Mapping the UAE’s Non-State Proxy Network.

In today’s increasingly multipolar world, change favors regional powers—and particularly, those regional powers with the money, the cunning, and the ambition to take an active role in global affairs. As the US, China, Europe, and Russia work to consolidate their global influence, regional powers aren’t merely courted for their loyalty; they’re offered ever-more-important roles as collaborators and strategic partners.

Across the globe, several regional powers are rising to the challenge: Brazil in Latin America, Turkey and Qatar in the Middle East, South Korea in East Asia, and more. But no nation has taken advantage of this moment quite like the United Arab Emirates.

The UAE has aligned itself with a range of non-state fighting forces across the Middle East and North Africa, each with their own distinct domestic objectives and a willingness to support Emirati interests. The UAE is leveraging those relationships to secure a volatile region, accumulate wealth, and create its own sphere of influence. The UAE’s non-state partners provide a critical window into the UAE’s short- and long-term geopolitical objectives, and they are a fundamental part of the UAE’s own value proposition, for the most powerful nations on Earth.

A Spreading Spiderweb.

In its approach to international affairs, the UAE’s grand strategy is actually quite similar to another Middle Eastern power player: the nation of Iran. Like Iran, the UAE has focused its attention on outreach to non-state actors across the Middle East and North Africa; like Iran, the UAE has provided those non-state actors with capital, military equipment, and diplomatic support whenever possible. The UAE’s non-state connections are treated as proxy forces, similar to Iran’s Axis of Resistance (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.), and are charged with furthering goals that mutually benefit the interests of Abu Dhabi, and their own.

Unlike Iran, however, the UAE’s role in backing these proxy forces has received only limited global attention. The UAE’s proxy allies are not engaged in any grand effort to bring down an ally of the West, in the way that Iran’s Axis of Resistance is focused on armed action against Israel. Religious orientation and political ideology play a substantial role, but not a defining one.

The UAE’s network of non-state proxy partners is comprised of four main geographic nodes: Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen. In each of those nations, the UAE does not support the resident internationally-recognized government, although it opposes those governments to varying, and sometimes limited degrees.

Sudan:

The UAE’s connections in Sudan are its most obvious, especially after the recent acts of genocide carried out in Sudan’s Darfur region. In the nation’s ongoing civil war, the UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary faction comprised mostly of Sudanese Arab fighters, and descended directly from the Janjaweed nomadic militias of the war in Darfur.

The UAE’s support of the RSF includes direct and substantial financial aid, as well as the provision of military equipment through a network of Emirates-based companies. Emirati aircraft ferry supplies to the RSF directly, and Emirati partners across Africa cultivate covert smuggling networks, where weapons are transported in and out of the conflict zone. Thanks to the Emirates, the RSF now fight with the benefit of heavy artillery, drone technology, air defenses, and guided missiles.

Notably, the Emirates have continued to support the RSF despite extensive, credible allegations of genocide, including mass slaughter in the city of El Fasher in late 2025. Not only that, but the Emirates have facilitated the arrival of aid from other nations that outright deny any association with the RSF: howitzers and other fighting equipment from China, and hundreds of experienced mercenary fighters from Colombia, as well as munitions sources from other African nations.

The UAE routinely denies any association with, or support for the RSF in global diplomatic settings, and uses private companies to provide a veneer of plausible deniability. While its ties to the RSF have been extensively documented, the UAE has been able to maintain smooth relationships with global powers including the United States. By avoiding scrutiny for its actions in Sudan, the Emirates have been able to set themselves a valuable precedent, with a real chance that future abuses and overreach will be excused, too.

In exchange for its support, the RSF’s primary form of repayment appears to be gold; the RSF controls a majority of Sudan’s gold mines, and a large portion of the nation’s gold is trafficked into the Emirates and then re-sold as an Emirati product. The UAE also relies on the RSF to counter Islamist factions within the Sudanese Armed Forces; the UAE routinely opposes political Islam across the region. If the RSF can gain control of the entire nation, it will also be able to offer the UAE direct civil/military access to the Red Sea.

Yemen:

Meanwhile in Yemen, the UAE’s quiet, but enduring support of the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) has recently become a matter of increased international attention. That’s largely a result of the STC’s recent territorial captures, where, in December of 2025, the STC surged forth in a lightning offensive and took control of the entire territory of the Cold War-era nation of South Yemen.

The UAE’s association with the STC is a byproduct of its participation in a Saudi-led coalition invasion of Yemen, in the mid-to-late 2010s. During that invasion, the Saudi coalition had supported the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen, but as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have been increasingly engaged in a regional rivalry across the Middle East, the Emirates’ support shifted to the STC.

While the STC have been nominally separatist since their founding, most of their recent history has involved a working relationship with the Republic of Yemen, who have built and maintained a seat of government in the port city of Aden (under mostly STC control) after Yemen’s Houthi faction secured the capital city of Sana’a. The UAE opposes the Houthi movement, both as a regional security threat, and as another manifestation of the political Islam that the Emirates routinely work to counterbalance.

That relationship came to an end in late 2025, when the STC booted the Republic of Yemen and their Saudi military advisers out of Aden, and captured the nation’s oil fields and most of the Republic of Yemen’s other territory. Notably, the STC’s takeover has been mostly bloodless, as Saudi officials have facilitated the withdrawal of Riyadh-friendly tribal militias before major battles could break out.

In Yemen, like in Sudan, the UAE’s support of the STC involves the provision of direct military aid, including heavy fighting equipment, drones, and technical expertise. The UAE also provides the STC logistical and financial support. In fact, the STC’s takeover of the former South Yemen appears to be a very well-manicured diplomatic appeal to the global West, suggesting that the Emirates have both learned the lessons of their RSF adventure in Sudan, and have conveyed those lessons to the STC.

On the international stage, the STC is openly making an appeal to foreign powers that would like to see a strong, dependable counterweight to the Houthi rebels. The STC have made a show of early, albeit limited, counterterrorism efforts against well-entrenched al-Qaeda camps, and are making clear that in exchange for international recognition of their sovereignty claim, they would be happy to fight the Houthis directly. Unlike the RSF, the STC has largely kept its image clean for global audiences, though it has a documented history of repression and extrajudicial executions in the areas it controls.

The STC and the Emirates are currently engaged in a standoff with Saudi Arabia, where up to 20,000 Saudi-backed forces are gathering on the Yemeni border in advance of a potential counteroffensive. Saudi Arabia’s success in that effort, however, is far from guaranteed, and the STC have made clear their intent to ignore Saudi forces to withdraw from their newly controlled territory. A direct showdown may quickly turn into an opportunity for the STC and the Emirates, forcing the international community to weigh in, and potentially favor a separatist movement with real potential to counterbalance the Houthis.

Libya:

In Libya, the UAE maintains a deep relationship with the Government of National Stability, a rival faction that opposes Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Unity. The Government of National Stability is supported directly by the Libyan National Army, which is led, in turn, by its Supreme Commander, warlord and de-facto ruler Khalifa Haftar.

The UAE’s relationship with Haftar dates back to the height of the Second Libyan Civil War, which concluded in 2020. During the war, Abu Dhabi sided with Haftar in what had been a highly complex proxy war, joined by Russia, Turkey, and other foreign partners. At that time, the UAE had carried out airstrikes, supplied Haftar with heavy weapons, and dispatched enough support, over a cumulative 150-odd military supply flights, that Haftar was able to stave off a collapse across his faction’s front lines.

After the war’s conclusion, Emirati support for Haftar only continued, surging additional supplies so that Haftar’s forces could reinforce their positions along the dividing line between Libya’s rival governments. With Haftar’s backing, the UAE was able to secure close ties with the faction that controls the lion’s share of Libya’s highly productive oil fields, and secured yet another ally who could act as a counterweight to political Islam, this time in Tripoli.

Over the last several years, however, Libya has become important to the UAE as a launchpad for its efforts in Sudan, first to lay the groundwork of the current conflict, and now, to support the RSF directly. Before the war began, the UAE used Libyan territory to build ties with the same Sudanese Arab groups that currently form the backbone of the RSF.

Today, the remote Kufrah airstrip in Libya’s southeast allows for the stable, safe transit of military supplies near the Sudan border, directly facilitating the recent capture of El Fasher, among other targets. That airport has undergone thorough renovations since the start of 2025, while Haftar’s fighting forces have built robust fuel-smuggling networks at the UAE’s request, according to a recent report by **The Sentry**. In June of 2025, Haftar’s forces even attacked Sudanese Army border posts directly, in clear alignment with RSF war aims.

Somalia:

Finally, the Emirates maintain significant ties in the nation of Somalia, aligning with not one, but two powerful non-state factions: the unrecognized separatist state of Somaliland, and the autonomous, but non-separatist Somali state of Puntland.

The Emirates have showed a consistent interest in Somaliland for many years, with that interest clearly intensifying in early 2017. At that time, Somaliland had agreed to host an Emirati military base in the port of Berbera, where construction finally began in 2024. Also in 2024, the UAE agreed to train Somaliland’s regional security forces, thus building up a faction that actively pursues independence from Mogadishu.

Somaliland has also played host to major Emirati economic interests. Berbera is rapidly being developed into a civil-use port, courtesy of the Dubai company DP World, and that port will be served by an Emirati-arranged free-trade zone. Attempts in Mogadishu to push DP World out of Somaliland have been unsuccessful, and the UAE has invested heavily in the construction of a road to landlocked Ethiopia, in a clear attempt to turn Berbera into an Emirati-controlled facilitating hub for Ethiopian trade.

In Puntland, Emirati interest dates back even farther, with UAE financiers facilitating the construction of the Bosaso International Airport, along the northern coastline, all the way back in 2007. Today, Bosaso Airport is used routinely by the Emirates as a layover location for heavy transport aircraft, carrying heavy military and logistical equipment, international mercenaries, and other warfighting supplies into Sudan.

As part of its Puntland relationship, the UAE has funneled substantial amounts of money into Puntland’s regional security forces, allowing for robust anti-piracy efforts, and securing Emirati interests like Bosaso Airport from potential threats like al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. Regarding the Islamic State, the UAE has provided substantial air support in Puntland’s recent anti-IS offensive, alongside airstrikes by the United States. Also in Puntland, the UAE secretly deployed Israeli-made military radar from at least March of 2025, to detect and respond to drone or missile threats from Houthi territory in Yemen.

In Somalia, the UAE’s support is more wide-ranging than in the other nations where it maintains heavy influence. The UAE has courted the semi-autonomous southern region of Jubaland, which recently declared its own independence from Mogadishu, and has even supplied military vehicles and helped to build bases for Jubaland’s use. At the same time, the UAE funds the Somali federal government and its military forces, training its soldiers and financing the training of Somali troops in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda.

In Somalia’s case, the UAE’s willingness to support several factions at once is likely pragmatic. Each of those factions oppose the UAE’s true enemy in Somalia, the militant terror organization al-Shabaab, and by building financial leverage with each of Somalia’s fighting groups, the UAE can disincentivize those factions from engaging in conflict with each other.

Abu Dhabi’s primary focus, however, remains clear. While Mogadishu and Jubaland are Emirati allies in an ideal world, the Emirates have only invested a fraction of the resources there, that they’ve devoted to Somaliland and Puntland. The UAE’s attempt to work with all sides in Somalia is likely a reflection of the nation’s persistent instability, with the aim of reducing the risk of a multidimensional internal conflict that would jeopardize Emirati interests.

A Greater Purpose.

Taken together, the UAE’s non-state proxy allies map across a large swathe of territory, comprising eastern North Africa, the African Horn, and the Arabian Peninsula. By operating in support of a common regional backer, these proxy forces also operate in support of a common set of objectives—but what are they?

In part, Abu Dhabi remains focused on combating political Islam—in all its interpretations—across the Middle East and North Africa. That’s been a consistent Emirati objective for decades, with no sign of change anytime soon. But the Emirates’ goals with its proxy network are obviously deeper—not least because, outside of Sudan, none of the Emirates’ proxy allies are primarily concerned with any active efforts to dismantle political Islam. Even Yemen’s STC is unlikely to focus primarily on a conflict with the Houthis, or even on defeating the Republic of Yemen in areas it still controls, if it can instead pursue its claim to sovereignty over the territory it’s captured.

Instead, this map of Emirati-backed proxy forces is also a map of Emirati trade interests, comprising the flow of critical resources, primarily gold, into the Emirates, and the flow of Emirati oil toward Europe, via the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

On gold, the UAE has long positioned itself as the primary destination for African gold that’s been smuggled, illegally mined, or sourced from conflict zones. That gold flows through illicit transnational networks to transit hubs, primarily war-torn Sudan, where the RSF produces substantial gold harvests of its own. That gold is then processed in the Emirates, allowing the UAE to list it as Emirati gold (despite the UAE having no gold reserves of its own), and resell it as legitimately obtained gold on the global markets. We at WarFronts published an in-depth explanation of this process, **here**, in 2024.

On oil, the Emirates rely on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to reach several important markets at once: Europe, North America, and Russia. While Emirati exports flow into the global West, Russia’s sanctions-skirting shadow fleet vessels use Emirati ports to conduct ship-to-ship transfers and reflag their vessels, making the safe passage of oil tankers toward the Emirates just as important as the safe passage away.

The Emirates’ network of non-state actors thus provides the UAE with crucial international vantage points, from which Emirati leaders can protect their financial interests from disruption and external threats.

Emirati installations and partner forces in northern Somalia allow the UAE to station troops and surveillance equipment on the Gulf of Aden, monitoring the Houthi threat while keeping a pulse on local piracy off the Somali coast.

The Emirates’ relationship with the RSF preserves an essential transit node for the flow of gold out of Africa, and may one day deliver an Emirati port on the Red Sea coast.

The Emirates’ ties in Yemen allow it to counterbalance the threat posed by the Houthi rebels, and to lock down nearly the entire southern coastline, if the STC can maintain control of the territory it currently holds.

And the Emirates’ relationship with Libya’s Haftar provides stable territory to sustain its other operations, a foothold in the Mediterranean, and indirect control over most of Libya’s oil reserves—the largest reserves held in a highly unstable country across the entire Eastern Hemisphere.

For the Emirates, security across its global transshipment networks is an existential concern, because its stable access to global oil and gold markets are foundational to its place on the world stage. Without those markets, and the immense flow of wealth that powers Abu Dhabi, the modern Emirates would struggle to stay afloat, and could very well collapse under the immense weight of investments, expensive developments, and reliance on foreigners that make up nearly 90% of its population.

As such, the UAE makes major investments of its time and capital all across the global transshipment networks that it relies on—and those investments go well beyond its proxy allies in Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. While those forces are vital for the UAE to stabilize portions of its supply lines that would otherwise be volatile, most of the Emirates’ shipping routes are controlled by nations where Abu Dhabi is careful to cultivate its influence.

Leading into Europe, the Emirates maintain strong relationships with Eritrea and Egypt along the Red Sea coast and the Suez Canal, as well as with Ethiopia, a landlocked, but powerful and unpredictable state under Abiy Ahmed. Leading into the Black Sea, the UAE has rehabilitated its once-fractious ties with Turkey, now engaging in extensive and growing partnerships across defense, finance, technology, and manufacturing.

On the route toward China, the Emirates have cultivated very strong ties with both India and Pakistan, deepening its relationships with both countries despite their ongoing regional rivalry. The UAE maintains close partnerships with both Indonesia, a strong Muslim nation in southeast Asia, and Singapore, a small state that’s managed to remain influential and economically vibrant, using a generally similar approach to the UAE’s.

Together, Indonesia and Singapore provide sufficient military power to lock down the Strait of Malacca, a vital access point that the UAE relies upon to reach the Pacific, and preserve its access to the massive Chinese market for Emirati oil. Protecting the last leg of that journey, the UAE has become one of the Islamic world’s largest investors in Vietnam, and maintains comprehensive strategic relations with the Philippines. It’s even a primary oil supplier to Taiwan, in a relationship that China is likely happy to allow in the short term, given Abu Dhabi’s closeness to Beijing—and the strategic advantages of Taiwanese energy dependence on a close Chinese partner.

Through its extensive investments-based relationships and economic partnerships, the UAE has managed to build favorable relations with nearly every nation leading to both the Mediterranean markets of Europe, and the Pacific markets of China and other wealthy Indo-Pacific nations.

As such, the UAE has little to fear from sanctions, diplomatic attacks, or other threats from nations across the Middle East, or nations that otherwise may be hostile to the Emirates. Nor does Abu Dhabi need to fear active security threats to its vessels or its personnel along the vast majority of these shipping lanes, as it can trust that its interests will be under the routine protection of friendly nations.

There are a small handful of unstable, potentially troublesome nations along those shipping lanes—and those are precisely the places where the UAE has chosen to back proxy forces, especially those with control over relevant coasts and a hostility toward opposed factions that might seek to threaten Emirati interests in the future.

In each of these relationships, pragmatism appears to supersede ideology, and the UAE is happy to operate in limited alignment with even the factions that their own proxy allies oppose, like the Somali federal government in Mogadishu or the Saudi-backed Republic of Yemen (until recently).

Even in Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces maintain their own economic dependence on the UAE, despite the UAE’s role in funding their primary rival. The Sudanese military regime sends about 97% of its official gold exports to the UAE, and the UAE allows the Bank of Khartoum and Sudan’s most important mobile money app, Bankak, to operate despite partial ownership by the Dubai Islamic Bank. In fact, the UAE was the largest buyer of exports from regime-controlled Sudanese territory in 2024.

The reasoning, on Abu Dhabi’s part, appears to be straightforward: Security is what matters to the Emirates, more than the victory or defeat of any single fighting force. If the UAE didn’t maintain ties with Mogadishu, it could attempt to use diplomatic leverage—and recruit the help of powerful world allies—to push the UAE out of Puntland and Somaliland. If the UAE supported the RSF without buying a degree of tolerance from the Sudanese regime, it could find its assets targeted by regime forces in Port Sudan, halfway down the Red Sea coast. Without the approval of the Republic of Yemen government and the government in Mogadishu, the UAE wouldn’t have been able to build a ring of bases on islands across the Gulf of Aden, where it now collaborates with American and Israeli forces to guarantee regional maritime security.

For the Emirates, the strategy is unquestionably risky; it involves the careful balance of competing interests in several unstable or war-torn nations at once. But its efforts appear to be working, and thanks to the Emirates’ broader approach to international relations, most of the relevant nations on Earth appear to be fully in support of its overall mission. In building its multinational proxy network, the UAE has practically guaranteed its own security, and built itself a stable position on the world stage that it’s unlikely ever to lose.

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