Middle East Round Table: War Everywhere

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good evening, good afternoon, whenever and wherever you're listening to us from. This is the Middle East Roundtable. I know you have not gotten your podcast confused.

I know that's how I usually open the Deo South podcast, but today I'm using it to open the Middle East Roundtable because it's just me and Kyle. Our buddy Evan is all the way in the Barbell Vandep Street. He is trying to figure out the situation there and will give us a report hopefully next week when he comes back to the office.

Today, it's just me and Kyle, like I mentioned. So without any further ado, I'm going to pass it over to Kyle to tell us how the week has been because, ladies and gentlemen, it has been an absolute burn of a week. To say the least, it has truly been one for the record books in terms of just how much news is breaking across so many different fronts here.

So for a quick rundown, I'm going to do my best to consolidate this. Forgive me if I missed something here. But overall, the big scope that what we're looking at right now.

First, I'm going to start with the surprise attack that Iran launched onto the U.S. base in Jordan on Tuesday or two days ago at this point. Very uncharacteristic of how this war has been going on lately. They've been very willing to target shipping in Hormuz.

But when it comes to actual strikes on U.S. bases, the Iranians themselves have not been just launching during ceasefires, which we were effectively in over the last few days. So this is definitely a shift in Iranian philosophy in terms of their, generally speaking, emboldened willingness to actually go out ahead of the game and start things themselves.

The U.S. has, of course, responded.

This was basically guaranteed. We're going to see how much this actually escalates. So far, it seems to be more in line with just a generic tip-for-tad exchange, which we've certainly seen plenty of over the last few weeks and months at this point.

So the concern here being that there may be a more intense and even more escalated version that breaks out. We will have to see what goes on there. But that is only one side of the story in terms of what's going on in the Middle East this week.

We also have essentially what's likely a new war going on between the Houthi rebels in Yemen and the government in Saudi Arabia, where they have been launching on each other. It's really kicked off about a little over a week ago. The Houthis have announced a shipping blockade on Saudi. exports, namely of energy flowing through the Red Sea.

Now, keep in mind, Saudi Arabia is geographically blessed for the region, whereas they are able to sort of bypass or move to some extent over the last few months by shipping out through their west coast. They have a city along the Red Sea called Yanbu, which has been able to ship north through the Suez Canal and south through the Bab al-Mendeb Strait.

The Bab al-Mendeb runs right alongside Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, which makes any shipping going through there sort of a sitting duck.

My biggest concern there being that all of this is just an escalated version of the war, because the Houthis did not enter this specifically in defense of Tehran. They're doing this for their own domestic purposes, but I'm sure we're going to get into all of that in due course. Kyle, you know what this week reminds me of?

It reminds me of that quote by Lenin, that there are decades where nothing happens, and then there are weeks where decades happen. Because, and you know, this is a little behind the scene tidbit for our listeners. Because when we were planning out this podcast, we had so much to discuss that we couldn't even figure out where to begin.

And the condensed version that Kyle has given you guys isn't even the full picture, because there's so much to talk about. There's Trump's meeting with Netanyahu, there's Ukraine becoming a bigger participant in the war in Iran. There's the fact that Saudi Arabia has been striking Iran itself.

There's so much to talk about. So instead of drowning in all of the news, let's go one by one. Kyle, since you've already taken us through, I'm going to pass it back to you the situation between the US and Iran as it stands now.

There was a brief period where both sides didn't strike each other. And it seemed to be, as you rightfully put it, a mini ceasefire. So what happened and why, why go from that situation to, you know, everyone is back to striking?

Yeah. So in the lead up to the mini ceasefire, the US was actually considering a more expanded operation against the Islamic Republic. The US actually pulled back from that, in part because of the concerns of shortages of interceptors, both in the region and of course, more globally, as we've been pulling from our supplies throughout. world.

So this is something that I've been following quite closely. These interceptors are very, very important in terms of missile defense systems.

So we live in a unique time period where if you live in a NATO country or one that has any form of missile defense, a lot of the like missiles that get launched at major population centers, they're certainly a concern, but you don't have to worry about them quite as much because, I mean, as you can see throughout the Middle East, Iran has been launching just

About everything it can at various countries across the region, including major population centers.

So Manama, Kuwait City, Doha, even Riyadh to an extent. And some have gotten through, but the vast majority have not. So life has been able to continue as relatively normal as you can imagine throughout all of it.

That world is very easy to forget, or it's very easy to forget the world that preceded it, where missiles flying at major population centers means mass civilian casualties. And that's something that if we run out of interceptors or critically low on interceptors and have to begin rationing them, then we are really looking at a different world here.

So I think that's part of the reason why the U.S. ultimately pulled back, at least according to the various reporting that we've seen from the Telegraph.

But ultimately, we're going to have to see where that goes. The U.S. now, though, is considering once again a heightened two-week blitzed across Iran in response to the Tuesday surprise attack by the Islamic Republic, because this mini ceasefire did not do anything.

So on some level, you can only push Washington so much before it's going to just retaliate, even if it is low on munitions like the interceptors.

And I think we are definitely seeing that culminate here, because ultimately, all of this is just beginning to come full circle. And if a ceasefire is not working, then what's the alternative to a ceasefire? And I think you can draw the line from there.

The alternative to a ceasefire is usually war. And what has me absolutely just concerned is how shaky, how unreliable any kind of ceasefire is between the U.S. and Iran. And I say this because one thing we need to get across as a podcast, as a front, we really want peace to succeed.

We want Iran. the iranian people to live in peace we want the us to live in peace we want the wider middle east to live in peace that is something we long to see kyle has been dreaming about you know writing a video called lebanon hasn't fucked itself very true i would equally like to write a video saying iran hasn't fucked itself but we are unable to you

Know write such videos because war continues to be such an attractive option for everyone involved so i want to bring in a counterpoint because a renewed war i renewed blitz isn't the only alternative that the trump administration has at least according to mark caputo at axios mark is a colleague of barack ravid who does some exceptional work as well very

Well connected individual whose work kyle evan and i reference multiple times so according to caputo's reporting president trump believes that an economic pressure campaign would be as effective if not more so than a bombing run so this is a quote from an admin a senior administration official who spoke with axios of course on the condition of anonymity the

Iranians want to stop being bombed and they want money but that's almost in reverse order they really want the money fast so that idea that iran wants money the administration has really clung on to it as well as the broader idea that the iranian economy economy is in shambles to come up with this theory of victory where they can place immense economic

Pressure on iran to try and you know force the iranian people to rise up against their government similar to what we saw in january where there were multiple multiple protests that drew hundreds of thousands of people angry at the economic conditions within the country so one thing that i'm concerned about with such a blue kid is the impact it will have on

The global economy because as we speak oil passed a hundred dollars a few days ago that's the price of brent crude i'm not sure what the price is at the moment if you can hear me type in the background that's what i'm trying to confirm we are currently at about at the time of speaking we're at about 85 dollars and you know that's mainly because all your oil

Traders are trying to price in a potential peace deal a potential you know the time between the us and iran but you know whatever happens with the oil the outcome is still the same.

The price is so much higher than it was pre-war, and we might not get to pre-war levels again for a long time. And even if the price does drop, the amount of oil needed to fill the shortfalls that existed because of the three-month period that the war was at such an intense level, it will take time to fill that gap.

So if the Trump administration chooses to go the route of an economic blockade, a long-term economic blockade, Iran will most likely respond by being even stricter on the ships that can pass through the Strait of Hormuz because we have seen some ships pass while their radar is off, their identifying information is off, and that has been enough, in some cases

At least, to get through the Strait of Hormuz.

But in my estimation, Iran will be a lot stricter on the ships passing through there. And not just that, but they might begin to target the bypass routes that countries like Saudi Arabia are already planning to use.

Some of these bypass routes are already in service. As Kyle has mentioned, the Bab el-Mandeb was for a time one of these routes. The Port of Yanbu was another one of these bypass routes.

So if we go down the route of an economic blockade, that's a situation that I fear could happen. Kyle, what do you think of this idea that the Trump administration could go down the economic path if the booming campaign doesn't achieve the results that it wants?

Well, it is one that I was advocating for in past weeks here as a option because the alternative is just simply far uglier to me and ultimately not one I necessarily think would have any chance of success.

We have seen a considerable amount of bombing, to say the least. I mean, this has been the defining strategy of the war. This has been an air-only, air plus naval operation, I should say.

But we have not seen any meaningful cracks forming in terms of the Iranian regimes, not their domestic in their workings, but in terms of their ability to actually conduct this war. The IRGC is very much still firing on all cylinders.

I am quite skeptical that even a ramped-up version of that air campaign, which again, I mean, the early stages of Epic Fury were very intense in terms of aerial campaigns, by the way.

So this is not something that was by any means light. handed operation. But ultimately, when it comes to actually being able to get Hormuz open to international shipping without tolls going up, like when it comes to that, the blockade very well may be the US's only option at this point.

Because again, I don't think any sustained bombing effort will really yield the results that the US and Gulf communities and wider international community is looking for here.

Well, we'll wait to see what the US chooses to do. Because the one thing that Trump has in front of him is a lot of options. Some much, much better, at least in terms of the costs, in terms of lives, in terms of manpower, in terms of military equipment.

And some of these options are much, much better than the others. And for us, you and I can both agree that a blockade is a much better alternative than a ground invasion, which is bound to have way too many casualties, something that the American public cannot bear to see.

And if you want to hear more about how many casualties or just how successful or how much of a failure a ground invasion can be, we have a podcast out from last week and multiple podcast editions before where we go deep, deep into this.

So let's move away from the situation in Iran proper and talk about one of the other fronts that has opened in this war, specifically around the Babel Mandib Strait, which has now devolved into a war between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. Kyle, you spoke about this briefly during your intro for our listeners. So take us through it.

Yes, we have an episode coming out on war fronts today, Thursday, depending on when this podcast itself comes out. It's almost guaranteed to be up by then on this issue specifically. But basically, the concern that I have with this Yemen war is twofold.

First, the Houthi rebels in Yemen are taking all the wrong lessons and for their perspective, all the right lessons from the Iranian experience thus far in the campaign. So they are learning in terms of their what works in terms of asymmetric warfare.

They're learning in terms of what could be done via geographically being blessed by sitting on very narrow bodies of water that carry enormous amounts of in a distance from the word for the water that carry.

So… So you know, we're talking about this, So we are not available for you. international shipping through it, and even the ability to charge tolls. Iranian officials after the funeral of Ali Khamenei returned with Houthi officials to Sana'a.

The Yemeni internationally recognized government in Aden did try to stop that return flight because they knew there were some 20 plus IRGC officials on board.

They ended up shelling the airport in Sana'a, but it was effectively not successful in stopping them. They landed in Hudaydah instead, and since then they have gone, they've been quite busy.

They were basically setting up shop with the Houthis in terms of demonstrating to them how to get a port authority, which is what they call it in the Persian Gulf, going that basically is a toll booth.

The Houthis do want to set up toll booths across the Bab al-Mendeb Strait. So that's one element of it there. The second element of it being they are waging essentially what may spiral back into a second war with Saudi Arabia in terms of there's been tons of back and forth bombing strikes.

The Houthis have hit, by my latest count, at least three, potentially four Saudi ships in the last few days in the Red Sea. And importantly for me, those ships were not all located just in the Bab al-Mendeb. They were able to actually fire up further north, so off the coast of the city of Jezan, and then even further north, the city of Yanbu itself.

Yanbu, of course, we discussed that a bit earlier. Yanbu is the endpoint of the Saudi pipeline that runs from east to west. It literally crosses almost the entire country there.

So if they're able to actually hit Yanbu, then they would be able to potentially knock out Saudi's attempt to bypass Hormuz at the source. Thankfully, the two ballistic missiles that were inbound to Yanbu were shot down by Patriot interceptors. So there was no damage there.

But the Houthi missiles did hit the city of Jezan, which has a facility. That facility, by the way, puts out some 400,000 barrels of oil a day. So this is not a small little place, to say the least.

And the damage was so extensive that they had to shut down production. And again, this is just in the first week or two of this conflict, where it's still relatively limited tit-for-tat exchanges.

So you can see where this could ultimately go in terms of escalatory strikes and just the damage to the international energy markets that could be a result of this.

The shocks toward the international energy market are going to be great, specifically because, Jezan, as you've mentioned, produces about 400,000 barrels of oil per day. And as I said earlier, I don't think the world can take much more shocks to its system in terms of how many more barrels of oil per day are removed from the global system.

Any single barrel of oil per day is significant.

And when you're talking 400,000, that quickly compounds you over time because within 10 days, that's what, 4 million? That's a very staggering number to imagine. So the fact that the Houthis and Saudi Arabia are fighting this heavily, I know it's just the first week of the fighting, is something significant.

For me, one of the biggest developments in the fight between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is the fact that Saudi ships are beginning to sail dark. By that, I mean the switching off their transponders, the switching off their identifiable information to try and prevent the Houthis from identifying them as Saudi flagged ships.

So two ships, two tankers have already done this.

One is the Amazon, which was carrying about a million barrels of oil for the Indian Oil Corporation. And then there's the Rordos, which was carrying about 700,000 barrels of oil for the Mangalore refinery and petrochemicals facility. So both loaded at Yanbu and initially appeared to be heading towards the Suez Canal.

That's in Egypt. We'll be talking about Egypt in a moment. And then they turned off their public tracking information and traveled south through Houthis-threatened waters.

For me, this is significant because it shows something as simple as turning off their transponders is effective enough to prevent the Houthis from identifying them.

And given the fact that these two ships passed successfully, I believe more Saudi-flagged ships will be doing the same, will seek to do the same in order to get the oil into the international markets because it is desperately, desperately needed. And it also reveals one of the key limitations that the Houthis have.

Because unlike Iran, which can mine the Strait of Hormuz and make it really, really difficult for any ship to pass, the Houthis, with full appreciation of just how effective their tactics can be, there's a limitation in what they can and cannot do. They cannot mine the Babel mandate.

They cannot identify ships as effectively as Iran can because we have seen instances where even with a ship, turning off its transponder information Iran was still able to identify it and you know either turn it back or seize it and we've also just gotten to understand how limited operations in the barbell-mandered street can be but you know despite all of

That there's still been a noticeable noticeable effect on the cost of transporting oil through the barbell-mandered street so according to I believe this is Reuters the premium for transporting the risk premium which is basically the insurance price of transporting oil through the barbell-mandered has risen from roughly 0.3 percent of a ship's value to more

Than one percent and all you know those numbers might sound small I really want to emphasize that for oil shippers for anyone in the maritime industry they operate on small margins so the insurance premium rising by that much when oil has already the price of oil has already risen yeah that's not going to be definitely not you know something they want to

Deal with and one percent is on the lower end there are ships that have been quoted a premium as high as three percent so you know that in and of itself just raises the cost of you transporting the oil even further and if a ship chooses to pass through the Suez Canal instead of you dealing with the Houthis the barbell-mandered that increases the length of

Time that it's in the water means that the customers get their oil later and it means that these ships are refilled later basically any option that Saudi ships have right now increases the cost of transporting oil by a significant amount and speaking of insurance there was a report a few days ago by the financial times that several leading maritime war

Insurers that you that are operating in the Lloyds of London marketplace had told brokers that they would not provide war cargo insurance for Saudi-linked vessels operating in the Red Sea and it's not just Saudi-flagged vessels it's vessels carrying Saudi Arabian cargo foreign-flagged ships that are currently calling on Saudi ports or which had previously

Done so and ships loading at Red Sea terminals such as Yanbu, Jizan or Al-Shukaiq hopefully I'm pronouncing that right so the fact that you your insurance are either increasing premiums so exorbitantly or outrightly choosing not to insure these ships is making the situation really really intense for Saudi Arabia, which is why a few days ago, Saudi Arabia

Introduced an idea that I find incredibly interesting, that they will lead a 50-nation coalition to protect the state of the Babel Mandib Strait.

What do you think of Saudi Arabia's broader efforts to protect the strait, as well as just the economic implication of having the strait be attacked by the Houthis and just this war in general? Yeah, so I mean, I do think the Saudi coalition is going to get some serious international support. So far, we've seen a few signups already.

We have Egypt joining in, along with Somalia and Djibouti off the coast, which is sort of the Yemeni equivalent of Oman in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran and Oman share that body of water.

Djibouti and Yemen share the Babel Mandib, and as we've been able to see throughout various back and forths for months at this point with Hormuz, getting the other player on board that you share the body of water with can be both challenging and certainly important to actually getting any toll booth set up.

So the fact that Djibouti is actually more hostile to the idea of doing this than Oman is.

Oman has been luke-cold, is basically how I would describe it. They're not enthusiastic, and they're trying to they've been trying to just do workarounds where they have optional tolls or ridiculous things like this that are just transparently ways of getting ships out of actually paying them. In this case, the Houthis are going to have an even harder time.

Now, what I'm really looking at is whether there's going to be even more international campaign or international members joining the campaign. So right now we're waiting to hear on the United States as well as Pakistan and Turkey. I think all three are likely yeses, but we'll have to see how that actually plays out.

Turkey there has been mostly absent from the equation of this war with very minor roles played so far. So I think if they're actually willing to throw some muscle behind this, that could be a serious escalation. And I think that could have some actual implications for where this goes.

It's extremely interesting for me to see Djibouti mentioned in international affairs to such a large extent because So I guess we're asking you anything to expect this task. For us, Because Djibouti is a really, really tiny nation for anyone who might not be familiar with it. It's about, I believe it's smaller than New York City, if I'm not wrong.

And it's just not a major player when it comes to international relations. So the fact that it would wade into matters concerning the Babel Mandib, and obviously it has its own geostrategic reasons for doing so, is really, really exciting for me. Djibouti is one of those countries that doesn't get talked about enough, but it's such an interesting country.

Kyle, let's move on our way from the Babel Mandib to other interesting countries that are also choosing to get involved in the Iran war. You have a video out on war fronts about how Ukraine has become a player in the Iran war. So take us through it.

Yeah, so this is, I mean, if we ever need proof that what we were saying about this being a busy week is true, look no further than the fact that we are, what, 20-something minutes into this conversation, and we're only now getting to the fact that Ukraine has joined the war in Iran.

So basically what's been going on is Iran has been supplying for years at this point. The Russians, who are obviously fighting Ukraine, with a large amount of drones and munitions, as well as helping Moscow construct more drones to begin with.

So Ukraine sees this as basically Iran having entered the Ukraine war, not that they've entered it, the Iran war themselves. So it's sort of a difference in terms of like who do you believe on that front.

I am pretty sympathetic to Ukraine's claims here, though, because overall, Iran has been such a long-term supplier of Moscow that it's quite difficult to imagine how this is not a legitimate claim.

So what happened the other day is Ukraine struck at least two ships that were transiting through the Caspian Sea. So the Caspian Sea is a very unique body of water. It's quite large, but it's completely surrounded by land.

So there's no way in or out of it. It's just whatever you set up shop in the Caspian is what's going to be there. That just so happens to border both Russia and Iran on opposite ends, as well as a few other states like Azerbaijan.

But ultimately, where this goes is that Ukraine has been keeping tabs on this for... at quite some time now and knows that Iran has been ferrying all sorts of goodies up to their friends in Moscow by way of the Caspian to bypass sanctions and decided that enough was enough and made a strike. Iran has been not happy about this, to say the least.

So we're going to have to see if they actually make good on some threats.

The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Aragji, was saying that the strike on Iran had to be responded to. And there have been some more hardline politicians in the Islamic Republic making even more aggressive threats. So we're going to have to see where that goes.

But again, broader theme here, stability is sort of falling apart throughout much of the world at this point. And stability falling apart throughout much of the world feels like a recurrent theme in basically everything we do here at Wolframs.

So Kyle was telling me a few minutes before we started the podcast proper that Russia had fired a ballistic missile which had entered into Poland and made a very deep trench.

And such news, while it might seem like, you know, we're used to it, is genuinely still shocking to us that the world can find new and very creative ways to fall apart. And trust me, when we say new and creative ways, you guys don't even know just half of all the things we see because we can't cover everything.

That's why we have segments like the briefing room on France.co, where we get into some of these other underreported conflicts.

This week, we are talking about on the briefing room how the relationship between Mali and Algeria has improved over the past few weeks at the behest of Russia, and how that might impact the war between Bamako and the Azawad Liberation Front, which has become one of the most important allies for Janim, the Al-Qaeda-backed militia group.

And we're also talking about a situation in Colombia where the incoming president, ADLE, please do not ask me to pronounce his name, is in a feud with the outgoing president, Gustavo Petro, that has forced him to be inaugurated. His inauguration will happen on the 7th of August.

His inauguration will happen at a university field instead of, you know, at a military barracks as is tradition. So we get to cover some of these smaller issues in the briefing room and basically on France.co.

So I just, I just. to plug that away from you know the briefing room one thing i do want to talk about is the options that iran has when it comes to you know sending a message to ukraine so this is from the new york times some people briefed on the intelligence said that they expected iran to fire a ballistic missile with a small warhead at ukraine to make a

Symbolic point but caused relatively little damage other officials said the target was probably one of ukraine's black sea ports so if honestly if iran did this it would be such a major escalatory step and to be honest i don't think they understand the impact of opening up a new front with ukraine and i say this because a few countries in the world

Understand drone technology as well as russia ukraine and iran in the middle east iran has no counterpart when it comes to an understanding of drone technology they are unrivaled unmatched and they can basically outgun everyone everyone was playing catch-up that's why we've seen so many devastating attacks in jordan in the uae in qatar basically anywhere

Where iran you know pointed its drones even if some were intercepted some got through and did enough damage that we're talking about it so if ukraine enters into this war more forcefully then you know we're looking at iran meeting its march in terms of drone technology not you know just drones but also anti-drone technology because several middle eastern

Countries have already signed deals with ukraine to you know better improve their anti-drone capabilities but you know those deals only go so far and ukraine will be a lot more incentivized to improve your what it's offering these countries if iran chose to open up a new front so i'm actually surprised it's taken this long for ukraine and iran to come to

Blows because the relationship between the two countries has been on a downward trend for a long time you know obviously the issues with tehran supplying moscow with drones has been top of mind but when khameini died an iranian diplomat offered a ukrainian diplomat the chance to you know sign a condolence book basically condole with the iranian people after

The death of their leader but the iranian diplomat said and i quote that iran's leaders are military allies of russia who have stained themselves with the blood of thousands of ukrainians killed with the help of iranian shahed drones quote your leaders were very complicit in the endless grief that ukrainian civilians have suffered as a believer i try not to

Rejoice in the death of other people even those who consciously decided to be the tormentors of my people who did nothing wrong for you but as a person who lived in kiev for three years under the daily howls of iranian death machines i cannot help but wish that every criminal would receive what he deserved for what he did if not before people then before god

So just the amount of vitriol dripping off of that statement you know this is from the ukrainian ambassador to south africa alexander shreber someone who is a trained career diplomat who knows that his words will be scrutinized by people like me and kyle looking for the hidden meaning and so much vitriol just pouring off of his words it's clear that the

Relationship between iran and ukraine was at the very least unsalvageable so yeah genuinely surprised that it's taken this long for them to come to some sort of blows yeah it's it's something we're going to be watching you know over the next few days and months yeah it's it's a it's an aspect of this war that's been pretty like undercovered to be honest

Because a lot of it's treated the two separate wars as completely isolated but they're not because of the close relationship between russia and iran just it's almost impossible to underscore just how much supplies in terms of drone technology iran is been supplying to russia russia is at this point very well known for their drone capabilities but the drones

That they're using most of them are either iranian inspired or literally just iranian they do have a domestic one called the jaron 2 but that's basically just a licensed copied version of the shahead so all of this that ukraine has been under fire from certainly traces back to the islamic republic and there is no love lost between those two i do think you're

Absolutely right that iran doesn't really know what it's potentially biting off if it in if it goes against ukraine although on some level i almost have to imagine the fact that we have not seen an iranian response is part of the reason that there are people there who do know that okay actually would be going up against somebody who is quite good at

Countering the number one military strategy we have so we'll have to see where that goes ultimately i at this point just given how much is going on i think that it's more likely than not that we don't see a full escalation between the so the two, but I have to imagine that if Iran continues to ship through the Caspian, which they most likely will, Ukraine

May strike again.

And on that quote from the Ukrainian ambassador there, it very much reminded me of a Mark Twain quote from here in the United States, where it's, I've never wished a man dead, but I have read some obituaries with great pleasure. And I think that was a very common experience for many Ukrainians after the death of Ali Khomeini.

I've just read a passage in the New York Times that has improved my understanding of why Iran hasn't retaliated on Ukraine so far.

So apparently on Tuesday, that is, so today's Thursday, the 30th of July, just to give our audience a temporal signpost. On Tuesday, that will be the 28th of July. Abbas Agachi spoke with Ukrainian diplomats in an effort to reduce the tension.

After the call, Agachi said that the Ukrainians described the attack on the cargo ships as unintentional, and that Iran didn't seek to escalate the situation near between the two countries. Agachi also spoke with Paja Kalas, the top European Union diplomat, about how they were going to decrease tensions in the region within Europe.

So with all of these diplomatic conversations happening behind the scenes, you can simply assume that tensions between Iran and Ukraine won't necessarily boil over into a new front anytime soon.

So let's go back to that idea of eulogies that people read with great pleasure. Senator Lindsey Graham passed away after a heart attack shortly after visiting Ukraine and seeing their drone manufacturing industries. He had been one of the greatest supporters of Ukraine and of the war in Iran.

Kyle, how do you see his death impacting, you know, both of these wars? Because as we've said, they're so deeply intertwined, we can't really speak of one without speaking of the other, especially when it comes to someone like Lindsey.

Yeah, so given just how big of an outsized role Senator Graham played in terms of foreign policy in the states, especially when there's a Republican administration, this is definitely going to be a big hole to fill.

So he has been a longtime proponent of both hawkish stances on Iran, as well as a very strong supporter of Ukraine. So a lot of the determination on this is going to come down to which side you're asking there.

So I have to imagine there's genuine concern in Kiev over this while some more celebratory stuff going on in Moscow. and Tehran given just how constantly he had been pushing for more hawkish policies on them.

But ultimately we're going to have to sort of see where the GOP goes after this, because when it comes to these like larger than life people that push from either direction, when it comes to like hawkish foreign policy on their, in the Republican party, Graham was always at the front and center of it, along with his now, his also late friend John McCain at

The time.

So both of them being gone we'll have to see given just where the different factions of the party are trying to push towards again in the United States, just because it's a two party system, you inherently have very eclectic coalitions where you have different people who otherwise don't have that much in common, nevertheless, in coalition together.

So it's always sort of a battle to who, to see who can take control of the party, both institutionally and then in terms of voter support as well.

But ultimately I do have to imagine this is going to be a slight setback for causes like Ukraine where Graham has been just such a long time ally of Kiev. Well, hopefully it's not too great a setback.

And I say this, you know, with understanding that the Republican party hasn't necessarily been the greatest friend to Kiev, but attitudes are beginning to change.

We recently saw Republican influencer, Laura Luma. She is someone with a president's ear, someone who has previously influenced even the people that the president chooses to hire and fire.

She recently went to Ukraine, had a meeting with president Zelenskyy and you publicly admitted that she had consumed so much Russian misinformation and disinformation that she just ended up parroting it without really understanding the situation for the Iranian people.

And forgive me for the Ukrainian people. So if people like Laura Luma, who has been a long time you know, champion for the Russian cause can change their mind and become supporters of the Ukrainian cause, I have reason to hope that the Republican party won't, you know, drift too far away from Ukraine.

There's also the fact that President Trump and Zelenskyy's relationship has improved significantly, specifically following their meeting at the Vatican city, which just underscores how much diplomatic influence the Vatican city country.

Who continues to wield even though.

Peter, it's something that's not really talked about as much anymore so it's definitely something we're going to see more of in the coming weeks and months with lindsay cray i'm dead there is there is a very genuine concern about how the republican party will move in terms of foreign policy and one thing that i have been looking at more consistently is a

Vote is what's within the u.s house of representatives so the house is controlled by the republicans and on thursday they voted on legislation directing trump to halt military action against iran which is the latest rebuke of the republican president from congress which you know the constitution gives the exclusive power to declare war anyway this is

Something that lawmakers have done even a while graham was alive they passed similar resolutions repeatedly in the past few months but you know they've not led to an end to the war obviously we're still talking about the war and you know this is primarily because these resolutions get passed in the set in the house of representatives then they get blocked in

The senate so you know they don't really have any teeth so i wonder if with lindsay senator graham passing away we'll see more republican senators willing to join the democratic colleagues to vote in support of such resolutions and whether it will have a lasting impact on whether president trump how he chooses to wage war against iran yeah i do think that

The that the sort of combination of the wars here is going to be beneficial to ukraine the u.s after having been bogged down for over five months at this point in hormuz with the iranians is certainly going to welcome a new friend to the equation to be honest ukraine has been willing to be a partner since the get-go and the u.s has sort of slow walked it we

Have been engaging to some extent but especially on drones but it's been more limited and more slow going than certainly i would have liked to have seen i also think that sort of speaks to sort of a misconception that a lot of people have so there were a lot of like quote-unquote mega influencers if you will such as lara loomer who were very pro-russia but

If for the reasons that even she explained it was it was very fake in terms of like the underlying cause the total amount of americans who are pro-putin is incredibly small even if you look at the total quote-unquote mega republicans which at this point i'm not even quite sure what that means but I think the latest polling from late last year had favorable

Views of Putin amongst MAGA Republicans at about 12%.

So, I mean, it's very, very small because even if they're not very supportive of providing big amounts of support for Ukraine, the whole Laura Loomer wing of pro-Putin stuff was just like, it was never going to get off the ground, in my opinion, at least.

But we'll have to see where that goes. I do think that it's certainly a welcome transition to see that she's no longer being quite so out there on that issue. But when it comes to Iran more broadly, any assistance that Ukraine can provide on drones is certainly going to be welcome news to the United States as well as the Gulf.

Definitely. Any assistance that Ukraine can provide is definitely going to be well appreciated. Now, moving on from Lindsey Graham and American politics in general, hopefully, hopefully, Kyle, you and I get to do an American podcast politics one of these days because we have so much to discuss every time American politics comes up.

And I'm saying this as a Kenyan who isn't necessarily as affected by American politics as you are living in the U.S., but I find it so fascinating. So, yeah, let's move on away from that to a meeting that happened this week between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and American President Donald Trump. Kyle, you are our resident Israel expert.

You are our go-to guy when it comes to Netanyahu, so I'll let you take this one. Yeah, so the meeting, most of it, obviously, behind closed doors. Unfortunately, not a spy on the wall, a spy on the wall there.

So I can't give you exact quotes, but basically, Netanyahu was trying to use this opportunity to sort of smooth over some bumpy relation or bumps in the road that they had after the Iran war kicked off and obviously did not go quite as well, nearly as well as Netanyahu had advertised it, if you will. Basically, I do think that some of it was successful.

A lot of the there were some very spicy phone calls between Netanyahu and Trump, mostly with Trump just yelling at Netanyahu about various things.

Overall, I don't think that those calls represented a huge shift away from the Israel relationship with the current president. But I do think that this. I do think that this.

I do think that this. more. Marked a turning point in the relationship where criticizing Israel, especially on the right, suddenly became not just like OK in a way that it wasn't before, but started to become much more common.

And we've already seen this happening with other people on the right where they've just been steadily criticizing Israel more and more.

So the fact that the most pro-Israel Trump president, Donald Trump, was doing so is definitely going to be something that sort of blows the door wide open on that, in my opinion, moving forward. You also saw some statements from J.D. Vance criticizing them as well.

So ultimately, I think that this meeting sort of smoothed things over between the two of them and may even be part of the push to resume strikes against Iran in the days and weeks that come forward.

So basically, there is a an idea out there, as we discussed briefly earlier, that if you take two weeks and just bomb extremely aggressively, this being championed by Cooper in CENTCOM, that the Iranians would have to capitulate. Again, I have my own thoughts on this.

I'm not exactly optimistic that could play out in a way favorable to U.S. interests, but this is an idea out there and they very well may end up going for it. I have to imagine Netanyahu was quite supportive of that one. I'd have to agree, Netanyahu would most likely be very, very effective in his support of any plan that includes bombing Iran.

It's been a personal goal of his to get the U.S. involved in a war with Iran, and the fact that we are here is one of his biggest wins on a foreign policy level. Now, Kyle, we might not have had a fly in the room to leak to us details of the call, of the meeting between Trump and Netanyahu, but we have something much better.

As close to better as can be in our field, we have Axios and specifically Barack Ravid, probably the most well-connected reporter when it comes to the White House and the Netanyahu cabinet.

So according to Ravid, and this is a report from Axios, obviously, the two world leaders had a meeting for about 90 minutes, a really long conversation, basically the usual length of one of our podcasts.

So they discussed the three options that Trump has when it comes to Iran, obviously reaching a deal, continuing the naval blockade, and resuming and intensifying military threats. So, you know, this is. all stuff we've discussed.

For Trump, he was really, really concerned that as long as the war is continuing, as long as there are strikes on Iran, there's going to be a big impact on energy prices and the global economy.

So it seems like Trump is, at least from the notes that we have of this meeting, that Trump might be leaning towards making a deal with Iran to at least lessen the impacts on the global economy. Because as we've mentioned many times, his Republican party has the midterm elections coming up in November, just a few short months away.

And as long as the economy is doing badly, as long as oil prices are up, they are not going to do well. And this is because they were, one, they were not favored to do well. And two, voters are really, really sensitive when it comes to economic issues.

So apparently, Netanyahu didn't disregard Trump's concerns about the economy, but told him there were ways to continue increasing pressure on the Iranian economy, which is still under severe strain. Back to the idea we were talking about earlier about, you know, the naval blockade.

So with all this in mind, it seems that Trump and Netanyahu might be on the same page when it comes to the naval blockade.

One thing I do want to talk about is Netanyahu's statement after the meeting. He said in Hebrew, he called the meeting excellent. And then he said, when I say excellent, I don't mean it in a superficial way.

A conversation with full partnership, with mutual support, with an understanding of the common goal of ensuring that Iran does not have nuclear weapons and other goals as well. So basically, it seems that Netanyahu and Trump are back on the same page.

So, yeah, I think some, some of that comes down to like, the Iranians have sort of blown the moment in terms of if they wanted to really champion a U.S.-Israel divide.

Because while there was a serious rift there going on for a bit, especially when it comes to Iran, the fact that Iran is striking U.S. bases and civilian shipping in Hormuz is something that really did blow the moment.

Whereas if they had pursued, and I'm not even saying just like laid down all fighting or stopped all fighting, I'm saying like if they had been a bit more strategic here.

So if they had continued the approach we saw in late May and early June, where we were seeing them insisting, okay, focus, they want to focus on Lebanon. and they want to focus on scaling back Israeli operations.

And in exchange for that, they would open up Hormuz. I think they could have had a significant impact in terms of driving a rift between the Israelis and the Americans here. They did not do that, though.

They basically tried to take everything all at once. So in addition to pushing that part, they were then trying to set up poles in Hormuz and firing on civilian vessels and firing on U.S. bases. So ultimately, this is just naturally going to push the U.S. and Israel back together on the issue.

So no surprise there on my end in terms of where this ended up coming out. Even Saudi Arabia is basically on Israel's side when it comes to Iran at this point, just given how aggressive Tehran has been firing on Gulf countries. So when it comes to stability in the region, Iran has just once again sort of not really read the room fully, in my opinion.

I do get the logic that they have. They think they can just sort of take everything and concede nothing, which there's something to be said. I get it.

They think they can pull it off. I am skeptical as to if they fully can, just given the fact that we're five months in and nobody's really winning this thing.

And then just in terms of moving forward, again, that was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to deliver a serious victory to Iranian foreign policy in terms of breaking up the U.S. and Israel alliance at least a little bit.

And that's kind of gone at this point. So basically, Iran managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. And, you know, this is something that's becoming more and more apparent with Iranian foreign policy as the war drags on.

They had a really, really good deal with the Americans through the MOU. And the fact that we're back at war, the fact that the MOU isn't being implemented is just a deep, deep failure of the Iranian foreign policy institution. And, you know, a deep failure of the Iranian negotiators just to convince the powers that be in Iran.

And, you know, in this case, it's the IFGC more than anyone else that the deal was worth sticking to. So, yeah, that's just a deep, deep failure on the part of Iran. Let's move to Lebanon, which is one of the other areas that you usually cover for us.

Yeah, so obviously I will be keeping an eye on in case we have any all-out return to war. which, by the way, we may ultimately have. So we'll be keeping our eyes peeled on that front. But if not, I'll definitely be focused in on Lebanon per usual.

So there was an attack by Hezbollah for the first time in several weeks the other night. I think it was yesterday. It was either yesterday or the day before, where a Hezbollah drone attacked an Israeli bulldozer in southern Lebanon.

And so Israel has basically declared that it is freezing any withdrawals. They've ruled out for the withdrawals. And the military commander there is threatening a deeper advance into the Lebanese south.

So we're going to have to see where ultimately that goes. There's a lot up in the air. The government in Beirut went really far out on a limb to make this deal work.

A big part of that was conditional on Israeli withdrawal. The problem with the deal being it doesn't set a specific timetable for how long they have to withdraw.

Now, from the Israeli perspective, I certainly understand the LAF has had some bumpy roads along the way in terms of disarming Hezbollah, which they've promised to do on several occasions at this point, and never really happened.

So I do understand Israel doesn't want to do an entire unilateral withdrawal all at once and just hand it over to the LAF and say, here you go. I get that. But I also think that they have to fundamentally play ball with the Lebanese more at this point, because where this currently stands is there's still over a million.

I sound like a broken record when I talk about Lebanon, because it's the same thing just constantly. But it's new and old at the same time, where there's over a million Lebanese displaced.

This is a huge percentage of the otherwise tiny country, and the government in Beirut and the LAF, the Lebanese armed forces, are willing to go to bat and get this ball rolling.

But ultimately, the IDF is still there. It's still occupying massive amounts of the country across the south, and they've shown very little eagerness to actually withdraw. All right.

For me, the one thing that I'm going to be focusing on for the remainder of the week, up to when we record our next podcast, is the situation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Yemen. Because as we've described, it's one front in the world that is developing extremely, extremely rapidly.

I'll also be watching the situation between Iran and Ukraine to see if tensions escalate again, or if you have the conversations between the Iranian diplomats and the Ukrainian diplomats.

Absolutely. Absolutely. Thank you. lead to any sort of lasting, if not peace, ambivalence between the two sides.

So with that, for Kyle, for Wilfred, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you so much for listening to us. And to all our premium subscribers, thank you so much for supporting Fronts.co.

We wouldn't be able to do what we do without you guys' support. Thank you so much. We don't take it for granted.

And with that, we're going to close this out. Have a lovely day. We'll see you on the next edition of the Middle East Child Table.