Due South: The Tigray War Returns (w/ Michael DeAngelo From Critical Threats)

Ladies and gentlemen good morning good evening good afternoon whenever and wherever you're listening to us from this is the dear south podcast with me your host wilfred minor and today i am joined by someone who has been a guest on our podcast before someone who was going to come back as a repeat guest and his appearance was moved up by a couple of weeks

Because the situation has forced our hand ladies and gentlemen let me take this chance to reintroduce you to my good friend michael d'angelo from the critical threats project mike say hi to the people thanks for having me again wilfred appreciate the opportunity to be here and excited to talk about this development awesome yeah so the development we've been

Hinting at you know that we haven't mentioned so far is the fact that the tigre war seems to have restarted at the time we're recording this which is around 4 15 p.m eastern time on the 3rd of august 2026 just to give you a temporal signpost of where we are at in you know space and time things seem like you know the situation in ethiopia's tigre region is

Really really bad i have a video out about it on war fronts because you that's how dire situation is that you know we had to record an emergency video today morning and we're doing this emergency podcast session me and mike so mike let's start with what happened what do we know what don't we know how did this entire thing start yes so there what we know for

Sure is that the endf or the ethiopian military and the tplf clashed in western tigre near the sudanese border about 25 miles south of humera which is a town in northwest in the northwest corner of tigre right on the border with eritrea and also near the sudanese border so the two sides clashed on august first about 25 miles south of humera the clash

Involved heavy artillery and drones it seems like there were significant casualties on both sides but at the same time it doesn't seem like there was any significant military advantage gained by either side there are reports that the tplf units involved in the clashes retreated you know into sudan and that you know the ENDF kind of gained the upper hand in

The area.

Overall, though, it is unclear who started this clash and what precipitated it. Both sides have accused the other.

The TPLF in particular accused the Ethiopian military of starting an offensive against it. And interestingly enough, also accused the Ethiopian military of working with the RSF to commit this attack, I guess you would say. We can talk more about the whole Sudan dynamics after.

There's just an interesting data point there. On the Ethiopian side of things, the federal government has really not commented for the most part. Although a cabinet minister did confirm that there had been clashes and accused the TPLF of starting them.

So that's what we have on the Ethiopian federal government's side of things. Now, in terms of, you know, what precipitated the clashes and what went down, I guess two plausible scenarios stick out in my head. Not saying either of them is what happened, but I just think that these would be plausible ways that this went down.

The TPLF could have been, you know, moving or even conducted kind of a limited sort of offensive maneuver in western Tigray to kind of test the ENDF in the area. And that could have provoked an Ethiopian military response. But at the same time, we also, the ENDF could have launched a preemptive kind of attack as well.

So those are the two kind of most plausible scenarios I see here. But generally speaking, the bottom line is that the Ethiopian military and TPLF clashed and that there, you know, is no, I guess, significant military advantage gained by either side in this.

But it has many broader implications in terms of, you know, looking at the broader tensions between the two sides.

And the trajectory is certainly not positive right now. The trajectory not being positive is, I think, one of the biggest understatements of the year. Because if, you know, this war restarts to the degree that the previous Tigray war was at, you know, by its peak, then we're looking at one of the most catastrophic wars in history.

I titled my video today, the 21st century's most deadly war, the deadliest war in the 21st century has restarted. Specifically because the last time Tigray and the federal government went to war, about 600,000 people died.

And then. millions were displaced so it is a war that has the potential to be exceptionally brutal and again we really just don't know how much the situation on the ground has changed from when the first reports that this was happening which was on again on saturday the first so about two days have passed since since the start of the fighting so one thing we

Do know one thing i have seen several commentators talk about is the fact that on the tplf side it was an a unit known as army 70 that participated in the fighting mike what do you know about army 70 what do you know about the group itself and have you had these claims that it was the one involved in the fighting army 70 is basically a unit or branch of the

Tplf that is based in eastern sudan so they have safe haven in eastern sudan they have training camps in eastern sudan so that's all army 70 is just a unit of the tplf that happens to be you know based in sudan in terms of their involvement in this in this current or in this clash the most recent clash it seems like they were involved many of the reports

That i've seen have indicated that they were involved it seems like as well that some of these tplf units did retreat in back into sudan after the endf attacked so that would imply that army 70 was definitely involved and just to kind of situate people in terms of where this happens so for anyone that knows the shape of tigray region it basically happened

All the way in the western corner of tigray and again about 25 miles south of humera so it's it's really right on the sudanese border and you know the areas in sudan that are parallel to the area where the clashes took place you know the tplf is known to have rear bases in this area specifically army 70 so yeah it seems like army 70 was likely involved so

You've mentioned that army 70 has bases in eastern sudan an area of the country that is broadly controlled by the sudanese armed forces the saf which you know is but it's the government forces in sudan they're not necessarily the good guys but when compared with the rapid support forces they're better by a long stretch not to say that they're good guys not

To say that you they're not killing civilians they're not puppetry massive crimes against humanity, but, you know, they are on a scale much better than the RSF.

So does AMI-70 have any links with the SAF? So more broadly speaking, the TPLF does have ties with the SAF that enable the TPLF to have these rear bases in Sudan. So basically, it starts all the way back to Ethiopia's civil war, or I should say the TPLF-led fight against the Durg regime, you know, throughout the 70s and the 1980s and into the 90s.

And basically during this time, Sudan, the Sudanese government supported the TPLF rebel movement and allowed them to set up rear bases in eastern Sudan.

So when the TPLF, you know, overthrew the Durg government and they were leading the new government of Sudan that was in place from 1991 until 2018, the TPLF and Sudanese government actually, you know, enjoyed pretty, I should say, decent, relatively decent bilateral relations.

There were certainly disputes over things like the Alpha Shaga border area, but generally speaking, their long-standing ties kind of helped them overcome disputes and come to some, you know, kind of understanding.

Of course, the TPLF lost power in Ethiopia in 2018, and the current Prime Minister, Avi Ahmed, came into power.

And what we've seen since then is that the TPLF, basically the Sudanese armed forces have almost not restarted cooperation with the TPLF, because I don't think the cooperation really went anywhere, but it went from being, you know, two states co-op, two state governments cooperating with each other.

So now the Sudanese armed forces is supporting kind of this armed rebel group, again, the TPLF, allowing them rear bases in Sudan.

And then in addition, there is also, you know, evidence that the Sudanese armed forces helped arm the TPLF during the Tigray war against the, you know, the Ethiopian federal government. So yeah, these ties are between the TPLF and the SAF are, you know, long-standing. And yes, the TPLF is based in eastern Sudan.

It's not without the knowledge of the Sudanese armed forces. The Sudanese armed forces condones and supports the TPLF's presence in eastern Sudan. So let's move on from, you know, the TPLF and the Sudanese armed forces to the other armed actor in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces, the RSF.

There have been multiple reports linking the Ethiopian federal government, Abiy Ahmed's government, with supporting, with supplying. when you're suffering from the United States as a president or really the ability to help you now study.

So, I think the myündenhuh right mostly makes the rest of us You know, it's a powerful thing that might probably take another the rsf with manpower with equipment with training facilities with rear bases basically places to act where the saf can't really attack them without causing a major international incident so what are we looking at that how is the

Relationship between the rsf the rsf and the ethiopian federal government that relationship has certainly grown substantially since i would say you know late 2025 so within the last year ethiopia was essentially neutral in the war but especially in 2025 in later 2025 there was a pretty definitive shift in terms of the ethiopian federal government supporting

The rsf now what does that support consisted of so essentially you know the it's well known that the united air emirates or the uae are the kind of indispensable backers of the rsf they play a key role in arming the rsf including with drones which have become you know a very significant weapon in the sudanese civil war and but to do that the uae needs supply

Lines ways to get you know these weapons shipments to the rsf and ethiopia has become a major kind of transit hub for these emirati weapons shipments since late 2025 and in addition to that ethiopia has also allowed the rsf and allied forces to set up rear bases in western ethiopia specifically the banishangul gumuz region and from which they have you know

Begun conducting attacks the rsf and allied forces actually launched an offensive in southeastern sudan's blue nile state in january of 2026 and you know this offensive you know has essentially been enabled by ethiopia you know allowing these emirati weapons shipments to flow through ethiopia but then also allowing you know the rsf and allied forces to have

Rear bases in western ethiopia and one notable thing that you know one notable base i should say is you know it's been well documented by reuters and others there's a training camp in western ethiopia it's an rsf training camp reportedly it's being directly overseen by the ethiopian military and it has the capacity to hold thousands of fighters now whether

It's being fully used and how operational it is that's a little unclear but it just goes to show that over the past year, the Ethiopian support for the RSF has drastically increased.

Now, a reason for that is specifically because of the relationship between the SAF and the TPLF that we just talked about earlier.

Of course, the Ethiopian federal government views the TPLF as a threat, and therefore, by extension, it views the SAF support for the TPLF as a threat as well. So this is almost a way for Ethiopia to put pressure on SAF to cut its support for the TPLF. Perfect.

So I bring up the RSF and the SAF for people not as infinitely familiar with the situation going on in the home of Africa as you and I, because the TPLF put out a statement a little while ago, a couple of hours ago at this point, about five, saying, and I quote, as previously reported, the Genocidal Prosperity Party regime launched an open military offensive

Against the Tigris security forces in the vicinity of Shirena, Western Tigris, forces belonging to Sudan's Rapids of Port forces, led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagallo Hermetti, together with other armed groups operating in the area, participated in the offensive.

From dawn until late afternoon, the regime's army launched repeated human wave assaults, deploying various ground troops and employing air power. Nevertheless, the gallant Tigris security forces, steadfast in the noble mission and guided by the solemn pledge, successfully repelled the offensive and thwarted the regime's aggressive objectives.

And we'll come back to the latter part of the statement in a minute. I want to talk about that first part, the claim by the TPLF that the RSF and other allied groups, groups allied to the RSF, presumably, that they participated in this conflict, that in the latest clashes between the TPLF and the Ethiopian army, what do you make of that?

That claim seems to me to be a bit implausible, just because the RSF's rear bases in Ethiopia are located in Beni Shango Gumu's region, as I said before, and, you know, the clashes with the TPLF occurred in Western Tigris.

There's quite a, you know, large distance between those two locations. And also, too, just the RSF has enough of its own, you know, issues to worry about in Sudan, where I don't see why they would involve themselves in fighting in Tigray. And, you know, I don't see why the Ethiopian military would want the RSF to be involved in fighting in Tigray as well.

So, to me, it just seems like a TPLF. to kind of influence the information space there especially in light of you know the Ethiopian fellow government's claims that the Sudanese armed forces are directly supporting the TPLF and kind of forming this axis to oppose the Ethiopian fellow government so with Sudan Eritrea and the TPLF so to me it just seems like a

TPLF attempt to kind of combat that narrative in the information space and that idea of the information space is very important because as we've probably mentioned before it's it's a very difficult war conflict for us to cover because there's very little that's you're publicly coming out the government has gone to great lengths every time there's a conflict

In Tigray to either harass reporters arrest them reporters without borders at one point had multiple had documented instances multiple instances where Ethiopian journalists in the Tigray region had been arrested simply for covering this conflict so again it's such a difficult difficult conflict for us to be able to cover properly to be able to understand you

Know even what's happening and we'll move on from the Sudanese angle in a moment but I want to talk about one final thing in relation to Sudan the news that Ethiopian artillery landed in Sudanese refugee camps and you know it's obviously made the tensions between the two governments worse what have you had that and you know what's your take on that yes I

Have heard that because the fighting took place so close to the Sudanese border and you know as I said before it seems like these TPLF units based in eastern Sudan were involved so it's it's definitely possible that you know Ethiopian artillery struck on the Sudanese side of the border including in refugee camps definitely plausible I've seen yeah I've seen

The reports in terms of the broader implications on the relation between Sudan and Ethiopia the ties are at a very low point right now they deteriorated they deteriorated rapidly in the first part of 2026 due to Ethiopia's increasing support for the RSF especially amid you know the RSF launching that offensive in southeastern Sudan and you know this current

Kind of current clash and then you know any spillover into sudan will likely only serve to further deteriorate or degrade relations between the two governments what makes this situation particularly saddening for me isn't you just how badly it's going to deteriorate the relationship between the two governments because if relationships hit a lower level of

Rock bottom than they already have we're looking at a massive massive clusterfuck and pardon my french because it's it's a deeply troubling situation but there's also the fact that a lot of civilians have fled from the tigre region into these refugee camps in sudan where now their lives are still at risk you'd think in a refugee camp they'd be safe and again

It's an odd thing to talk about them being safe in sudan a country that's in the midst of its own civil war but the fact that the war has followed them that far is just very depressing to think about let's move on to the other major power that's involved in this one major in terms of a regional sense eritrea so a couple of hours after the fighting had ended

I believe this was on sunday videos emerged showing senior figures within the eritrean leadership the eritrean army being warmly welcomed in a in a tigre town by you know figures within you know the tigre people's liberation from the tplf and these are senior figures being warmly welcomed senior eritrean figures being warmly welcomed by the tigre which you

Know will definitely come as a surprise to anyone who followed the very fast iteration of the tigre war where eritrea was on the side of addis ababa fighting against the tigre so what do you make of this alliance between eritrea and the tigre what let's start with what caused it and how far are they willing to take it is asmara willing to intervene in this

War on the side of the tigre in terms of what caused the this kind of alliance of convenience between eritrea and the tplf it was actually born out of the tigre war essentially so of course eritrea was allied with the ethiopian federal government in the tigre war and you know fought in the tigre war deployed tens of thousands of troops into tigre into tigre

Where they were implicated in you know numerous war crimes so yes reality has kind of turned on its head now and you know why are the two now working together so essentially eritrea was frozen out of the pretoria peace agreement the ethiopian federal government did not include eritrea in the talks with the TPLF over, you know, the resolution of the war.

And, you know, reports have indicated that Eritrea wanted to keep the war going and wanted to, you know, I guess, fully root out the TPLF. So that, you know, when the Ethiopian fellow government signed a peace deal short of that, Eritrea's relations with the Ethiopian fellow government collapsed.

So you have increasing tensions between Eritrea and the Ethiopian fellow government again. And then you add in the whole sea access issue to this, which have only, you know, further deteriorated the relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

So since 2023, Ethiopia, the Ethiopian fellow government, including the Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, have been, you know, very adamant that Ethiopia, you know, obtains sea access specifically at Eritrea's port of Assab, in which, you know, Ethiopia used to have access to and then, you know, lost access to it once Eritrea gains independence and then they

Fought a war in 1998.

So Ethiopia has made it essentially an existential issue for them not only to get to obtain sea access, direct sea access, but also obtain it at Eritrea's port of Assab, which Eritrea has, you know, firmly refused to even talk about with the Ethiopian federal government. And Eritrea clearly feels threatened by Ethiopia's claims to the port of Assab.

So in response, they have started forging these ties with the TPLF.

And as the TPLF's own relations with the Ethiopian federal government deteriorated and the Pretoria peace agreement fell apart, TPLF kind of welcomed these, you know, overtures. And they have since formed an alliance of convenience.

And there are, there's reporting that says that one, Eritrea supported the TPLF's de facto coup of the Tigray interim administration in March of 2025, which the TPLF did basically to, you know, begin the process of installing their own government in Tigray.

So there's evidence that, or reporting that Eritrea supported that. And then since then, there's also been reporting that Eritrea has told the TPLF that it will support it in any broader conflict with the Ethiopian federal government. And so basically it's an alliance of convenience.

They are two very awkward partners, especially given the history. in the Tigray war and then also before that too with the 1998 to 2000 war where Eritrea and the TPLF-led Ethiopian government fought against each other kind of this very strange and tension-ridden history but you know they formed an alliance at convenience due to their deteriorating relations

With the Ethiopian fellow government and I think that the Eritrean the presence of Eritrean officials in Tigray in the immediate aftermath of the recent clashes is a clear show of support for the TPLF.

War makes for the strangest bedfellows don't you think it's it's very it's something that if you had told me you know as I was watching the initial iteration of the Tigray war flare up and you know even throughout the entirety of the war that at one point the TPLF and the and the Eritrean government will be on the same side I would have never believed you

But now it's happening and as I said it's an alliance of convenience and such alliances are by their very nature shaky they have a lot of underlying issues because yes the enemy of my enemy is going to be my friend but this isn't you know the best of friendships and to make matters worse they've added an another armed group that has its own issues with Addis

Ababa and still has its own issues with the Tigray the and the TPLF specifically I'm talking about the final insurgency in the Amhara region of Ethiopia and the claims by the Ethiopian government that Eritrea has been arming the FANU and has gone as far as having Eritrean soldiers dress up as the FANU to be involved in attacks something you know we've seen

Rwanda do in the DRC where Rwandan troops would dress as M23 soldiers to be involved in attacks in eastern DRC so Mike let's talk about the FANU for a minute and their alleged links with Eritrea talk about this yes Eritrea you know it does have long-standing ties with FANU and when I say long-standing I maybe that's not the right term for it they have types

Pre-existing ties with FANU they you know have armed the FANU groups since basically their inception and supported them in that way and also reportedly provided them you know kind of political advising if you will so Eritrea's support with FANU is basically part of this broader strategy of trying to keep Ethiopia weak and divided internally so that Ethiopia

Then does not pose an existential threat to Eritrea.

And, you know, that concern has only been on Eritrea's part, that concern has only been furthered by, you know, Ethiopia's claims over the port of Assad that I mentioned before.

So, yes, FONO is, you know, included in this. Well, I should say Eritrea has ties with FONO and Eritrea also has ties with the TPLF now.

It's very unclear whether FONO and the TPLF have actually, you know, worked together at all, because as you hinted at, there are significant disputes between the two groups, especially over, you know, basically land in what is now considered Tigray that these FONO militias considered part of Umhara region.

So very significant land disputes. And FONO did fight with Eritrea and the Ethiopian federal government against the TPLF during the Tigray War.

But that being said, it seems like there's more of an alignment now, again, as part of this alliance of convenience that I used to describe Eritrea and the TPLF earlier, there's more of an alignment now between FONO and the TPLF against the Ethiopian federal government.

And there have been reported meetings between Eritrea, FONO representatives, TPLF representatives, and also representatives of the Oromo Liberation Army as well, facilitated by Sudan, in Sudan, actually. But again, it's unclear whether the extent or the operationalization of any cooperation between FONO and the TPLF. Certainly a worrying trend, though.

And there's even a name for this alliance between all those actors, SMIDO. So, but again, it's unclear whether those ties have been operationalized at all. So, again, there's the risk of multiple fronts within Ethiopia merging into one, which will be very difficult for Abiy Ahmed's government to deal with.

Because, yes, dear listener, we might be talking about this from the one major war that Ethiopia is fighting. But fundamentally, the Ethiopian military is spread very thin because it has to fight an insurgency in Oromia. It has to fight an insurgency in Amhara.

It's fighting the Tigray now, and it still has its eyes on Sudan and Eritrea, just in case anything blows up in the direction. And this is from Ackled, from one of the analysts at Ackled.

They had previously warned that in case of a TPLF campaign to capture Western Tigray, Fano factions with ties to the TPLF and obviously with ties to Asmara, Eritrea that is, could either intensify their own fight against the federal government or actively support a TPLF offensive in the north, creating a pincer maneuver designed specifically to overstretch

The Ethiopian National Defense Forces across fronts.

It's already struggling to hold. So we don't know how likely it is for these disparate forces with their own disparate fights against the Ethiopian National Army are to coalesce around a common cause. But if they did, everyone is already warning that this is going to be something absolutely catastrophic.

So I want to go back to that idea, Mike, of the tension between the TPLF and the Fano forces because of the situation in Western Tigray. So talk us through that.

Talk us through how the Amhara saw a chance to seize land that the Tigray themselves had seized from them during the initial iteration of the Tigray war and what the Tritoria agreement that peace deal signed between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF said about that disputed land.

Definitely. So basically, these Amhara ethno-nationalist militias, some of which are now known as Fano, but then there's also other groups as well, they have long-claimed territory that is designated as being part of Tigray as Amhara territory. And essentially, Fano joins the fight against the TPLF during the Tigray war.

As you said, it was almost a bit of opportunism on their part, and they took advantage of that to assert control over some of the lands that they claim, both in Western Tigray, but then also in Southern Tigray as well, bordering on the Wolo zones of Amhara region.

So basically, Fano forces, or I should say these Amhara ethno-nationalist militias were able to take control of some of these territories and set up kind of local administrative structures and uproot the two TPLF from these areas. And they're relatively significant chunks of lands as well.

Now, the Pretoria peace agreement called for the withdrawal. of all forces, including Eritrea and Fano, from Tigray, including the areas that these Amhara ethno-nationalist militias claimed and had taken control of. The Ethiopian fellow government was supposed to be the sole sovereign authority within Tigray and provide security for the entire region.

Those Amhara ethno-nationalist militias never withdrew from these disputed areas of Tigray and have continued their presence there, which has been a source of serious discontent among the TPLF.

And the TPLF has repeatedly and recently cited the shortcomings of the Pretoria peace agreement in that it didn't actually result in the withdrawal of these Amhara ethno-nationalist forces as being a primary reason, a reason of their current tensions with the Ethiopian federal government.

So there's a lot that the Pretoria peace agreement coincides in my view, but you're leaving the situation in Western Tigray in the hands of a government that hadn't really shown the political will to fully implement the deal one and, you know, to be a good partner to the Tigray as a peace partner, because when you're making peace with someone, when you're on

The other side of war, you have to be a good partner.

I think that is one of the major failings of the Pretoria peace agreement.

Would you agree? Yes. Okay.

So let's stick around, you know, on that idea of the Pretoria peace agreement and, you know, the kind of negotiations that are needed to bring such a war to a close, it's very early days. We're in the very early days of the war.

But one source who is, you know, an individual within the TPLF told the AFP, the Agent Free Press, that there were efforts at de-escalations happening behind the scenes.

And it's something that was confirmed by a security source within the Ethiopian government. So what do you make of these claims that there are efforts to de-escalate the situation? And do you think it will be enough to calm things down enough that we're not looking at another major war?

I do think it's possible that both sides are able to de-escalate to avert the risk. of an imminent war. It's often said among, you know, analysts of the region that it's not in either side's interests for there to be another Tigray war.

The Ethiopian federal government has very ambitious goals for the development of the country and to be a regional power and, you know, seemingly would not want to get bogged down in another Tigray war and the TPLF as well would not want to face another onslaught like they did last time, especially because the TPLF is not nearly as united internally as they

Were last time.

So yes, it's really not in either side interests on paper for there to be another war and therefore it's definitely possible for these de-escalation efforts to bear fruit in the imminent term.

However, I don't see these de-escalation efforts as solving the broader issue between the TPLF and the Ethiopian fellow government, which is basically over who controls Tigray region.

The situation has significantly deteriorated within in 2026 and specifically since May of 2026 because the TPLF reinstated their pre-Tigray war regional government and have fully asserted control of Tigray again, which is exactly what the Ethiopian fellow government was seeking to prevent through the Tigray war and the resulting Pretoria peace agreement.

So the Ethiopian fellow government clearly has no intention to let the TPLF control Tigray and the TPLF has no intention of, you know, stepping down and allowing the federal government to assume control up to Gray.

So you have these fundamental differences over control of the region still at play and I don't see any short-term de-escalation talks that's, I don't see the potential for those solving this broader issue that would require a much more substantive negotiation process that neither side has been willing to undertake so far.

But that being said, of course, the start of that is to, you know, de-escalate things in the imminent term and the fact that there are reports of these talks aimed at de-escalation and the fact that there haven't been any more clashes since August 1st, those are, you know, promising signs in the short term.

But again, there needs to be a much more substantive process to prevent a war from breaking out in the long term. I agree. We do need to see.

I agree.

We do need to see. much more substantive process in order to prevent this from becoming a recurring issue because as long as Ethiopia or the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF don't address the underlying issues that you keep bringing them on to the verge of conflict and you know in the most recent instance already to close then we'll be stuck in this

Escalatory cycle where we see violence time and home and time again so I do want to talk about that idea of talks a little bit more because as you mentioned Eritrea considers Ethiopia's ambitions and you know these are these are very deep-rooted ambitions for Abiy Ahmed's government to be an existential threat particularly when it comes to matters around

Port access maritime access so do you think Eritrea will push the TPLF away from negotiations that's a very good question I think that Eritrea clearly feels like it has something to gain from the TPLF remaining in control of Tigray region they almost Eritrea sees Tigray basically as a buffer between you know the Ethiopian federal government and Eritrea

Especially over the issue of Ethiopian sea access so I think that Eritrea feels that like it's in their interest to make sure that the TPLF remains in control integrate and would not support negotiations aimed at a settlement that would you know produce a result different than that then continuing TPLF control of Tigray whether Eritrea would oppose any

Negotiation whatsoever and that's a little bit unclear just because I once war begins it's Eritrea can't control the outcome of that so if Ethiopia if the Ethiopian federal government and TPLF you know resume hostilities and another war breaks out Eritrea can't control the outcome if then Ethiopia is able to actually take control of Tigray region and then

They would be posing a much larger threat to Eritrea especially the port of Saab but also just you know you know entire country as well so whether eritrea doesn't want any dialogue to occur or actively you know wants a war to occur i'm not convinced of that just because again once that cat is out of the bag they can't control the outcome and you know they

Could be dealing with an ethiopian military poised on their border if the ethiopian military won a war against the tplf so as you said it's it might not be in their best interest to push for a war but you know when you're in the heat of the moment when the fog of war is all around you people don't necessarily see things that clearly so again it's it's a

Situation that we will be monitoring very closely so mike before i let you go because we've just hit the hour mark in terms of when we're recording this i don't want to talk about one situation in ethiopia that might affect its ability to conduct a war either against you know the tigre and by what i mean a full scale assault a full scale basically a

Full-fledged return to fighting what we are things like what you're seeing in sudan or what you're seeing in ukraine or you know the congo i want to talk about the situation with fuel so at the height of the iran war ethiopia was really in a really really bad place in terms of fuel cars were spending so much time in line at fuel depots at fuel stations to

Try and get whatever little that they could that people who rent taxi cabs or you're going to bed hungry because they simply couldn't afford to operate recently this is on the 14th of june it was reported that the state-owned ethiopian shipping and logistics company has resumed handling the country's petroleum imports including from new international

Suppliers so they imported about 120 000 liters of diesel and airplane fuel from the dangote refinery in nigeria and the first shipment arrived in yeah mid-june on the 14th of june as i said earlier so what do you have any insights into what the current fuel situation is in ethiopia and whether you know with ethiopian shipping and logistics coming back on as

A major player in ethiopia's fuel industry if you will be able to avert an oil an oil shortage that could cripple its army no i don't have any insights as to i don't have any insights into you so Thank you. you know, how much the situation or if the situation has improved significantly since the early days of the war.

But here's what I can say.

So back in late February, which is when the Iran war began and when you started to see fuel prices shoot up and there were massive shortages within Ethiopia.

Right before the war touched off, I forecasted that the Ethiopian federal government would launch an offensive to essentially neutralize the TPLF in Tigray because there were massive buildups going on at the time.

The Ethiopian military was conducting massive buildups on the Tigray regional border and the TPLF-aligned forces were responding in kind and it seemed like war was imminent.

However, the Iran war broke out, fuel prices shot up and then, you know, due to other reasons as well, such as the Fano insurgency, Ethiopian, the Ethiopian federal government seemingly recalibrated there. I do believe that the fuel shortages, you know, were likely the most significant barrier for the Ethiopian military launching that offensive.

Although, again, there were other significant barriers and constraints as well.

That being said, if suddenly that situation, you know, improves and Ethiopia is not dealing with fuel shortages and is not, you know, paying exorbitant prices for fuel, I do think, you know, the likelihood of conflict definitely goes up.

Because, again, more so than anything, I think, the fuel shortages were a significant constraint on the Ethiopian military at a time when it seemed like they were poised to launch an offensive imminently.

And then also, too, though, one thing I do want to note is that even if this fuel situation does resolve itself in Ethiopia, there are other constraints as well, especially the Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army insurgencies.

You know, Fano especially is, you know, it takes up some of the bandwidth of the Ethiopian military in Amhara region and also, you know, kind of complicates the Ethiopian military from, you know, supporting an offensive Antigre, given that you have to go through territory that Fano can test to get up to Tigray.

So that kind of complicates supply lines a bit there. So there are other constraints as well, aside from the fuel.

But I think the fuel shortages were the biggest constraint. on a potential Ethiopian offensive against the TPLF. All right, so there are constraints that are keeping, at least for the time being, the war at a sort of manageable level in terms of just how much the Ethiopian National Army can do.

On the Tigray side, I do want to point out that they have their own constraints as well, one of which being manpower.

There have been multiple reports that the TPLF has been going door-to-door, grabbing kids as young as 15 and even people who are injured. We're talking long-term injuries, not something that's easily rectified.

People who had suffered long-term injuries in the first iteration of the Tigray war and you're forcing them back into the training camps, back to fight again.

And as someone who has been covering war for a really long time, it does take time to turn recruits into capable fighters.

That's why Russia, one of the reasons why Russia was really struggling against Ukraine, because even if they did have the manpower advantage, it does take time to turn someone you've recruited, someone who's green off the streets into a capable military fighter who can operate independently, who has a sense of autonomy and a sense of battlefield sense in

Order to play a significant role on the battlefield.

So the TPLF has that manpower constraint and the forced recruitment isn't necessarily helping because these are people who will flee at the first chance that they are given.

So yeah, there's a lot of constraints on both sides. And hopefully the constraints work to give diplomacy and your peace negotiations and actual dialogue a chance to bring peace to the region. Because as we've mentioned before, the last Tigray war was really, really devastating.

And now every time there's even the hint that another Tigray war could pop off, it chills me to my bones because I think, are we going to see another 600,000 people lose their lives? Or is the death toll going to be even higher? And given the things we've seen in Sudan so far, we really do not want to be in such a situation again.

And there's always the risk that the wars in Ethiopia and Sudan merge into one giant war zone. And of course, this is one of those worst case scenarios.

But again, it's something worth considering just given how much and how deep the ties are between... the various groups mike one final question before we log out for the night what are you watching in the coming days and weeks what signals will you be looking for to better understand you know what's happening on the ground i think that the main thing that

I'm looking for are you know mobilizations on both sides so especially kind of recalling what happens back in january and february of this year so what we saw then was kind of these massive convoys ethiopian military convoys traveling up toward tigray to you know build up its presence on the tigray regional border and then you also saw the tpl offline forces

Responding accordingly and building up their own forces essentially right across the border from the from the ethiopian military so mobilizations are the biggest thing because then that signifies of course that you know both sides are actively preparing for further hostilities i would also just keep a very close eye on statements of course by both the tplf

And also the ethiopian fellow government as well now what you saw in the lead up to the recent clashes was essentially an information operation by the ethiopian state media basically portraying the tplf as warmongers and you know placing the blame for any for the current tensions but then also any future hostilities placing the blame for it on the tplf and

Basically implying that any conflict would be the tplf's fault and that you know the federal government would be the one acting defensively that the tplf was the aggressor so i would say sustained information operations by ethiopian state media along those lines is definitely a concerning indicator and as well like further tplf statements that they are ready

For war and that they don't really see and basically implying that they don't really see a pathway through further talks i think that those would be concerning indicators as well and then the last thing is just a lack of you know mediation efforts by you know the african union for example as the african union was the forum where the pretoria peace agreement

That ended the peace agreement that ended the two gray war that was the forum that helped sponsor the of peace talks.

So if we don't see any mediation efforts by the African Union, by IGAD and other actors too, potentially including the U.S. or Saudi Arabia and other actors who have a stake in Turkey as well, other actors that have a stake in what goes on here, I think that's definitely a concerning development because as I said before, again, these talks of de-escalation

Are fine in the short term, especially if they avert an imminent conflict, but this fundamental political dispute over the control of Tigray is not going anywhere.

So if we don't see any additional mediation efforts and then substantive steps by the Ethiopian federal government and TPLF towards solving this, to me, that's an indicator that neither side is interested in doing so.

And then if you pair that with information operations and mobilizations, those are the red, the alarm lights are going, would be going off for sure.

All right. For my part, what I'll be watching closely is what comes out of the Critical Threats Project newsletter because that's one of the key sources of information I use for conflicts like this.

I'll also be watching social media to see just how accounts allied with either the TPLF or the Ethiopian federal government are portraying this war and, you know, just how that is evolving.

So with that, we're going to end the podcast here. If you've listened to us all the way through, one, thank you for indulging us and allowing us a space to talk about the Ethiopian conflict, what we know, what we don't. It's a rapidly evolving situation.

And yeah, we just needed a forum to really talk about how much of a mess it is and it still could be. And again, we are pretty sure that by this point, you're a premium subscriber to France.co. And if you aren't, please join the bandwagon.

It's only $5 a month or $50 a year, basically the price of a couple of cups of coffee. And it allows us to do stuff like this. It allows me to have guys like Mike on the podcast to talk about rapidly evolving situations and basically have a breaking news show where we talk about stuff like this.

So yeah, thank you so much for supporting us. We don't take it for granted. Mike, thank you so much for being here with us.

Thank you so much for sharing your insights with us. And as always, thank you for being a friend. Thank you for having me, Wilfred.

Yes, appreciate it. All right. We'll see you next time.