Middle East Roundtable: Deal or No Deal?

Hello and welcome back to the Middle East round table at fronts.co. I am Evan Maloney here with Welcome back gentlemen. Wilfred W.: Wilfred Miner, Africa correspondent for front.co. Kyle Moran: Kyle Moran. Evan Moloney: It has been a touch-and-go week for these ongoing negotiations between the US and Iran.

As you can refer to the title of this episode, we are kind of in a deal or no deal situation. We do not have any specific insight as to the workings of the mind of Moshaba Kamei nor Benjamin Netanyahu. We are doing our best just like everybody else to make sense of where the situation is now.

Evan Moloney: But so far as we are aware, the US and Iran are possibly maybe converging on terms that would allow the US to oversee or have somebody else oversee some sort of disposal mechanism in regard to nuclear materials. Possibly open the Strait of Hormuz, possibly. Who's to say?

So, why don't we go to Kyle first if you can give us a little bit of the background on this and then we'll jump in on the overview of where things stand. Kyle Moran: Absolutely. So, there has been considerable back and forth. Depending on what sources you're reading, you may feel as though you're reading two different universes colliding at the same time.

Basically, there has not been much progress to speak of at all on the substantial issues that divide Iran and the United States in these negotiations. So, in particular, it comes down to enriched uranium.

Iran's favoured proposal kicks all negotiations on that down the curb, but they have publicly been talking about opposition to handing over their highly-enriched uranium at any point, which has been a US demand, as well as putting out general statements that indicate a hostility towards the US approach.

The US has also been keeping its more maximalist positions. Kyle Moran: So the other day the Supreme Leader Mashaba Hami released a statement reaffirming the regime's commitment to the principles of the revolution and explicitly reaffirming 'death to America and death to Israel' will remain the slogan of Iran.

So we can see how much progress has been made on that front. In terms of actual going on in the Strait of Hormuz, this remains one of the biggest barriers to any actual progress here because Iran wants to keep that under their control and charge tolls throughout the strait and the US has been absolutely opposed to that from the get-go.

Wilfred W.: So, I want to add that I've just gotten access to a report from China News Asia. Wilfred W.: I'm not sure if it's a reliable outlet, but they do some really good aggregating work.

They're saying that Iran state TV said Iran had obtained a draft of an initial unofficial framework for a memorandum of understanding with the US on ending the conflict. So this is I think the first we are hearing from the Iranian side on what's in the document itself.

So under this framework, Iran will restore commercial shipping through the Strait to pre-war levels within a month while the US would withdraw military forces from Iran's vicinity and lift the naval blockade. States TV.

Wilfred W.: So, Iranian state TV said on Wednesday that the framework, which excludes military vessels and envisages Iran managing ship traffic through the Strait in cooperation with Oman, was not yet finalized and that Iran will take no steps without tangible verification.

It added that if a final agreement was reached within 60 days, it could be approved as a binding UN Security Council resolution. So we have a situation where Iranian state media is saying and I think this is the most important part. We haven't gotten to the nuclear parts yet.

Iran will restore commercial shipping through to pre-war levels but Iran and Oman would maintain control of the Strait. Wilfred W.: So, we're back to a situation where Iran really wants to put tolls on this trade. And I don't think, as Kyle has mentioned, that's something that Washington can stand.

Kyle Moran: And to that point, it's not just Washington there either. This has massive international implications because for the better part of the last century or even further than that, the doctrine that states throughout the world have adhered to is international waterways are not to be interfered with.

Freedom of shipping in international waters is guaranteed and states must adhere to this. Kyle Moran: So now if Iran by argument of proximity is able to set up a toll booth, you can already see where this is going to go in terms of specifically China looking at different locations in the South China Sea.

For any of those who are interested, we have a whole episode on this in terms of what an Iranian toll could mean. You also had Indonesian politicians discussing the Strait of Malacca with other regional partners in terms of 'hey if we divvy this up between ourselves where would this go?' And he later clarified that he was joking.

But whether or not he was joking, the fact that this is in their minds as front and centre of what is now possible is exactly the issue on why these tolls are so internationally concerning.

It is in terms of

What they're like if people are willing to steam up and donate to the Islamic Republic, they're able to do so. Their regime is not saying no to that. The problem being, can once you pay Iran, you're officially sanctioned by the US and the blockade in effect is going to attempt to intercept you. There have been some attempts at doing this.

There have been also some that have gotten through as well. Kyle Moran: So it hasn't been 100%.

But Treasury put out several weeks ago that basically paying these tolls is a sanctioned violation in and the bigger picture here being I don't doubt there have been some that have paid the internet blackout that only yesterday started to be lifted in Iran that went into effect in January was estimated by Iranian sources to be costing the regime between $30

And $40 million per day.

So I mean this is a massive black hole to come back from. 30 ships in total paying this is to me pocket change because if you had a situation where even the majority of the ships going through at pre-war volume were now we're talking serious money, but there were somewhere around the vicinity of 100 ships a day going through Hormuz before the war.

So in terms of the grand scheme of things, 30 over a month is not going to make or break stuff.

And we're going to talk about nuclearization separately, but I do want to bring up this quote from a senior Iranian official in the last few days who essentially came out and said, there's an argument to be made that control over the Strait of Hormuz as we've started to establish it is going to be more valuable for our regime than a nuclear weapon.

So unclear whether that is an attempt to argue for hey let's denuclearize and kind of keep the status quo as we've established it, right? The war has granted Iran essentially control of the Strait of Hormuz and perhaps that can be parlayed into something that this back and

Forth about nuclear weapons over the past couple decades never achieved. But what do you make of that and do you think that that's an accurate assessment of Iran's position now?

Yes, you are. Wilfred W.: I would love to have Daniel.

So Danny has written extensively saying while the idea did exist in the minds of the Iranian generals, C, the people in charge, seeing proof of concept, seeing just how much Iran can destabilize the global economy, can really, pardon my French here, f*** over the American economy, and to a really greater degree the political fortune of Trump's GOP party by

Closing the Strait of Hormuz, they will never willingly give it up.

It's become part and parcel of what I like to call you the ideological maximums, the nuclear weapons, the missile deterrence, and now the Strait of Hormuz.

I mean, I definitely think that they want to maintain this for those reasons. I don't think it's had quite as much of an effect as we may be saying there. So, in terms of domestic politics, the war is what I would categorize as soft, unpopular in the United States.

So, you can see it's the majority of Americans oppose it, but there aren't mass protests going on. Gas has gone up, but again, it's not at extraordinarily high levels. So, it depends on how long this goes on for.

Kyle Moran: A threshold that I personally just view is if we start seeing gas approaching or exceeding $5 a gallon, that's where things really start flashing red. The administration has been able to keep it below there. Right now, it's four and change, low fours. So, we'll see where that goes.

That's been my thesis on this so far, and so far, it's mostly held in terms of international approaches here. The only supporter of this has been Iran, though the entire region is opposed to this as well as the broader international community for the reasons we were discussing earlier in terms of precedent setting.

This would be a deeply concerning development if it is allowed to be enacted.

But I would be willing to bet a substantial amount of money here that the United States will not be withdrawing the blockade if the toll system is in place. I cannot see that happening. It would be such an enormous concession to Iran. This was actually a conversation we had in their very first episode of the Middle East round table.

I'm sticking to my guns here. I don't see it happening. I cannot see a world in which Donald Trump has to sell a recognition of Iranian control and tolls over the Strait of Hormuz as anything other than a humiliation.

And as you can see, I do not see a world in which that happens. Perhaps I'm wrong. I'm on the record here, so you can hold me to it. But we'll see where that goes.

So, I want to get the terms right. Evan Moloney: You said a substantial amount of money. I would like to take that bet. I absolutely would like to take that bet.

Just to point out here, so this is something we've all kind of touched on a little bit is the thing that manages and governs passage out of the Strait of Hormuz right now is not the presence of Iranian weapons. It's not the presence of Iranian mines.

It's risk perception, and it's the impact on insurance premiums, especially, that essentially recalibrates pricing.

Iran, I will say, somebody in there understands maritime trade law and maritime trade insurance because they are doing a very, very good job at setting this toll at sums that seem rather extreme to just a person thinking about it. But you say a $2 million toll, placed on a ship.

If that ship is carrying light cargo, that's 5% of the value of what they have on board. Initially, Iran was looking closer to 2% of value carried by a vessel would be taxed. That is so much better for the international trade system itself than the current status quo.

And unfortunately, what the global maritime trade system would be paying for in this, right, what they're paying Iran for is not only to allow individual ships safe passage, but to establish a framework under which there may be a chance to go back to a Strait of Hormuz in which this is not a possibility, in which these kinds of large attacks and complete

Disruptions to global shipping, right, are less likely because they are managed through this toll system that Iran can see continuous benefits from, that is in itself a form of insurance for the entire global trade system.

Assuming that Iran kind of comes back to there, which it seems like they were looking to place this toll initially, that is not an egregious price to pay. And you look at the US side of it, right, that would be a massive black eye for Trump, that would be a humiliation of humiliations. At the same time, the alternative is less humiliating.

To continue what has essentially been an empty bombing campaign, right? Where military hardware has been destroyed. Iran's regime still remains in place. Iran's nuclear material is no closer to being destroyed today than it was a couple of years ago. I mean, this has gotten nowhere. Evan Moloney: It's gotten to destruction of Iranian hardware.

It's gotten to this slow attritional bleed of the Iranian economy that supposedly will kick in at some point. Right?

And the recalibration that we're talking about here again is 1 to 5% of the value of trade, one that's going to be partially offset to shippers and so on and so forth. Right, but that is also a much smaller burden than the one that has been placed on the international trade system for the past three months, not by Iran but by the US.

So the argument of this being affordable relative even to the current status quo in the street, this is what they're pitching now before they have even a single country recognising their right to do this.

Once they actually have this in place, nothing will be holding them back from just actually raising more cash, they would have a significantly easier barrier of entry. That in itself is a double-edged sword.

And double or triple is still substantially lower than what we're looking at now.

But the problem being like the right there that says that the current status quo has to be recognised as something that cannot go away to be replaced by a toll system because you'd be seeding enormous ground to the regime in order to be able to charge whatever it would like, which would set an enormous precedent that any country along any straight can set

Its own toll booth.

But they're willing to pay it.

The Omanis, the

They don't have to be in favour if they pay it.

But they haven't. Companies are

They have, that's why these ships are going through is because countries and companies are paying.

But the Amiradis, the government is wildly opposed to this.

That has not happened.

So it's not that they are directly sanctioned. They are committing sanctions violation which puts them in violation of the blockade there and they have been intercepted. There have been several instances of this and turned around.

I hadn't seen that but I will take that argument on my side then.

But to one more point here back to Evan's point on the stalemate versus surrender. Recognising here the massive difference in Trump's logic is that a stalemate is not surrender. The current status quo is not surrender. You're absolutely right. It hasn't been very effective but that's not surrendering.

And so if we're even having a conversation about something for Donald Trump using the term legacy-defining humiliation as being the alternative to a stalemate, he's not going to go for it.

I don't know how much that matters quite frankly.

I think the international shipping system is recognising and doing it slowly because it's a hard thing to get your head around, but recognising our options here are now to either go into a future in which Iran is relatively pacified, is engaged with, and knows that its economic dependence on this trade system is going to be fostered and going to be allowed

To kind of create this reciprocal benefit or we're going to go back to this position where the next time Iran gets pissed off, we go through this whole thing again for a few months.

I think

You are right. Evan Moloney: But I think there's been a real recognition now that's starting to come across that the old status quo has been broken. Evan Moloney: We are not going back to that. Evan Moloney: There is not a way back. Kyle Moran: So you are right that the ability to do this again exists

But this has always existed. This was a problem in the 80s as well. Not quite to the scale, so implementing this hasn't been enormously revolutionary in my opinion. This has always sort of been the cost of doing anything against Iran. But to the memorandum

The front of it. Kyle Moran: Though that's coming out today. Again, I don't want to put too much stock in the back and forth here. But under this deal, Iran would restore commercial shipping through the Strait to pre-war levels within a month without tolls.

Evan Moloney: Yeah, I would like to get into maybe this is actually a good moment to pivot into this because now we have seen a few reports about what is happening on the negotiation side of things where for one thing it appears that this has been passed off on the American side to Marco Rubio.

It appears that Rubio has asked the Pakistanis to give up their lead negotiator status so that Qatar can take over. One of the reasons behind this from what I've been seeing from various sources is this idea that the Pakistanis have started presenting the US and Iran with differing versions of peace deals, and kind of seeing what each side agreed to.

And I want to get into that as a point of conversation in itself. But I will say because of that, because the US and Iran are kind of working themselves back from this position allegedly of having kind of essentially both been played by their lead negotiator, right, and played against each other in a way.

Because of that, I generally speaking, I would not put much stock into a memorandum coming out of this reflecting the US's understanding Iran's understanding of anything. Evan Moloney: I think that generally is a losing proposition. I would be especially hesitant to put any faith in it whatsoever right now.

I agree. Kyle Moran: Not putting too much stock in it. Just to clarify though, this is the Iranian interpretation of the Iranian side. So this is from Iran's regime media. Evan Moloney: Mhm. Okay. Evan Moloney: Go ahead. Kyle Moran: So when we're talking about the tolls

We come at this from a different approach and deterministic outcomes because I think you see it right now as because it's it's not going away. The Iranians are actively per the terms of regime outlets, they are willing to use this and give it up as long as they get some concessions.

Kyle Moran: What that actually entails, how broad that is, of course, a conversation to be had. And this could easily collapse again, no doubt. But this is not a done deal by any means.

Wilfred seems to be the tiebreaker here.

Was it? So, I haven't seen anything that would change my mind on this. Yeah. Wilfred W.: Okay, let me define my point. Let me actually explain why I was on your side. How many weeks ago is this? About 3 weeks when Evan was Yeah,…

I was in the street about three weeks ago. Wilfred W.:

No, it's not all right,…

So that is concerning. But I still maintain the argument here that this is a tiny fraction of what was coming through beforehand. So even if some are paying it, I mean this is literally a quarter less than a quarter of pre-war volume. So, in terms of maintaining this, I cannot see the blockade being lifted before the tolls actually stop being charged.

Wilfred W.: I will. Kyle Moran: And that's my thesis here, and I'm going to be sticking to it. Kyle Moran: But by all means, hold me to it if I'm wrong. Evan Moloney: I will. Evan Moloney: And I do just want to note one other thing here. The Iranian proposals to withdraw tolling, because those are part of Iran's proposals.

I do want to point out those are contingent on a few other things in the Iranian proposal package.

The biggest one here being the release of $24 billion of frozen funds. There's a right and

And they want that before any of it actually even happens. Kyle Moran: So they want it before the deals even begin to be implemented in terms of further concessions from them. Evan Moloney: We can discuss how not willing the US would be to pay that.

I mean, what we've seen in negotiations as far as what's been reported would suggest that they are very unwilling to go to that number to unfreeze that much. But I think it's important to note, right, that the reason why those two things are tied together is because if Iran gets $24 billion all of a sudden, then, yes,

Their short-term need for a toll is less. As in so many elements of the way that Iran has fought this war, Iran is looking to stabilise its situation today and deal with the fallout later. We've seen that in its relationships with the rest of the Gulf States. We've seen it in its conduct towards its own citizens. Right?

Iran has viewed this war as a matter of existential survival. It is what it needs to do to get to tomorrow right now is find some kind of an income stream. But I would not trust at all that after that money is unfrozen, we somehow go to a world in which Iran maintains its pledge for the foreseeable future never to put a toll on the trade.

Evan Moloney: I think that so many other things, right, its relationship with the Gulf, its conduct towards its own citizens, whatever it may be, is going to be up to negotiation in the near future and very well may be imposed anyway after Iran gets $24 billion because once the US equipment is moved out, I mean, that's just moving that equipment is a

Multi-billion dollar operation.

We're going to go all the way back in just to clear a toll booth. Now that again is probably when it goes into effect, in a more permanent way, 1 to 2% of global shipping tacked onto the insurance that is I forget

What the premiums are. They're a significant percentage per transit or per vessel insurance. So adding a small sum there. So Wilfred, go ahead. Wilfred W.: So I believe the insurance before the entire crisis happened was about 0. at most 1% of the value of whatever was being shipped.

Wilfred W.: And with the situation right now it's bound to be a little bit higher if I am not an insurance professional. I'm just saying this from what I've seen and what I've read. If it goes high it's by about 2%. And again, if the companies are willing to pay this amount to transit their stuff through the state of they'll pay it.

And there's something you've said, Evan. Will America invest that much money again in removing what is essentially a toll booth? Trump keeps repeating this thing that the US doesn't really need the Strait of Hormuz; every other country needs the Strait a lot more than America does.

Wilfred W.: So I don't see them if we see a situation where American forces are pulled out I don't see them going back unless it's something really big and that's all booth doesn't count.

I can

Because the US already it went in a pretty big way to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers to get them through. It was a small-scale operation in terms of what the overall was going through this was during the Iran-Iraq war before all of that was happening.

But it was nevertheless a significant operation that involved us a pretty substantial amount of hardware commitment on the part of the point that I would make here to what Wilfred was saying earlier, who wants to be the next Iran in terms of the international fallback? 00:40:00

But this is exactly the point, okay? Once you open this Pandora's box of you can just set up tolls here. And the way that the regime's framing it is it's ostensibly a protection against themselves so that they don't shoot you. So keep that in mind.

But once you establish that the barrier for the next country is much lower once there's any amount of international recognition of this and so that is even if you disagree with my thinking that the US will not recognise this and I don't just mean the US either this is a broad international consensus in my opinion but even if you think I'm wrong on that the

Implications of this aren't even an opinion anymore.

Kyle Moran: This is just a huge problem that's going to be seen by countries throughout the world. Evan Moloney: Absolutely. And I want to make clear I am 100% with you in that evaluation. I am not arguing that this is some kind of better world disc.

I'm arguing that we are slow walking into a really bad global maritime trade situation as we kind of have several years. Kyle Moran:

I agree, by the way, because I think regardless of if the tolls come into effect now or not, I think we're going to see movement on this particularly by China. Evan Moloney: Yeah, I agree. Kyle Moran: We've Yeah,…

And I think there's Sorry, go ahead.

We've already seen a little bit. I won't give away too much of the front's episode. Kyle Moran: You've got to go over the front.co and check out the latest there on this. But there have been significant movements by China already in the South China Sea. Evan Moloney: Yes, there have.

Evan Moloney: And to that end, as well, not only I think having kind of been immersed in what is China doing for the past couple of years now, not only would China jump at the chance to enforce something like that, right, to kind of get the practice of kind of asserting itself more actively against maritime shipping and potentially against other countries.

But in a tangential way, it allows China to put more ships in the Taiwan Strait at any given time. That is something that is much more strategically valuable than I think the conversation in regard to trade volume really gives credit to. Kyle Moran: Agreed. Evan Moloney: I think China will be very enthusiastic about getting in on this and

Setting it up if this resolves in some way other than a complete reversal of the situation as we see it now. Wilin, did you want to jump in? Wilfred W.: I don't necessarily agree. Wilfred W.: So I'm saying this because today I have an episode coming out today again for our listeners. Today is the 27th of May, 2026, Wednesday.

I have an episode coming out today specifically looking at China and Japan. Asking the question, can Japan stop China? And I'm going to borrow a leaf from Kyle here. I'm not going to give you any spoilers on what's going to be in the episode. You have to go to our main channel to check it out.

But even with all the things that China does in the South China Sea and anywhere else it has maritime claims and harasses other countries, Wilfred W.: I don't see a situation where China risks putting in place a full-on blockade, a full-on toll against any other country because China is really trying to position itself as this bastion of international

Diplomacy and stepping into the role that Washington has left behind.

So those two don't necessarily jive in my head. It can't position itself as a global abiter of democracy, not democracy diplomacy rather, and

I just don't see their commitment to liberal internationalism. I mean I don't even think they ostensibly even pretend that they're committed to this.

Kyle Moran: They may try to take the vacuum out of spaces left by the United States in terms of some of its withdrawals, but I mean in terms of overall commitments to liberal values, China is not outspoken on pretty much any of these things. It is not pushing for democracy or democratic reforms or liberal institutionalism abroad.

It's pushing for international cooperation. It's pushing for its own interests. Even multilateral interests, but it's doing it so from a very different framework. Agreed. Wilfred W.: And

It either happens in the next 12 months or

It never happens. Kyle Moran: It never happens. They've pushed it back, then ever knew and

Right. Kyle Moran: Slightly. 2027, I think, is optimistic because they're not entirely where they want to be on several factors, especially with the emergence of robotic warfare. By the way, we may have a piece in the works on that. Just keep your eyes peeled, ladies and gentlemen.

But in terms of that could be a total game-changer in terms of taking Taiwan because the whole barrier of entry was always that once you start sending soldiers across to start going over if they launch a full land invasion. It's going to be an absolute bloodbath.

Kyle Moran: If you're able to at least soften this with robotic entities, shall we say, to not spoil too much, then that's a fundamental game-changer. I could definitely see them scaling back their timeline slightly on it.

Interesting. I don't want to dwell on this too much, but I actually am going to come in and now I guess it's me versus both of you. So, this is something we covered on Warfronts a little bit ago, but I do just want to lay it out. I don't know that China is going to choose to go. I don't think it would be a particularly good idea.

I do think that they are in a situation now that it's looking as good as it's going to get for them for the foreseeable future.

Japan is the big thing here, right? All of that talk about 2027 was long before Japan was ever going to rework its constitution to allow a substantial military buildup.

Evan Moloney: Japan, not only economically, but in terms of manufacturing capacity, is possibly the only Indo-Pacific nation that could form a legitimate rivalry with China in the near future.

Not to say that Japan would come out and trounce China today if they were to start, but it's certainly a plausible rivalry, and specifically because of Japan's manufacturing capacity, the shift, and the shift to long-range drone technology, things that Japan is already working on, right? Japan is very good at building long-range drones and missiles.

They are very good at setting up assembly lines when they need to. They just have not connected those dots yet for constitutional reasons.

You also have in a situation where for the next little while you have this guy, Donald Trump, who is Kyle. Evan Moloney: I'm sure we're going to disagree about this, but who may be a bit slower to spring to Taiwan's defence than most other American presidents would have been.

And yeah, I would never say what China needs to do is to saturate the Taiwan Strait as quickly as possible with overwhelming naval and air power. And if Trump gives them three hours, that might be the invasion done.

I think that could be fair.

It's one of those things where it really is just such a thin margin right now as it seems that an invasion will work. And then again, right, Trump is about to lose a fair amount of his political power in what's looking like it's going to be really tough midterm election, especially with the election results last night in Texas.

Two years later, the situation gets a bit tougher, and so on, so on.

Paxton.

And while I don't think that China would have a very easy time taking Taiwan right now, I do think that China can look at this situation now and say there is no point in the next decade that's going to be more favourable for us than right now. Especially with critical interceptor stockpiles having been run down with the US naval power elsewhere.

They were taking fat interceptors out of South Korea, that is not a small thing by any means. So I think if it's going to happen between now and the end of 2026 presents some strategic advantages for China that are going to dry up and are not going to come back.

So that would be my only thing to point out there.

I agree.

I think it's very difficult to ascertain where any administration really stands in terms of what they do in case of an all-out invasion on Taiwan. Ostensibly there would be support, especially and do in no small part because of how much of the American economy, especially critical infrastructure, thinking chips in particular comes from Taiwan.

It's hard to imagine there just being a total acquiescence to it, but this is where stuff starts getting scary.

I mean, when you're talking American involvement against the Chinese military, you could be supplying Taiwan for sure. But Taiwan is they have spent the last century building or half century building up as much as they can to sensibly repel any invasion. But a certain point, the size factor is going to be quite challenging there.

So a world in which you are anyone's even talking about American hardware, American jets involved in any of this is deeply concerning to me and that starts really risking much broader fallout. So I don't know what the administration would do, but I can also say I don't know what any administration of my life would truly do in that situation.

Kyle Moran: they've all maintained strategic ambiguity as the term that they like to call.

Yeah, I think I would just advocate some significant concern right now. Strategic ambiguity or not, you don't spend four or five decades of global security policy getting ready to rush to Taiwan's defence on the presumption that you're just not going to rush to Taiwan's defence.

I think the political support to surge aid to Taiwan is going to be there with a little bit of adjustment in the midterms based on, who's in charge, who's got control of the House, the Senate, but also what the voting coalitions are. And…

To the point that it's ambiguous at all, I think that ambiguity will be a lot more clear towards Taiwan's favour in about what, 8 months than it is today. So, there's that. Wilfred W.: So 8 months will be approaching your timeline Evan cuz I generally don't see an invasion happening within the next 10 years.

Wilfred W.: And if it doesn't happen, within you, the time span you mentioned, you're moving over to my side. 00:55:00

Yes, I am. Kyle Moran: I think all three of us are I…

If it doesn't happen in the next decade, I don't necessarily see them going for it nearly as much as I do currently. So Evan's timeline was the next 12 months. I think that's a little bit forward just because of how much they're a little short of where they want to be to the points on hardware that you were making,…

Yeah. Interesting. Kyle Moran: Wilfrid. So, I think the 2027 timeline was just a little rushed. I would say end of 2030 that's the biggest counter point of course…

I just think Japan's going to be too big of a threat.

Kyle Moran: But the factor being here warfare is changing so much now between AI and what's will be coming for robotic warfare this could be a fundamental game changer even if Japan will be in a significant better position just the ability to send tons of mechanical entities over could really justify waiting another year or…

Two in my opinion. Evan Moloney: Certainly. And I think at this point we probably should return to Iran…

Because we've now gone a little circuitous route through the world. Kyle Moran: Full circle

So just to bring it back to the other point in negotiations here, let's talk about the nuclear side of things. Out of the White House, right, from Donald Trump, we've seen a recent kind of set of proposals on options that Iran could take for the highly enriched uranium still in their possession.

Trump has basically set out, hey, you can either give it to us and we'll take it and we'll destroy it or you can destroy it on Iranian soil in the presence and with monitoring of a third party organisation. So he threw out the IAEA. Evan Moloney: There are a number of different options on this. Evan Moloney: What do you make of that offer to Iran?

Do you believe that that's something they would take up? And then do you believe that that is a meaningful end to the Iranian nuclear programme? And will this be first? Wilfred W.: I am very sceptical that Iran will willingly give up its nuclear dust to borrow Trumpism simply…

It would have to be a pretty compelling deal before I see them doing that.

Although, what I'm starting to think is they're going to choose one or the other to really maintain a hard line on. So, they're going to choose nuclear or the Strait.

So, I don't see a world in which they pursue both to the detriment of their own economy, willing to maintain all of this current blockade, all of this stuff, a maximalist position with no concessions on both nukes and the Strait.

I think they're going to choose one to really focus on because I don't think you really need both. Right. So, they've had it confirmed to them that their conventional air defence systems are not worth the money they were printed on. But the Strait and nukes are the two big things here. So, I see them sort of choosing one and going at it that way.

That at least gives them the ability to say, "Hi, we've made concessions. We're surrendering our nuclear programme or whatever. So, we'll see where that goes, but I think it's going to be one or the other."

And let's take a little turn to the Abraham Accords now, because we also got a different Trump announcement this week, basically saying that he was mandatorily requesting that several nations, including Jordan, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt – I'm missing a couple – Pakistan was a big one – would have to join the Abraham Accords with Israel as part of

The end of the war.

Iran supposedly would be included in that. But that would be kind of this hardline stance that Trump would take on Abraham inclusion on the path to end this conflict. Pakistan has already come out and said that's absolutely not going to happen. These are two fundamentally unrelated issues.

Basically every other nation has stayed quiet. A couple of the nations in there had already normalised their relations with Israel a bit ago. By a bit, I mean several decades. So, this is not exactly a new push into this new Middle Eastern reality in the same way as it is just kind of a misunderstanding possibly of where things stood.

That said, there are tangible benefits or there supposed to be to joining the Abraham Accords, right? Economic cooperation, diplomatic engagement, so on. But what do we make of this and specifically the seriousness or I suppose lack thereof, of this proposal that these countries will have to sign on and normalise with Israel if they want this war to end?

To be honest, I don't necessarily know how much of a benefit to anybody it would be after they've already normalised to join in. So, I think this is just sort of looking for a way to spin stuff as a win for him. But overall, I don't see this going anywhere.

I do see long-term more countries moving towards recognising Israel in the region, but I don't see this being happening right now at all, especially because of the war. I don't see them joining in with this as part of the war. Evan Moloney: So just to make a quick pivot to another bit of US news that has just started to make the rounds here.

Pretty recently we have had some reports come up that the United States, going back to the earlier days of this conflict, was essentially on the receiving end of an offer from Starlink.

I forget what the exact prices were, but it was a certain amount of money to essentially institute Starlink coverage over Iran, which would have allowed Iranian citizens to access the internet through means that the regime would have essentially brought the country online. The US said no to that. Decided not to take them up on it.

Evan Moloney: This was something we referenced earlier today, but there was this window at a certain point to potentially coordinate some kind of internal action with ordinary Iranians against the regime while the US-Israeli campaign was happening and that was a missed opportunity.

So in light of this, right, if the US did in fact have the opportunity to grant Starlink access to the country and did not, where does that leave Iranian citizens at this stage and what does it tell you, I suppose, about the US's conduct at earlier points in this conflict?

Wilfred W.: I think it speaks to an American belief that the war would be over within short order and they wouldn't need to pay whatever the price was for Starlink because, in effect, they already had the war won and Iranian people would have access to the internet in the traditional way.

So I think it's more in line with this American belief and could be an Israeli belief as well that the war would be won within the first few weeks. They'd have a regime change. They'd have a pliable government in place, maybe led by Mahmoud. As insane as that sounds, I am still thinking about that story from last week.

Wilfred W.: But I think it's more of a reflection that Washington really thought it would have this in the bag pretty quickly. Kyle, what do you think? Kyle Moran: Yeah, I think that's broadly the case. I think a big miss for Washington was not giving Starlink.

They seem to have recognised this because they're now offering it as part of a $100 million aid package to Cuba rather. So you can see what that mindset has sort of shifted in order of getting internet access to people there.

But overall, I think the lack of coordination between the United States and Israel in terms of preparation for what this would entail after the fact was a huge miss. So there was the idea that the Kurds would play a big role in this. I don't think that was particularly realistic at all.

And then they weren't on the same page as to how that trifecta was supposed to work. Kyle Moran: As well as this Ahmedad piece was also a sticking point where Israel was backing him and then the United States was not.

And so at various points there were drone strikes coming in to set this guy free from house arrest because he was under house arrest for having allegedly collaborated with Israel previously. And then potentially more that originally was reported to have assassinated him and then he came back from the dead.

Again, I think that guy's long gone from the country at this point. If he's still in Iran, I don't know what he's thinking, but I think he's long gone. Kyle Moran: But there definitely were misses in terms of what Washington was thinking about in terms of where this would go after the fact. 01:10:00

All right.

What do you make of this in regard to the conflict more broadly and also the timing of it? And Wilfred, I'll go to you first on this one.

I'm not in favour of this to begin with, but I mean I think that's kind of harsh language. The whole approach here stems from two factors. So, this is a site that's specifically holy to both Jews and Muslims. Christians do not have a role to play in this.

But the issue being at the actual Jews call it the Temple Mount at Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jews cannot pray by rules that have been enforced continuously by Jordan. There have been hardline extremists who go up there as well who on the Jewish side who go up and start inciting conflict.

So when we're talking about this, a lot of people in Israel, moderate people as well, resent that in the Jewish state, they cannot go up to a holy site there. That's why they have to line up at the bottom of the Western Wall, which is along the edge of that vicinity. So, this is a complicated issue.

I don't think that it's a very good idea to start poking at this either, but I also don't want to present it as these people are all crazy for having thought that they want to advocate for some change here.

I think that might inflame the situation a bit as well because the reason Jordan even has this is because they occupied the West Bank themselves, which was condemned by the Arab states and Muslim states to begin with.

So when they seated the West Bank back to Palestinian control after '67, they kept the Dome of the Rock, Al-Aqsa as sort of like a favour, so they would be stewards of it, shall we say. But this is not some long-standing tendency, if anything, the Palestinian claim is that it should be under Palestinian control, not Jordanian, as well.

So, the presence of Jordan there is not by some long-standing religiously invoked right. It's a quirk of geopolitics, so I think you'll see the Muslim countries in general come out against this for sure.

But just to add some context to it, there.

Who actually think this though that's even mostly just American evangelicals to speak honestly. Wilfred W.: But American evangel,… Wilfred W.: okay, speaking and we are not an American politics podcast, but American evangelicals do have a really outsized influence on the Republican base and Republican. It's the difference.

Kyle Moran: Yeah, I wrote an episode on this for Homers…

Which I encourage everyone to go check out. But overall, I mean my point here was that it's not a Christian holy site is all that I was getting at. It's the evangelicals recognise it as important because it's a Jewish holy site. Wilfred W.: I'll pass this back to you, Evan, because I don't really want to get bogged down in the religiousness of this.

It's again not my field.

Evan Moloney: Yeah. the only thing that I would say to just weigh in here is regardless of the religiosity of it, and again that's not a conversation we need to get into today, this does seem like the kind of proposal that can take meaningful progress in these negotiations and just detonate it immediately. the strategic timing on this seems incredibly poor

To even be initiating these conversations at all, let alone to allow it to leak and have it happen at a scale now we seeing, according to this six other countries brought in, right, where it's obviously going to leak from somewhere.

Wild to me that this would be a decision that was made. Mford, I see you want to come back in. 01:20:00 Wilfred W.: Yeah, you mentioned the timing.

I do want to mention that this story broke in the middle of the Hajj which is the period when Muslims go to Mecca for pilgrimage and it's one of the most holy holy periods and there was an idea that Trump held back on some strikes against Iran… Wilfred W.: because he didn't want to do it in the middle of Hajj because it will be a really negative look for

Him.

The fact that this story broke at that point again really really just but I mean that's all I wanted it God for me this week. Evan Moloney: Yeah.

On that note, we are coming up on the limitations of our time aotment here. So, wanted to pass it around to the both of you just to see if there's anything that you want to clue our audience in the coming week. Tell us what you're excited to learn about or dreading potentially depending on what this week holds for us. And Wilfrid, we'll go back to you first.

Wilfred W.: I'm just looking to see what the peace deal ends up shaking out to be because there's been so much anticipation over it. We thought it will happen over the weekend and you again peeling back the curtain.

Our team was actually getting ready to we were putting plans in place to figure out who between the three of us was going to have to give up our weekend to write something in case the actually So other than the peace deal, I'm going to be watching Syria where there's been a report, I think this was either yesterday or just today, that the chemical weapons

From Assad's time in office have been found.

So that's something I'm keeping a close eye on. Kyle Moran: And on my end, I'm going to be keeping a close eye on Lebanon. as usual here, I'm keeping track of the ongoing negotiations. there have been ongoing Israeli campaigns, especially in the south. They've been pushing up further in this case, slightly past the latani, which is note noteworthy.

In general, Iran is pushing very hard, as I would expect them to include Lebanon in their deal. Lebanon has been insistent that that will not happen. They are not part of any deal other than their own,…

And talks will be ongoing with Israel. Evan Moloney: All right. Evan Moloney: On that note, thank you to everybody who has chosen to tune in with us today.

Thank you, Wilfford, as always for coming out and giving us your insights. and if you are at this point in our episode, then you are almost certainly a subscriber to fronts.co. thank you very much for doing that. We really truly appreciate your support. We could not do this without you.

So you allow us to do what we do, keep our independence and it goes a long way. Thank you very much. This is Evan Maloney from the Middle East round table with Kyle Moran and Wford Mina. We will see you next time.