Avdiivka: How Ukraine Came Close to Ending the War in 2024

The Author is a senior advisor to Ukrainian High Command, and a former frontline drone operator.

“Hi. The plan is really great,” replied Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov to my Avdiivka counterattack plan in early February 2024. “We have already worked out some details with the military. Everyone has the document already.”

By “everyone”, Fedorov primarily meant the principal decision-makers in the war at that time: General Valery Zaluzhny (then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), General Oleksander Syrsky (soon to succeed Zaluzhny), President Volodymyr Zelensky and his right-hand man Andriy Yermak. The plan in question was an ambitious military manoeuvre that had never before been attempted in the history of warfare. I proposed to break the strategic stalemate Ukraine faced at the time—recognised by Zaluzhny in a 1 November 2023 article in The Economist (1)—by new drone tactics I had proposed to the Ukrainian High Command: a drone blitz.

Translations: author’s own.

The idea behind a drone blitz (called a “massed drone attack” at the time) was simple yet innovative. Most Ukrainian and Russian drone forces were dispersed more or less equally along the 1,000 km front line. For a simple illustration, if Russia and Ukraine had 1,000 drone crews each, this resulted in a drone coverage of around 10 crews per 10 km of the front line (not all of them deployed forward at the same time). This created a level of battlefield transparency and drone omnipresence that made operational-level manoeuvre warfare impossible—you cannot make a breakthrough without a concentration of effort, and traditional concentrations of armour, artillery, and infantry were easily uncovered and attacked by drones well before the breakthrough forces moved to the assembly areas. Thus, traditional breakthrough battles became futile.

Yet, another form of concentration was still possible—that of the drones themselves. A drone has a low physical and logistical footprint (no ammo depots or large, bulky military hardware), and its operators can be tactically dispersed yet operationally concentrated (spread over high ground in treelines, cellars, and bunkers).

If Ukraine left only minimally sufficient drone coverage in all sectors of the front (adequate for a defensive posture)—let’s say 3 drone operator crews per 10 km sector—it would free up 700 crews (70% of the total drone forces) to be secretly concentrated against a vulnerable Russian position in order to achieve a crushing local correlation of drone and EW (electronic warfare) capabilities. The 700 Ukrainian drone crews would then face only 10 unsuspecting Russian crews on a 10 km front line—a correlation of drone forces of at least 70 to 1.

In reality, it would of course be much more complex than that paragraph makes it sound. You would deploy your 700 drone crews over an area of up to 50 by 20 km so they would not be hiding in the same treelines. There are also different drone and EW types with different ranges, radio frequency harmonisation (augmented by communication links via Starlink and fibreoptic cables), etc… but you get the idea. A successful Ukrainian drone blitz would hinge on four prerequisites: (1) surprise, (2) maximum concentration of drone and counter-drone forces, (3) favourable terrain (high ground for advantageous drone radio horizons) and weather, and (4) simultaneous attack to the full depth of enemy defences (at least 20 km, with longer-range fixed-wing drones hitting enemy rear areas).

In order to coordinate command and control of such a large drone armada, I proposed to Minister Fedorov and some other senior Stavka members the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces as a separate branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Zelensky agreed to do it, but didn’t execute it efficiently in early 2024), as well as the creation of large drone formations of at least brigade size (which was done with a one-year delay, losing the first-mover advantage over the Russians). I even went as far as to propose the creation of still larger drone formations—drone divisions (consisting mostly of drone brigades, but also artillery and mechanised assault infantry brigades), and even a drone army-level formation (consisting of three drone divisions)—to quickly end the war by concentrating Ukraine’s drone forces against Russian dispersed drone operators at the critical place and time, executing a rapid breakthrough, and then performing a deep battle operation, enveloping one or more Russian Groups of Forces from the rear and reaching other operational and strategic objectives.

The critical place and time were to be Avdiivka. The plan I submitted to the Stavka (High Command) and the General Staff on 31 January 2024 called for a never-before-attempted concentration of most of Ukraine’s drones and supporting electronic warfare (EW) assets on a narrow section of the front (up to 30 km). The Russians were concentrating their best troops on a northern pincer attempting to envelop the city of Avdiivka and, at that stage, had almost succeeded—this was the exact moment when they were least suspecting of a major counterstroke into the overextended right flank of this northern grouping.

Copyright: Deep State and Illya Sekirin

The Ukrainian High Command had already redirected its best reserves—the 3rd Assault Brigade—into the area to be used as a stabilisation force, most likely to enter Avdiivka city proper and engage the enemy in bloody urban combat. I believed it was a waste of its combat potential (urban combat is exhausting for both sides, even though it favours the defender until, that is, he is cut off from the main forces—that is why most battles for fortified cities are decided on the flanks and subsequent encirclement attempts).

I proposed that the 3rd Ass. Br. instead be used as the ground component of the drone blitz—50 to 70% of all Ukrainian drone and counter-drone systems would be placed on the elevated terrain around the Russian northern bulge over Avdiivka (thus creating strong drone crossfire), providing cover for the assault brigade to attack into the right flank of the Russian northern Avdiivka pincer and move along the ridge and river lines into the rear of the enemy grouping fully engaged in storming and surrounding the city. It was to be a Ukrainian Stalingrad of sorts, but instead of tanks, our main striking power would be the drone.

That was not to be. It took enormous effort for Minister Fedorov to convince General Zaluzhny of the merits of a drone blitz (their personal meeting took several hours, according to Fedorov, as the Ukrainian top general was slow to understand how modern drone warfare works). However, on 8 February 2024, Zelensky dismissed Zaluzhny for political reasons (he began to worry that Zaluzhny was becoming too popular among Ukrainians and might harbour political ambitions after the war). The timing couldn’t have been worse, as we had to move fast and now had to quickly convince Syrsky why the drone blitz and Avdiivka counterattack should be carried out.

That proved to be mission impossible, as Syrsky was even more of the old Soviet school “no-step-back” tactical rigidity than Zaluzhny, so he did exactly what I feared he would do—cancel the counterattack and use the reserves to enter the half-encircled city to try to hold on to it at whatever cost was needed for as long as possible. Despite Ukrainian valour and fanatical resistance, the fate of Avdiivka was sealed, and many soldiers were cut off, with some of those who could not escape ultimately executed by the Russians (for example, wounded infantrymen from the 2nd Company, 1st Battalion of the 110th Mechanised Brigade, who were shot in cold blood at the Zenit position by troops of the Russian 1st Slavic Brigade).

Translations: author’s own.

Not everything was lost, however. The drone blitz tactics were first used half a year later, albeit in a greatly diluted form—in the Kursk 2024 Offensive (please refer to my new book on the role I played in advising the High Command during the planning and execution of the Kursk Offensive). Once Fedorov became Ukrainian Minister of Defence in January 2026, he used my drone blitz tactics, also based on my operational advice, for an attack into the right overextended flank of the unsuspecting Russian Group of Forces “Vostok”, who were withdrawing their best units from its flanks to continue pressing their attacks in the centre against Huliaipole in an attempt to envelop Ukrainian strongpoints around Orihiv, and thus open the road to Zaporizhzhia. Due to Syrsky’s insistence on dispersing the attack over too wide a front (around 100 km) instead of a more concentrated attack on a narrower front, that operation only partly succeeded. Accordingly, a drone blitz is no longer a military secret for either the Russians or the Ukrainians; the only militaries who remain blissfully unaware of it are NATO countries. That is why they had better take heed of what is going on in the Russia–Ukraine drone war, as the Russians may well, sooner rather than later, try to conduct a drone blitz of their own against the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. If that is the case, let God help Europe. And if NATO asks, Ukraine will help too.

Illya Sekirin is the author of Rise of the Machines: Drone Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War – Tactics, Operations, Strategy (2026). In addition to advising several senior members of the Ukrainian High Command since early 2024, he has also worked as a researcher and translator for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He has also served as a front line drone operator in 2022 and 2023.

Here are the links to get his book:

Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Machines-Russia-Ukraine-Operations-Strategy/dp/1804519707

Publisher: https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/rise-of-the-machines-drone-warfare-in-the-russia-ukraine-war---tactics-operations-strategy.php

(accessed 7 April 2026).

1. The Economist, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia, 1 November 2023, https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia