
Middle East Roundtable: As the Dust Settles.
July 3, 2026

middle-east
May 22, 2026 · 1h 3m
Note: this transcript was generated by AI and may contain errors or inconsistencies.
Hello and welcome back to the Middle East round table at fronts.co. This is Evan Maloney here with Kyle Moran. Say hi, Kyle. And also with a very special guest back from deep in the bunkers of some undisclosed country. Kyle Moran: Hello everyone. Thank you for tuning in. Evan Moloney: Wilfred, how are you doing?
Wilfred W.: I am doing well, thank you for asking.
Wilfred W.: Evan. I have tattoos to commemorate my time in those deep bunkers in a country whose name we shall continue to keep secret to protect our sources. Evan Moloney: I was hoping for a big reveal, but that's all right. Kyle Moran: Maybe next week. Wilfred W.: Next week.
In the intervening time, the Iran war continues to be the Iran war, albeit in a kind of toned down, less explosive form than we saw a couple of months ago. That allegedly, according to Washington, nearly changed yesterday as of the time of recording.
So, Tuesday, Trump went to social media to announce this and essentially said, 'Hey, we were going to reopen strikes against Iran.' The Gulf States asked us to call it off, and so we're going to call it off and give peace another chance. So, Kyle, I'll throw to you first, and then Wilford will go to you.
Early reactions on one, the idea that the US was so close to going back to war and
Then two, that the Gulf States' intercession was what had prevented it.
Yeah. Even though I've been writing that I don't think a return to any type of bombing campaign would be in the US or broader war efforts' interest, I do think that just given the political stalemate, it is this sort of tempting option that the US could pursue, and that's why I think this may be in the cards.
There is always the chance with Trump, as to whether this is a bluff? So, was he actually planning on doing this, or is he saying this to try to encourage the Iranians to make further concessions? To be honest, I don't think that will be particularly persuasive.
Even if it was a bluff, you have to keep this in mind while discussing all things Trump, because you never quite know. So, on that front, it didn't entirely surprise me. And even if we see a return to actual bombing campaigns in the next few days, that wouldn't enormously surprise me either.
But the point of interest to me has been the back and forth between different Gulf States. I believe Qatar was on board saying yes, this did happen, and then other Gulf states were saying no, this request did not come through. Again, you also sort of have to parse through all of that.
Are the Emirates denying that because they want to make it look like they are willing to do this even though in private they might not be? This is the sort of fog of war, so to say.
Wilfred W.: I want to say I agree with Kyle, and it's so wonderful to be back with you guys. Just wanted to shout that out. But yeah, it's very tempting from an American perspective to believe that further air strikes, a further bombing run would cause Iran to make more concessions.
But I don't really think I agree with that idea because how much more pain can you inflict on Iran without necessarily just taking out the entire country? And at that point, we're looking at a situation where regime change is a lot more preferable than continuing to mark time with the same guys just marching in place.
So it might be tempting for Washington to think that a continued bombing run would yield more concessions from Iran, but I don't see that happening, at least not in the short term.
The blockade of Hormuz might have a bigger impact just in terms of economic pain and the impact it has on Iran's ability to export its oil and actually mine the oil that's coming out of its oil wells without the oil wells being shut down. That might have a bigger impact than just a return to bombing.
And yeah, the Wall Street Journal, as Kyle has mentioned, the Wall Street Journal did have a statement that has gotten a lot of attention that several Gulf officials from some of the countries Trump mentioned in his post on Truth Social said they were not aware of any imminent plans to attack Iran.
So it could be a situation where Trump is using the threats of attack as a sort of mallet to remind Iran, 'Hey, American bombs can drop on you guys at any second' rather than an actual dedicated serious plan to go back to bombing.
So in that case, we've seen this play before from Washington several times now. We've gone through the roundabout on multiple occasions where we see these big threats of imminent retaliation that are supposedly called off at the last moment. That hasn't seemed to generate much progress in the past.
We've seen that according to reports coming out from negotiations, Iran and the US are slowly adjusting their positions over time. That's all and good. It doesn't seem as if there's this big seismic response to these threats when they've come out in the past.
And here we are making those starts again, drawing back from the brink of conflict again supposedly.
So, I suppose what is the purpose in doing this if it's been tried and
It has not succeeded? Is this just a kind of a deep-seated belief from American leaders that American intimidation has some kind of staying power that just hasn't manifested yet? Is this a play for time? What are we seeing here?
Wilfred W.: So I have a video coming out around tomorrow... Wilfred W.: which will be a collaboration between war fronts and home fronts. Please check it out. It's discussing a concept in diplomacy that I find extremely interesting. The idea of soft versus hard power. In that video, I talk a lot about America's soft power declining.
But for this, I want to talk about America's self-belief in their hard power and the belief that American military can overcome any enemy at any time. And that's why we see the US making these threats that Iran will be destroyed, Iran will be taken back to the stone age, there'll be one big beautiful blow coming from Thran.
Wilfred W.: These are all things that Trump has said.
And I might have paraphrased along the way because I don't obviously remember every single thing he said, but it's just this sheer belief that that makes And because America's military is oodles of times so much stronger than Iran, it's this belief that that will eventually force concessions from the Iranian government.
Wilfred W.: And I think that's such a fundamental misunderstanding of how Iran views its own military strength because Iran does know that America and Israel in this case are much stronger than it.
But it has the ability to draw this out much longer than both countries can seemingly particularly in the US with the rising gas prices and the midterms being projected to go horribly for the Donald Trump's party. That fundamental miscalculation between America and Iran just on the nature of America's hard power and America's willingness to use it.
I think that it's just an attempt by Washington to remind
Wilfred W.: We can drop bombs on you at any time. Like I just said previously, it's an attempt to get concessions and it's not going to work.
Yeah, I don't think it's going to work either. But in general, something that I do think that this type of stuff is just sort of throwing darts at the wall and seeing what the cost of putting out statements like this is zero. It's the cost of putting out a tweet.
So, if it can do something, then that's in Washington's view one step closer than they were previously. As to the lack of, sorry, we'll have to cut that out. So, in terms of lack of actual progress in terms of hard power for the United States, something that you do speak to there correctly is that bombs just cannot do fully regime change.
So this was the debate going into this whole thing. Are you actually able to conduct regime change by an air campaign alone? As it turns out, the conventional wisdom that's probably an unrealistic assumption was correct.
But again, that's not necessarily saying I wouldn't go as far on the Washington cannot wait it out because what I've been saying over at fronts has been sort of the opposite. I think Iran is starting to feel the time pressure as much as the United States, if not more.
So, historically speaking, a second-term president's party gets wiped out in the midterms regardless. The last time that a president's party in his second term has not had a pretty substantial congressional loss in the midterm election. You have to go back to Eisenhower who was president in the 50s.
So it would be extraordinary to me if the Republicans held on to Congress. So that doesn't speak too much on this in terms of political pressure, but what I do think is very important is this is the US blockade on Iran in terms of not being able to sell its oil.
I know you can see they are trying to move all types of stuff over rail as well as other ways out of the country with a little success but in terms of overall scale it really just is not delivering. So you can see this in terms of the Iranian economy.
Kyle Moran: Al Jazeera was actually reporting in Thran which I mean this is a very unusual case of them criticising the regime from within the country in terms of the economy.
Typically when they're correspondents are actually physically in the country they're quite friendly but they were going around and just showing how much prices had gone up which sort of talks to me speaks to me about the impact that this blockade has had.
So I do want to push back on one thing that you just said which is that the cost of these US threats issued online or wherever they may be is zero.
And I only want to ask is it true that there is zero cost there or does it matter to be showing from the US perspective that hey when we come to an impasse the thing that we have to revert back to is these empty threats right to establish this cycle of just drawing back visibly pretending to draw back from the line if we can consider that this is a bluff…
Which it seems like we all are tending to where that direction right in that case is there not a cost there for the US to be demonstrating continually there is a threat of abstract use of force here but we really don't have any other tools to move this negotiation along other than just waiting
I mean, I don't think that there are other tools to move it along aside from waiting or military action to be honest because we've seen in previous cases throughout with North Korea as So, it's not just Iran. Pretty much the entire Obama presidency was spent doing strategic patience and then significant parts of the Trump first term, same thing.
And then second term or excuse me, during the Biden administration, very similar. So, with Iran, they were in negotiations prior to the strikes and they didn't go anywhere.
This is where it gets important for this line of sight. So, if you're saying if the US is constantly putting out these threats that never materialise, does that cause something? Yes, it would. If nothing ever happened with them, okay, yes, you could very easily say that ultimately the US cannot be believed on this stuff. It's just, the boy who cried wolf.
Okay, but last we have to keep in mind even if nine times out of ten the bluffs are bluffs back in February Trump took out Al-Hadeed. So there is not nothing here in terms of action if you know what I mean on that front.
So it's not entirely empty and it's sort of creates what Trump wants as this guessing game around him. Whether or not that's in the US interest, I don't know. But it is what he very much prides himself on.
Wilfred W.: I do want to add something that I saw on Twitter. It's taco Tuesday every day until it's not taco Tuesday. Basically, Trump will make these threats that he's going to attack Iran, he's going to do this, he's going to do that. And people like us, we've been following Trump basically since his first presidency.
We can easily dismiss, what we consider a bluff until it gets to a point where you follow through with a threat. And I don't think it does damage American credibility as such because even with Trump chickening out, there's always going to be that notion in everyone's mind, America has the single most powerful military in the world.
00:15:00
Wilfred W.: There's no point in antagonising them unless you're Iran or North Korea or someone on the other side of the world not world rather someone on the other side of the aisle of that conversation. America's military might isn't in question. It's just a Trump tactic to be as ambiguous as possible to keep everyone on their toes…
Agreed.
Wilfred W.: until he actually does do something.
Wilfred W.: One thing I do want to add is that there have been accusations that the Trump administration is using these market-moving announcements to influence how sorry can I take it again?
Okay, three, two, there's also something I want to bring up this idea that the Trump administration is using these proclamations that President Trump is making on Iran, this announcement that war will resume. We're back to, a situation where oil is going to not flow at all through Hormuz.
And, right now we are at a situation where oil flows through Hormuz are at all-time lows, but stuff is flowing.
Wilfred W.: There is an opinion that Trump is using that chaos to manipulate stock markets and make money not just for himself but also for you people with ties to the Trump administration with ties to his family. And I don't have any insights on this. I am not claiming that President Trump is doing this.
I'm not claiming that any insider within his administration is doing this. But it is something definitely worth noting that every single time President Trump makes an announcement on Iran, there are massive trades that have been placed just minutes before with people who seemingly have an insider knowledge of you what President Trump is going to say.
Wilfred W.: And the simple fact that this really isn't receiving that much attention outside of your financial press is concerning in and…
Wilfred W.: of itself because it's emblematic of the kind of corruption we've seen throughout the first Trump administration and has become more widespread in the second Trump administration.
This gets to a broader issue that's going on in the United States of insider trading.
So Congress has this unique status where it can sort of unofficially do insider trading and there have been multiple attempts by various members of Congress to overhaul this.
It hasn't gone anywhere because Congress needs to strip itself of the ability to do this.
Kyle Moran: I am not optimistic that it will pass, and I don't even necessarily know which side of this I come down on because on some level, like banning people from making stock market trades based on information that they may have, it seems to me to be a legal grey area in terms of infringing on people's economic freedom on that front.
But in terms of congressional trades, some of them have been egregiously bad, others have been not as bad in terms of various people. So both on both parties, Nancy Pelosi being like the queen of Wall Street insider memes, if you ever take a look at some of those, she has this incredible reputation because she has outperformed the S&P. 00:20:00
She has outperformed the top hedge funds in the United States for a decade running now. So, she's truly the queen of this. I know Anna Pelina Luna has been pushing very hard to sort of restrict this, but again, it would have to be Congress who sorts of dials in its own legal rights on this.
Now, to the Iran stuff, part of it just comes down to all of these events move. So when Trump announces a ceasefire, oil is going to go up. This is just sort of how reality for this stuff is going to happen. So does that mean none of these people should be allowed to have or own stock?
Kyle Moran: There are cases where they have to put them in blind trusts or whatnot, but even then there's super grey areas because what exactly qualifies on some of this stuff? It gets quite complicated quite fast. I ultimately don't know where to come down on it, but it is worth discussing in my opinion.
Wilfred W.: I do want to point out that from my perspective, members of Congress should be trading stocks. I do not think the president should be trading stocks. I don't think anyone in government should be using the privileged information that they have to make money.
Because if the three of us had a company, let's say we called it our organisation, and we are trading stocks based on insider information that we would go to jail. Why is Congress any different? Kyle Moran: It isn't. So the problem being here is what counts as insider information.
So for instance, if somebody has let's say the stock market was around before the internet. So somebody just being in New York at that time had an inherent insider advantage over somebody in Florida because it would take somebody in Florida a week or a few days anyway to hear about something that happened with a company.
Kyle Moran: And then by the time they put in a trade, especially if you go back before phones, they would have to physically mail orders to New York to Wall Street. So therefore, people in New York just had this geographic insider advantage where they had insider information before people outside.
And the further you get away from New York, the more disadvantaged you are. So to me, this is sort of like saying because the people in New York have such an advantage over the people in Florida that people in New York should not be allowed to buy stock until everybody knows at the same time.
I don't think that that's really legal and I don't necessarily know it should be either.
Wilfred W.: I disagree with that because we're comparing distance and time before the internet to a time when, let me give our audience a bit of a brief on how a lot of trades are executed on Wall Street. Right now, we're at a time when computers are so fast that most trades are not executed manually.
We no longer have a situation where unless you're a retail trader, a single person is sitting down looking for the exact right moment to buy a stock or sell a stock. It's all algorithmic. Wilfred W.: There are so many bots that do this.
So we can't in light of that compare a situation where I wanted to say hundreds of years ago and I realised that that's not accurate. Let's even say 30 years ago when the internet wasn't as widespread and information transfer wasn't happening as fast.
That's why you have stuff like the Bloomberg terminal which was created specifically to solve this issue of how fast information was travelling between stock brokers around the world. And I'm getting on a tangent. Let me just get back to my main point here. 00:25:00
Wilfred W.: You can't compare a time when people didn't have access to information because as you've mentioned geography and the internet wasn't really a thing when the internet is a thing. Everyone has access to information at roughly the exact same time. I have traded stocks. I have worked at a stock brokerage.
It's crushing work and that's why I am here doing you a podcast with you guys today because I much prefer talking about the Middle East and every other single region we cover.
But you can't compare a time when people didn't have access to information now and to people who have access to information that can shape how markets move. Let me give you an example, right? Wilfred W.: If Trump knows for a fact that he's going to promote a company because Trump has done this. I believe it was Palantir, if I'm not wrong.
He specifically promoted Palantir and even mentioned their stock ticker, which was the very first time an American president had promoted a company with its stock ticker in his personal social media messaging.
And it came out that Trump had bought Palantir stock just weeks before, and after his post on Truth Social, the stock went so high – I might be misremembering this – but he made a profit of more than 90% just from a single post.
So if someone has the ability to influence markets to that degree and they're actually using that to make money, Wilfred W.: Isn't that unfair to everyone else? The Trump example is a bit extreme. Let's look at members of Congress. If someone is in a defence committee, for example, right?
They have access to information about defence contractors that most people won't have. They have the ability to use that information to again make money. So, that idea of privileged information is what I'm trying to get at here – that some people have access to information that nobody else can have simply as a result of the position they hold.
Kyle Moran: Sure. Wilfred W.: Not because of any geographical advantage, not because of any inherent internet advantage. It's just they only know this because they work in Congress or because they work for the president. Kyle Moran: I mean, I do get that the geographic thing is not a perfect analogy.
I use it as a philosophical exercise to show how this sort of information has never been as equal as people may make it out to be.
Kyle Moran: But that notwithstanding, something that I would very much be in favour of is making it so that congressional trades and any public staffer or whatever has to disclose them immediately, maybe within 24 hours, because right now they have to do it within I think 30 days, but then they have very minimal fines for the next 30 days after that.
So, a lot of times you don't even hear about it for two months. By that point, it's long gone. But I'll use this case as an example as to why that might not be as advantageous for the American people as you may be making it out. Kelly Loughler, I don't know if you all remember – she was a brief senator from Georgia.
She was the queen of it, if Nancy Pelosi was the House version, Kelly Loughler was the Senate version. Kyle Moran: So, back during when COVID was first coming out, she was a huge COVID sceptic. She's like, 'This is fake. This is not going to be anything.' Blah, blah, blah.
Meanwhile, she was dumping her stocks left and right because she was in these government briefings and she knew damn well it was going to be a huge thing. And she was lying to the American people. And you know what? She wasn't putting her money where her mouth was.
If the American people could see that in real time, actually she's selling all of this stock because she knows that this is going to be a big deal. That completely exposes her for having lied about these things. And I think that that is a type of transparency a lot of Americans would appreciate. 00:30:00
As to the more hardline approach of if she should just be banned from selling or buying stock to begin with, first off, I mean, that just discourages a ton of people from even running for any of these seats without any real reason why.
In my opinion, I don't necessarily see the reason we have to outright ban it because if Congress has almost become something that people run for this, which is a problem, I do admit. I don't like that. That's sort of part of the job.
But if you also make it so that you're incredibly financially disadvantaged, so you can't have a Robin Hood account if you're in Congress, that's going to discourage people from running. So that's the other extreme in my opinion.
Kyle Moran: But beyond that, in terms of what actually is accomplished here, I don't see that the sort of transparency that Americans are looking for would be accomplished by just banning these activities altogether. Kyle Moran: I'm fully aware I am in the minority opinion of Americans on this, that I do not want to present this as anything other than that.
Kyle Moran: But I will defend it nevertheless as being more in what would help in the long term in my opinion than just outright banning because I think the Kelly Loughler situation is such a clear-cut case of you can see these people lying in real time and…
In a way that no other act would actually accomplish. But anyway, I digress. Evan Moloney: And Wilfred, I see you want to jump in. Go ahead. Wilfred W.: Okay, just a final point and then we can go back to the Middle East ever.
So, okay, we don't want to ban people from trading, why not just put all their money into an ETF or an index fund? That's simple as that, if the American economy is doing well, let's pick something simple - the S&P 500, the Dow Jones.
If the American economy is doing well, and if the executive is acting in the best interest of the American people, those index funds usually go up. What will incentivise the congressional leaders, Wilfred W., to do well if their money isn't tied up in those kinds of index funds? And it automatically removes the whole idea of insider trading.
Let's just put our money in an index fund. That's my proposal.
Because then you're forcing sales on massive amounts of stock which trigger capital gains. Wilfred W.: Okay, true. I do concede that point. But at the same time, how are we going to get rid of the vast corruption that has become endemic? How are we going to do this?
Just make this stuff public so that everybody can see there's an automated fund right now that you can put money in and it just tracks what Nancy Pelosi is doing. Okay, it outperforms the S&P. The problem being it's so delayed. Kyle Moran: So, you're buying 30 days after the fact. I will send you guys this after the fact.
But this stuff is really like if people have insider knowledge and you trust these people. By the way, these insider traders don't even always make money. Marjorie Taylor Green was an insider trader who lost 60% of her investments. So, you've got to work towards getting there. But it's not even that guaranteed.
So, on some level, I mean, you've got to be cautious copying these people.
But it's not this g this. Wilfred W.: I do want to point out that some people are just really bad at using whatever information they have. Wilfred W.: MTG, God bless her soul, but if you give me the kind of insider information Congress has, I promise you I will beat Nancy Pelosi at this.
Kyle Moran: If you come at the queen, you best not miss - that's my best advice there.
Alright, on that, I'm going to do a hard cut off of this discussion because we are too far gone at this point. Again, American Politics podcast really making a strong pitch for itself in the Middle East round table. I will make a note here just moving away from the US insider trading element of this conversation.
One of the things I spent a lot of time looking into is illicit finance and financial liquidity across the globe as it relates to whether it's support for non-state actors, whether it's support for regime elites in various countries, kind of moving their money offshore and hiding it in different places.
By the way, recommendation for anybody watching or listening - Between the Lines by Adam Rousell is an excellent Substack and I highly highly recommend it for this reason.
I bring that up to say the financial picture here, as it relates to the Trump family specifically, as it relates to a lot of these business interests that are very tied in with them, is much murkier than it would necessarily first appear. Insider trading is a large element of what's happening here.
It is also one of the more obvious components of a developed system that exists well beyond them. This is not only their doing by any means, right?
But the tools of illicit or kind of grey zone finance that exist today, especially through cryptocurrency exchanges, especially through the use of physical, in-person, non-tracked markets to launder cash, all sorts of things really go well beyond what regulators are able to keep up with right now.
So, on that note, just to point out that the finance questions that are swirling around this conflict, especially given the Trump family's proximity to nations that are pretty deeply tied in with all of this, the Emirates, be even the rival government in Libya, not the internationally recognised one, but the one under Khalifa Haftar, which the Trump
Administration has gotten a little bit cozier than we might have expected.
They are clearly enjoying connections with all sorts of folks around the world who are deeply enmeshed in this sort of thing. So, as we move on, something to keep an eye on. Not necessarily that we're going to get any answers from it unless you can move faster than regulators, which if you're listening and you can do that, let us know.
We would love to talk about how we can parlay your services into some work with France.
I do want to move on to Iran, however, because the US was not the only nation making grandiose threats today or yesterday. So, this morning, as of the time that we're recording, the IRGC, essentially threatened to extend the Middle East conflict beyond the region if the US and Israel were to resume attacks against Iran.
Quote the regional war that was promised will this time be extended beyond the region, and our crushing blows will bring you to ruin in places you cannot imagine. So, first off, what do we make of that statement?
And then beyond that, what do we believe the risk of an actual attack might be against other targets, especially given some of the information we saw recently about the expansion of Iranian missile range beyond what they had kind of politically agreed to constrain themselves to. And we'll throw it to you first on this one.
Wilfred W.: So I want to start this response by saying a couple of weeks ago, I think it was two or three weeks ago, I did a segment on the briefing room, which I hope everyone who's listening to this catches, talking about a group in the UK called Hay, which stands for Harakat Ashab Alamin al Islamia.
And apologies if I am butchering any pronunciations there - Arabic is not one of the languages I speak. But it's a group that since March, basically, has been conducting low-level, low-grade kind of violence throughout the UK and in other countries in Europe, including the Netherlands.
And their most brutal attack to date has been a stabbing attack, which saw two men injured. This tells me that Iran has already worked to expand the war far beyond the region, as Hay has been identified as an arm of the IRGC's Quds force, which handles their international partners and international proxies.
And what makes Hay really difficult to handle is the fact that they don't use ideologically hardened operatives - the kind of people you would expect to align themselves with the IRGC and can be easily identified as a threat. Instead, they use people with criminal backgrounds who are just looking to make a quick buck.
This has made it extremely difficult to constrain. So, that alone, the fact that Iran has activated Hay as a terror cell, is proof that they have the capability to expand the conflict far beyond anywhere where you would expect it to be. And they're doing this with very little risk to the IRGC itself.
None of the people who've been arrested have any direct links to the IRGC. They have no direct links to Iran, and they're disposable, which is a whole new way of thinking about your asymmetric threats.
Wilfred W.: So, yes, Iran does have the ability to expand this war. And I do want to insist here that so far, all the attacks that this group has carried out have been low-level, low-grade kind of violence. None of them have involved a firearm. None of them have involved what we traditionally expect of a terror attack.
So, if Iran is serious about this threat, we could be seeing a lot more violent attacks that use firearms, etc., throughout Europe, if that's the route they decide to go.
So, part of this references the attack on Diego Garcia, the little island outpost in the South Pacific. But the problem here is that this has put significant parts of Europe also in range, which previously was not thought to be within range of the Iranian attack.
I'm not entirely convinced that this is quite as much of a code red as some are making it out to be. So, I believe it was two missiles that were shot at Diego Garcia. Both of them were shot down, or one of them was shot down, and I think one of them just didn't even make it - it just entered and crashed back down to Earth. Yeah.
So, the Iranians - that's their maximum limit right now. And it clearly is not that sophisticated. Personally, I wouldn't want to put that to the test in terms of betting the farm on the fact that they couldn't reach, but their missiles clearly are kind of struggling to reach those targets.
But more broadly speaking, despite their extreme aggression towards their neighbors, they have shown a restraint against firing on Europe, if they have the ability to, in part sensibly, because it would just drag the EU into the equation. I mean, that would probably be what it takes to, and it would be irreversible at that point.
Europe would be fully team US at that point, in my opinion.
But beyond that, in terms of widening the regional calculus, I sort of struggle to see why they would do it in the first place, for that very reason, because you're going to wind up in a situation where you have even more people wanting and pushing for your country's and not country regime specifically elimination.
So, overall, I don't see necessarily what they get from that other than potentially thinking they'll increase pressure. Because I view them as being poor readers of the situation, they may actually do that.
As we've seen with their neighbours, it hasn't worked for them at all in terms of regional attacks,…
Especially on countries like Oman, which was their friend. But overall, could they perhaps? It is something that I would definitely keep an eye on. 00:45:00
And that threatens to mature a little bit this week as well as we saw some other statements out of Iran essentially implying pretty heavily that they may go after undersea telecommunications cables. Evan Moloney: So these are cables that run underneath the Strait of Hormuz. They connect much of the Gulf to a fair portion of the rest of the world.
They also route traffic from elsewhere to other destinations just through that waterway.
For those to be cut, for those to be disabled, severed, whatever it would be a pretty major hit to global telecommunications, global finance, especially as it relates to the Gulf States, obviously, right, where we see on a day-to-day basis the inflow and outflow of the equivalent of billions of dollars worth of energy-related trades.
Evan Moloney: All kinds, I mean, you look at what the Saudis and the Emiratis, especially the Kuwaitis, have done to make themselves really a global financial hub in so many other ways, whether it's logistics, whether it's tourism, whether it's sports and culture. A lot of money moves through the Gulf on a daily basis, and all of it relies on those cables.
So how salient of a threat is that if Iran is really starting to look in this direction?
I would say that that's much more of a threat than the attacks on a wider region, because this could further double down on their strategy without adding to the list of hostile forces gunning for the Islamic Republic. I just can't see an attack on Europe being anything other than a further blunder by the Islamic Republic.
So when it comes to internet connectivity, this could be something that actually further hurts the region, which I don't think helps the Islamic Republic either, but they seem to think as though it will.
Kyle Moran: On this topic, there have been discussions per NATO diplomats that the alliance is reportedly planning to begin a transit operation through the Strait should Iran continue its blockade. This could begin as early as July, which is not exactly an expeditious timeline, but it is something.
So as Europe starts to enter this more, I do think that that could be the only thing that sort of tips the scale here if Iran's sort of on the fence, should we actually do this, should we not? That could be something that tips the scale.
As well as the internet connectivity, because at that point if you have Europe trying to bypass your blockade of Hormuz as well, then there's really nothing left to lose.
Wilfred W.: As you guys have said, if Iran chooses to attack the undersea cables, then it will probably have a lot more success than in attempting to extend the conflict to the wider region.
I do want to point out here that to me specifically, Iran's threats of attacking the undersea cables are very reminiscent of what Russia has been threatening throughout Europe as a whole, and it points to the ever-growing links between the two regimes.
We've known for a long time that Russia has been aiding Iran through the provision of satellite images, through the provision of intelligence. Wilfred W.: But if Russia is providing Iran with the technical know-how of how to attack these undersea cables, I'm not saying that Iran didn't have it on its own.
But if Russia is, the one that is providing the capabilities, the equipment, the know-how to do this, then that will be a very big escalation on Russia's part.
So, I do want to bring in the possibility as well as Iran discusses an expansion of strikes that Iran could also begin to target other US bases in other locations across the globe.
If they don't want to expand to Europe, there are a number of other bases that the US does maintain that have had their air defences drawn down to support this offensive in the Middle East. So, looking at places like Egypt, one. Cyprus would be another. The US has bases and a true presence in Somalia. It has a true presence in Nigeria.
It has a true presence in Kenya. All of which are well within range if strikes on Diego Garcia are within range, right? That is within the same radius.
Evan Moloney: So is there any potential as you see it for a lateral expansion of the conflict away from Europe to these nations that are part of the global south that don't really have the geopolitical incentives to throw themselves into this war right now, but who may be vulnerable both in terms of their own native air defences and what the US still has on
Site?
Wilfred W.: So as someone who lives in Kenya, this is a question that is extremely pertinent to me because there was that fear very early within the very first days of the war that the situation you described could happen, that Iran could turn its attention towards bases within the global south that aren't necessarily as well protected as your bases
Elsewhere.
And I do want to preface this by saying I have had a couple of conversations with the Iranian ambassador to Kenya ever since the war began. There has been a deterioration in the relationship between Kenya and Iran, not necessarily because of Kenya's ties to the US but because of other economic issues, specifically tea exports.
Wilfred W.: So with that in mind, there is a very real fear still among the Kenyan people that Iran could execute such an attack. But the Iranian ambassador told me that such an attack isn't on the cards. And obviously, there's no way in hell he was going to tell me, Wilfred, we're going to attack all the bases in Nairobi.
There's no way in hell he was going to tell me that. But I don't necessarily see it as something that Iran is going to do. Iran, even with the context of the sort of geopolitical beef between Kenya and Iran, the two nations enjoy really close ties. And I'm focusing on Kenya because that's the relationship I know best.
Wilfred W.: I don't necessarily know how Iran relates with other countries in the global south. Iran has very close relations with Kenya as a whole. The Kenyan people, a large majority of them, at least within Nairobi, the capital, are very sympathetic to Iran's cause. They're very anti-western. And I don't think Iran wants to jeopardize that.
One thing that Iran has proven really capable of doing throughout this war is having people on its side either through some of the funniest social media memes you'll ever see or through just being funny on social media rather. So Iran knows the importance of soft power.
They're not going to squander it by attacking bases in the global south even if they host American troops unless and if America starts using them to attack Iran, and given America has a host of options within the Middle East that are closer and better positioned, I don't see that happening.
Yeah, I basically agree with that. The only thing I don't agree with is that Iran is a good reader of its soft power. It has burned so many bridges. This is a point I keep making because it's so just blowing to me that they've gone to this extent, and you can see the backfiring on when it comes to their system they want to set up in the Strait of Hormuz.
They want to do this toll system in part with Oman because they both share that air neck of the woods, but it turns out Oman's not really that willing to set up shop with them after they've been bombed by them for a month and a half. So I don't put a lot of faith in the strategic decisions that the Islamic Republic makes on all of that.
But I do in general agree with this idea. I don't think that they have much to gain at all. They have a plethora of US bases they can target elsewhere, especially with drones and their militias in Iraq have been very aggressive in terms of targeting the UAE as well as Saudi Arabia and then American bases throughout the region as well.
I don't really see it as being in their interest.
Again, I'm not putting a lot of faith that they will withhold that they will stick to that. They've misread the situation many times in my opinion, but in general, I agree.
Let's talk about those Iraqi militias because also a couple of days ago now, we learned that the United Arab Emirates had come under attack at its only nuclear power plant.
According to the Emirates, this was a drone that flew in, I believe it was one of three from the presumably launched by Iran-backed militias there, that struck an electrical generator at the facility. There was no radiation leakage, but even still, it's an attack by an Iranian proxy against a piece of nuclear infrastructure. Reactions.
This is not obviously the nuclear dimension is kind of the thing that underlies this entire war thus far, and it's one of those lines that we are really hoping isn't crossed here isn't crossed in Ukraine isn't crossed when the time comes in Taiwan, so on so forth, right?
So as we kind of wiggle up toward the precipice here in a way that we don't see in very many conflicts
What do we think of that expansion of Iran's or the malicious target?
Wilfred W.: For me, this was one of the single most surprising things that has happened throughout the war. I expected the UAE's nuclear plan to be attacked only if America carried out strikes that were so devastating against Iran, it felt it had no option but to pull the trigger and pull the entire region down with it.
Wilfred W.: When the desalination plants were attacked, I assumed that's the kind of attack that would get us to this kind of threshold, not Iraqi militias for whatever reason choosing to remind the world that they have the ability to target such an installation, and it points to a broader issue that we will discuss later in the podcast about Iraqi militias
And...
Wilfred W.: Whether the new government of Ali Zedi will be able to handle them. But for me, the fact that a nuclear installation was targeted, shocking, absolutely shocking.
To me, this is a clear warning shot. They hit this generator, in my opinion, very purposefully. This was not intended to hit a reactor or anything like that. So the fact that there was no radiation wasn't entirely surprising here. I think they want to send a message that we can hit the most critical infrastructure you have.
Their messaging on attacking various oil infrastructure equipment has not sent that message. So they upped their game.
So I think that is far more likely than a more regional, beyond the region escalation. They have such a hatred for the UAE. It's very difficult for me to understand because they also use the UAE as their bank, and so much of their funds have been locked up in Dubai and Abu Dhabi at this point.
If they attack the UAE's nuclear facilities, they're just completely writing that money off as gone. And they were moving it there in January. So, this has just been such a poorly thought-out strategy in my opinion, at least.
If anyone has any other thoughts, I'm all ears, because I cannot make heads or tails of what their strategy here is, but that pushes the UAE closer to
Wilfred W.: One thing I do want to point out is that the UAE is increasing its alignment with Israel, not only during this war but just slightly before, as a potential reason why Iran could hit them a lot more than they have in the past. Just throwing that out there.
The IDF now has Iron Dome interceptors in the Emirates as a result of this.
Wilfred W.: But there was no realistic situation where even with all their money, a significant amount of their money tied up in Abu Dhabi and elsewhere, the UAE and Iran are going to be anything more than friends of convenience and business partners. There was no so I also want to point out one thing.
But yeah, I completely agree. But the problem being like what changed? Because in January, the senior leadership, including IRGC people, were moving significant amounts of their own personal funds from Iran to the Emirates. And then all of a sudden it just snapped, and they're like, "Okay, let's give them 50% of everything we're firing off to in the region."
Wilfred W.: There was a report, I think it was early this week or late last week, that the UAE was conducting covert military operations against Iran.
So depending on when these military operations began, if they started around the same time as Israel and America's strikes, which was the 28th of February, that could give us justification from Iran's point of view.
All the reporting I've seen is that was much after. Kyle Moran: So especially the bombing campaign was of course after I mean Iran was launching on them day one of this operation. Yeah.
Yeah, there's been more direct confirmation that they were hitting just before the ceasefire, but it appears based on leaks of planes that had to be Emirati in the sky just because no one else flies that kit in the region, probably around mid-March that started.
So, I will take this there's just a sensible explanation as to what this strategy is supposed to entail other than we hate the Emirates.
Yeah, maybe this is a good point to bridge into some other nonsense that came up just last night. This one reported by the New York Times. Going to illustrate a
This is so good.
I'm going to illustrate my situation here. So last night, I, out for drinks with a couple of friends, catching up. I'm walking back to my car just down the street, and I glance at my phone, and the name that I see on my phone in a New York Times notification is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Blast from the past.
I'm going to read you the notification, then we'll get into a little bit more of the story. So here's what Evan from fronts.co saw at about 7:45 last night, quote, "The secret plan at the outset of the US Israel war in Iran, free Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and put him in power."
So, a little bit of background on this. He's been in house arrest for a bit. He's been just kind of sitting waiting for the regime to decide what exactly they want to do with him. Possibly just kind of let him marinate and then leave him in his situation unresolved. Who's to say?
His home was apparently targeted by Israel on the first day of strikes not to kill him but to get him out of house arrest.
This is quoting now from Osen Defender, one of the better open-source outlets that we follow, designed to free him from house arrest and place him in a position to take over the country, following the excuse me. Wow. Evan Moloney: Following the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
So the idea was that Israel, with the US's consent, would kind of clear the way for him to begin aggregating power and eventually challenge the Supreme Leader. Evan Moloney: It appears that did not happen. Quoting again, after the near miss, he became disillusioned with the regime change plan, aka, hey, you just dropped a bomb on my house.
What was that about? Disillusioned with the plan and halted further communication with Israel. He has not been seen publicly since then, and his current whereabouts and condition are unknown. He was reported killed after the first day of strikes, I believe, by the second day, twice. Kyle Moran: Twice. I have to jump in. Evan Moloney: Fascinating.
So, I'm just going to open the floor here. Not even going to do a little prompt. Just how are we feeling about this? Kyle Moran: This story has been something I've been so fascinated by for no rational explanation, but I just from the outset had this gut feeling that there was something going on here.
And it's starting to make sense because none of the official story just did not make sense. He was apparently under house arrest.
Kyle Moran: The former president of Iran was under house arrest, and then they bombed his house, but he survived after originally thinking he had died, and then it was thought that he had been targeted to be as an escape method, and then it was reported he was assassinated once again, and then he came back from the dead again.
So it's really just been this guy has nine lives type of situation. So on all of this, it's fascinating to me the lack of coordination between Israel and the United States on this. You would imagine that this would have been banged out ahead of time.
If anybody in the DoD or whatever may be listening, this should have been banged out ahead of time rather than figuring out what the heck to do with him after. 01:05:00
I have to imagine there's good intel that he is in fact working with Mossad or at least was prior to this, given how much faith they ostensibly placed in him. But it's just very difficult for me to see how him coming to power after having already served as Iran's president as a hardliner would actually be able to accomplish any of what Israel wants to.
That said, I also think that they must have some pretty good intel that he'd actually deliver on stuff to actually back him like this. But I don't know. Kyle Moran: Perhaps they thought he would be the Iranian Deli Rodriguez. Wilfred W.: I want to preface this by explaining where I was just as Evan did when I saw the news.
So, in my little hiatus last week, I decided to give up alcohol. And when I saw this story, I was you taking a walk trying to replace that the dopamine from alcohol with just, natural stuff. And I have never seen a story that made me want to drink more than this simply
Wilfred W.: Because of the kind of person, Ahmadinejad... He's a guy who at one point said he would like to see Israel wiped off the map. He exactly. Kyle Moran: Many times. Kyle Moran: Many times. Wilfred W.: So when I said this story made me feel like drinking, it's because one, I simply couldn't believe it.
And two, how did I really want to know how the communication between Mossad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad happen? At what point did they approach him? How did they decide that this was going to be our guy? And what had he offered in terms of concessions?
Because yes, if he was going to be a Deli Rodriguez figure, he must have offered concessions because as we've seen with Deli, she's deported allies of Maduro. She's gotten them out of power. She's opened up the Venezuelan oil industry to American interests. So, what kind of concessions had he offered?
Wilfred W.: And again, it's so ironic that we went from Ali Khamenei to the guys running the IRGC right now, Vahadi and crew, because of Israel's and America's operations, we went from someone who wasn't necessarily a moderate, not really a hardliner, just somewhere in between two guys who are extreme hardliners running the country right now.
Evan Moloney: Yeah, that raises a question as well
Because Trump had that infamous quote in I believe the second or third day of operations to say, "Yeah, no, we were going to do regime change here, but we killed our choices for regime change." Oops. So possibly that was who's to say? Again, that's not known. Kyle Moran: He's still ticking though. Kyle Moran: He's still there.
Evan Moloney: They specify he's not been seen or heard from really
Since he went off the grid pretty close to the start of this. Kyle Moran: Yeah, but he's not dead is... what I meant by that.
Wilfred W.: So, if he's not dead, let's just assume for a moment he's not dead, what are the odds that the IRGC makes a public spectacle of his execution just to send a message to the West? Kyle Moran: I have to imagine he's getting the heck out of Iran if he hasn't already.
Kyle Moran: I mean, he was freed from captivity under house arrest on February 28th or… Kyle Moran: March 1st. So, if he's still around in Iran, I mean, it might be over for him, but I have to imagine he's left.
Evan Moloney: Yeah, I would have to guess that he has taken a long walk to Turkmenistan and… Evan Moloney: then a quick flight to Russia and probably a third location after that. Kyle Moran: Yeah, the Russia thing is it's almost comical to me. There's going to be like this club of former dictators just hanging out together in Moscow.
Kyle Moran: You got Bashar, you got Ahmadinejad. Who else we got? I know there's several more, but they're going to be all hanging out together. Evan Moloney: Yeah, those are the kind of parties I do not ever want to attend. Evan Moloney: One more note before we close up for the day because we're going a bit over time now.
Let's take a turn to Iraq, where I'm going to just bring up the question of their political transition right now because I know both of you have many thoughts on that.
Wilfred W.: Iraq is a very fascinating place because it has gone from being ruled by dictators to basically being in the palm of America's hand and not being able to take a decision, without America's approval. And Kyle and I have spoken about this a bit in past broadcasts. There was a leadership vacuum in the country.
They didn't have a full-time prime minister, and the guys who are standing for the position had received a lot of pushback from Washington because one of the guys, Kyle, remind me his name, please. Wilfred W.: The guy that Washington didn't want, because of his ties with Iran, because he oversaw the complete security of Maliki. Kyle Moran: Maliki.
Wilfred W.: Yes. Maliki was one of the main leading contenders for the prime premiership. But Washington basically said, if this guy becomes your prime minister, you're not getting anything from us. You're not getting any of the money that's coming in for your oil. You're basically getting nothing, and Iraq can't operate without it.
So they went with a complete political novice, someone who has not held political office before, a gentleman by the name of Ali Alawi, that I mentioned earlier. Wilfred W.: And one of the things that Washington wants from him is the dismantling of the Iranian-backed militias within Iraq.
Wilfred W.: And my immediate question was, does he have the political capital and the experience to take down these militias that have been in existence much longer than he's been a political figure? So, what do you guys think? Kyle Moran: Yeah. Kyle Moran: So, Iraq has been in the world's most awkward love triangle.
So, it's not just the United States who has influence over them. They're equally split, 50-50, between Iran and Washington. Some days you may lean one way, some days a little more the other way. Both Iraq badly needs both, which, before this war, was awkward enough, and given the current situation, is even more awkward and more of a balancing act.
Kyle Moran: So, when Iranian-backed militias are launching attacks on not just US bases but also Arab allies of Iraq, it's Iraq that has good relations with many of the countries Iran's militias are firing on, at least had, and now Iraq is sort of being caught up in that because the Gulf countries are saying, you guys have to get this under control.
You cannot just allow these militias to be firing on us. So, part of this Maliki's legacy was just absolutely awful in terms of the sectarian divides he instilled in the military. He just fired people who weren't Shia.
Kyle Moran: He packed them with Shia loyalists and basically just led this huge buildup of stagnation within the Iraqi army that ultimately culminated in the rise of ISIS and the complete collapse in cases like Mosul. So, I don't think it was in anyone's interest in Iraq to have Maliki be prime minister.
I don't think it would be in the Shia, Sunni, Christian, or anyone else's interest because his legacy is just so bad on that. So, when it comes to any of the other contenders, the problem was that other than Sudani, who was a caretaker PM, there weren't a lot of great options, in part because nobody really seems to want that job.
It's a difficult position to be in. I don't envy him at all on it. So, when we talk about I don't think he's capable of delivering on disarming these militias at all. I think that Washington wants somebody who's less openly pro-Iran than Maliki. The PMF, this umbrella force, was sort of put together by Maliki after the total failure of the Iraqi army.
So you can sort of see the logic there. But in terms of dismantling them, this is the same case as Lebanon. Once these things get embedded deep in the country, they cause a complete political gridlock because they have such outsized influence. They can just declare their own foreign policy, begin their own wars, and drag the country in along with them.
And Iran has been very willing to back groups that are willing to do that to countries throughout the region.
So ultimately I would love to see these groups disarmed and folded into the Iraqi state. Whether or not that actually happens, I'm not holding my breath. I think this was a case of a lesser evil rather than any ultimate good in itself. But that gets to my broader pessimism as to the stability of the Iraqi state.
All, and on that note, today unfortunately we have to wrap it up because we are about at time. But thank you both for coming. Any other observations? Anything to watch for the upcoming week before we log off?
Wilfred W.: For me, one thing I do want to watch is when will the US stop being involved in the region? Because it will happen at some point if a deal is not reached. And on that note, I also want to see if Washington and Tehran can actually agree on a deal if that happens. That's the best-case scenario for everyone involved.
But if not, then we'll be back here with more war reporting.
Yeah, I agree on that. It does seem, at least to me, that an eventual resumption of hostilities is almost inevitable in a way. It's just a matter of when we get there and how we get there and the circumstances that lead us there.
But the clock is ticking and it doesn't seem as if this wait-and-see strategy is going to get us all the way to the Iranian collapse that Washington seems to want.
And keeping an eye on all of that as well as any impact from the blockade that may or may not come through. I have been laser-focused on what Iran is able to actually set up in terms of tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. This has to be my number-one issue at the current moment because it would set such a terrible precedent for the international shipping system.
And we will have an episode out on this front either next week or the week after. Not sure entirely, but keep your eyes peeled for that.
All in that case, thank you both very much for coming on. Again, this has been the Middle East round table. I am Evan Moloney at Fronts.co with Kyle. If you're listening all the way through, then we have a feeling you're one of our premium subscribers. If so, then thank you for all that you do to help us keep the doors open, and retain our independence.
It means the world to us, and we look forward to bringing you more soon. Thank you very much.
Free newsletter
Warfronts Weekly
A free briefing on conflict, defense, and security. Delivered Tuesdays, with the Blitz on Fridays.
Membership
Fronts Insider
Enjoy benefits with your membership including:
AI Answer