Briefing Room 20.12.2025

Welcome back to The Briefing Room, where this week we're bringing an end-of-year update that pairs the bizarre and inexplicably horrific tone of the Star Wars Holiday Special with a series of absolute crimes against humanity on par with 2014's Saving Christmas, starring Kirk Cameron.

I'm Simon, and unfortunately, I've got the usual slate of generally bad news to share with you. This week, we'll be discussing upheaval and conquest in the Congo, Latin American power plays by Beijing, and the subtle messaging war playing out between Russia and Turkey, with Ukraine and the Black Sea stuck in the middle.

As always, thank you for supporting us here at Fronts.co, and for one of the final times in 2025, let's get into it. M23 Captures Avira If you asked the respective governments of Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and even the United States of America, they'd tell you that a state of peace in the DRC has finally been restored.

Barely a week ago, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Congolese President Felix Shishikady came together in a ceremony overseen by U.S. President Donald Trump and observed by several other leaders from across Africa.

But as the Rwanda-backed rebel group M23 made clear this week, the idea of a Congolese peace is just little more than an illusion. Within days of the signing of the Rwanda DRC peace deal, hundreds of thousands of Congolese people had been displaced, hundreds at a bare minimum had most likely been killed, and the city of Avira had fallen under rebel control.

M23's capture of Avira, pre-war population about three-quarters of a million, is the product of a months-long set of offensives that had focused on setting the conditions for a successful takeover.

Following their capture of the capital cities of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, earlier this year the cities of Goma and Bakavi respectively, M23 had essentially achieved one of its main strategic objectives, to take over the entire border between Rwanda and the Congo.

From there, M23 had shifted to a new set of priorities, with the basic objective of protecting and solidifying the gains that M23 had already made. But in order to ensure that its territorial capture was set in stone, M23 had to turn its attention southward toward Avira.

While Avira is neither a provincial capital nor the location of any particularly concentrated reserves of critical minerals, it represented a key strategic problem for the rebels. Move south from the Congo's border with Rwanda, and you find the Congo's border with Burundi, which is currently working to oppose M23 as a military partner of the DRC government.

Back when M23 captured Bakavu, Burundian forces had played a critical role in ensuring that M23 couldn't immediately move south, barreling down the M5 highway that runs parallel to the Burundian border.

But, take a look at a map of the region, draw a line from Bakavu to Avira, and you quickly see the problem. Take over the territory between those two cities, and you've established a zone of control across the entire Congo-Burundi land border, before you meet the much longer stretch of border that divides the- expansive waters of Northern Lake Tanganyika.

By capturing the city of Avera, M23 has captured that entire stretch of highway, and thus the entire stretch of land connecting Burundi to the rest of the Congo.

That's going to be a major problem for a couple of reasons at once.

For one thing, Burundi's support has been very important in delaying M23 for this long, both because Burundi has dedicated thousands of its own troops to that effort, and because Burundi allowed the Congo to move troops, store supplies, and build logistical chains on Burundian sovereign territory.

So, without Burundi at its disposal, the Congo is going to have a much harder time continuing to fight in this region.

Avera is surrounded by easily defensible highlands, and while it's been the operational center of the Congo's operations in South Kivu, it's not clear where or how the Congo would be able to build a new forward operating zone now that Avera has fallen.

As for Burundi, the nation's leaders have been skeptical of Rwanda for quite some time, and they fear that now they're sandwiched between Rwanda to the north and M23 to the west, they could very easily become the next target of a regional offensive. The most economically important city, Bundrumbura, is very close to the border zone that M23 now controls.

Finally, by capturing Avera and the surrounding zone, M23 has taken over the flow of trade in and out of this part of the Congo, not just via Burundi, but via the two other, more southerly nations that rely on the lake, Tanzania and Zambia.

By taking Avera, M23 seals off its southern flank, isolates Burundi, and gains control over most of the economically important parts of north and south Kivu provinces.

They may still choose to expand their hold on the rest of the provinces, and in particular, they're already pushing toward small cities like Kamatuga in South Kivu and other hubs of the artisanal mining industry.

But the areas that M23 is really after, well, they've already captured.

As for why M23 has seemed to focus on locking down its territory and preventing strategic challenges to its control, instead of trying to make a substantive push toward the rest of the Congo, it's for the same reason that leaders in Washington, Kinshasa, and Kigali are all trying to downplay the situation.

At its core, the civil war in the Congo is a resource war, focused on the capture and exploitation of critical mineral deposits.

That recent US brokered peace deal, signed between Rwanda and the Congo, was focused largely on establishing resource extraction deals with the United States, which will guarantee the US a major stake in the same resource deposits that M23 now controls.

The deal has been sweetened for the benefit of the Congo, with the US agreeing to other lucrative deals that help Kinshasa to swallow its frustrations over the current situation. And, of course, Washington gets to claim it's brokered a peace deal, with Rwanda, a nation that's always denied supporting M23, instead of the actual fighting faction that matters.

Over the last week, it appears that M23's Uvira offensive has created a headache for those leaders.

Burundi has been trying to sound the alarms over what's happening with the nation. foreign minister telling the afp quoting here signing an agreement and not implementing it is a humiliation for everyone and first and foremost for president trump recently the u.s issued a rare public rebuke of rwanda for allowing m23's offensives to continue and on tuesday

The 16th of december m23 publicly agreed to request to withdraw from the vera according to reports on the ground nearly two days later m23 and its rwandan support forces have yet even show signs the withdrawal is coming and when you really think about it why would they leave rwanda can take a bit of a scolding on the diplomatic stage and ultimately loses

Nothing m23 is already captured of era and there's nobody in the region who can actually force them out even if they did temporarily withdraw they'll keep control of the surrounding highlands and can pressure the city or march back in once things have quieted down and while washington clearly feels that it has to keep up appearances the trump administration

Has already made it very obvious that superficial appearances are all that matter after all that was precisely what washington prioritized when it secured its illusion of a peace deal with kinshasa and kigali give the appearance that all is peaceful continue to reinforce the idea for low information global audiences and whatever actually happens on the

Ground doesn't really matter as long as it's kept quiet enough that it doesn't get in washington's way china's vision for latin america china is furious over geopolitical changes in latin america that was the assessment of arturo mcfields nicaragua's former ambassador to the organization of american states who in an article for the american outlet the hill

Was making the case that china's weakening global footprint particularly in latin america has become a major source of concern for president xi's government since president trump's re-election a lot of countries in the region including some that china would consider crucial partners such as panama have made moves to appease washington while others like

Guatemala are pursuing stronger economic ties with taiwan peru a country where beijing has invested millions of dollars in infrastructure projects is said to be officially designated as a major non-nato ally which would position it squarely within washington's camp and in venezuela the pro-china maduro regime could soon be replaced by one that is more

Pro-america there's also the simple fact that president trump's national security strategy has made it clear that his government will be aggressively implementing the monroe doctrine a 19th century statute that basically says washington is the only big dog allowed in the western hemisphere this was widely seen as a not so subtle message telling china to get

The out of the region all in all not exactly the best years for china in latin america washington's aggressive push for control of the western hemisphere has basically given president xi's government two options either give up the region entirely accepting american dominance or respond in a way that made it clear to both washington and latin american

Governments that beijing isn't going anywhere now if you have even the slightest interest in global affairs and i mean you're a you're a you're a you were a front say you do, you big brain, you probably can guess how China responded.

On Wednesday, the 10th of December, the Chinese government released a policy paper on its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean.

This is the third time that Beijing has released such a document, with the first two coming out in 2008 and 2016. Given that historically such policy papers have been good roadmaps for predicting how Beijing will interact with a region, you can understand why this document created a stir among China and Latin America observers.

American political scientist Robert Evan Ellis described the document as self-confident, albeit diplomatic in tone, as it lays out China's commitment to deepening its relationship with the region.

The paper highlighted China's expanding collaboration with Latin American governments, not only in commerce and investment, but also in science, technology, and people-to-people exchanges, making it clear that these programs would not only continue, but also grow over time.

Additionally, the document portrayed China as an important partner in the fight against climate change, positioning itself as a reliable ally in an area where Washington has increasingly stepped back. However, the document was perhaps more noteworthy for what was omitted rather than what was included.

Because throughout the entire document, China didn't make a single direct reference to the United States. That's right. Despite the US making clear its position on China's growing influence in the region, a paper widely seen as Beijing's response didn't mention America by name even once.

Instead, it chose to take veiled shots at Washington with references to unilateral bullying and Latin America's glorious tradition of independence, which observers have interpreted as a criticism of Washington's current policies.

For the first question, while we can't claim to know the thinking in Beijing with 100% certainty, given that we are quite obviously not members of the CCP, we can make some educated guesses based on what we know of China's playbook.

The most obvious reason, in our view, is that China is simply trying to avoid escalating tensions with Washington, while still maintaining its presence in the region.

By not mentioning the US directly, Beijing can claim that it's not trying to pick a fight or challenge American dominance, rather it's simply trying to conduct business and foster good multilateral relationships. It's a diplomatic sleight of hand that allows China to assert its interests without appearing overtly confrontational.

Another possibility is that China is signaling to Latin American governments that its engagement with the region isn't about countering the United States, but rather about genuine partnership and mutual benefit.

By keeping America out of the conversation entirely, Beijing is essentially saying, this isn't about them, it's about us. There's also a third explanation that's worth considering. China might be demonstrating confidence.

By refusing to even dignify Trump's Monroe Doctrine rhetoric with a formal response, Beijing is essentially an attempt. saying that America's concerns are irrelevant to China's long-term strategy in the region. It's the geopolitical equivalent of telling your ex, I don't think about you at all. Now, we're not sure which of these is true.

It could be any of them, could be none of them, could be all of them at once. What we are sure about, however, is that Washington has seen the document, and at the time of writing, is yet to offer a formal response.

That might be because they view the recently released national security strategy as having already said everything that needed to be said, or they could just be biding their time, waiting for the right moment to put out a statement.

Whatever the reason, one thing is clear, China is going to stick around in Latin America for the foreseeable future, regardless of how many times the Trump administration invokes the Monroe Doctrine.

For the region, this could either be a positive, as countries have more options to choose from, or a negative, as all the same countries risk becoming pawns in the next phase of great power competition. Only time will tell.

Russia strikes Turkish tankers Lastly, we've got to discuss a new series of developments in the Black Sea, where, just days after Ukraine seemed to declare open season on vessels linked to Russia's shadow fleet, Russia has now responded in kind.

But, instead of targeting rare and well-defended Ukrainian shipping vessels, which largely rely on a corridor for the country's grain exports, Russia has chosen to focus on targets under the protection of the NATO nation of Turkey.

The bulk of Russia's attacks came on Friday, the 12th of December, when Russia attacked ships across two Ukrainian ports, Odessa and Chornomorsk.

There, according to Ukraine, a total of three Turkish-owned vessels were hit, despite the fact that, according to Ukraine's president, neither the vessels themselves nor the targeted locations in port carried any military value. One of the Turkish vessels was an auto carrier, while another was a cargo ship.

Then, on the following day, Ukraine accused Russia of striking another Turkish vessel, this time a commercial bulk carrier transporting sunflower oil across the Black Sea.

Luckily for the civilians aboard those ships, no deaths or serious injuries were recorded in any of the strikes. On the other hand, Russia's attacks on trade vessels in the Black Sea shouldn't necessarily be a surprise.

The ships of Russia's sanctions dodging shadow fleet were, of course, very recently targeted, and while Ukraine would obviously prefer it if Russia were unable to retaliate in any way, that just isn't the case.

Russia was probably going to respond in some way, likely with a focus on Ukrainian maritime targets, and possibly with strikes on commercial vessels. But what's much more of a surprise is Russia's decision to target Turkish ships, either under Turkish ownership or sailing under a Turkish flag.

Turkey, of course, is part of the NATO alliance, and like any other attack on the assets or people of a NATO member state, an attack like this does technically give Turkey the option to invoke NATO's Article 5.

That's the treaty provision in which all member states are entitled to collective defense, with an attack on one nation interpreted as an attack on all.

But really, there's not much chance that Turkey would invoke Article 5, unless it really had to, and certainly not for as small of a... provocation as this while turkey certainly benefits from its nato security guarantees and the extension of america's nuclear umbrella to go with it turkey does not see nato as its first or only layer of security protection

Unlike some of the alliances member states in europe instead these attacks are important because of the way that they fit into a much larger evolving power dynamic between russia and turkey while turkey has always been more friendly to russia than most other nato nations it's been the last decade or so working to chart a much more independent course it's

Become far less willing to allow russia to use it as a pawn to push it around diplomatically or to build arms or economic dependencies that russia can then use as leverage turkey is becoming a major global arms exporter it's building hegemony in the middle east and it's pivoting into a long-term rivalry against israel and the gulf states in the process it's

Become very willing to push back against russia when necessary including in its infamous shoot down of a russian combat jet that violated its airspace back in november of 2015.

I think i'd call it famous not infamous awesome sorry editorializing over so for russia to decide to rain down kamikaze drones or cruise missiles against turkish targets it's a message sent directly to turkey more than to the native alliance or even to ukraine while russia understands that it isn't infinitely powerful in the black sea it relies on turkey's

Willingness to keep the peace in international waters and control the flow of ships in and out of the black sea via the bosporus strait while ukrainian attacks on russia shadow fleet are ultimately ukraine's doing their attacks on non-military vessels in waters where turkey exerts major influence in fact it's a testament to the security of the black sea more

Generally aside from in the battle zone between ukraine and russia that it's taken all the way until 2025 for attacks on russian shadow fleet vessels to become a problem so the message that russia seems to be sending to turkey is rather straightforward even if perhaps turkey might take issue with the way that the message is delivered in essence the message

Is to bring ukraine back in line and ensure that these attacks don't become a regular occurrence because if turkey allows ukraine to declare open season on black sea shipping then that's a game that russia can play too whatever it may be worth ukraine has not carried out any strikes against russian shadow fleet vessels since that time they did take out a

Russian submarine so that certainly counts for something thank you for watching thanks for being a member of fronts.co and see you in 2026