Briefing Room 13.12.2025

Welcome back to The Briefing Room, the weekly show that attempts to be the modern equivalent of an old-school newshound. Metaphorically hiding behind the bushes before jumping out with a gigantic camera and exclaiming, what a scoop!

I'm Simon, and this week the stories we've dragged out from the undergrowth are all focused on a single continent, Africa, specifically the nations of Somalia, Benin, and Libya, where a combination of separatism, coups, and military maneuvers have fueled fears of future crises.

And while very, very few are talking about these stories, they may soon turn out to be of major importance, As always, thank you so much for subscribing.

Your subscriptions help us not only produce bonus shows like this focused on the little-known and unsexy stories shaping our world, but also allow the main channel to get its teeth into serious topics like Sudan that we couldn't otherwise afford to talk about. Let's get into it!

Somalian Jubaland Declares Independence Take even a brief look at the nation of Somalia, and you'll be well within your right to think that the leadership in Mogadishu must be absolutely exhausted.

Al-Shabaab runs rampant through the countryside, the international community is courting the breakaway states of Puntland and Somaliland, piracy has returned off the coast, the power dynamics of the region are always tumultuous, and the odds of a palace coup are just never zero.

But now, it seems that a long-simmering feud between Mogadishu and another one of its long-time headaches, the semi-autonomous state of Jubaland is about to boil over with potentially disastrous consequences for Somali leadership.

Jubaland is Somalia's most southerly region, a broad expanse that's home to an estimated 2.5 million people today. For Somalia, it's economically important territory, mostly because of its impressive agricultural potential and the strategic port located in its capital city.

It's been semi-autonomous since 2013, when a Kenya-backed administration reconciled with Somalia's federal government and agreed to partially integrate while maintaining sole authority in many of its own affairs.

Its leadership, however, have raised a long series of complaints against Mogadishu over the last couple of years, as Jubaland, like the rest of Somalia, feels the impact of ongoing conflict, poverty, and underdevelopment.

Those tensions really started to spiral out of control, however, in late 2024, after Jubaland held a series of regional elections that the federal government claimed that it hadn't been involved in.

Both Somalia's president and Jubaland's regional president accused each other of treason, local fighters clashed with federal troops a couple of weeks later, and since then, Mogadishu has agreed to keep its distance, partially owing to the fact that Jubaland's regional forces got the better of the six-hour firefight.

From then until now, Jubaland's authorities have tried to chart a new course for their region, something less similar to the status that most of Somalia's states enjoy, and more aligned with the state affairs in Puntland and Somaliland.

For all practical purposes, Jubaland became autonomous, just like its northern counterparts, and while Jubaland has continued to defer to the Somali federal government on foreign policy and other areas that are best managed for the entire nation at once, the federal and regional governments have clashed... over policy in areas where both governments would

Prefer to do as they please.

Recently, although Jubaland and Mogadishu have collaborated in efforts to deal with al-Shabaab, it's become clear that Jubaland will have to handle most of the long-term counter-insurgent work by itself.

The Somali government has only supplied tip-of-the-sphere special operators in order to clear out and capture al-Shabaab territory, while it's up to Jubaland to hold that territory basically without support.

This week, the situation came to a head, when on Monday, Jubaland declared itself to be an independent government and announced that it had withdrawn from Somalia's federal administration.

The announcement, made just days before a nationwide gathering of opposition leaders in Jubaland's capital, appeared to be intended partly as a display to those opposition leaders.

The decision seemed to be partially motivated by concerns around Somalia's current leader, Hassan Sheikh Mahmood, who Jubaland's administrators have consistently criticized for mismanagement of the nation's economy, shortages of support provided to states, and the ongoing degradation of Somali political freedoms, especially for the opposition.

Making matters worse, Mogadishu still doesn't formally recognize the legitimacy of Jubaland's current leader in the wake of those disputed 2024 elections.

Jubaland leaders seem to believe that Somalia intends to eventually take its territory back by force, at least in part, and the actions of Somali military leaders at the fringes of Jubaland's territory certainly haven't quelled those fears.

As for what Jubaland intends to do next, it's likely to follow the example of Puntland in the north, after Puntland's officials made a very similar series of announcements and internal changes in March of 2024.

Unlike breakaway Somaliland, which is working to get its sovereignty claim recognized by foreign powers, Puntland has positioned itself as an autonomous counterweight to Mogadishu within the nation's overall structure.

Puntland's leader seems to be on course to challenge for the national presidency in 2026, and it's maintained close security cooperation with the United States in the battle against the Islamic State, something that Washington would probably withhold if it believed that Puntland posed a true threat to Somalia's internal stability.

Similar to Puntland, Jubaland is likely to remain at least partially engaged with the Somali government for the near future, although it'll probably continue to manage its own affairs to whatever extent possible.

The decision is likely to make the job of combating al-Shabaab more difficult, given that the jihadist insurgency thrives in environments where it doesn't face well-coordinated opposition, and given that Jubaland's own regional security forces have struggled to deal with al-Shabaab themselves.

As of now, though, it doesn't appear that Somalia's special operators have withdrawn from the region, and there's a non-zero chance that Somalia and Jubaland will be able to continue their security partnership, even as they gnash their teeth at each other and prepare for an eventual larger political showdown.

Until that showdown comes, it appears that Somalia will have to tolerate one more loose cannon on its territory, and considering the Mogadishu can't do much about it'll be up to Jubaland to make the most of its new auto- economy. Another Almost Coup in West Africa For our next story, we turn our attention to West Africa.

Now look, becky viewers of The Briefing Room, the show you're watching right now, well, remember that in a recent episode, we introduced the Guinea-Bissau rule, basically saying that as long as we are talking about Guinea-Bissau on war fronts, it's most likely because a coup has happened there.

Well, we want to expand this rule to cover the entirety of West Africa. If we talk about a small West African nation that you might never have heard of, it's probably because a coup was at least attempted. With that in mind, meet Benin, the West African nation home to about 14.5 million people that last Sunday was the site of an attempted coup.

In the early hours of the 7th of December, Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigre, commander of the Special Forces Group of Benin's National Guard, led a mutiny against the government.

He appeared on national television, flanked by several armed soldiers, and announced that after attacks on the presidential residence in Katono and the residences of other top-ranking military officials, his faction of the armed forces would be taking over the government.

The group, which called itself the Military Committee for Refoundation, announced that the constitution was suspended, all government institutions were dissolved, borders were closed, and Lieutenant Colonel Tigre had been elected president of the military committee.

In other words, it was almost a carbon copy of other recent coups in the region. In their statement, the coup plotters also hit another perennial favorite trotted out by Hunters in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The deteriorating local security situation.

In northern Benin, the country is dealing with a jihadist insurgency that in January and April launched major assaults that killed dozens of soldiers, with the neglect of fallen soldiers given as one of the reasons why the plotters were overthrowing the government. This isn't the first time that Benin has faced a coup attempt.

After its independence from France in 1960, the country experienced nine coup attempts in 15 years, making it one of Africa's most coup-prone nations.

The final successful coup came in October 1972, when Major Matthew Carrico seized power and established a Marxist-Leninist regime that lasted until 1990. By that point, Benin was in the midst of a dire economic crisis that forced it to abandon Marxism-Leninism.

Carrico was soon after stripped of power and multi-party elections held, where he lost to Nisifor Soglo.

This made him the first mainland African president to lose power through the popular vote. This transition and the subsequent years of political stability made Benin one of Africa's democratic outliers. Until the 7th of December, that was.

Now, given that we've titled this section Another Maybe Coup, you probably already guessed that Lieutenant Colonel Tigris' coup was, in a word, unsuccessful.

On the same day the coup was announced, Benin's Minister of the Interior and Public Security told the press, and we'll quote him here, in the early morning of Sunday, the 7th of December 2025, a small group of soldiers launched a mutiny with the aim of destabilizing the state and its institutions.

Faced with the situation, the Beninese armed forces and their leadership, true to their oath, remained committed to the republic.

End quote.

The government. later announced that some of the coup plotters had been arrested two senior military officials who had been taken hostage were freed and that a manhunt was underway for those still on the loose senior government officials who spoke to reuters said that diggrey and four others were hiding in togo and the government had demanded their immediate

Extradition now the fact that an attempted coup happened isn't a story in and of itself this is west africa we're talking about here after all and as we've already mentioned benin despite its recent track record of relative stability has a history as one of africa's most coup-prone nations the true story lies in understanding why lieutenant colonel diggrey

And his men failed while others in the region succeeded first france provided intelligence logistical support to the government to thwart the coup plotters while french officials declined to give the press more details on what the help entailed the fact that they intervened suggests that paris is desperately trying to maintain its influence in one of its few

Remaining stable west african allies second and perhaps most importantly nigeria which shares an 809 kilometer border with benin sent in warplanes to bomb the mutinous soldiers at the national tv and radio station and a military base near the airport in kotono additionally the regional bloc ecowas announced the deployment of ground troops from ghana nigeria

Ivory coast and sierra leone to protect the government of president patrice talon the immediate response from ecowas represents the dramatic shift from the regional bloc's track record over the past few years since 2020 ecowas has watched as military coups succeeded in mali pakina faso nigeria and guinea in each case the bloc imposed sanctions suspended

Membership and threatened military intervention but those threats never materialized into actual force after nigeria's july 2023 coup ecowas followed its usual strategy of diplomatic threats with one major change nigerian president bola tinubu threatened armed intervention to restore president mohammed bazoon to power however when mali and bikini faso warned

That any military action against nigeria would be considered a declaration of war against them ecowas backed down the sanctions also backfired spectacularly creating critical supply shortages that fueled anti-ecowas sentiment while consolidating popular support for the hunters so by intervening in benin ecowas has seemingly abandoned its sanction first

Approach and is signaling that it will intervene in the future should more militaries attempt to overthrow their governments whether this will be enough to stop coups in the region which are often copycat in nature only time will tell however the bloc's intervention in this case proved vital in preventing another nation from slipping into the hands of a

Military dictatorship and that at least has to count for something hafta makes preparations in libya a few thousand kilometers north of mogadishu libyan warlord khalifa haftar appears to be making preparations for future action although just what haftar is preparing for and just what he intends to do is a mystery according to reporting by africa intelligence

Haftar is in the process of rebuilding and restructuring his military forces and extending his network out toward the border with Sudan.

If you've been keeping up with the global news over the last week, you've probably picked up on a growing trend.

It seems to be a really good time to be a UAE-backed fighting faction. In Sudan, the rapid support forces are expanding, taking over extremely lucrative and geopolitically sensitive targets like the Heglig oil fields while they continue the ethnic cleansing of the Darfur region.

In Yemen, the Emirati-backed southern transitional council has taken massive amounts of territory over the last week, as we've discussed at length in a recent Warfronts episode.

Check it out. And now, over the span of the same few days, the Emirates' primary client in Libya seems to be on the move. According to the report by Africa Intelligence, Haftar and his son Khaled, chief of staff of Haftar's Libyan National Army, are in the process of reorganizing their security units and allied militias into a truly unified fighting force.

Partly by nature of the complex power dynamics on the territory his faction controls, and partly due to the fact that Haftar's forces aren't under any real military pressure from Libya's rival government in Tripoli, his fighting forces have, until now, been structured into a relatively loose coalition.

Professional-style military units fight alongside tribal militias, local self-protection groups coexist with paid paramilitaries, and usually, because Haftar's control over his territory, and Libya's lucrative oil reserves is essentially secure, they don't have all that much to do.

Now, though, Haftar appears to intend to construct a more coherent, fully integrated fighting force, bringing together some of the more powerful brigades and other fighting units at common bases in the important southern region of Fezan.

While the Fezan region doesn't directly border RSF-controlled areas of Sudan, it's a critical node in supply and smuggling routes that move through Libya's disputed southwest and the northern reaches of Chad, before reaching parts of Sudan, where the RSF exerts strong authority.

Those supply lines have been important for both factions, as they allow for the transfer of weapons, cash, and other war-fighting supplies into Sudan, fueling the nation's civil conflict, while Haftar and his allies get rich by enabling the transfer.

They've also become increasingly vital now that the RSF appears to have given up some of its control over the triangle of territory between Sudan, Libya, and Egypt after it was targeted by recent airstrikes.

The northern part of Chad is far easier to navigate safely, with very little risk of intervention or even diplomatic interruption by the Chadian government. Now, though, as an emirates-backed faction in Yemen launches a major offensive for the first time in several years, it's worth considering Haftar's new efforts in a different light.

Consolidating his forces would allow him to exert a stronger hold on the parts of the Libya-RSF supply lines that he's responsible for, but it could also be interpreted as overkill if that were Haftar's only objective.

It's important to consider here that the flow of supplies along this route doesn't necessarily need to go from Libya to Sudan, especially now that the RSF… appears to be gaining momentum in Sudan's central regions, and has essentially locked down its control of Darfur.

Instead, we've got to consider the opposite possibility, that with the RSF in a favorable position, weapons, supplies, and perhaps even fighters could start to flow back toward Libya. The balance of power between Haftar and Libya's rival Tripoli government has been steady for years, but all is not well within the Tripoli faction.

In May of this year, Tripoli was torn apart by intense fighting between rival militia groups, and that fighting very nearly broke out again later in the year.

The Tripoli government, the so-named Government of National Unity, is supported by the United Nations and enjoys a special relationship with Turkey and Pakistan, but the UN has never been more divided than it is today, and both Turkey and Pakistan are distracted elsewhere. Turkey with Syria and Israel, and Pakistan with India and Afghanistan.

Libya is a combat environment where relatively small groups of fighters have to sustain operations across vast open deserts, where individual casualties matter quite a bit because there simply aren't all that many bodies to go around.

An infusion of reliable hardware, or especially a few hundred to a few thousand experienced fighters from Sudan, could be a real game-change of Haftar and its forces.

Not only that, but their impact would be far greater if they were operating alongside the sort of integrated fighting force that Haftar is building now, instead of trying to navigate a mess of semi-autonomous militias and paramilitary brigades.

To be clear, this evolution represents a degree of conjecture on our end, putting together pieces in Sudan, Yemen, and Libya across the UAE's growing international proxy network. It's entirely possible that Haftar just wants to firm up his fighting forces and enhance his ability to secure transit routes to and from Sudan to better facilitate the war there.

But, if Haftar was planning something bigger, then the next thing you would expect to see would be a meeting with neighbouring Egypt, a powerful regional player whose endorsement, or at least tacit approval, would be necessary to provide diplomatic cover and ensure that nobody will be coming to intervene.

That meeting would probably include not just Haftar and Egypt's president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, but Haftar's son and chief of staff, as well as his other son, who serves as his deputy, and you'd probably expect the chief of Egyptian intelligence to be there, too.

As it turns out, that's precisely the meeting that took place two days after the Africa intelligence report dropped on the 8th of December in the city of Cairo. Are we onto something?

Maybe, maybe not. But either way, history will show us in due time, and right now it appears that the Emirates' entire proxy network is making moves. If Haftar was going to prompt a new round of fighting in Libya, that'd be the time.

While Tripoli is vulnerable, the RSF is pushing forward, and the Emirates have thus far avoided repercussions for their growing campaign around the world.