Middle East Round Table: When is a Ceasefire Not a Ceasefire?

Hello and welcome to the Middle East Roundtable at Fronts.co. I am Eben Maloney, head writer for Warfronts. With me is Wilfred Miner, you go first. Hi, my name is Wilfred Miner. I am the Africa correspondent for Fronts.co. And I'm Kyle Moran. I am a staff writer here at Warfronts, mostly covering Middle East.

And today we are here to talk about a number of developments from Iran, but I think we all know the big one. And as of last night, the U.S. and Iran agreed a ceasefire of some kind. And we say of some kind because we're going to be talking about the competing proposals, the differences in understanding that we've already seen.

So, Wilfred, you have been working around the clock trying to get our Warfronts update ready. Why don't you tell us a little bit about what's been happening, kind of where things stand right now? Thanks, Eben. And around the clock is really underselling it, considering you and I were up at about 3 a.m. my time. I'm in Kenya, for anyone who's wondering.

We were up at around 3 a.m. my time just waiting for Trump's 8 p.m. Eastern deadline to pass. And he had promised that if that deadline passed, an entire civilization would be destroyed, which is perhaps the single most escalatory statement we have had in this war.

So, with all eyes on Trump, all eyes on Washington, trying to figure out what will happen once that deadline passed, at around 6.32 p.m., President Trump posted on Truth Social that after talks with Pakistani Prime Minister Shabazz Sharif, he would be implementing a two-week pause on any attacks on Iranian infrastructure.

And this would be a double-sided ceasefire, which is Trump's own words, where both Iran and Washington would pause attacks on each other and on any other infrastructure in the region. Israel, as an ally of the U.S. in this war, would be involved in the ceasefire.

And according to Shabazz Sharif, in a statement that he had made on Twitter, Lebanon was supposed to be included in the ceasefire, but from a statement from Prime Minister Netanyahu, it was not included. So, as it stands, what we do know is that there is a ceasefire in place. What we don't know is what it covers and whether it will hold.

That's part of what we don't know. And already we've seen a bit of continued attacks, actually in both directions. We've seen continued attacks, we've seen continued friction in Lebanon. Kyle, could you speak a bit about kind of the after the ceasefire and what we're kind of starting to see emerge as the new?

We'll see you on occasion one more time to chime in Yost Brown Now, I'll be back at the court of 2013, points of friction right now. Yeah, there's been a lot of back and forth going on, specifically as it pertains to Lebanon, with Hezbollah operating specifically in the south there.

Israel has been hitting Hezbollah positions hard in the country in what's been described as the biggest strike since the war broke out. But this has been a very interesting series of confusing statements because Pakistan's prime minister said that Lebanon was included in the ceasefire. Israel has said that it was not included in the ceasefire.

Hezbollah has been very publicly saying that if Israel does not abide by the terms of this agreement in terms of withdrawing its troops from the south of the country, as well as ceasing to strike, that their forces would initiate a larger scale attack on Israel itself.

So they're threatening to essentially collapse the peace deal before it really even kicks off. Meanwhile, we've also seen Iranian launches on Emirati locations as recently as, I believe, two hours ago. So the peace is more of a relative concept. There definitely has been a cessation of U.S. and Israeli strikes.

Whether or not that is upheld throughout the region remains to be seen. Sure. So zooming out, looking at all of this, kind of the grand view of everything, right? First question to both of you, can this ceasefire hold at all? Are we counting down the seconds until some kind of escalation just brings us back into full-scale conflict? Does this have a shot?

In my view, the answer is, it depends. On Friday, as we're recording this, today is on Wednesday, April the 8th. Friday will be April the 10th. On Friday, the U.S. and Iran are meant to conduct negotiations in Islamabad to iron out the issues between the two sides.

And in my view, it needs a lot of genuine, open, frank conversations from both sides for the peace deal to hold. Regardless of whatever escalatory actions that might happen while the ceasefire is in place, if there are genuine attempts by both sides to have a conversation, I think the ceasefire might hold.

And again, this is a really big if, given what we know about ceasefires in the past. Evan, as you mentioned, I was working on an update for war fronts on what is involved, on what would be necessary for the peace deal to hold. That was one of the things I covered. And one thing I mentioned was, since the October ceasefire between Hamas in Gaza and Israel,...

Israel has violated the terms of that ceasefire more than 390 times, about 393 times, according to estimates from the UN. So despite that, the ceasefire in Gaza seems to be holding, and that's a whole relative conversation. But regardless of whatever escalatory actions happen, Iran and the U.S. genuinely need to talk to each other.

And if they do, the ceasefire will hold. And if they don't, well, you know, you and I and Kyle will be up at midnight again, just rising and rising again. I think that may be inevitable. I just don't know if it's going to be for this conflict. Kyle, what do you think? The strongest thing that this ceasefire has going for it is that it is time limited.

It takes a serious act of dedication to collapse a two-week ceasefire. That's not to say that it can't happen. It could. The people, the group most willing to collapse it right now seems to be Hezbollah, if Israel does not stop striking, which by all indications, they're not going to stop striking Lebanon. So that is sort of the wild card to me.

But in terms of what happens after the two weeks, that's much more pertinent here, in my opinion. Because calling off these strikes on Iran for two weeks, that doesn't necessarily set either side back. Both of them are able to get daily life a little bit more back to normal.

But in terms of what actually comes after that, you're going to have to have these sides sit down. And we saw just yesterday, Iran put forward its 10-point plan and the U.S. put forward its 15-point plan. And both of them rejected each other on substantial grounds. Neither of them are willing to agree on just about anything of either of those plans.

So once these negotiations are really getting started, they're going to find out that they're not exactly in a different position negotiating-wise in terms of their ultimate goals than they were at the end of February when these strikes started to begin with.

All right, so in a moment of high ambiguity then, where we have so many different outcomes kind of spiraling out in front of us, let's start gaming this out. And let's start with the stability case. Let's say the status quo as it is now, however this ends up happening, this C-spire holds.

In that case, looking back at everything from this war, I suppose the easy way to phrase this is who won. Who can call this a strategic victory? Who has been dealt the greatest strategic failure? If this is where the Middle East ends up, what is the aftermath of this? And Kyle, let's go to you first this time.

Sure, so I'm not going to call a victor or loser until it's actually over. And so that's why I like this. the two-week ceasefire here is it's a pause, but it's not the end, in my opinion. It may end up becoming the end if they are able to reach a deal.

But again, as I was saying earlier, I don't think that's any more likely than it was a few days ago and certainly a few weeks ago. So there really hasn't been any developments on that front. So while there may be a pause in the action here, it still remains to be seen as to whether the war is actually over.

So when we're framing winners and losers, I think we have to keep in mind that this is very much still an ongoing risk of just kicking off again. Wilfred, do you want to weigh in? Yes, yes, I do want to weigh in.

When you're talking about losers and winners in a war, well, I do agree with Kyle that you can't really you can't really choose or even decide who's a winner and a loser while the war is still going on.

I would argue that as of where we stand, April the 8th, 2026, 2026 rather, Iran is the only country that can claim to a degree to have won something out of this war. And let me make my point.

First of all, first of all, before the war started, traffic was flowing through the Strait of Hormuz, unobstructed, unhindered, without any, without any blockage from Iran's path. And Iran showing that it can block the Strait of Hormuz.

And despite America and Israel's best efforts, best military efforts, they couldn't keep it open, they couldn't force Iran to open it until, you know, the ceasefire was agreed, I think that is a very major strategic victory for Iran.

And this is something that Danny Citrinowicz, an unresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, posted on Twitter a little while ago. I'll paraphrase since I can't remember it correctly. The Strait of Hormuz has now become so important to Tehran that it's on the same level as its missile program and its nuclear program.

So we now have a body of water that, while yes, was previously important to the Iranian regime, Iran now has proof that if they close it down, the world won't necessarily stop, but the world will feel the pain. That's one of the reasons why I think Iran can be considered, you know, an early victor. And second, the regime in Tehran has survived.

Despite America's best efforts, despite Israel's best efforts, mostaba Khamenei replaced Ali Khamenei and...... For all intents and purposes, the regime is still intact. Despite all the assassinations, despite everyone who has been killed, the regime is still kicking its tail in power.

There were claims that protesters would rise up against the regime once strikes began, but that never happened.

And the fact that it didn't happen and the fact that it hasn't happened despite constant strikes against infrastructure, against any semblance of the regime's machinery, the fact that even then, protesters haven't rised up against the government, that's another victory for Tehran. So in my mind, for now, as it stands today, Tehran can be declared a victim.

Yes, I mean, so for starters there on Hormuz, I mean, this has always been a critical component of Iranian national security. They've threatened to close it during previous conflicts as well.

It doesn't take, because the fact that the insurance agencies who underwrite the shipping through the Strait of Hormuz are very risk averse, it doesn't actually take any particularly great military feat to close this thing down.

So any, given just how much coastline they have along this neck of the woods, the fact that they were able to do that, I mean, it shows that they're willing to go the whole nine yards for sure. But when you look at what it actually took, it didn't actually take that much. They struck one ship.

They didn't actually mine the Strait, nor did they attack further shipping. So it wasn't any, like, military genius pull-off that they had there.

But in terms of what that actually won them, I mean, what this has effectively done is solidify the entire Gulf along Washington's talking points that Iran is an existential threat to stability in the region, which was unthinkable even a few months ago, because the UAE, Oman's foreign minister was in Washington the day before the strikes launched.

And now they have been under attack from Iranian missiles themselves. So the Gulf has been very resolute. They've closed ranks and have been clear. The UAE is calling Washington its number one security partner at this point. Tehran's goal was to force the Gulf countries to choose between itself and Washington.

Washington, and they have won in terms of making them make that decision. The result was not in their favor, though. And given how... dependent Iran is on specifically the UAE in order to bypass sanctions, keep all of their money or their regime's money in various sanctions evading methods in Dubai and have the shell companies set up there.

Many of those have already have begun to be shut down, and the UAE is threatening to go even further in terms of actually seizing Iranian assets there. So in terms of showing it's willing to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, I completely agree. They were successful in showing that they are able to do it.

I just question what that actually bought them and how that's helpful at all. So I'd like to think about that just a bit, because point well taken, right? Because Iran has now alienated itself to most of the, I mean, it was already alienated to most of the world, but now any remaining good faith that it had in the Gulf states has been broken. Right.

But how much does that matter?

If we are in a world where increasingly we've seen the breakdown of international law over the last few years, we've seen kind of the breakdown in this post-Cold War order that had been, generally speaking, led by the United States, predicated on a number of assumptions about, you know, international justice and fairness and so on and so forth.

And we can talk about, that's a separate conversation as to how much of that was actually, you know, reflected the way that the world worked at any point.

But all of that to say, if we're at a point now, right, where Iran has demonstrated not only its ability, but its willingness to attack ships in the strait, to attack Gulf oil infrastructure, Gulf natural gas infrastructure, strike desalination plants, right, to display that it can use these fast boats, right, to go out and lay mines in the strait as it

Wishes, in a way that the U.S. and Israel have struggled to really completely stop, right?

How much of that sheer threat of force is going to be able to override the kind of the diplomacy of it all, right? How much does Iran's ability to say, well, we can't exert power in this area and you can't really stop us? How much does that matter? I think it definitely does matter.

And I do just want to finish up on the point of the Iranians not rising up, to your point there, Evan, of using force. The fact that there have not been widespread protests in the middle of a war, to me, it was not surprising.

I found the arguments, especially pushed by some more on the Israeli side than the American side, that Iranians would start rising up as bombs were falling, to be unpersuasive. But again, this followed a massacre in which over, the number initially reported was 36,500, and I believe that went up, were massacred in two days for protesting.

So the fact that, again, they were, they, I agree with you, Wilfred, that they may have won in terms of clarifying. saying to their own people that, yes, if you go out and you protest us, we will slaughter you. But I question what that's actually won them.

To your point there, Evan, in terms of what force can actually achieve in doing this, in terms of regime stability, the willingness to use lethal force like that to intimidate its own people, as well as its Gulf neighbors, is impactful.

The Gulf has taken a hard line against them recently because they recognize the threat that ongoing attacks on their civilian infrastructure pose.

So when Iran is threatening to hit or hitting, in many cases, hitting energy plants and threatening to hit desalination plants, this is going to be something treated as an existential threat for many governments throughout the region.

That may be the case in terms of buying them some more buy-in or legitimacy in terms of what they're actually able to force the region to accept. But whatever they're able to get at this point, it is through sheer intimidation alone. There is no diplomatic buy-in from any of its neighbors at this point.

I would love to pivot a little bit into a conversation kind of more about the Iranian people. And Wilfred, I would love to take it to you, right? So where we have now this Iranian population that has yet to rise up in the way that I think the U.S. and Israel kind of anticipated, right?

What does life look like for people at this point with this ceasefire as written? So for the Iranian people, in the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire being announced, there was a sense of relief that Washington wouldn't go through with its threat.

Because as we mentioned before, this was one of the most escalatory statements that President Trump has put out. And he isn't the most subtle of presidents. And that feels like an understatement. But there was an immediate sense of relief that, okay, we're not going to die tonight. Shit isn't going to hit the fan. Pardon my French.

And we have time for our leaders to negotiate a deal. The only issue is there's a lot of mistrust within Tehran, not just among the leadership class, but among the ordinary people.

Yesterday, when the threats had come out that Washington was willing to bomb Iranian infrastructure, the Iranian people had started to form human chains along critical infrastructures, as was reported by the New York Times. And the fact that they could do that, and they were willing to do that.

They were willing to put their lives on the line. is just indicative of how they view Washington and how they view Israel. So even with a ceasefire in place, there is a fear that strikes will happen because, as we've mentioned in multiple videos, the U.S. and Israel have previously attacked Iran in the middle of negotiations. So it's cautious optimism.

That's the best way to describe it, cautious optimism. And that was really interesting to see. You mentioned the human chains being formed around these bridges, around these power plants. In advance of what was expected to be, obviously, a massive wave of U.S.-Israeli strikes.

So there was a lot of talk in the early days of the war and even before it began about the risk that the U.S. and Israel might take in this moment where the Iranian people had demonstrated a real opposition to their government on a number of different points and issues.

That by now attacking the entire state, you risk unifying the Iranian people around the regime in a way that otherwise would not have happened. Do you assess that has happened or that it's in the process of happening?

I think it's very risky to immediately consider it around the flag moment because despite the U.S. and Israel constantly attacking Iran, despite all the attacks that we've witnessed, the regime in Tehran is still deeply unpopular. In the middle of this war, they executed several people, including a teenager who wrestled on the Iranian national team.

And I believe this was according to Iran International. They have refused to hand over the bodies back to their families. So, yes, while the strikes by the combined forces are deeply, deeply unpopular, the regime is still a lot more unpopular.

From the people I've spoken with, specifically Professor Rockford White at the Taft School, he believes there's about 40% of the Iranian people who are deeply committed to the IRGC, either because of ideological issues or because they're gaining something financially from the IRGC, or they're gaining because the IRGC is in power.

So that leaves about 60% of the nation that isn't necessarily committed. And that 60% is what we usually see when protests, like what erupted in January, that they're the people who take to the streets. But that 60% can be significantly reduced because of the strikes.

But still, I don't think it's significant enough, given just how brutal the strikes against Iran have been. They're caught between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, a regime that has... proven exceptionally willing to kill them, to kill their brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters who went to protest in the streets.

And on the other hand, American and Israeli forces that if they had come a bit earlier, if they had kept the promise that President Trump had made that help was on the way, could have made a much more significant difference. So yeah, they're caught between a rock and a hard place. Kyle, do you have any additional insight there?

Yeah, I do just want to add for some context here. I agree roughly with those statistics, but a big wild card here is the regime has cut off all internet access for over a month at this point. So getting any, the only information that's really coming out of Iran is regime-approved reporters.

There are a few people who have been able to access via either Starlink or a few alternatives. The wider internet, but they have literally just shut off the internet throughout the entire country. So it's very difficult to actually talk to Iranians on what they actually think of this.

Al-Monitor has had a correspondent who they don't name for security reasons inside of Iran who has been able to get a few reports out as well as interview some people who have fled. In general, it really does fall down along those lines of people who are hardcore dedicated to the regime.

Of course, I mean, they will be very anti-strikes and very willing to say that Iran needs to stay the course and not surrender to what it sees as American aggression or Israeli aggression.

The other side being, Al-Monitor's reporter has shown a lot of people fleeing have been saying that their fear has been that the strikes go this far and then stop without actually finishing the regime there, which would leave them in the worst possible situation in terms of, first, you wind up with a much more hard-line regime that learned that because of,

They didn't necessarily allow, but they didn't crack down that hard on protests in December.

In January, they really started to crack down. And the lesson that the regime has taken from that is had they started cracking down sooner, then the big protests wouldn't have kicked off and therefore this whole war might not have gotten started.

And so they're deeply concerned that the IRG, an IRG-dominated Islamic Republic would be, like, the worst possible outcome in terms of quality of life for everyday Iranians. One thing I just want to add on that is how Iran is framing the ceasefire to its citizens.

Iran is framing it, and, you know, this was a statement from... a section of the IRGC, that it had forced America to acquiesce to its demands. And for the Iranian people, hearing that, hearing that the people you expected to be your savior have been forced to negotiate a deal with your oppressors, has to be one of the most demoralizing feelings in the world.

Yeah, I did see this. The regime has been putting out that sort of talking point for a considerable amount of time, honestly. For hardliners, I'm very pessimistic as to how much people actually buy into this stuff. So I really see it as breaking down on a fault line. People who support the regime are going to be like, absolutely.

Iran defeated the United States. It's like all the way there. And people who hate the regime are going to see it and not buy any of it. This happens in a lot of countries with repressive media, where people just broadly don't buy what the state's pushing. They see it and they say, OK, you know, and they keep going about their day.

I'm curious how both of you would weigh in on something that I've had on my mind in covering this conflict, specifically as it relates to the Iranian people and the really interesting approach that the U.S. and Israel took in the early days of the war, right, where we saw these big shock and awe attacks to start out.

And we saw these calls for the Iranian people to rise up and take to the streets when, at least from my vantage point, I've seen this echoed by a number of different experts from various schools of thought that the conditions had not been set in Iran in that time to foster a successful revolution of any kind, or even just a more basic uprising, right, where

You have the U.S. and Israel not focused on distributing weapons to ordinary people and regime strongholds or opposition strongholds, rather, who might have been able to take up those arms, right?

You saw strikes targeting a number of different military priorities, but not focusing on the paramilitaries, right, the besiege forces and other internal policing elements that would have been the first line of response to a revolution, right? You saw the support of Kurdish groups in Iraq looking to come across the border, which ultimately didn't happen.

And you saw that not really be tied into the possibility of a revolution elsewhere. And you have Netanyahu, right, going in and publicly calling on Iranians to take to the streets while the streets are being bombed, right?

So looking back at all of that, thinking about the Iranian people's perspective here, right, people who were inclined to stand up to the regime, what has this war in West? has the U.S. and Israel's conduct told them about where the U.S. and Israel actually stand on Iran and where they stand on their view and treatment of a revolt?

So, in my view, it all boils down to what America specifically said were their main objectives for this conflict. And this might be difficult to pass specifically because American objectives have not necessarily been that clear, considering there's been multiple shifting goalposts since the conflict began.

But one thing that should have been consistent from the American point of view was that they were doing this to protect the protesters, to protect the civilians, to be a positive force for them.

But given that a lot of the strikes have been focused on military installations and degrading the state's capacity, not to inflict harm internally, but to do it externally, it communicates to the people in Iran that, yes, you were important to push the regime to the wall. But once you've done that, your role is over.

Now, all we want to do is make sure that Iran can't harm anyone outside its borders. To the people inside, you're not really a priority for Washington and Israel. Kyle, what do you think? I mean, I don't necessarily know how we could arrive at that conclusion because a lot of this comes down to limitations of an air-only campaign.

So if we're talking about how they could have supported the Iranian people more through bombing alone, I'm skeptical as to the implications of saying that more bombing or a different targeted bombing would have expressed any greater love for the Iranian people.

I don't think that their initial campaigns, the initially stated goals of the campaign were particularly helpful.

And we've seen this in past American and Israeli involvement in various Middle Eastern or not Israeli so much, but specifically American involvement in past Middle Eastern conflicts where they want, we want regime change is what the U.S. is trying to say, but they find other ways of justifying it or saying.

So with Iraq, I mean, the case was regime change and it was made via WMD. They hated the fact that Saddam was in power there. The hardline Iraq hawks in the early 2000s were regime change guys and they would not have been less opposed or less supportive. of regime change had Iraq completely verified its WMD disarmament.

So on that front, I see it in much the same case here, whereas the ultimate goal that Washington very badly wanted was regime change. But because that term has become so unpopular now, and it involves boots on the ground and never-ending wars, etc., etc., it was not willing to say so publicly because of the backlash it would receive domestically.

So therefore, where do you go? You wind up with this sort of like half-in, half-out approach of we'll bomb them until they surrender, unless they don't, and then we'll just target their missile productions and then also bomb the besiege in order to help an uprising, even if it doesn't happen, that sort of thing.

So you wind up with this very like almost wishy-washy thing where it just changes every day what the stated goals are. And ultimately, I think that's one of the biggest issues with the way Washington set out to fight this. In the early days, there was going to be the involvement of the Kurds, but again, that didn't materialize.

We have an episode over on war fronts that discusses all of this. Highly encourage you guys to check that out. But the ultimate goal here was never clearly defined, and so it's very hard to fight a war that you don't know what the ultimate goal is going to be or how to achieve it. So that actually leads directly into the question I was going to ask, right?

Where our team, through war fronts, through fronts, we're very focused on actions, right? Talk is cheap. Rhetoric is flying in all directions. We can discern somebody's intent by looking at what they did, right? Or a nation-state's intent by looking at what they did. And we've seen the moving goalposts be a really fundamental part of this conflict.

So now looking back, right, having the first, what, five and a half weeks of conflict kind of in the rearview mirror, can we look at this and discern what the U.S.'s real strategic objectives were? Or, conversely, can we look at all this and say, well, the moving goalposts were probably an artifact of kind of a lack of a true mission objective on the ground?

I think this is a real difficulty of not having the objectives clearly laid out. Because, excuse me, I'm about to sneeze. Kyle, do you mind taking over for a minute? Sure. Sorry, we'll edit this out, Simon, if you're listening. We'll work on that. So let's just create a moment of dead air.

So in terms of the initial campaign with involvement of the Kurds, there are specific goals that have been leaked via or reported via leaks through the times of Israel, was that they were going to send munitions to the Kurds who would then use it, and I am not exaggerating here, to march on Tehran, which almost is unbelievable to me.

I don't think that the Kurds were ever willing to go the whole nine yards in terms of launching an all-out offensive against the Islamic Republic.

They are willing to go to bat for their own independence, but that opens up another can of worms, and that's another issue with long-term U.S. involvement in the Middle East, but where we're not understanding the importance of, we're not prioritizing the long-term stability of the country in exchange for what we perceive to be short-term gains.

So at the beginning of this conflict, one of the biggest issues was that their strategy seemed to have heavy dependence on Kurdish participation in not just rebelling locally in Kurdish areas, but actually outright marching on Tehran, according to reporting in the Times of Israel, which is an extraordinary development, given how unlikely that seems to me to

Have ever materialized.

Israeli intelligence apparently was saying that if this actually kicked off, the Kurds would do their part, which I can see them going to bat for their own areas, but the Kurds are a small force.

The idea of them just outright marching into downtown Tehran and setting up shop as the next, or to help usher in a new government there, seems just unrealistic on the face of it.

And that sort of gets to the broader issue of American foreign policy depending too heavily on short-term gains that don't necessarily reflect broader divides within countries, and we've seen that throughout the wars in Afghanistan, as well as Iraq, that sort of thing, where we don't seriously take into consideration the divides between different groups.

I think something else we need to talk about, just beyond the nature of America's foreign policy engagements, and something else that just came to mind was what happened to the Kurds in Syria.

According to President Trump, and this was a couple of days ago, he said that the U.S. had sent guns to the Iranian people to fight back against the regime, and they had sent them through the Kurds, but apparently the Kurds had kept those guns for themselves, and the president was exceptionally angry with them. promising that they would pay a very heavy,

Heavy price for this.

So, Kyle, to your point about America's engagement with several groups in the Middle East and just their foreign policy in general, prioritizing short-term gains over long-term stability, it doesn't seem likely that the Kurds would have involved themselves beyond brief skirmishes, beyond brief attacks.

Yeah, and to the mention of Syria there, Trump was none too popular with them after he sort of bailed in Syria in his first term. And to be honest, I didn't understand the rationale behind that at the time, and I still can't explain to you what the upside of that was.

It was a very small U.S. deployment there, and so withdrawing them, and they were not in active combat. They were just assisting. But in terms of actually pulling out, it just opened up a whole new flank and made him very unpopular with the Kurds there, which may have come back to bite. Now, again, this is Syrian Kurds versus Iranian Kurds.

So they're all Kurdish, but there are distinctions there. How much of that actually played in, I can't tell you for sure, but I have to imagine the memory of Washington not delivering back in 2018, 2019 may have held through to today.

Yeah, just to weigh in here as well, there is a—one of the things I've been consistently surprised by is the—what appears to be a lack of strategic forethought in a lot of areas in this U.S. campaign, right?

Where if you look at the—to stick with the Kurdish example, if you look at the idea of a Kurdish offensive, right, was it necessarily realistic, right, that we have a few thousand Kurdish troops marching on Tehran? No, not at all. You could roll the dice and see if you get Syria 2024 again. You're probably not going to, right?

Could you leverage a regional force to draw out, right, Iranian ground troops, Iranian short-range weaponry, right, put them on a front line where, you know, you can, like, use their power to come in? Kind of the same thing we're talking about with the resistance, right? Can you get people going to overthrow the government? Maybe, maybe not.

Can you get them out in the streets? Possibly, under the right circumstances, right? And it's been interesting to look at—I mean, you look at the apparent failure to anticipate retaliatory strikes across the Gulf, right? This apparent failure to anticipate that Iran could and would shut down the Strait of Hormuz, right?

At least for me, it has seemed as if there have been a number of missed tactical institutions. opportunities here i don't know if that's an artifact of just wanting to rush into this and rush out of it get it done as soon as possible with a an incomplete understanding of what the demands of this world would be i don't know if it's a political issue in

Washington i don't know how much is really pressure affected into it but i suppose how would each of you weigh in insofar as the u.s is strategic and tactical handling of this object obviously you know all of us can armchair general all day right but at the same time there is a certain amount of at least from my perspective and from what i've seen from

People who were involved in this space as well right there's a certain element of some of these things just don't really match up with what you would expect either from u.s force doctrine or from any other military leader across the globe yeah part sorry about that okay so i think there was let's give it some dead air so that's i can edit this out i think

There was sort of a hangover a celebratory hangover in the immediate aftermath of the venezuela operation where american forces basically took two and a half hours to snatch a sitting president from his highly protected bunker in the middle of his capital city to taking him all the way to washington to stand trial for all the charges that they've brought

Against him and with that in mind there were those in washington that genuinely believed an iranian operation wouldn't take long we've seen a lot of analysts say that trump favors short operations where he can you get in and out as quick as possible and you know with that in mind that i think that celebratory hangover that you they were very successful in

Venezuela they did something that no other american president had managed to do they believed that they could do something similar in iran which you know just showed a fundamental misunderstanding of the battle conditions in venezuela and iran and we'll explain why the very first strike was against ayatollah former ayatollah ali khamenei and when that didn't

Have the effect of forcing the regime to capitulate it extended the war into the seven-week quagmire that we're looking at today kyle yeah so i definitely agree with the venezuela hangover it was a moment of ec of just ecstatic celebration in certain circles in dc where people just couldn't believe that had been pulled off and when you're coming off of that

You do feel like on top of the world where you can just go in and start doing all this other stuff it's going to happen exactly the same as venezuela you know you take out khamenei and then question mark question mark question mark and then you have new regime change you know what are the Those question marks, we don't know, you know, we'll figure it out,

Basically.

The biggest issue here to me is Delcy Rodriguez, the acting president of Venezuela, seems to me to be a far more rational actor than the regime in Tehran, where the regime in Tehran is far more committed to revolutionary ideology, its own, specifically economic, but also security or well-being of its people, I should say, would be a far more secondary

Concern to the regime's survival on explicitly revolutionary lines.

So the regime cannot go because it must be the revolutionary government in the country that sets an example for the region.

And once you're at that point, doing something like taking out the leader is going to have far less impact than it would in a highly personalistic setup like Venezuela was, where you take out Maduro and it's just all of a sudden he's just, the country is way more willing to negotiate with all sorts of, on all sorts of different issues.

Evan, to your points there, I definitely agree there could have been a lot more playing on certain aspects. I have always seen the Strait of Hormuz as being something of an inevitability, which, and this touches on what I was saying earlier, it doesn't take a particular active military genius by the Iranians to actually shut this thing down.

They struck one ship and the whole thing went kaput. I mean, it was overnight. To your point earlier about mining, if they drop a few mines in the Strait, just the very risk of that is going to send these insurance underwriters running. So I think the administration had to have realized that this is the outcome that will happen.

And they took that as the cost of doing war. And so they wanted to mitigate it to an extent and they could have handled it better in terms of working with other powers to get the Strait open faster. But ultimately, I don't think like there's any way that any country can just sort of come in and just like protect the Strait of Hormuz.

I had for fronts a piece on this that looked back at a campaign during the late 80s, early 90s, where we were running escorts through the Strait of Hormuz. But it was, it was very unsuccessful because we had to, we had to have so many ships that actually escorted the tankers. in the. And on the other hand, On its first run, one of the tankers hit a mine.

So, I mean, it was an absolute fraction of what actually used to be going through, just like it would be today, because the strait has only become even more important. So ultimately, I think if you go to war with Iran, like they will close the strait. And there's very few ways to get around that.

Kyle, I just want to push back on the idea that Iran is not a rational actor. So this is actually an idea I have encountered previously, most recently from a piece I was reading by Philip Salzman, who is a professor of anthropology at McGill University.

So Philip and a lot of people have argued that Iran is not a rational actor, because as you mentioned, its raison d'etre is based on a religious objective and a fundamentalist idea of Islam.

But in my view, and in the view of General Martin Dempsey, who was a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Iran is a rational actor, because as you mentioned, if they go to war, if something happens, they will close the strait of Hormuz.

We know how they will react to the real political kind of pressure that countries like the U.S. can create with their military force. So I would argue that all things being equal, Iran is a very rational actor. They know what they want to achieve. They know what is within their control, and they know how far they are willing to go to achieve their goals.

Yeah, so I agree, actually, with the idea that the characterization of them, especially today, as being specifically driven by a religious zealotism, is not accurate. That was true in previous decades. The original Supreme Leader, Hormuzhani, was far more along those lines. He explicitly was calling for the setup of a theocracy, all this stuff.

The Islamic Republic, to me, is devoted to spreading a religion. I don't think it's really like that anymore. I think it's far more indicative of it not being a rational actor by looking at its behavior towards its own neighbors. Why does it hate the United Arab Emirates so much?

Of the six GCC countries, the UAE has received almost 50% of missiles and drones that it's launched since the start of this war. Why is that?

Well, the reason is the UAE embodies what Iran, it's the antithesis of Iran, where it has embraced a more modern sense. of governance that's still in line with Islamic social teaching, but also very, I mean, if you're in the streets of Dubai, you can sense this is a pretty open country on a lot of fronts.

And they have benefited tremendously, specifically after the Abraham Accords, which the UAE signed and recognized the state of Israel. Iran was furious with them.

And even though they continued to work because Dubai functioned as their foreign bank account, the fact that the Islamic Republic is attacking them so heavily, when they could be attacking Qatar, they could be attacking Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia, by the way, has been more anti-Iran than the UAE.

The UAE was trying to negotiate with Washington to prevent this war. But that's what I mean in terms of not a rational actor. A rational actor would not be attacking the country that it is so heavily dependent on for its own finances.

I actually do want to weigh in on this one and kind of push back against that, just because one, on the premise that Iran is acting non-rationally, I think Iran has actually been remarkably consistent in its choices of targets across this conflict. It certainly doesn't follow a rational approach to the world that mirrors, say, Washington's or Israel's.

But insofar as its own understanding of the world, its logic has been very consistent. And we've seen Iran choose to impose costs. Everything that Iran has done during this conflict has been a lateral expansion of the war.

Iran does not respond to, say, a U.S. bombing campaign by trying to bomb the U.S. It doesn't really have the capability to do that, other than attacking military bases. It imposes costs on the rest of the world. And we've seen this with Qatar, where they're going after now a facility that handles, I think it's 20% of the world's liquefied natural gas supply.

We've seen them go after Saudi oil. And yes, the Emirates have substantial oil assets as well. I believe, according to satellite imagery, they've had an oil field on fire for over the last week that has not been addressed, has not been put out.

But if the Iranian regime is prioritizing the goal to target the most important strategic and economic assets of each of these other states, the Emirates' most important asset at this point is not oil. The Emirates' most important asset for a while has been its expansion into this kind of jewel of the Middle East as it kind of frames itself to be, right?

The idea that the Emirates are a safe haven in the Middle East has been the selling point that's meant to take the Emirates out of a world dependent on fossil fuels and into a whatever comes after, right?

The idea that... believe it's just over one in 10 people living in the emirates are emirati right about 1.3 million people in a nation of 10 million right this is a this is a state where if you want to harm the emirates you don't go after the oil you go after the perception of the emirates as this neutral stable place and you look at their strategic

Closeness with israel right where the emirates yes signed the abraham accords the u.s sorry the israel and the emirates are sharing intelligence bases across the persian gulf across the arabian sea across the red sea i mean they are very deeply deeply tied in together on much larger strategic objectives you can see what they're doing in what the emirates

Rather is doing in sudan right or with ethiopia or with somalia and how israel has been very close to all of those efforts where you really have this partnership between the emirates and israel that is not paralleled at all by the saudis by the cutaries by the by bahrain by kuwait right the emirates are really this fascinating case of a of a gulf state

Breaking from kind of gulf tradition and going over toward israel and i think when we look at it in that much larger geopolitical context it does make sense that iran would view the emirates as a much larger threat especially if they've already made the mistake of granting the emirates control over their capital right their their financial capital their

Liquid capital right what can iran do but to reassert power or some perception of we can threaten you just as you can threaten us this is very interesting to me because i actually agree with everything you just said and it doesn't change my argument because that's insistence consistency does not indicate being rational you do for listeners who may not be as

Familiar with these theories in international relations an irrational actor does not necessarily mean that it has to be some all over the place doing whatever sort of dynamic it can be somebody or a state that is simply not acting in its own rational best interest so when you're talking about iran recognizing the mistake of putting its money in the uae they

Were doing this in january i mean the we're going on eight years of the abraham accords at this point i mean the fact that the uae is buddy buddy with israel on a lot of fronts is not any new dynamic and it has it wasn't causing issues before this war they have been attacking the uae is much more than the other gcc countries for many of the reasons in my

Opinion that you were just listing which is that the uae represents the success a successful model in position in transitioning a country away from the oil is everything approach in the region and iran recognizes this as being sort of you must you must make that fail you must make that fail you must make that fail you must make that fail you Because in order

To sustain the idea of the Islamic Republic of Iran being the counterweight in the region, you cannot have a successful Western-friendly state recognizing Israel, all of these things.

And so therefore, it must act along those lines to deliver on just obliterating as much of that idea as it can. And that's why the strikes to eliminate the idea of the UAE being a safe haven or this jewel of the Middle East would be so persuasive to them. Interesting.

There's a lot that I want to poke at, but I want to turn to Wilford because I see you want to come in. Yes, yes, I do. So Kyle, as you mentioned, we were working on the assumption that all our listeners know what a rational and unirrational act in international relations are.

So as you said, an irrational actor is one that goes against its own best interests. And I would argue that for Iran, its best interest is survival above all else.

And by targeting the jewel of the Middle East, the country that has positioned itself as the bridge between the East and the West, where your investments are safe, there's buildings like the Burj Khalifa that are just massive tourist attraction, only one in 10 people are Emirati, you're inflicting as much pain on your opponents as possible to bring the war

To an end as quickly as possible and guarantee your survival.

That's why I would argue that Iran is a rational actor. But it didn't do any of that. They were shooting themselves in the foot. They're literally firing at their own bank accounts. I mean, they have their foreign reserves over there, which, by the way, the Emiratis are threatening to seize at this point.

And especially if after the ceasefire, if the ceasefire does hold out and if the U.S. is able to pull off some, even if it's this like total giving Iran whatever, the Emiratis, I think, would be much more likely in that situation to actually seize some of these Iranian assets because of how much of a threat it thinks that they are.

So on this front, I think that they have not acted rationally at all. They have gained nothing from their strikes on any country in the Middle East because all it has done is turn the Gulf against them in ways that like closing the Strait of Hormuz, that is the actual leverage point that can have actual results in terms of benefiting the Islamic Republic.

On this front, though, there is nothing, there is literally zero benefit, in my opinion, that has come about this. I mean, a considerable amount of downside to the Islamic Republic. Okay, so I just... want to point out two things.

One, the fact that both peace proposals, the 15-point peace plan and the 10-point peace plan, call for an entry to Iranian sanctions. So if, you know, we're looking at a situation where the sanctions are lifted, Iran won't necessarily need the UAE as a sanction evasion hub, because, you know, the sanctions won't exist.

And two, it goes back to the toll of Homo's, which you and I are on different sides of. I think the toll will happen. And if it does, Iran is looking to make about $120 billion, according to some estimates I saw from Reuters. So I don't know. I still disagree and think that Iran was acting in its best interest. Evan, you had a point to make. I do.

And I want to come in and just kind of point out, I think we're dealing with an issue in scale in our understanding of just how many costs Iran believes that it's in its interest to eat over the course of this conflict, right? We talk about Iranian asset seizure in the Emirates.

And yes, that would be a substantial portion of Iran's material wealth at this point. We also have seen Iran has been willing to withstand, if we want to go sector by sector, right? Iran has withstood the destruction of, I believe it's three largest steel production plants, right?

Major, major inhibiting factor to Iran's economic recovery, if it can happen, right? Iran was willing to, Iran did not respond very well, as we do in mid-March to a direct strike on the Southpars national gas field, where most of Iran's domestic energy consumption originates from, right?

But when Israel hit that area a few days ago and took out a petrochemical plant that's responsible for most of Iran's petrochemical exports, the response was very different. Yes, they launched a drone strike against U.S. troops in Kuwait, but it was much less than what we had seen, right? Iran seems to be willing to sacrifice immense amounts of capital here.

Now, we can agree or disagree on the strategic sense of that, right? But it does point to a consistent and clear understanding within Iran of its own interests, right? The loss of this capital that is held in the Emirates is not a non-factor. It's a major threat to Iran, but it appears that it is a threat that Iran is willing to eat.

If Iran is willing to sacrifice major components of its long-term economic potential, because that then indicates to me, right, there is something here that Iran believes that it is paying for with those goods that is ultimately as important or more so that is worth the price.

And if I had to take a guess, right, the idea that Iran can show very clearly that, no, if it is going to find itself in opposition with the Gulf states again, it is very willing to close the strait. It is very willing to target the economic crown jewels of each of these. nations, right? Iran has lost.

I mean, it's going to take a very long time to even do the numbers on how much Iran has lost, right? But at the same time, what they have gained, I think, is a strategic reset of understanding in the Gulf and around the rest of the world, just in terms of what Iran is willing to do as a counter to pressure against it.

I think sanctions relief is not an accident. The idea that the U.S. and Israel and the rest of the global economy are now looking to relieve those sanctions to give Iran kind of a bone here, right?

Like, there is a strategic level setting that Iran has accomplished, where at this point, the response to any dispute from this point forward could be mines in the Strait of Hormuz, could be bombing across them at least, could be whatever you want it to be, right? But that if Iran is challenged, we get here immediately, we get back to the situation.

And I think that strategic level set is so much more valuable than whatever economic assets Iran may happen to have placed into Emirati bank accounts prior to this. My response to that would be two different dynamics here.

The first being the fact if they had previously been stashing away this money in the Emirates, and then decided, okay, you know what, this, we may have to call a loss here and do it anyway, that would be a more understandable dynamic.

But that's not really how this has been playing out, because they were transferring money when to the Emirates when war was clearly a likely potential. As late as late January this year, potentially into early February, when the U.S. was in the middle of a buildup.

So I mean, if you're simultaneously funneling money into Dubai, while planning to launch missiles at Dubai, it just indicates that they're not weighing the costs rationally here, which would be separate from a situation where they're actually saying, okay, yes, we can withstand that loss of previous buildup.

But the second factor being, the Strait of Hormuz, that is something that has never been done because Iran has never been attacked like this by major military powers before. The last war it was in was the Iran-Iraq War. I mean, so all of these things are a new phenomena. But closing the strait has long since been part of their military doctrine.

They threatened to do it during the brief air campaign last summer. But the air campaign last summer was nothing like what we're seeing currently. So I think this is just sort of its logical progression as attacks have stepped up. Yeah.

Interesting. think we could probably go on this subject for a long time but we're a bit in the weeds and i want to take it back out and i want to present one final point that has actually come up as we've been recording so we have some live news updates here we're going to turn to lebanon where i'm just going to go off of what the idf is recording which is

That i'm going to quote from the ap's live updates here for people following along and looking for our sources as we do this quote the military the idf said the operation on wednesday this is a bombing campaign over lebanon right now over beirut included 50 fighter jets which launched 160 munitions at 100 targets in 10 minutes causing widespread panic across

The lebanese capital during rush hour this happened today this happened as we're on this call for a little bit of orientation right this second it is i'm recording in the u.s east coast it's about 10 30 here so about what quick math in my head about 4 30 in central europe and prague where the team is based this is the day after the ceasefire right this is a

Large-scale attack on the capital of a sovereign nation where according to israel right israel's premise for this strike is that hezbollah has now scattered its fighters into lebanon after the ceasefire right what does this attack tell us about the situation in lebanon specifically and what does it tell us about the risk of this conflict going hot again and

Kyle i'm going to start with you sure i think that this just indicates that now that the resources have been sort of freed up from the iranian sector they are focusing even harder on the lebanese front for those who haven't been following the conflict too closely it's been going on for pretty much as long as the war with iran has been they hezbollah dragged

The country into the war when they launched on i believe it was march 2nd they started launching on israel despite having previously given assurances to the speaker of parliament nabia barry that they would not do that lebanon had the most extraordinary response to this that i had imagined possible they had long been gridlocked by on sectarian divides where

The president is obligatory or must be christian the speaker of parliament must be shia and the prime minister must be sunni and it the it has really caused a lot of gridlock there between different communities in particular as to the role that hezbollah plays and while the lebanese state has been so gridlocked hezbollah has been able to sort of form as a

Function as a state within a state there after that launch happened the gridlock briefly just went away the lebanese state banned hezbollah military operations throughout the entire country.

They expelled IRGC operatives who were coordinating with them, and they recognized the Iranian ambassador to the country as persona non grata. Now, they have not followed through and actually expelled him. He remains in this weird limbo state in the capital, but he's not effectively an ambassador.

President Joseph Ayoun was speaking yesterday, or two days ago now, in which he's saying he's still here, but we don't recognize him as ambassador. So at some point, he'll have to find a new job.

But the Israeli strikes, I do worry that if they go too far with all of this in terms of, when I hear talk about annexation of the south of Lebanon, this worries me because some of the rationale behind Hezbollah's existence was as a defender of Lebanese sovereignty.

They've gone to war with Israel on two separate occasions using guerrilla warfare tactics, and Israel had to withdraw from the country both times on not great terms. Israel variously tried to position it as not a defeat. It was semi, at least a failmate, mostly a defeat because Hezbollah was still there.

And Hezbollah had a lot of popularity throughout a lot of the country, specifically for that. But because of what's been happening lately, where the country is getting dragged into wars that it did not start, not for the reason of defending Lebanon, but specifically for backing up Tehran, Hezbollah has really lost its sort of reason to exist there.

I do worry that if Israel goes in too heavy, we would be looking at a situation where that support, at least with the Shia community, which has been deeply divided on this, could at least begin to reassert itself, which would effectively block the state from taking action again. Thanks, Kyle.

I want to add a little bit more color to what Evan has described about the attacks in Lebanon. From what I can see on Al Jazeera's live feed, Al Jazeera's Arabic bureau chief in Lebanon, Mazen Ibrahim, has said that the attacks are reminiscent of Israel's invasion of Beirut in 1982, just to give you an idea of the scale of the attacks.

And he's not the only one with such an assessment. Jan Egoland, head of the Norwegian Refugee Council, said colleagues in the area reporting horrifying scenes of so much destruction and many casualties.

And just to your point, Kyle, if Israel does go too far with these attacks, it could galvanize Hezbollah, it could galvanize so much support for the organization which has been on the back foot for a number of years. And there's also that these attacks derail the ceasefire. An Iranian official told Al Jazeera that Israel would pay for these attacks.

And such statements, such statements, while all the countries should be focused on a ceasefire on the negotiations that will be happening on Friday, such statements are generally frightening for the possibility of this ceasefire just breaking down.

Yeah, the Iranian, it was the Iranian foreign minister, I believe, Abbas Arachi, who was saying that to Pakistan. He's sort of obligated to say these things. I don't take that with too much certainty. Like, I would be surprised if Iran didn't express some support for Hezbollah during all of this, or make vague threats about Israel paying the price.

The only differential between this and 1982, or other such cases, would be, in my opinion, that Hezbollah started this war on explicit behalf of Tehran. And there is widespread opposition to Hezbollah at this point.

Now, as I was saying, I do think that Israel doing something like an annexation of southern Lebanon could be a massive red flag to many in the communities there. But at least in terms of an air assault, this is, to me, something that will be taken as, I can't believe Hezbollah dragged us into this again.

Because keep in mind, this was exactly what was happening on a daily basis in late 2024, after the war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah there as well. So we'll have to see how this plays out. I am concerned to see how all of that ultimately winds up.

But ultimately, I do think Hezbollah is struggling here because of how unpopular it has become, specifically for this reason. So as we stay on this topic of continued violence, I want to raise one final point. I'm still here with my AP live fee.

We've seen a number of attacks reported across the Gulf States in the over nine hours, launched from Iran, as well as attacks against Israel. There was some thought initially that possibly the rogue IRGC elements or communication hasn't really gotten down to the lower levels of Iranian resistance yet.

As of a few minutes ago, Saudi Arabia has come out and stated that they have intercepted nine more drones in the last couple of hours, all launched from Iran. Gulf states are indicating that they are also picking up incoming attacks. So my final question for today, and we'll be back again. Oh my God. Thank you.

Let's see. soon it sounds like for folks who are listening thank you by the way my final question for the day what are the chances that this ceasefire just ends with washington washing its hands of all of this and essentially leaving the rest of the middle east to go and take care of whatever happens after this and wolf i'm going to go to you first i don't

Think washington would just wash it wash its hands of the situation in the middle east because fundamentally one it caused it through you know president trump walking out of the jcpoa and all the attacks on iran since the strike on soleimani first and you know the subsequent attack since i also don't think washington would walk away because of the

Implications for countries in the gulf as we've mentioned this conflict has pushed a lot of countries in the gulf to see things through washington's lens and that's that's perhaps the biggest coup that washington has walking away would mean losing that would mean ceding ground to other foreign powers to take control of the narrative in the middle east so

Without your mind i don't see a situation where washington just walks away it's very unlikely in my view yeah i have a strong endorsement of that of especially the second part there i cannot see the u.s just saying good luck guys it would it would burn one of the biggest victories that washington has had in this whole conflict which is that the gcc is now

Talking like donald trump was about iran a few months ago in terms of they can't have missile programs they can't have enriched uranium this has been a huge diplomatic win for the administration and given how the rest of the war has gone the this would be throwing away probably it's like biggest seat here all right well on that note i think we are at time

Today so i wanted to thank you both for coming on again this is kyle and wilfred our writers extraordinaire at warfronts at homefronts at fronts.co really across all of our broad umbrella projects thank you both for coming on and thank you to everybody who listened to this let us know what you thought if you would like to hear more of this and more of our

Team please let us know and we will come out with more of these in the future thank you for thank you for your support of fronts.co if you have not subscribed yet consider doing so we would love to have you if you have good on you do more of it i don't know well done thank you for your support thank you for keeping us independent thank you for keeping us

Able to cover conflicts like these in new and interesting ways and we'll see you soon thank you