Briefing Room 06.03.26 Niger Declares War on France (and more).

Welcome back to The Briefing Room, where, for perhaps the first time this week, myself and the writers here at France are not going to be talking about Iran. How about that? I mean, unless you include that mention right there.

So I guess technically we are going to talk about Iran just a little bit, but just that tiny bit. But then I just said Iran again. So let's move on.

And that's because while the crisis engulfing the Middle East has been dominating the headlines, unsurprisingly, it hasn't been the only thing happening in the world. But we here at The Briefing Room have long advocated following the lesser-known conflict stories, and that seems even more important when the rest of the media is focused on just a single war.

There are other wars, many of them.

So today we're not going to cover the Middle East at all. Instead, we're going to travel to distant Myanmar, where one of the biggest rebel operations of the civil war seems to be shaping up. After that, we're checking in on the DRC, where the proliferation of drones among rebel groups is starting to cause panic.

But first, we'll cover one of the strangest stories of the past few weeks. The story of how Niger just declared war on France. As always, thank you so much for subscribing.

It is the dedicated followers just like you there who allow us to produce this niche content on under-the-radar stuff. Something that's right now, honestly, more important than ever. And with that out of the way, let's go straight on to Niger's declaration of war.

Niger declares war on France For our first story, we turn to West Africa, where in the middle of February, a major news story broke, but slipped under the radar as a result of 2026 deciding to be completely insane. Because how often does a country declare war on a major European power without it making front page news?

And yet, that's right, because a few weeks ago, a West African nation, Niger, declared war on France.

And you probably never even heard about it. The declaration was made by General Amado Ibro, a aide to General Abduraharmine Tiani, the leader of the junta that has ruled Niger since the 2023 coup.

Speaking during youth rally in Naime, General Ibro claimed that France was getting ready to wage war on Niger because the latter was responsible for the poor economic conditions being experienced in the former.

And as so, Naime needed to go to war first. Now, tensions between France and the Nigerian junta are not new. Immediately after the general seized power following the ouster of President Mohamed Bouzoum, a French ally, they expelled the French ambassador, suspended a security cooperation agreement with Paris, and ordered the withdrawal of all French troops.

The relationship deteriorated even further, following a jihadist attack on a military base at Naime's International Airport. General Tiani accused the French government and their regional allies Benin and Ivory Coast of sponsoring the attacks.

General Tiani further claimed that this attack was meant to be followed by seven simultaneous assaults in the Tlaveri region, a long-traveled area near Niger's western border. have so far denied the allegations, with government spokesperson accusing Naime of waging an information war through its latest claims that France wanted to go to war with the West

African nation.

And let's be clear for a moment that the odds of Macron looking at the chaos in the world and the war in Ukraine and going, I've got an excellent plan, let's hire jihadists and attack an airport in Niger, let's just say it's really, really, really low.

Even without France denying any plans for military intervention, the prospect of Niger actually waging war on French soil is practically zero. Niger lacks a navy, it's a landlocked country and possesses no weapon systems capable of reaching metropolitan France.

I mean, there's David and Goliath, and then there's Goliath versus one of the munchkins from Wist of Oz. However, we do have to consider Niger's ability to target French interests closer to home.

French forces remain deployed across West Africa, and France maintain significant economic investments in neighboring countries, particularly Benin, which shares a nearly 300-kilometer-long border with Niger.

Niger could theoretically launch cross-border attacks against these interests or attempt to destabilize French-aligned governments in the region. But there's significant risk if Naime were to pursue this strategy.

Any military action against neighboring states could trigger a regional crisis that would likely draw on ICOWAS, the regional bloc that failed to intervene militarily in Niger following the 2023 coup.

In the years since, ICOWAS has been a lot more willing to throw its weight around, most recently in Benin following the attempted coup in December 2025.

Additionally, while Paris has said that it has no plans to attack Niger, an attack on French interests in Benin would force Paris to undertake a military response that could be devastating for Niger's already stretched armed forces currently engaged in fighting jihadist insurgencies across multiple fronts.

But beyond the discussion of whether a war is even likely or what shape it would take, the more important question is why Niger declared war in the first place.

According to the Robert Lansing Institute for Global Threats and Democratic Studies, the announcement appears to be more political theater rather than genuine preparation for armed conflict. The biggest indicator of this is where the announcement was made, in a stadium where General Ibro was surrounded by a supportive crowd chanting anti-French slogans.

And the fact is that this announcement wasn't followed up by any kind of legal, political, or diplomatic procedures that, you know, typically accompany an actual declaration of war.

Such theater works for the regime because it channels the public's frustration towards an external threat instead of the junta.

Since coming into power, the junta has done little to improve the economic conditions of the ordinary people, with the World Bank estimating that more than half of the country lives in extreme poverty, defined as surviving on less than $3 a day.

France is an inspired choice for a target because of the deep-seated resentment many in Niger harbored. towards their former colonial power, a resentment often summed up with the statistic about how Nigerian uranium powers about 70% of France's electricity, while about 80% of Nigerians live in the dark.

The war declaration also serves to deflect attention from the Hunters' inability to address Niger's deteriorating security situation. Since the coup, jihadist attacks have intensified rather than diminished, as the Hunters promised.

The January attack on Nami International Airport, which occurred despite the presence of Russia's Afrika Korps personnel, exposed serious vulnerabilities in the capital's defenses.

By blaming France for sponsoring such attacks, the Hunters shifts responsibility away from its own failures in containing the insurgency towards a country that many in Niger already hate.

And speaking of Russia, according to the Robert Lansing Institute, while there is no evidence that the Kremlin directly encouraged Niger to issue the war declaration, Moscow does still benefit.

Russia's strategy appears to be opportunistic, to fill the influence vacuum left after the withdrawal of Western forces and to take advantage of any actions taken by the junta that isolate Niger from its former partners.

All Moscow has to do is provide military support and watch as the junta's anti-French rhetoric does the rest of the work, further cementing Niger's dependence on Russian security assistance. Whether this strategy and the junta's incendiary rhetoric towards France will work for the Nigerian people, that is another matter entirely.

All we can do is wait and see.

The Battle for Sitwe is on the Horizon Okay, now let's turn our attention to events several thousand kilometers away, where rebels in the nation of Myanmar are on the verge of achieving what could be their greatest battlefield victory in months.

The location is Myanmar's Western Rakhine State, and the rebel organization responsible for the coming offensive is the Arakan army, one of the largest and most effective ethnic militia groups of the Myanmar Civil War. Their target is the city of Sitwe, Rakhine State's capital, pre-war population, roughly 125,000.

The Arakan have had their sights set on Sitwe for years, and if they can capture it now, then almost nothing will stand between them and their ultimate objective, full control over Rakhine State itself. Over the past week, Arakan forces have been closing in on Sitwe, the largest remaining Rakhine State holdout of Myanmar's ruling Tatmadaw regime.

After months spent setting the conditions for a final offensive, they've now moved to within just two kilometers of the city, according to the XR managed news outlet, the Irrawaddy.

The Arakan army's current focus is the village of Kietor, a small settlement on Sitwe's doorstep as well as contested areas surrounding a key naval base and the Tatmadaw's regional operations command.

Using the rivers, Arakan fighters have been able to conduct constant ambush attacks and skirmishers in a slow but steady battle of attrition across the surrounding district.

Once Kietor is captured, the Arakan believe that they will have set the conditions for a final attack on Sitwe or attack Mador troops. have lost their ability to pivot their units or respond dynamically to threats on the outskirts.

The Tatmador seem to agree with the Iraq on one key observation, that if they fail to maintain control of Sitway's outlying areas, they are likely to lose the final battle that will follow.

Defending the city, the Tatmador is believed to have roughly 2,000 infantry at their disposal, supported by minor local militias, including the pro-regime Iraq and Liberation Party, as well as fighters from the Rohingya Muslim population.

Inside the city, the Tatmador have purportedly kept many thousands of relocated residents hostage after they were moved into the city in mid-2024 to use as human shields.

The city has been surrounded and under pressure since that time. Also within the city, the Tatmador has artillery at its disposal, while just off the coast, roughly 1,000 naval troops and 10 warships of varying fighting potency are doing their best to support the city's defense.

According to sources on the ground, Tatmador troops have attempted limited counteroffensives on multiple occasions, although as of now, those counteroffensives have been quickly beaten back.

As is often the case, when it's desperate, the Tatmador has also been leveraging air power to its fullest potential, although, as is often the case, the Tatmador have been less than discerning about their targets of choice. Most recently, a Tatmador warplane bombed a local market in a village roughly 30 kilometers from Sitway proper.

That market is a known part of Iraq and supply chains, where weapons and logistical support often pass through, but it was far from a rightful wartime target.

Of the 20 people killed in that airstrike, 12 of them were women and six were children. On the rivers, the Tatmador have been laying mines, and they pose an acute threat to local civilians in the process. Nevertheless, the Tatmador seem to have decided that civilian casualties are acceptable.

Recent reports on the civilians trapped inside Sitway only confirmed that suspicion. Those civilians have apparently been resettled in areas close to military positions and supply depots. Because of the way that the Tatmador has entrenched itself, Arakan forces don't seem to be expecting a quick capture of the city in the coming days.

Instead, they're working to progress this siege to its final stages, cutting off the remaining connections between the forces in Sitway and the nearby warships.

Accomplish that, and in a best-case scenario, continued attrition will soon weaken the besieged forces enough that the Arakan could take the risk of urban battles, or could even get Tatmador forces to surrender outright.

But even if that doesn't happen right away, and Sitway remains besieged for multiple months before the next stage of battle, the Arakan will still gain a key advantage.

Once the Tatmador loses its ability to dynamically react to Arakan encirclements, the Arakan will need fewer troops and fewer resources to keep them in place and to keep the forces aboard Myanmar's warships at bay.

That will allow Arakan leaders to reposition their forces toward a second opening offensive, with the potential to turn the tide in Rakhine state once and for all. The Arakan are pushing toward the town of Kyapu, a key location in the China-Manmar economic corridor that Beijing has spent years investing into.

For months, the Arakan have kept constant pressure on the township, but they're now starting to stay up their efforts and already it's clear that they're making an impact this week tatmador forces and local partners started to disassemble a key chinese power plant in the area known as v power the plant has been offline for years but it's now expected to

Relocate away from the front lines and possibly outside of rakhine state according to local residents fighting has now encroached to within four kilometers of the plant and most parts of the plant are already gone clear out the power plant force china to relocate some of its other economic assets in the area and the tatmador soon won't have much reason to

Defend the areas of rakhine state where they're still present the area around the power plant is currently home to a major tatmador presence and their presence has been militarily justified given the mama regime's intense focus on protecting chinese material assets wherever possible but as china faces greater and greater incentives to move those assets

Elsewhere the tamador is in a position to start asking itself what else is there at this point left in rakhine state to hold on to losing sipi or pulling troops back from the second front line would be a blow to the hunters pride and would grant the iraqan army control of the territory it covers but as of now that seems to be a losing battle anyway and once

China loses any remaining interest in rakhine state the battle simply won't be worth fighting for a final story oh we're heading back to africa this time to the drc to examine one of the biggest developments in congo's seemingly never-ending war with a rwanda-backed rebel group m23 in a statement posted on social media by m23 spokesperson lawrence kanayuka

The group claimed responsibility for a recent kamikaze drone attack on kisangani airport in northeastern drc the statement claimed that the airport was targeted because kinshasa was using it as a staging ground for drone strikes against m23 positions according to chinese outlet cgtn the drones were deployed in four waves with a final wave coming just as a

Civilian aircraft was preparing to land the government of xopo province where the apple dislocated said that four drones were intercepted but it wasn't clear whether any other drones managed to hit their targets however a witness on the scene who spoke to reuters heard several explosions throughout sunday afternoon and bursts of gunfire that sent civilians

Around the airport fleeing this is the second time that the airport which serves as a major air and logistics hub for kinshasa's air assets has been targeted by the rebel group with the first attacks happening between january the 31st and february 1st but the attacks themselves aren't the reason we chose to highlight this story rather it was because of the

Weapons used drones now drones aren't a particularly new invention i mean just look at the fighting in ukraine sudan or even most recently iran they also aren't even a new entrant into kinshasa's war with m23 what is different though is how the rebel group is now using them the outlet critical threats reported that during the initial attacks back in january

M23 used eight turkish made year three drones which is designed for long-range precision strikes targeting high-value stationary targets including forward air bases although we don't have any confirmation of the drones used in the most recent strike you we can safely assume that it was likely the same type.

This is because Kisangani, which hosts the headquarters of the Army's Third Defense Zone, is more than 560 kilometers away from the front lines in North Kivu Province. These were M23's first attacks west of the battle line since early 2025, and the group's deepest strikes westward since it re-emerged in late 2021.

M23 targeting Kisangani, therefore, represents a significant tactical shift that should worry Kinshasa.

By striking so far behind the front lines, the rebels demonstrated that they can reach deep into government-controlled territory to target locations that Kinshasa assumed was safe, and because of that, the government will now be forced to divert resources to defend backline positions, stretching an already overstretched military even thinner.

Beyond the attacks themselves, there's the broader question of where M23 is getting such sophisticated weaponry, given that they are essentially just a local militia, an extremely powerful one, but a local militia nonetheless.

And here we turn to Rwanda. According to UN investigators, Rwanda has been running an extensive smuggling network across its border with the DRC that moves stolen minerals out of M23-controlled areas and brings weapons and military hardware back in. This helps keep the rebel group well supplied.

It's important to note that in November last year, Rwanda formalized a landmark agreement with Turkey that covers the joint production of drones, small arms, and associated subsystems, and includes the construction of a modern assembly and integration plant in Kigali.

Shortly afterwards, M23 began using Turkish drones to target distant government-controlled locations. For its part, Kinshasa has responded to these attacks with its own aerial capabilities, which according to recent reports now include the Chinese-made Wing Long drones that were purchased in early 2025.

In late February, Congolese forces used these capabilities to conduct a drone strike near Rabia that killed M23 military spokesperson, Willy Nogoma, and at least a dozen other rebel officers. These strikes happened after M23's initial attack on Kisagani Airport, and the rebel group's latest attack would very well be retaliation for Nogoma's death.

As analysts of regional paper East African rightly pointed out, that kind of tit-for-tat escalation just traps the DRC in a cycle of retaliatory strikes that blocks the path to a genuine peace deal.

And speaking of a peace deal, we have to mention that all of these attacks are happening as Qatar-mediated ceasefire efforts continue, with Kinshasa and M23 having signed agreements in Doha to establish a joint ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism involving Qatar, the U.S., and the African Union as observers.

Those agreements will continue to feel hollow as long as the weapons keep flowing and the strikes keep happening.

As multiple analysts have pointed out in the past, the best way to ensure a lasting peace in the DRC, or at the very least, one that isn't violated before the ink dries, is to cut off M23's supply lines so that the group has no alternative other than to engage in negotiations in good faith.

And that means targeting Rwanda. To some degree, Washington is already doing this. The U.S., is the U.S. U.S. Treasury recently sanctioned the Rwandan Defense Force and four senior commanders for providing direct operational support to M23, including advanced military equipment like GPS jamming systems, air defense equipment, and drones.

But given that Rwanda has been sanctioned multiple times before and still continues to support M23, it's doubtful whether these latest sanctions will be the ones that finally force Kigali to change course.

More needs to be done, but given how many fires are currently raging all over the world, it's likely that the DRC will continue to be an afterthought until it's too late.