory. That's a move usually reserved for groups looking to grow or those making contingencies in case negotiations with the government fail. Elizabeth Dickinson, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, believes the second scenario is what we're seeing now.

Quoting her here, the clan's priority is to remain strong because whether or not it reaches an agreement, it guarantees control of a territory crucial for its financing and mobility. That doesn't mean a peace deal is impossible.

According to Alvaro Jimenez, the government negotiator that we mentioned at the start of this piece, the government is offering the cartel a chance to see their kids grow up in an exchange for laying down their arms.

He adds that while this may not seem like much, it is apparently an important element for the cartel's leadership. Let's imagine for a moment that family wins out over profit. Something that would make Hallmark Channel writers everywhere shed a tear.

This would be a major coup for Petro's government. They would simultaneously eliminate one of the country's largest drug cartels, while proving that reports of Total Peace's death have been greatly exaggerated.

Internationally, it would be a repudiation of the Trump administration, with which President Petro has beef, which recently named Colombia as a country which has demonstrably failed to uphold its obligations to control drug trafficking.

But again, every silver lining totally has a cloud. While this would be a victory for Bogota, it wouldn't be the end of the drug trade or even the nation's struggles with armed groups. With Gulf Clan gone, the ELN or any of the other armed groups in the country would be free to move into its territory.

Alternatively, the Gulf Clan could fracture even further into small groups, all vying for control of the lucrative trade in drugs and access to the illegal gold mines. One of these groups would inevitably become more successful than the others, grow its territory, and consolidate its power to once again dominate the Colombian underworld.

Which would bring us back to square one, with the government trying to find a solution to a problem that seemingly just won't go away.

So where does that leave Bogota? What can it actually do to end this crisis? Well, President Petro believes that the answer lies in legalizing drugs.

According to Dr. Raoul Zepeda, a fellow at King's College London, Petro's belief is informed by research from journals as prestigious as The Lancet arguing that making drugs illegal has failed to curb the drug trade.

Despite this research, President Petro faces an uphill battle altogether. support to challenge the drug prohibition regime, particularly because President Trump has made it a core part of his presidency.

For now, Colombia seems caught between a rock and a hard place, pursue a peace deal that seems destined to fail, or push for legalization in a world that just isn't ready to listen.

And now, back to the Sahel region for our final story. In Africa's Sahel region, it's been years since the three nations of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso settled into a new equilibrium, overtaken by military dictatorships that swiftly expelled Western counterinsurgent forces in the name of anti-colonialism.

Since that time, however, the Sahel's three junta-led nations have struggled mightily with an ongoing jihadist insurgency from the al-Qaeda-affiliated JANIM organization.

As we mentioned briefly in our first segment today, Russian forces have proved ineffective in stemming the tide, and the three nations' attempt to coordinate their own counterinsurgency has struggled to gain any real momentum. All the while, the three nations' leaders have attempted to redirect the public's focus toward their own preferred message.

That tactic hasn't failed outright, but it's proved more effective in Burkina Faso under the charismatic Ibrahim Traore than in Mali, where JANIM has sustained a blockade of vital fuel imports for multiple weeks now.

Yet even though the Sahel's military regimes are clearly struggling to stay afloat, it was still a surprise when the Wall Street Journal revealed this week that the three governments are turning their attention back toward the US.

By the Journal's description, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are experiencing a little bit of buyer's remorse, and have come to regret their choice to replace Western security guarantors with Russia.

As the Africa Insights Hubstack points out, it's the nation of Mali that appears most interested in a return to alignment with Washington, after another recent report claimed that Mali has begun to receive greater intelligence sharing support from the United States.

Nonetheless, all three nations appear to be interested in a return to the pre-2001 order of things, and seem to hope that the United States can either offer that training support directly to their militaries, or could otherwise connect the Sahel states with trainers from other nations or from private mercenary organizations.

Niger quietly welcomed the head of America's Special Operations Command for Africa in late September, and although Burkina Faso's leader Traore has publicly criticized his neighbor's decision, there is no telling what sorts of negotiations could be underway through the back channels that would allow Traore to save face.

On the merits, a return to Western counterinsurgency cooperation would make good sense for the three military-led Sahel states.

While counterinsurgent efforts were not perfect by any means, when the United States and France were deeply involved in regional affairs, the recent swell of Janim and the Islamic State Sahel franchise have offered a bit of perspective.

No matter how persistent the jihadists in the Badlands had been, during that period of Western cooperation, they never became half as powerful as they are now.

Not only that, but- Recent reporting suggests that Russian mercenaries were too brutal even for the Sahel regime's taste, with a report by the Sentry detailing how Mali had been eager to see Wagner Group fighters replaced by the Russian Afrika Korps by the time Wagner left the nation earlier this year.

In Mali especially, Wagner was on the receiving end of brutal slaughters by the nation's insurgent groups, and the Afrika Korps appears far less willing to stick out the necks of its own personnel than Wagner ever was.

The Sahel security collaboration with Russia was also not replacing much that the United States couldn't replace, either directly or through a third party, and it would come with far better intelligence resources, none of the distractions that Russia faces with its war in Ukraine, and the option to eventually rebuild relationships with European security

Partners.

Not only that, but the Trump administration in Washington appears more than happy to strike the same sorts of deals that Moscow has been making, trading direct or indirect security arrangements for access to lucrative mines and natural resources.

But it's important to note that the United States is not the only world nation that's looking to encroach on Russia-Sahel relationships.

As we explained earlier in this very episode, Turkey has also set its sights on a security partnership with Niger, undercutting Russia while extending the reach of its commandos and paramilitaries all across Africa and the Middle East.

So, as the United States looks to re-engage in the same part of the world, it's worth taking a pause to ask a larger question, because right now, one of two things must be true.

Option one, these two NATO allies are coordinating in the United States and tends to extend the West's influence through the Sahel via Turkey in a mutually beneficial relationship. Or option two, these allies are in competition, aligned in the goal to push out Russia, but disagreeing on whether Washington or Ankara should fill the void.

Either way, it would mark an important shift within the wider NATO alliance, one that could have major repercussions down the line.

As always, we will do our best to keep you informed as things develop, and until next time, thank you for subscribing, thank you for supporting all we do here at Front's, and we'll see you again next week.