Middle East Roundtable: "America: 'I Surrender!'" "Iran: 'No Deal!'"

Hello and welcome back to the Middle East Roundtable. This is Evan Maloney at Fronts.co. I am here with Wilfred Miner, Africa Correspondent for Fronts.co.

And Kyle Moran. I'm a staff writer here at Warfronts. It has been a somewhat quieter week in the Middle East this week, but only if you're not looking at the negotiating side of things.

We are happy to report that for now, kinetic strikes going back and forth between Iran, the U.S., Israel, Lebanon, not down to zero, but certainly less than they had been. So that's always nice to see.

What we do not have is any degree of clarity on the status of the Strait of Hormuz, the status of this Memorandum of Understanding, the status of so many other things that we would love to have resolved.

So instead of sharing all of the good news that we were maybe led to expect this time last week, we're going to get into the broader negotiating breakdown that we're witnessing right now. So, Kyle, we actually want to start with Lebanon today.

And because Kyle is our resident Lebanon head, and thank you very much, Kyle, for understanding everything that happens in Lebanon, because I truly could not keep up.

So we're going to turn over the floor to you for a minute just to kind of get us up to speed. Tell us what's going on, and we'll take it from there. Of course.

So this came after a whirlwind of a weekend, tons of back and forth between pretty extensive Israeli airstrikes and campaigns going on there. And then suddenly, out of nowhere, a ceasefire was declared.

And that was right before or right after the infamous Ben Gavir from Israel himself weighed in, saying that all of Lebanon must burn, which is not exactly what you would anticipate a ceasefire being led with.

So you can see where all of that's gone. It hasn't held up particularly well. But I want to take a moment here and take a step back in time, just to provide some extra context, both for Lebanon as well for the broader region.

So if we go back in time to early 2025, the new government in Beirut has just formed. President Joseph Aoun has just been elected after years of the presidency being vacant because of Hezbollah walking out when parliament was trying to hold elections. So there was simply no president for years.

He, in rapid order, got Nawaz Salam to be prime minister, and the two set about implementing the deal that was reached in 2024, which required the disarmament of Hezbollah in the south of the country, as at least phase one did. So progress was being made, whether or not it was sufficient or not up for discussion.

Certainly the LAF has not been absolutely stellar on any of this.

But meanwhile, throughout the broader region, a similar trend was going on as well. In Iraq, you had the paramilitaries, including Kataib Hezbollah, which... which is one of the more pro-Iran factions in the country, saying that they would work to integrate into the Iraqi state to lay down their independent arms, at least.

And a commander of that group went on record, anonymously, but still went on record, as saying with Reuters, Trump is ready to take the war with us to worse levels.

We know that, and we want to avoid such a bad scenario. Essentially, he was saying, we certainly are not going to abandon the fight, but we are going to work to integrate into the Iraqi state.

I'm somebody who believes fundamentally that having tons of separate paramilitary groups running around with varying interests is a recipe for disaster, and I think both Lebanon and Iraq's stability situations or crises can be a test to that.

So if we fast forward to today, we are just in a completely different world. Iran has emerged instead as the most consistent defender of Lebanon against Israeli actions, more effective than the government in Beirut, because of Jerusalem's insistence on taking a very hard line. In light of this, the U.S. had an option.

And now keep in mind, we knew that as per the first point in the MOU, fighting in Lebanon had to come to an end. Knowing this, the United States could have done the smart thing and said, okay, we're going to apply significant pressure on Israel to tone things down. And not in a fake way, in a real way.

They have to stop shooting. Not if they're shot at, they can shoot back, obviously. But these campaign exercises must come to an end.

We did not do this. Instead, it resulted in the fake ceasefire that came out Friday, which was just almost completely ignored. It lasted for less than an hour and resulted in over 100 Israeli airstrikes in one of the most violent campaigns in a day to date since the war broke out.

Only after Iran said this, only after Iran said that this violated their red lines and closed Hormuz, did the U.S. truly ramp up maximum pressure on Jerusalem. This is the worst possible outcome for the United States.

We demonstrated that we had the ability to further restrain Israel, that we actively chose not to do so, and that we only changed our mind after the fact to get them to actually stop after Iran made us.

This is sad. This is just sad. I do not have words for how insane this is, but two thumbs down all around.

This is a pure choice that we are making to essentially just opt out of having a strategic approach to any of this, and we are going to see the results for a long time to come.

I think it's extremely telling that the U.S. was unwilling or unable at the very least to bring Israel to stop. at the very least stop their campaign in Lebanon before Iran complained about it.

Marco Rubio, I believe this was either yesterday or the day before, but just within the week, said that the Iran and Hezbollah files, and Lebanon files, rather, are two separate issues.

So I believe it could have been just the US trying their best to get a deal or something past the finish line before actually understanding the implications of all this.

But again, just that statement by Rubio that Iran and Lebanon are separate files underscores that, at least by this point, they understand just how big of a mess, how big of a situation they are in.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said yesterday that Israel would not pull out of southern Lebanon even if the United States demanded it. and that displaced residents will not return to the area, arguing that their homes and infrastructure were already destroyed.

So, and this is a quote from him, what happened in the past in the security zones where there were also a civilian population was improvised explosive devices and attacks against soldiers.

So, right now, Israel is at a position where, and just yesterday they killed two individuals who are believed to be Hezbollah operatives who entered one of these security zones. Israel is not going to leave Lebanon at any point.

So, it's just a difficult situation. Yeah, and I think, per Rubio's point, this is what's frustrating here. So, Iran and Lebanon should be two separate fronts from the American perspective if you want any coherent foreign policy.

Because if you combine the two, you're essentially granting the Iranian government significant influence over the goings-on in Lebanon. But our failure to hold Israel back to any meaningful standard here has been ammo that Iran can then use to give itself more power. So, to me, the issue is not that we're saying that Lebanon should be a separate front.

It's that we're then going about it in a way that makes it not a separate front and then hands even more legitimacy over to Iran.

So, I mean, if we look at some headlines out of various Lebanese outlets, so, one of the cities that was hit most hard recently is the city of Nabatea, which is in the south and just north of the so-called yellow zone, yellow line. This is a headline in Lebanese outlets.

It says, Among the ruins of Nabatea, people say thank you to Iran. Now, keep in mind, this is a... massive shift because the war was effectively started on behest of Iran, where Hezbollah started shooting at Israel. This was not popular in Lebanon.

Everybody knew that this was going to drag Jerusalem back into the conflict. It was going to open up a front and there would be significant Lebanese losses throughout it all. Hezbollah did this anyway.

But because Iran has now taken a more aggressive, I don't even want to say aggressive, they've taken a more ideologically coherent view of how the axis of resistance should work, where instead of just everyone protecting Iran and then Iran not really protecting them, Iran is really going to bat for their guys now.

Because of that, people in Nabatea, and Nabatea is a heavily Shia, so they're pretty supportive of Hezbollah overall. But overall, though, you are seeing more of a recognition that one of the best friends in terms of keeping Israel toned down in the country is going to be the Islamic Republic.

I think that is underscored by the fact that the nation's president, Aoun, indicated his willingness to accept Iranian help in negotiations with both Israel and the U.S. to find some sort of middle ground, to find some sort of end to all of this. I saw this and I spent a little while trying to figure out how much I think this matters.

I think Aoun is being clever here because Iran does not recognize the Lebanese government's discussions with Israel.

They've said this outright. They will not, they condemn it. They will not recognize anything that comes of it.

So Aoun saying he's open to Iranian help is a smart pivot in terms of he's basically going to be willing to accept Iranian involvement to some extent. But he has also made a consistent, clear red line, which he's reiterated yesterday, that Iran does not negotiate on Lebanon's behalf.

But to be honest, these are just like, this is just low-hanging fruit for any Lebanese government.

They're going to be saying this no matter what happens. So we'll have to see where this goes. I don't think in the long run any of this is huge news, but I may be wrong about that if Aoun is truly willing to work closely with Iran.

And then at this point, if you look at this again from the Lebanese government's perspective, what choice do they have in the matter other than to kind of do their best being buffeted by all of the various international forces here, right?

So if you are putting yourself in the shoes of the Lebanese government, what is the best, I guess, what is the best survival play right now, right?

What is the best way to think about this, to just keep Lebanon as a intact as possible day by day versus, I suppose, if either of you do see a way for Lebanon to take a bit of agency here as well, I'd be curious to hear more about that.

But what is the best survival case for Lebanon first? I do have an idea. So overall, Israel needs to give the government in Beirut a win.

It simply cannot be that a sovereignist government is the one that loses sovereignty over a fifth of the country or somewhere even in that ballpark. So right now, I understand Israel wants to couple this with Hezbollah disarmament. That process is inherently going to take a serious period of time.

We have over a million Lebanese who continue to be displaced. There's been a trickle of people returning, but it's a small fraction of the overall percentage of displaced people. If Israel wants a partner in peace in Beirut, it will not find anyone better than the current government there.

If they continue this maximalist approach in which they want to just occupy ongoing parts of the country where they are unwilling to make much concessions at all, this is not going to work for them. So unfortunately, this is a bit out of the hands of the Lebanese government.

But in terms of Israel and the US, which is why the US should be applying more pressure on Israel, to be honest, this is the only pathway forward, in my opinion.

I agree with Kyle that the government in Beirut really needs a win. You can't, and Kyle, this was a really good line. You can't have a sovereignist government be the one to lose more than 20% of Lebanon's territory to Israel.

So I don't think there's anything else other than giving Beirut a win right now that would be a good path forward to peace. Because if Iran is the one that manages to bring peace to Lebanon, then Aoun and everyone in the sovereignist camp looks like a fool. And that's not what Israel wants.

It's not in Israel's best interest. It's not in America's best interest. It's not even in the best interest of the Lebanese people, because what would be in their best interest is having a strong government that's, one, capable of disarming Hezbollah.

That would be a dream come true for so many people, and capable of defending their own sovereignty. So I don't know. I think that's the best case scenario.

But again, it's such a difficult position to be in from all sides. If you're Iran, you want to support, excuse me, you want to support your friends in Hezbollah. If you're Israel, you want to protect your territory.

If you're Lebanon, same case. So again, just difficultness. Exactly.

I completely well said. Back in February, I believe, I wrote in, or I think early March, But I think it's a great deal. And it's interesting.

I hope when you somehow thank you for all the time coming from the outside world. Thanks so much. I wrote an episode on this sister channel, Homefronts, Lebanon is finally breaking up with Hezbollah.

Israel might ruin it. And this was basically a warning that things could go south in basically exactly the way it's going south right now. Israeli politics are very focused on security, naturally and understandably so, but they're very short-term focused.

There are currently rockets firing at us. We must stop these rockets from being fired. So once you can achieve that, then you'll deal with later stuff down the pike.

When you start zooming out, though, it starts being clear that this lack of strategy from Jerusalem is really biting them. They have invaded Lebanon back in the late 70s. They invaded in the 80s.

They occupied for 18 years. They invaded in 2006. They invaded in 2024.

They invaded in 2026. These are five or six separate massive invasions. And it has never worked.

Okay. This is not something where it's like, well, if you just go in and bomb a few more times, then that is finally going to be what brings peace to Lebanon. Right?

So there just has to be recognition that you're going to need a partner in Lebanon who's actually willing and able to go about doing this. Now, I do understand the Israeli objection is that after the 2024 campaign, the government sort of dragged its feet. That's fair.

Fair criticism. Even if they mandate that the LAF Supreme Commander, Rudolfo Haikal, who is controversial, be replaced, I understand that. But at the same time, if you are, if you are the power who are, who is undermining the government in Beirut, you start losing legitimacy when you're complaining about not having a partner for peace.

I think the big question always goes back to Israeli internal politics. And, you know, Kyle, this is something I've really been thinking about because of our discussions, right?

Internally in Israel, the feeling is that, you know, Trump is tying, you know, their hands behind their back, is not allowing them to defend themselves, is making them beholden to a really bad deal.

So what government would be able to sell a deal with Beirut as a partner for peace, given, as you've rightly said, the feeling is that they were dragging their feet?

Yeah, this is just going to be such an ongoing issue, because as the country, and to be honest, the Iran situation has made this worse, because 92% of Israelis believe that Iran won this war, which is humiliating for any Israeli PM, but especially so for Netanyahu, who has really branded himself as the security guy.

So overall, this has been a catastrophe for his premiership.

It will likely cost him. I don't want to get too out ahead of myself here, but I have to imagine he goes down in October or even earlier if they move the election up because of all of this. But he sees Lebanon as like his last saving grace.

And so if he can just put up a strong showing there or whatnot, then perhaps he'll be able to save himself. I'm skeptical. But again, this gets to very, very short term thinking with short term strategic mindsets rather than long term ones, because any deal with Beirut is inherently going to take longer than October of 2026.

So that's the that's the situation we're in. And let's talk about the Israeli expansion now of this offensive, because that does seem to be the sign that Israel is signaling, right, that the U.S. goes and announces that there's going to be drawdowns.

And then Israel releases its new map showing additional areas of territorial control in Lebanon is going to expand into.

Right. So Israel is pretty clearly signaling that they are not looking to draw down. They're not looking to establish any kind of security partnership with the Lebanese government.

They are looking to ramp this up. So two questions on that. First off, how much of that is a political decision for Netanyahu versus how much of it is a strategic decision?

And then second question, is it even worth entertaining the idea that this could be drawn down or has Israel already made up its mind? Yeah.

I think it's a purely political decision versus a strategic one, because, you know, as Kyle and I have said, the internal dynamics of Israel are geared in such a way that anything short of, you know, maximalist positions when it comes to some issues will be seen as weakness.

Yes. And, you know, with an election coming up, there's there's really no room for weakness. And I don't think that Israel is going to draw down at any point, just given what Israel Katz said, the defense minister and, you know, other statements by other members of the government and the armed forces.

I don't really see Israel drawing down. I see them only drawing down depending on how much pressure is placed on them. So overall, there has been a massive reduction in Israeli activity over the last few days.

That's not to say it's zero. It's not. As you were saying, there was there was drone strikes yesterday.

There was two killed. And then there was another incident where somebody was struck on a motorbike. But and I don't know if they were a civilian or Hezbollah.

But overall, this is a huge scale down from last week's activities. So over Friday and Saturday, especially in Abatea, there were well over 100 killed. But in those two days combined.

So overall, I do see this trending downward because the U.S. now we have arrived at the conclusion that, OK, we have to rein Israel in. But again, we've done so after we knew we would already have to do so.

But before, we didn't do it until Iran made us by closing the Strait of Hormuz again, which is just the absolute worst possible approach you can think of.

I mean, it's just completely just like, OK, U.S. Secretary of State Abbas Aragchi at this point. It's just embarrassing. U.S. Secretary of State Abbas Aragchi is perhaps your best line, Kyle.

Because, yeah, it feels like he's the one you're dictating terms to the U.S. when it comes to you have to rein in, you have to rein in Israel, you have to rein in your junior partner. And again, it goes back to something I said during last week's podcast that and, you know, this, again, is a very contentious comparison.

It feels like Israel is being placed at the same level as Hezbollah.

Basically, Iran has to leash Hezbollah and the U.S. has to leash Israel. It's such a bad comparison. But the fact that is, in essence, what's happening is maddening.

Yeah, I agree. And to be to be a little fair to the current administration, I do give them a bit of leeway with some of Israel. Like if the U.S. truly wanted Israel to pull out, I'm not sure we could do it.

And you can see that through like Israel Katz's announcement today. If we like truly went the most hardline maximalist approach, maybe we could do it. But I mean, it would take like this would be moving heaven and earth, to be honest.

So overall, like if it was a case of Israeli withdrawal, that's one thing. But in terms of just getting them to scale down, I do think that would have been easier than waiting for Hormuz to be closed. Although that certainly gave us more of a.

And I imagine this is the way it worked out, because before we were saying, OK, Israel, you really need to work with the Lebanese government here, which we've been saying for months. And Israel was like, OK, whatever.

But after they closed Hormuz, now all of a sudden, Israel's campaign in Little Lebanon is the reason that the entire international oil market is in turmoil or was in turmoil briefly.

So that is a different level there. But overall, I do think you are absolutely right. Hezbollah and Israel are just fundamentally two different types of beings.

Hezbollah will answer to Tehran far better than Israel will to the United States. Hezbollah is not a sovereign country and does not hold elections. They answer to nobody other than themselves and Tehran, whereas Netanyahu is staring down the barrel of a upcoming general election in October.

And let's talk about the Israeli politics side of this, because as we've seen sitting on the sidelines, people like Ben Yavir, people like Ezele Smokrich are having a field day with this whole thing.

And it seems as if there's nothing that they would prefer more than to see the U.S. exert such extreme pressure. in Israel, and then to have Netanyahu capitulate, right? Kind of, again, as you were saying, backing down from this maximalist position right ahead of an election.

So as we look at this conflict in context to Israeli upcoming elections and exchanges of power, how much of an opportunity is this for Israel's hardliners? I don't think it's a good opportunity for them at all. If Ben Gavir is doing this, it's solely out of foolishness.

Although, to be honest, I'm not sure he is super gung-ho about blasting Netanyahu to begin with, because he has to recognize Netanyahu is the only PM who's going to sit with him. Bennett and Yair Lapid may be very hawkish, but they absolutely despise the guy. They are building a campaign.

Bennett the other day is literally saying 0.1 of his premiership, or any government in which he's part of, will be to stop being stupid in terms of PR. He was saying that if Israel was a PR firm, he wouldn't hire them because of how terrible it's been under this Netanyahu premiership.

And do a no small part to, you can literally, whatever issue is going on in Israel, you can simply Google that issue and then add Ben Gavir or Smotrich to the end of that issue and find the most unhinged take possible.

So those two, they're both little parties. They're leaders of two, respectively, small parties, religious Zionism and Jewish power. So those two are not going to be in any future government other than a Likud-led one.

So I have to imagine this is going to be sort of self-shooting themselves in the foot, if you will. So then can you put this into further context in the rise of Bennett in this whole thing, right? Where is he coming in?

Is he, at this point, Netanyahu's premier challenger? And what does that mean for this conflict? Bennett is such an interesting figure because he has been a member of almost every party in Israeli history, save for labor, perhaps.

But so he got started. If he wasn't a member of Likud, he was working with Netanyahu years and years ago. But he really got his start in Israeli politics as more of his own thing in what used to be called the Jewish Homeland Party, which, if the name is any indication, is not exactly centrist.

They were to Netanyahu's right on many issues, including settlement stuff. So I believe he is a settler himself, so certainly not exactly a conciliatory figure on any of that stuff. But his biggest thing is the Netanyahu premiership has done military action, but they have failed to deliver any substantial long-term stuff.

So essentially what I was saying with the short-term objectives, but where does this all lead? Okay, so Israel destroyed significant parts of Gaza. Okay, now what do you do?

Right now Israel occupies 50-60% of the Gaza Strip. Well, okay, do they just have to occupy this indefinitely? Like, what's going on there?

How do you deal with this long-term? Bennett will frequently point to this as, okay, Netanyahu has not translated this into any long-term strategic victory for Israel. Same thing with Iran.

His line with Netanyahu is that Netanyahu repeatedly promised a new Middle East. If this is the new Middle East, I mean, this is not worth it, right? This is a significant downgrade because Netanyahu may be willing to use military force, but what does that actually buy them?

So I think you've said in the past that Israel really is not a country with a cohesive left-wing, if that makes sense, right, in the way that we would see it in Europe and the U.S. or wherever else.

So in these kind of flavors of political parties that are all tied in with whether it's settlers or whether it's the IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet, like the intelligence apparatus, military apparatus, right, where all of these parties and all these political leaders are tied in with the Israeli security complex in some way, how do you see a transition from Netanyahu

To Bennett?

Is this a—again, assuming that this is what is going to come to pass—is this a really substantive change in Israeli strategy and practices with kind of the same overall strategic bent, or is this a much larger reorientation of Israeli policy?

Yeah, so Bennett and his partner, they launched this thing called Together. So Bennett is representing more of the religious Zionist front, small r in that. The religious Zionist party is separate.

That's one of the hardliners. And then Yair Lapid is the other guy. So I'm not going to put money on who actually comes out ahead in that race there.

It could be one or the other as far as I understand. But right now, the two of them, they share significant overlap in terms of goals. The biggest one being, a lot of this being is very personalist.

So it's going to be very anti-BB. And it's very anti-BB for the reasons I was saying, in terms of failing to deliver on long-term strategic objectives. Some of this rings to me as wanting to have their cake and eat it too, though.

Because at the same time that they're blasting, and correctly so, I may add, in my opinion, Ben Gavir and Smotrich, especially Ben Gavir, for destroying Israel's reputation in the international community. He's certainly not alone in doing that, but he's almost always at the forefront of it. They are also pretty hawkish in terms of politics.

That are not going to exactly help them regain international standing very much or very well. So in terms of Lebanon, they want to continue to, they're criticizing Netanyahu for tying the hands of the IDF in the country, right? So this is not exactly a pro work with Beirut approach.

At the same time with Iran, they have said that Netanyahu has normalized Iranian attacks on the country by not forcefully responding to the strikes a week or two ago.

To be honest, on the Iran front, I think they actually have more buy-in, especially with the Israeli electorate, because again, 92% of Israelis believe Iran won this war, because Iran did win the war, if we're being honest. But the long-term implications of that being that Netanyahu is sort of a man without a coalition.

So he's hated from all sides. The hardliners hate him because they see him as a sellout. Anyone left who's more dovish hates him because he's gone too far.

And then people in the middle who really, like I describe Beirut as, in Israeli politics at this point, like center-right. So his faction in the center-right there are defecting to either Bennett or Lapid's movement, because overall, Israel has lost so much standing, including with the United States. This has concerned many people in Israeli politics.

Yeah, the loss of faith with the U.S. has really been pretty stunning to behold. As we've mentioned on the podcast before, Kyle and I, obviously, you're both American.

I know from just my vantage point, it's been really incredible to see how quickly the shift on Israel has happened in ways that are very much about the Iran war, but also seem to tie in kind of a larger cultural understanding of everything else that Israel has been involved in over the last several years.

So it is, I think, interesting to see the way that this relationship will continue to develop where the U.S. is, I have to imagine, in Israel seen as partially responsible for the Iranian victory in this conflict, right? The U.S. didn't go far enough, didn't manage things in ways that the Israeli public would have wanted.

So instead of the U.S. perception of Israel, how do you see the shifting Israeli perceptions of the U.S., specifically among the Israeli public, right?

Not so much the political sphere, but among the Israeli public, how do you see the shifting role and position of the U.S. impacting Israel's strategic approach? I do want to bring in one note here.

Israel has been talking about increased defense autonomy for some time and has been really starting to put in orders, write out checks to that effect to really kind of break Israeli military industrial dependency on the U.S. That'll take a while just because of how deep that dependence

But do you anticipate there being, I suppose, room in the upcoming Israeli elections for messages that center on not so much realigning with the U.S., but accepting that the U.S. relationship is broken in some way and looking to move beyond that? I'll make this one quick.

So I think overall, the Israeli perspective is going to be sort of a combination of the two.

They do want increased strategic independence on this, but they absolutely, and again, part of this is just personalist stuff, so they will blast Bibi on basically anything. They will not miss or pass up an opportunity to blast Netanyahu for sabotaging the U.S.-Israeli alliance.

And right now, just because of how unpopular the war with Iran is inside of Israel, they are very, Bennett and Lapid, both, I believe, I know Lapid has, put out statements slamming Netanyahu for essentially launching a stupid war that involved Israel's closest ally.

And then, of course, the U.S. is now suddenly like, what the hell, like Israel is, they're having a fallout with Israel over it. And so they're basically laying the blame for that at Netanyahu's feet. And on the U.S. perspective, it has been quite interesting to see for sure.

One of the biggest factors here being J.D. Vance, who has been being absolutely slammed by many people in the more pro-Israel movement for his condemnation of several parts of their approach. But it really has sort of let a genie out of the bottle, in my opinion, that's going to be quite hard to put back.

It's difficult to put into terms just how much like you have to not have to be pro-Israel, but it sort of just like went with the whole package of being a Republican in the United States. And that has been shifting for a little while now. But overall, I think this is a trend that's going to continue.

I think the most interesting example of how the relationship, how the U.S. is viewed in Israel has shifted is a report from the Times of Israel saying Likud was planning to scrap election ads, highlighting the ties between Trump and Netanyahu in the wake of the Iran deal. That tells me the U.S. is viewed really, really negatively right now.

And there's also another poll that 71% of Israel don't trust Trump to look out for them in the Iran deal.

So those those facts alone just tell me there's a very negative perception of Washington right now within within Israel. Kyle, you had a point?

Yeah, I don't think it's that they're hating the U.S. I think that Netanyahu recognizes that while Trump is blasting, I mean, on a daily, there's been like a weekly phone call, like a spicy weekly phone call for like the past month in which they, he very, the telegraph the other day reported that he, over the weekend, he called up.

Bibi and told him all the Jews are sick of you. I'll let that speak for itself. But there have been many such phone calls like that recently.

So throughout these types of incidents that are ongoing and widely reported in Israeli media, it's going to be extremely awkward if Bibi holds like a rally in where he's like saying we have such close ties with the U.S. when all of this is going so sideways.

So I don't think Israel has decided to hate the U.S. I think you are right that they may not see Trump as being a great guarantor of their security. But I think this is moving decisively in a Bibi screwed this up sort of way.

I don't think it's a purely Trump thing.

I think given recent trends specifically within the Democratic Party where the party has moved decidedly left, decidedly closer to the Palestinian position instead of the Israeli one, and you're aware lobby groups like AIPAC are being seen as an extension of the Israeli government, the Israeli lobbying efforts within the U.S., that entire negativity around

Israel, I think it does influence your general Israeli perception of the U.S. into a more negative direction.

Yeah, I agree.

I think it's sort of a trend that's happening long term. I just don't think that like it's been a massive shift over the last month or two. So this is sort of like an ongoing breakup rather than like an immediate divorce, if you will.

So I do want to pivot into another issue of regional realignment here. Wilfred, this was one that I know you wanted to talk about. The Prime Minister of Qatar was speaking this week about some progress to a new regional strategic framework that would, I believe, include Iran.

So can you tell us a little bit about what's happening there? So this is something that I saw in a report by the Financial Times that the Qatari Prime Minister said that regional states are considering looking at a security framework with Iran shifting away from a U.S.-only security protection framework.

And this is something that we said would most likely happen as a result of this war.

The truth is that once this war is over, no matter how it ends, whether Iran wins, the U.S. wins, Israel wins, whatever outcome comes out as a result of this war, the countries in the region, the Gulf countries, will still have to live with Iran as their neighbor. They'll still have to operate through the Strait of Hormuz.

They'll still have, in one way or another, have to have some interaction with Iran.

It's not like North Korea where, you know, it can be isolated from the rest of the world and only South Korea can occasionally think about it when something happens at the DMZ. For good or bad, the region has to live with Iran.

And when American ships leave, because they will leave, the carrier groups, the strike groups, the jets, the overwhelming force of America, when it does leave, there will be a situation where these countries need to work with Iran to either guarantee their own security or assure Iran that they're not a threat.

This is what the statement by Qatar's prime minister is telling me, that the region is looking ahead at a future where they have to still deal with Iran, and they're preparing as best as they can for it. Yeah, and I think it's curious that it's Qatar leading this. So Qatar is in a very unusual situation because they have been more friendly to Iran.

The two Gulf ones, the two Gulf countries who are more friendly with Iran are Oman and Qatar, Oman more so than Qatar. But Qatar has maintained relatively good ties. But again, they themselves were under attack by Iran throughout the whole thing.

So this has put them in a very uncomfortable situation where they have to sort of maintain that, okay, they want to maintain ties with the Islamic Republic, and they want to be prepared for if the U.S. does continue its sort of retreat, if you will. I don't really have a better term than that. So overall, I think that puts them in a precarious situation.

And I do see that a Gulf movement to maintain its own security is going to emerge from this. But I am skeptical as to the role that Iran will play in this. I have to imagine that perhaps Qatar would be willing to play ball with them more so.

But somebody like Saudi and especially the Emiratis and Bahrain, I mean, these guys have, these guys took a beating, and they have very little desire to be in an alliance with the Islamic Republic anytime soon. I don't necessarily see it as being an alliance.

I see it more as being an understanding, a gentleman's agreement that the kind of violence that Iran rained down on its neighbors, on its regional neighbors during this war will never be seen again.

And in exchange, the Gulf countries will give up something, whether it's a financial incentive, whether it's reducing the dependency on America, reducing the number of bases on their territory. I don't know. We obviously do not have the details of this arrangement in front of us.

But that's what I see it being not, you know, a NATO style Islamic NATO, but rather a situation where they have some sort of gentleman's agreement in place.

Yeah, I'm very curious to see where this goes long term, because I see so many variables that could lead to... several different outcomes whether it's something like that or honestly something else entirely emerging separately from this in which the gulf states sort of say look if like if iran if we're left alone with iran which we very well may be we have

To be ready if they if these guys start shooting again i agree i agree on that they do need to be ready in case those guys start shooting but again i can just a wait and see thing at the moment and i think there is an interesting question here as well about just how far this deal would go whatever it ends up being right this is something i've i've know i've

Talked about in prior episodes on more friends and i think you guys have touched on as well that like there's a certain desire in geopolitics generally right to get as expansive and as broadly covering a deal as possible right if you're going to get two sides to negotiate get them to negotiate to and agree to as many things as you can whereas in this case

Right it may be that there's some value to taking the opposite approach right can we get a deal that covers straight up hormone security that doesn't go any further doesn't touch on any other issues but it nails down hormone security right maybe there's an argument to do that do you as you're looking into this get the sense that this is more of a

Comprehensive agreement that qatar is targeting or is this more of like let's get the key issues addressed and leave everything else for another day i think given just how important the state of humus is given just how much it's wrecked you know regional economies not to have access to it and the lengths that you know the countries have gone to try and

Figure out an alternative to the street it has to be a deal that keeps the street open and then you can figure the other the other stuff out later down the road but for now let's keep the street open let's make sure our ships are secure let's make sure the oil is flowing and our economies can't survive this period after the war that's my thing i have a

Slight comparison or slightly different comparison to make so in terms of like including various members so there are different ways to go about this of course so there's more of like and i don't see them going anywhere near like a full nato style thing to be honest but if that's one extreme then something called the commonwealth of independent states is

Another in it's essentially the whole former ussr block minus a few and it effectively doesn't do anything because it includes russia so russia sits i think at the head of it's headquartered in moscow and it exists on paper as sort of a formality so to speak but it doesn't do anything of any importance so overall like if this includes iran i almost wonder if

We'd be looking at something like that because again even if qatar is willing to play a role similar to you with Iran, similar to that Belarus does with Russia.

Forgive me if that's excessively negative to Qatar.

I understand they're more independent. But if they're willing to be more pro-Iran like that, the other states, I have a much harder time seeing them going along with.

Yeah, it is interesting anytime we talk about Gulf state politics, because there's kind of this overarching narrative among most of the countries that is all of this war, all this violence, whatever, ultimately is secondary to what we really want to be doing, which is trade, development, right now kind of reorienting their economies away from just being pure

Petro states and trying to incorporate as much else as possible.

So I do wonder whether there is space for kind of some minimum mutual guarantees here. That is to say, you know, all of these countries would very much like to get back to business. They happen to have a country like Iran on their doorstep that is prone to upending the course of ordinary business at a moment's notice.

So I do wonder how much room there is just to say, hey, put everything else aside, right? Can we agree on some minimum terms just to manage our day-to-day operations here?

And that seems like something that Saudi, the Emirates, these other countries that not only are, you know, were hit fairly hard by Iran, but also have their own strategic competitions to be looking forward to.

That does seem to me like something that they would be willing to entertain if there's a way to create kind of a baseline standard for peace and or avoidance of major war in the region. Exactly. Because some of those Gulf countries, especially like Saudi and the Emirates, have their own, as you were saying, rivalries.

But in terms of like when it comes to collective defense, I have to imagine like they're already preparing. Like, okay, if the U.S. pulls out and we're left on our own, like we have to overcome that and secure our own stuff to begin with. Yeah, and it will be an open question to whether or not they can even do that at this stage.

We put out on war fronts a little while ago and a pretty extended piece on the need for the Gulf states to remilitarize and just how big of an uphill climb that's going to be. As of now, we know that Saudi and the Emirates and a couple other states did take a degree of kinetic action during the war in Iran.

They are not in a place where they can manage those kinds of sustained campaigns by themselves.

Then again, right, even the idea that they would take part in a limited campaign was more than Iran seemed to have bargained for. So I think we are looking at a strategic reorientation and kind of some new lessons to be learned over the next couple of years in the Gulf. But as for what those are, I think unfortunately we're going to have to wait and see.

Unless we have any other further points here, I do want to talk about the strait itself because as of right now, we have a big ongoing discussion of whether or not tolls will be imposed on the strait. Iran says, you know, in essence that they are guaranteeing a toll-free strait only for this memorandum of understanding.

Trump says that they've committed to... you know indefinite toll-free passage so what do you think the reality of the situation is and where are the two sides on this yeah one of my favorite things about monitoring the iran file has been who even knows with the state of almost anymore it's trump's trump has been insistent and you know his entire government

Folks like rubio have been insistent that there will be no tools but iran and oman i believe this was yesterday they issued a joint statement basically saying you know they're trying to figure out the future administration of the strait and the fees for services provided the only service that iran can provide in the state in the state of and you know if

Anyone has more expertise on maritime stuff it is not to attack your ship they're basically pulling that mafia move what a nice looking ship you have there it will be horrible if something happened to it if you didn't pay our fees man we can't guarantee that nothing will happen to it so that's that's the entire thing that they're doing the only thing that

They're doing and despite the claims by the u.s that you know no fees will be paid no tools will be paid i can't help but go back to just the 27th of feb when you know just the day before the war started before you know we knew that something like this will erupt to this degree ships were passing through the strait without paying a single toll without paying

A single fee it's literally just come down to this war allowing iran to do all this so i think iran believes they'll be able to collect tools or fees as they call them and the u.s doesn't think that will happen so it's just going to be a matter of negotiations and given just how many concessions iran managed to extract from the u.s i really do see them

Charging tools the other alternative is you know the u.s seizing control of the strait themselves and there were there was a commentator i can't remember who it was who said that if the u.s does seize control of the strait you know to prevent iranian tools they'll have to charge tools to finance the operation so again it's a question of who is charging the

Tools does it end up being the u.s to guarantee freedom of navigation or does it end up being iran charging fees so that they don't blow up people's ships again it's just a mess it is a mess i truly am no longer in a prediction game when it comes to her moves i'm taking a backseat on that and i think the decision to do to do that is a wise one because of

Just how much is up in the air Although I have to say, the barrier to entry of closing Hormuz has been lowered substantially over the last few weeks.

So especially over the Lebanon front, they did it again after previously opening it. So as you can see, like they did it and they sort of got away with it a second time. Okay, now the barrier to entry, like with every passing iteration of closing Hormuz, it just sort of becomes an easy move.

So the barrier to entry is quite low. So I have to imagine if they really push this and say, look, we'll close it again if you don't let us charge tolls, then they may be able to do so. The question to me here is just how far can they push before the U.S. just says, look, this is not worth it.

We have made historically unprecedented, historically unthinkable concessions because of this. And if we're not even getting toll free shipping through Hormuz like the way it was before, then I mean, what are we even doing here? So and they may ultimately go back in.

Lindsey Graham, for whatever that's worth, he has been extremely hawkish on all things at all times. But he's been saying that if the deal collapses, Trump will go in and do exactly what Wilfred was saying.

So, I mean, honestly, this could be summed up best by a commenter over on Warfronts who on our Monday Middle East update has summarized the situation relatively well.

So he goes, let me try to find this here. He goes, the United States, I surrender. Iran, no deal.

So that's sort of where we currently are. So maybe you both can help me out with something that's been on my mind regarding the strait, right, which is this U.S. administration, since they took office in early 2025, has obviously had some notable disdain for kind of old international rules, international order.

The idea of like this mutually agreeable kind of gentlemanly conduct between nation states, which I mean, we can, you know, ridicule the idea that was ever really a meaningful thing in the first place.

Right. We can have that conversation as long as we want. And I know that we all are, you know, happy to drill down on that kind of being a mirage in the first place.

But this is one of those situations where it kind of is helpful to have, right, where regardless of what maritime law may stipulate, the strait of Hormuz is for all intents and purposes. And Israeli, not an Israeli, and Iranian and Omani holding until that is proven otherwise, right? It is much closer to both of those states than it is to anybody else.

They have, they each have the ability to either place tolls or to leverage munitions to assert control in other ways. Unless, like, the U.S. is essentially making a fairness. based argument here, right? It is not okay.

It's not fair for these countries, the border of the Strait of Hormuz, to then place a toll. And that is a much tougher argument to stand on when all of these kind of international fairness-based rules and norms have been upended.

So my question is there really a path for the U.S. to be arguing this case that does not lie in the idea that force will be used at some point to reassert American control?

Is there any other leg to stand on for the U.S. here? Or are we just kind of working our way to a might-makes-right situation in the Strait? I think we are making our way to a might-makes-right situation, not just in the Strait of Hormuz, but in basically nearly every other place in the world.

Trump, as you've rightly said, he's upended so many international norms, international conventions, so many gentlemanly agreements, you know, on how nations conduct business with each other, just respect each other in a post-World War II era, that international law, and it was already not, it didn't already have much of a leg to stand on.

It's been reduced to so much worse. It has nothing going for it right now.

So I don't think the U.S. can make a case on something like international, just given how much they don't seem to respect it. So yeah, again, it's, it's, they don't really have much to stand on. I completely agree.

I think that the move away from international law was going to move in this sort of direction where it's much more might-makes-right by way of Iran, but also Russia, China, these types of things. The argument that China cannot move on Taiwan and whatnot becomes much harder in a world where the U.S. does all of this.

So there are two, there are some different approaches we can take here.

So ultimately, like the U.S. helped build and was basically the architect of the post-war liberal international order, to whatever extent that was in existence. Now, a lot of things come down to, in politics, come down to not just reaction, but over-reaction or over-corrections, perhaps is a better term.

So the U.S. had, especially on the right, but to some extent the left, they had some grievances with the sort of international order, where especially something like the U.N. was seen as more of a club for countries to sort of bash the U.S. to begin with.

So they decided, okay, you know what, we're done with this. But now you're seeing the impact of that, where the reaction or over-correction to grievances with these institutions results in, oh, wait a sec, okay, unless the U.S. is hegemonic, like a sole hegemon in the introduction.

I mean, this starts getting really messy really soon, because even though it may have resulted in some annoying General Assembly resolutions for the U.S., honestly, like there were there were still enormous benefits to something like well-maintained international maritime laws.

So in a world before this war, if Iran had tried to close down this the strait, this would have been and it already it still is internationally condemned. Nobody is gung ho about Iran charging tolls here. They know what's coming after that.

But if they had just decided to do this randomly, like say they just want some extra money, there would be a overwhelming international response.

And I have to imagine Europe would have participated much more enthusiastically in terms of reopening the strait, because it would have been Iran that initiated that move to close it in the first place or to charge tolls.

So I have to imagine there would have been a much more broad based movement, perhaps even I see Japan is mobilizing self-deforce vessels to the strait, I believe, to help demining operations.

So I have to imagine, like there would have been an overwhelming international response that would have been much more helpful to the United States in that other world where we did not launch this war.

Trump's disdain for international law has really come back to bite him, because if he had just a shred more respect for it, this would have been a much, much different world, a much different experience for him. I mean, you're conducting this war.

And I just want to add that Europe is also sending several ships into the strait of Hormuz. The UK is sending the RFE Lime Bay. Germany is sending a minesweeper and several other ships.

So there is some international movement towards securing the strait, keeping it open. But like Kyle, I feel like it would have been a much bigger response, much more pronounced if there was a shred more respect for international movement.

And I do want to bring to one final point before we wrap up for the day, because we're starting to come up on our time here.

Sure. The U.S. Senate and House have now both passed through a resolution, essentially voting to stop the Iran war. So that has moved through both houses of the U.S. Congress that will, I believe, come to Trump's desk, which he will then have to veto, which he will.

So this is really, in essence, a symbolic vote. But what do you think it says and what bearing do you think it has in a practical sense on Washington moving forward? I don't think that much.

It's it's very symbolic. The two. So in the Senate, at least, I believe the two who are Republicans who voted yes were Murkowski and Collins, who are themselves quite centrist.

Collins has a Senate race coming up in November. I believe. She was up in 2020.

Yes, so she's up again. I don't know about Murkowski, but overall, this is a strategic just positioning, in my opinion. I think there must have been a third.

Oh, yeah. I always forget Rand Paul. Every single time I forget Rand Paul.

He voted with it because Fetterman voted against it. And Bill Cassidy also voted in favor. Oh, yeah, because this is so funny to me.

So Cassidy was so anti-passing the War Powers Resolution before he lost his primary. And Trump supported the guy who was running against Cassidy. And then after Cassidy lost his primary, he's been voting yes on every anti-Trump thing he can find.

You were right about Susan Collins having an election coming up during the midterms. She's going up against Graham Plattner from the Democratic Party.

He's been controversial to say the least, but there's a lot of excitement, a lot of feeling within the main Democratic Party that he's going to defeat Collins, mainly because of Collins' decision to support Brett Kavanaugh and the ripple effects that had on Roe v.

Wade. But also because of stuff like this, the Iran war, which could help explain Collins' vote to stop the war. But I don't really see this having much of an impact on Trump or just how negotiations are conducted, just anything in general.

This will be just one of those meaningless resolutions that pass through Congress. It's interesting to bring up Kavanaugh. I mean, this was a huge, this was almost a decade ago now.

This was a big vote back in 2020 when she was up last time against, I think it was Gideon, Sarah Gideon. And Collins is sort of like this independent, leaning titan up in Maine where she has long done her own thing and she's been consistent, like very heavily scrutinized as potentially subject to losing. And every single poll in 2020 had her down.

Some of them had her down almost by double digits and she won pretty decisively. So I think she will probably survive. I'll, you know, I'm not, I don't like betting this far out on individual races, but if there's one person to be cautious betting against, it's usually Collins.

Yeah, she is a very competent politician. She has survived a lot of, what's it called? A lot of tough, tough votes.

And even right now, the polls, the polls are within a margin of error because I'm looking at the New York Times right now. A poll between the 11th of June and the 11th of June. The 14th puts Plattner at 48%, Collins 45%, one from Qantas Insights, 9th June to the 11th, Plattner at 46, Collins at 45.

There's just very small, very small margins, very small margins. So, yeah, she might end up surviving. The Democrats, I would imagine, should be a bit more excited about Texas, perhaps.

The Republican candidate down there is terrible, so we'll see where that goes. The joke was, after the Republican primary, the biggest winner were the Democrats, because the Republicans nominated Ken Paxton down there, who's also controversial, to say the least.

But the Democratic candidate is also himself somewhat out there on some issues, so we'll have to see where that goes.

Okay, so the thing with Paxton is he is such a controversial figure. He was nearly impeached, if memory serves me right, but was saved by the Senate. And the main thing for me is that he won't be able to draw any votes from the left.

He might sweep the entire Republican vote, and that might be enough to propel him towards a victory, because Texas is a very red state. But if Taylor Rico, James Taylor Rico, his opponent, can manage to convince Republican voters who feel iffy about voting for Paxton, given his record, given his track record, basically, then that will be a sweep.

And it will be a very, very big deal for the Democrats and a very negative sign for the Republicans if they manage to lose Texas.

I'm sorry, Evan, we managed to turn this into a U.S. politics board. That is all right. I think it's still making its case for maybe a spinoff in the future.

But thank you both for coming on. Obviously, lots to still get to this week, but, you know, time limitations are what they are. And we've got to save some stuff for next week, because if we prognosticate too much, then we'll end up being proven wrong on every single thing, as every analyst, it seems like, has been throughout this war.

So the more we stay out of the seesawing of this whole thing, maybe the better. Before we wrap up for the day, any notes on what you both are watching in the week ahead? Yes.

So for me, what I am watching is what comes out of these negotiations, obviously. Any public statement that comes out of it is very, very interesting for me. But something else that I'm also watching is how it's being received within Iran.

I have a piece coming out tomorrow. So today is Wednesday, the 24th of June, as we record this. I have a piece coming out on Thursday, the 25th, about how peace might break Iran just because of how negatively the hardliners have been taking the news of this peace deal.

Because, you know, they view it as obviously a challenge to their own power base, but I don't want to preempt the video. But, yeah, that's something I'm watching. And then on my part, I will be monitoring the situation, so to speak, with Lebanon, as always.

Lots going on there. The talks, the fifth round of negotiations between Beirut and Jerusalem are ongoing as we speak in Washington, D.C. They have been described by the Israeli ambassador as a, quote, train wreck.

So we will have to see where that goes. I have to imagine that the train wreck situation is the government in Beirut has been maintaining nothing short of a full Israeli withdrawal from the south with a full deployment of the LAF to the region is acceptable for them. So they're willing to do the heavy lifting in terms of continuing disarming Hezbollah.

But it must be partnered with the return of the residents who have been displaced, as well as the ongoing destruction of the south needs to stop. Well, thank you, gentlemen, for being here in the Middle East Roundtable with us here at Fronts.co.

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We have all sorts of exclusive content and articles and so on and so forth that we would love you to check out. So this is Evan Maloney here with Kyle and Wilford for the Middle East Roundtable at Fronts.co signing off and we'll see you next week. Thank you.