Middle East Roundtable: Saudi Arabia's Pre-Existing Condition.

Welcome back to another episode of the Middle East Roundtable. I am Kyle Moran, and we have a very jam-packed episode for you all here today. When we started this show, it was all Iran all the time, and it's slowly been escalating and graduating into other conflicts as we speak.

But I am not alone today. I am indeed joined by... Fred Miner, Africa correspondent for All Fronts, Homefronts, and everything fronts related.

And Evan Maloney, here with some updates on Yemen. Because last time we all spoke, the Houthi rebels were in the middle of a campaign to try and expand their control over Yemen's west coast, which borders, of course, the critical Red Sea and the even more critical Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which regulates entry and exit to the southern end of the Red Sea.

That is a waterway responsible for about 10% of global trade volume year over year.

It's very important. But the Houthis do not gain control of that land because then they can use drones, missiles, etc. to basically institute a blockade of Red Sea shipping, which would be very bad for the whole world, especially while the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf is also blocked. Unfortunately, we say that about this worst-case scenario.

It has now happened. Over the last week, the Houthi rebels were able to surge to the coastline, first to the city of Mocha, and then pushing south. Basically, to the peninsula on Houthi territory that sticks out into the Bab al-Mandeb.

The Houthis were also able to storm multiple islands, take over the infrastructure there, including one in which an Emirati base had actually been built up fairly substantially over the last few years. So they have now taken that base, taken that territory.

They are now squatting on those islands, kind of looking out into the Red Sea, which is, again, not ideal.

There have been some limited counter-offensives. There has been an attempt by the Saudi-backed, internationally-recognized government of Yemen that has included a push that seems to have challenged control of that peninsula. It's not clear whether or not anybody is currently situated there, or if it's kind of become a no-man's land.

Geolocated posts, videos, photos from the Houthi rebels have kind of stopped trickling in from that area, saying it can be said for the southerly island that kind of splits the Bab al-Mandeb, so some limited cause for optimism that parts of this situation could be recovered.

But that being said, this has been a major escalation for the Houthis, a huge unequivocal victory for them. We've seen Saudi forces, or Saudi-backed forces, rather, in absolute disarray.

Some of these militias that had been intended to fight alongside the Yemeni government had been revealed to be comprised of, like, 80 percent of what's called, ghost recruits, so people who kind of signed their name to say that they were on these brigades, but then never showed up and had been, you know, getting paid, quote-unquote, but that money's been

Going to their commanders and units and so on.

So really just kind of a horrific showing from Saudi-backed forces in Yemen who retreated back to kind of more bulwark territory, which is something we've seen from them before, right? So in late December, we saw an Emirati-backed group kind of take over a fair, large portion of Yemen.

These Saudi-backed forces retreated, gave up basically the entire country, then surged back. There's some chance of that happening here. It is overall quite unlikely.

The Houthis are pretty well entrenched at this point on most of the coastlines they've captured. They're very good at defense in Yemen's highland regions. So tough situation right now for the rest of the world.

We're going to talk about global involvement at the moment, but General, what do you make of this initial Houthi push, and where do we go from here? Well, it's certainly... It's an extraordinary escalation that I didn't have on my radar as being likely to capture this much territory.

I also would have expected a better showing from both the Saudis and the Saudi-backed government, given just how important the battle of Mandeb is. Now, the Houthis have been able to flex muscle over the waterway for years at this point when they so choose, despite not sitting on it.

But this has been... a rather unencouraging set of developments for the Saudi-backed government there.

In particular, the other day, just yesterday, there was a report from the Saudis that the Houthis launched a drone attack on the city of Mecca, which it could have... The Houthis have denied this, and it goes back and forth on where the evidence actually stands for that. But

But... But if the Houthis were doing that, they would be taking a look at where Iran sits in terms of international support and saying, you know what? Let's go even harder at making ourselves as unpopular as possible.

But that aside, there really hasn't been much of any willingness by the international community, including Saudi Arabia's own supporters or allies, especially Turkey and Pakistan, to actually enter the fray here. So Saudi Arabia does not have very many good options left.

So one of the things that Saudi Arabia has been doing a lot of in the past few days before we recorded this podcast is trying to convince as many world leaders as it can that joining the war is in their best interest.

The most recent one I have seen them try to approach is Andy Barnum in the UK. He's the UK's prime minister. And that just tells you how desperate they are.

And I want to go back to something you've said, Kyle. The fact that Pakistan and Turkey have not really lived up to their end of the deal in the NATO agreement, the whole point of that deal was an attack on one is an attack on all. And, you know, they just point jointly.

But the fact that they haven't responded in any meaningful way, is just honestly an indictment of the deal. And it looks like the deal has died, you know, even before the ink has dried. So that's completely disappointing.

There's also the fact that the United States hasn't participated in the conflict so far. It seems that the Trump administration and the Houthis had a conversation and the Houthis managed to convince Washington to stay out of this. And there's some analysis as I saw on Twitter, I can't remember the person, otherwise I would have credited them.

Washington has shown an increasing willingness to talk to anyone and everyone just so that they can get out of conflicts that they have no interest in being a part of. I had something of a little bit going with a friend of the France universe, Pavel Vucic, about whether the US would be involved in the conflict by the end of, you know, the past weekend.

And, you know, nothing really happened.

Because, again, there's such a reluctance within the US right now to just expand any theater of this conflict with Iran. Which side of that bet were you on, if you don't mind me asking, Wilfred? I had bet that because of Trump's general aversion to conflict, he wouldn't get the US involved or conflict to

Yeah, I would have taken the same side on that one there. Good, good. I love it when you're on the same side.

So, yeah, I won that bet. There was nothing on the cards for whoever won it. It was just an empty bet, but an interesting one nonetheless.

Just to show you how much American foreign policy has changed in the past few years since Donald Trump became president, it's significantly different now. So, yeah. That is where we're at.

On that diplomatic point, this has been well played by the Houthis, in my opinion. They are resisting the urge of going full Iran in terms of shutting down Bab al-Mandeb or targeting international shipping. Their focus has been from the outset, specifically on Saudi shipping, in response to Saudi Arabia's blockade of Yemen because of the Houthis.

Lately, during the negotiations that happened last week, last weekend, they met in Oman, the Houthis told U.S. officials that they still consider their ceasefire with Washington to be valid and are not trying to attack American shipping.

So that is, if they can continue to demonstrate that sort of restraint, in spite of what I have to imagine is some encouragement from Tehran to ramp things up, they would be very well placed. But Evan, I'll turn that over to you.

Yeah, and let's talk about the Houthi side of this first because, you know, for folks looking into Houthi rebels and trying to figure out what to make of them, they're not really going to be like your world-beating military or diplomatic group or whatever they may be. They are, however, a lot more savvy than kind of your average non-state actor.

They tend to get a lot further than folks give them credit.

They tend to have kind of a better strategic read on a given situation than people want to admit a lot of the time.

All of that is to say, right, it's not really a huge surprise that the Houthis are looking at the situation and kind of managing to make inroads with the U.S., managing to leverage it to kind of be in the same rooms and the same conversations where decisions about straight security would typically get made. We've said it last week, and we'll say it again.

This is a play for legitimacy, above all else, for the Houthis. They see this as a way, basically, to leverage physical control of a really major global chokepoint to get the world to say, well, to start working with and negotiating with them.

The idea being, even if the world doesn't necessarily love us, even if we keep on receiving condemnations, people still have to engage with us as if we are a nation-state with sovereign control over the straight, which at this point, right, the Houthis have not gained sovereign control over all of Yemen.

At the same time, they are a robust, internally self-sustaining state infrastructure that it's really hard to look at them and say, like, there's nothing even, like, proto-state-like or rogue-state. Like, about this group. Thinking about Iran, right, the Houthis are an Iran-backed group.

They receive weapons, they receive support, they receive training, they receive financial aid, so on and so forth. They are also the toughest Iran-backed group for Iran to control directly. The Houthis very much have their own interests.

They are happy to diverge from Iran when it suits them. And even though the two groups can kind of look at this situation and leverage control over two really important chokepoints to, you know, to mutual benefit, it's not really so cut and dry as to say the Houthis are an Iranian proxy, acting fully as an Iranian proxy.

So as we look at the idea of the U.S. stepping in and the rest of the Middle East starting to get involved, do you think that the Houthis can really leverage this into kind of a greater legitimacy play in the area?

Every time I think about the Houthis and legitimacy, one thing gets down the line. Syria, Al-Sharra, and HTS. It's a similar play that he made, right?

The world might not like me, but I am such a staggeringly powerful religious force that you have to take notice of me, that you have to put your prejudices and biases aside and your personal dislike of Al-Sharra to the side and actually engage with him as a state-level actor.

And of course, Al-Sharra has the benefit of the fact that he got to kick Bashar out of Syria, but that's neither here nor there. So the Houthis have their own needs, right?

And they will be successful in getting that legitimacy if they can cause enough global pain. Because if they can't, then the Saudis will be able to help them and the world will be able to ignore them. Just as they've been doing for the past couple of years.

But if the Houthis are able to cause enough pain on a global scale, and by this I'm talking about pain on the oil markets, we've already seen what happened when Iran had control of just the state of Hormuz. Now with the Babylon there as close to being the Houthis' trust as possible. And what's coming now is that the Houthis want to mine that water body.

This is the best chance they have to just legitimize themselves. Because if people, if the world wants to wants to avoid a global economic catastrophe, their best bet is to actually play ball with the Houthis.

The fact that the US had those negotiations with the Houthis and actually expected them not to get involved in the war tells me they're already at least halfway there to their... to their need for legitimacy.

Absolutely. I think it is worth noting the US and other countries have tried to kinetically engage the Houthis before in Operation Prosperity Guardian when the Houthis were launching these longer range drone and missile strikes against shipping to kind of show their solidarity with Mosk. That was roundly condemned as a failure.

I mean, governments will frame it the way they want to frame it, but if you look at the results they were able to achieve or the non-results they were able to achieve, so to say, you can look at what's happened in the last week or so and say the Houthis are not deterred.

But Kyle, I want to turn it over to you because I know you have a lot of thoughts here as well.

Yeah, so on the failure specifically of Prosperity Guardian, I think that really just demonstrated and showed the Houthis sort of the same type of dynamic that's going on with Iran where, you know, the international community can not just like condemn it, they will actually take military action and you're still there, you're still kicking, you're still

Attacking these ships.

And so that can really be an emboldening factor, even though they were taking losses from the ongoing bombing campaign. It was almost like they were looking at it and saying, is that all you got? So when it comes to this type of dynamic, like in 2026, how does Saudi Arabia go about fixing it?

Well, so much of it has already been tried and really shown as not being particularly successful. So right now, the Houthis have claimed this week alone that they've dropped or Saudi Arabia has dropped 450 bombs in the country. So where does it go from here?

Because it simply doesn't look like they're going to be able to actually accomplish much of anything. And on this front, there is a lot of concerns internationally. But when push comes to shove, the internationally recognized government in Yemen does not have the capability to get this under control.

Saudi Arabia does not have the ability to get this under control. Nobody in particular seems willing to step in with the Saudis. So where does that leave the Houthis?

I think that it leaves the Houthis in a relatively envious position. I want to talk about that figure for a minute. 450 bombs that Saudi Arabia allegedly dropped on Yemen. Those are, in fact, a lot of bombs. 450 airstrikes, right?

That's such a high figure. And the fact that it has had almost no impact on the Houthis' ability to conduct their activities in the way they see fit. That's such a great failure of the Saudi Arabian military system.

And I don't know if it will have any backlash. And I don't know if it will have any backlash on MBS, Mohammed bin Salman, but it should. Because how do you have one of the wealthiest countries in the world consistently having such a poorly organized nation to the point where the Houthis are not as, they're a non-state actor.

So you'd imagine that 450 airstrikes will have more of an impact on them, right? So how does Saudi Arabia, with all of its wealth, with all of its actors to American intelligence, and, you know, so much more, how is it still struggling this much?

Well, I think, honestly, the sort of status quo that Saudi Arabia has been able to enjoy where essentially they didn't opt out of having a military.

They built up some air fighter capabilities. But overall, their ability to sort of sit this thing out and let the rest of the world do the fighting in the Mideast while it sort of enjoyed just exporting as much oil, as possible and getting rich in the process, those days seem to be over.

I think from here, the only real option for Riyadh is to pursue some military buildup, at least.

Evan, I know, I think you wrote an episode on specifically this, though. So do you have any thoughts? - Oh yes, I did. And oh yes, I do.

So Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries that kind of has taken it as well. Indonesia is another really good example of this. And basically buys a whole bunch of military kit from various countries as kind of a geopolitical signaling tool, right?

So when you buy a weapon, you're essentially purchasing a long sustainment chain, right? So if you buy, like, let's say an F-15, 'cause the Saudis have a ton of those. If you buy that, you're now buying 30 to 50 years of support and training and kind of customer service from the US and from, goodness, what makes a F-15?

Oh, wait, I don't know why I'm having a memory lapse on that. But hopefully, you know, Lockheed Martin, don't sue me. But all of that is to say, right, the Saudis have kind of built their military as a signaling tool.

So they'll take from the US, they'll take from France, et cetera, to kind of say like, "Hey, we're gonna be on sides with you guys "for about the next several decades. "You have nothing to worry about "because if we were to cross you, right, "we don't get access to these weapons anymore. "We can't maintain them, we can't use them." Saudi Arabia also is very

Concerned about internal threats to the House of Saud, right?

The ruling house that governs Saudi Arabia. So they try to keep the military intentionally kind of not that great so that they can keep it fragmented. So it doesn't really pose a coup d'etat threat to the Saudi state itself.

Internationally, they rely on proxy forces like the Yemeni government, the internationally recognized government that Saudi supported for a long time. They also rely on mercenary forces. All of this kind of to offset the responsibility from Saudi Arabia itself.

To take large-scale military action. That's going to have to change in some way. It's not clear how they're going to do it.

All of those internal concerns from the House of Saud remain pretty acute. Saudi has not done a great job getting its armed forces into fighting shape.

There's a lot of kind of showmanship that goes on with these like young elite members of families going and doing military services, kind of like their way of proving themselves within the internal Saudi hierarchy, right?

Culturally, it's less of a I joined the military to go and fight abroad than it is. This is kind of a display of machismo and preening and whatever it is. That has to change in some way.

At the same time, that takes real time and investment. And there's just not that opportunity right now, right? The Saudi government could embark on that change.

That will take five, 10, 15 years to really get right. And by then, on current terms, if we take the last few weeks and we kind of project outward, will the Houthis be recognized as either the sovereign leaders of Yemen or possibly in a split Yemen?

It kind of goes back to the Cold War era where you had this one state on the territory that the Houthis mostly control, then another state with the internationally recognized government controls.

We also saw the, not to bring them in again, but the Emirati-backed separatist group that took a bunch of territory last year kind of made a similar play with it. And now they're going to break Yemen in half. There are a lot of ways for this to spiral really, really far out of Saudi Arabia's control before Saudi can get itself together.

And right now, the Saudi government just does not have what it takes to come in and really intervene here.

And to your point about the Houthis and the kind of lessons that they learned from Prosperity Guardian, that campaign was so mismanaged, largely because it both signaled to the Houthis very, very clearly, hey, the West is going to rely on bombing runs and they're going to rely on international pressure to stop you, and that's not enough.

But it also signaled, hey, when you bother shipping in the Red Sea, the entire world really, really, really cares.

They want to step in. They want to create these huge results.

So the U.S., Europe, all the other countries that participated in that kind of gave a game away in those last few years where they really did show like, no, you can force us into a really compromising position, force us to respond with mass military action, and it won't be enough if you bring them in the street.

That's kind of where we are now. - Evan, I have a question for you. As someone who has looked at the Saudi Arabian military a lot more in depth than I have, so there's a claim going around on social media right now.

I don't know if you guys have seen it, that every prince within the Saudi Arabian system, and there are a lot of them, is born with a general's birthright, basically the ability to command the sections of the military, at least.

Is this true? And then second, there have been reports that the Saudi Arabia is enlisting Somali army personnel to fight in Yemen, right? And you know, right now, Somalia is dealing with its own internal crisis.

So how do you see that Saudi Arabia drawing from Somalia's limited military results affecting Somalia's own crisis and its position, its tension further with Saudi Arabia's relationship? - Absolutely, so love those questions.

So on the first one, for the Saudi kind of princess being born with the rights of the general, that is, so there are a few layers to this, right? So on the one hand, the Saudi civilian government is like overrun with memory of the royal family, which it's a giant royal family, like it's truly incomprehensible.

And it's not necessarily unusual for countries to kind of, kind of define military rank, so to speak, to people in civilian positions. So like in the U.S. system, for example, I know the diplomatic corps, right? High ranking diplomats have kind of an equivalent military rank, but they can, usually they don't, right?

But they can, if necessary and in a crisis, use that to kind of put themselves within a military chain of command. So in a way that is part of it. On the other hand, if you are a young Saudi member of the elite and you go and join the military, it's not going to be a very hard time for you.

You know, there's not really a ton of Saudi drill sergeants or high ranking officers who are really going to be trying to put you through the paces. It's more to do with those folks trying to curry their own favor by, you know, being really nice to the 19th in line for this like minor house that happens to feed into the House of Saud, right?

But there's a lot of institutional leeway for young Saudi elites joining the military to kind of use it as just really just an exercise in self-promotion more than anything else.

Now, as for your other question and the involvement of Somalia here, Somalia and Somali fighters are actually on both sides of the conflict. So the Houthis have built up a relationship with al-Shabaab for a few years now.

Al-Shabaab, of course, being the jihadist group that is working to slowly but kind of surely wrap in around Mogadishu and really threaten the security situation there.

There had been some reports from the Yemeni government and, you know, treat this with as much legitimacy or not as you want to, that basically al-Shabaab forces had come in to support the Houthis directly on the ground. Now, as for Saudi, for the Saudi government bringing in Somali fighters on the opposite end, right?

Mogadishu and Riyadh are getting closer and closer right now.

Same with Mogadishu in Turkey, same with Mogadishu in Cairo, so on. It would hardly be a surprise. If the Saudis kind of look to Somali forces for additional manpower.

That being said, Somali forces, Somali forces are really like kind of a two track group where on the one hand you have these small units, not small, but like smaller, a small proportion of the military. They're genuinely really elite. A couple of years ago, we did an episode on war fronts on Dandaab, which is Somalia's kind of leading command and brigade.

Those guys for, you know, for the resources that they have, for the training they have, they're genuinely excellent. Right. These are guys who will sweep into villages and kind of clear it out of Al-Shabaab or whoever else and really do a great job locking down control.

Then of course they have to move on, right?

Because they're kind of these shock troops that are these offensive units and then the regular Saudi military, sorry, the regular Somali military comes in and kind of holds that territory and they are in a word abysmal, really, really, really awful, very prone to routing, very low training standards, very high corruption, all of like the, you know, if, if

You can, then think of something bad to say, and you try to say it about the Somali military, it's, it's probably accurate.

If you're looking at kind of the main bulk of Saudi sorry, Somali forces.

So the question I would have is which of those two groups did Saudi Arabia take, right? Did they take from the commando units? We're now going to be able to kind of spearhead anti-Houthi operations, but are now coming off the front line in Somalia at a time when Al-Shabaab is looking kind of resurgent.

It's, it's been a kind of a back and forth contested couple of years, but Al-Shabaab is kind of creeping closer and closer to Mubadishu. So if you take those elite troops off the front line, right?

Are you handing Al-Shabaab an opportunity, especially when Al-Shabaab itself is so connected to what's going on the Houthi side, or if you're Saudi Arabia, did you take the other group of, of Somali forces, right?

The ones that really are not up to scratch. And in that case, why did you do that in the first place? Right.

Those are just going to fill these kind of empty ranks. Of the Yemeni backs sorry, the Saudi backed Yemeni government and fill those ranks even further with kind of some more empty personnel numbers.

So yeah, certainly it's, it's a tough situation for the Saudis because they really don't have a ton of other places to turn given that the U S and their other allies are not going to step in, but pulling from Somali forces is kind of a lose-lose proposition, no matter how you do it.

So we know for a fact Saudi Arabia got corpse Shushan and Somali personnel in 2015, right to face alongside the Yemeni government.

If we're seeing that it took the same numbers, given what you do know about Somalia, do you think these will come more just from the sheer volume of numbers, do you think it's some more from the commando guys or from the, or, you know, the regular army?

Because I do remember that video you did, it was one of the videos that convinced me that I really needed to work here.

So, yeah, thank you. Well, first thing honored in that, you know, that means a ton because we've of course loved having you on staff and on the round table and everywhere else. So thank you.

And glad to know that, you know, putting that out into the ether had some good results for us. That number 1500 is still low enough that you certainly could make up part or all of it from the commando forces. That said they're already stretched so thin.

I mean, even if you take 300, those guys out the front line, right. You assume that some of them are always going to be in training. Or resting or away from the front lines.

Right. Then you take 300 of the available frontline troops and let's say 1200 of kind of the whole, this territory, that section of the Somali military.

That still is maybe not enough to force, you know, really substantial Al-Shabaab gains, but it's certainly enough where Al-Shabaab can do what it does best kind of creep in around the periphery really the best way I've kind of found to think of Al-Shabaab getting, getting closer to Mogadishu.

Right. If you think of like. Imagine like a, like a big wad of paper towels, right.

This is a weird analogy, but go with me here, right. And, you know, we're going to think of Mogadishu as this big ball of paper towels. Right.

Al-Shabaab is not taking a flamethrower to that thing and just like, you know, bursting it into flames, it's like dripping little drops of water here and there, right. Here and there and here and there and here and there until that whole thing is saturated. Right.

And outwardly it doesn't really look any different, but it's just soaked. Right. And that's kind of what Al-Shabaab has been trying to do and like slowly just glom itself onto the periphery of Mogadishu, wherever it can get deeper and deeper into the city.

And if you take, you know, 300, let alone 1500 guys off the front line on Somalia side, who are really kind of willing to lean on to keep that security. That's going to be a real problem moving forward. It's, it's hard to say how huge of a problem that will be, but it's certainly non-zero.

So I hope that does an okay job answering your question. So let's see if that's, and then for my final question before we transition out to Somalia, I think where you go, that's when we checked out of the conversation for a minute here, I'm going to talk about the technology transfer between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, right.

We know the Houthis are one of the most technically capable of Iran's proxies with capabilities that to some degree rival Tehran's own capabilities.

So how big of a threat is it that, you know, the Houthis and Al-Shabaab have this seemingly ever growing partnerships and you know, how big is that idea of technology transfer between the two groups? Yes, it's huge. It's a huge problem.

So it's, it's less likely, right. That the Houthis are going to, let's say, send like a bunch of ballistic missiles to Al-Shabaab, right. Al-Shabaab would need like the launch infrastructure.

We need to keep those hidden, which is going to really struggle to do. That's going to be less of an issue. What the Houthis can supply is one, just kind of an endless supply of like small arms and munitions.

And kind of the everyday stuff that Al-Shabaab needs to keep up the fight. They can also supply drones and drone components. It would be really dangerous for Al-Shabaab to kind of expand its use of FPV, excuse me.

Wow. I can't say FPV drones today expand its use of FPV drones kind of similar to think of what you would see on the Ukrainian front lines. Obviously bad if Al-Shabaab learns to do that at scale, even worse if Al-Shabaab can kind of set up these like garage factories to produce their own stuff, which the Houthis could certainly help with, right.

The Houthis, by the way, take a lot of these Iranian designs and just like spin up their own production lines, which is kind of impressive and unusual for a non-state actor that's of that size. So in that way, right.

Thinking of the Houthis being able to get their hands, I'm sorry, the Al-Shabaab being able to get their hands on that kind of technology could be a really huge issue.

And then the other side that I kind of. Worry about, especially in this short-term the short-term horizon here would be direct Houthi action against Mogadishu, right. Or against other Somali forces.

If, you know, Al-Shabaab is in position to make major gains in the ground, if they can devote the ground resources to that, and the Houthis are kind of already in this internationally challenged ostracized position, when they feel they can get away with a little bit more, who's to say that we couldn't see Houthi ballistic missiles turned toward Somalia at

That.

Is again, one of those concerns that does feel really out there, even just to voice it, but looking at the situation, looking at how close those two groups are and looking at how, at how much the Houthis would like to have Al-Shabaab and the kind of related pirate affiliates active in the Gulf of Aden to kind of help to assert a Houthi led maritime order.

Right.

It's, it's difficult for me to look at the situation and say, that's not a possibility. If that makes sense. Absolutely makes sense.

So let's move on. From the situation in Somalia, gentlemen, and talk about just how bad an economic impact this is having the entire situation. We'll demonstrate over more as within the Bab el-Mandeb street is having on the global economy, Kyle, I'll throw this to you.

Yeah. So it has just been sort of one thing after another here. So for a little while it was, I mean, oil prices and its related products.

Were still significantly elevated compared to pre-war levels, but it seemed as though the energy market had basically stabilized for a few months there, honestly. And back and forth between the U S and Iran with various kinetic strikes were almost becoming something where the oil market sort of looked at and goes, oh, there they go again.

You know, they're almost banking on the fact that core moves is just a mess that they're going to be lucky.

They're going to be able to get almost anything out of, but at least, you know, we have Suez and we have Bab el-Mandeb and by way of in large part, the Saudi east west pipeline here. So last week on September 11th, the Houthis attack Houthis attacked the Saudi east west pipeline.

This is a massive project that carries as many as 7 million barrels of oil from the Saudis east coast where a lot.

Of the drilling takes place all the way to its west coast to the city of Yanbu, where it is able to export to the north via Suez and through the south via Bab el-Mandeb in the red sea. So overall though, the fact that the excuse me, Houthis were able to not just hit, but actually shut down and at time of recording on September 16th, it remained shut down.

This pipeline is.

Pretty enormous. That was a significant amount of oil that was being passed through and basically being able to bypass the mess in Hormuz. That is a very concerning development.

Now we have seen some indications that repairs may get this thing back up and running hopefully sooner rather than later. I have to imagine if you're Saudi Arabia, you are fully committed to getting this up and running as fast. As humanly possible.

We have seen that the U S energy secretary, Chris Wright said crude could start flowing again within days. That might be a little optimistic. Reuters sourcing has said that it would range from relatively quickly to as many as five to six weeks or four repairs.

That's an enormous time span. So it's hard to pin down exactly where it stands, but point being today, September 16th, no oil flowing. Going through, and we've already seen that I, yesterday, I believe Saudi Ramco canceled all of its September European crude oil allocations and is scrapping every cargo slated for late September loading onwards.

So Europe taking the brunt of it here, but I have to imagine that they're not going to be alone moving forward. And just given how much of this, of the energy markets rely on oil flowing through these various choke points. Right now, it's just Suez that is still fully functional.

And even if Suez is open though, Saudi Arabia can barely get the oil to the West coast to export it, which leaves a lot of the middle, mid east, just sort of sitting around twiddling their thumbs, waiting for something to open up. Yeah. Just looking at the numbers here, Brent crude has not come down from over 100 or sorry, at least over 99.75, if you will.

Since last Friday, we're now seeing those climbing, continue to climb. We're seeing the world really not able to step up here. I do want to go back to the idea of Saudi Arabia's kind of echo tact with Pakistan and Turkey.

Pakistan has basically said outright, we're not going to intervene here to use medical language. They've essentially written off the Houthi threat as a Saudi pre-existing condition, their idea in the situation is. You know, the, this was an issue that you faced before.

This is not something that we're going to come in and really try and change the, this go on because this is not you know, this is not what we signed up for, so to speak.

There's a lot of implications out there with the Mecca path and how this was really kind of more focused toward Israel and the Emirates and that kind of alliance from the start, we're seeing the us not step in. We're seeing Pakistan not step in.

We're seeing Turkey now step in you would think easily. Egypt might be a kind of a candidate to play a role here. They're nowhere to be found.

Europe obviously has a vested interest in making sure that this is locked down. Europe is nowhere to be found. The countries of South and Eastern Asia, right?

So South Korea, Philippines, Japan really can't afford these kinds of energy shots right now. And yet they also are nowhere to be found. So looking at the destruction of the east west pipeline, especially right where you kind of.

Take the Suez canal off the table just by default, because you can't use the Saudi export terminals that rely on the Suez and not the bubble. And it really is kind of a situation where the Houthis have gained the ability really quickly to throttle the global oil market in a way that nobody seems to be willing to weigh in on. We are most surprised by Egypt.

Oh, lack of assistance for lack of a better one, because they are. Sorry. I read this.

Egypt is one of the most important allies in the region and Egypt is one of the most influential. I have states. So if Egypt had stepped in, I don't feel special where other states you're thrilled to step in.

It will have helped rally a lot of support. So for me, Egypt, I have to sense in all of this is the most shocking. Kyle.

Yeah. So Egypt has long had this reputation, the Egyptian government, many Egyptian governments, I should say of basically. So Egypt has long had this reputation, the Egyptian government, many Egyptian governments, I should say of basically.

So Egypt has long had this reputation, the Egyptian government, many Egyptian governments, I should say of basically. Playing all sides very, very well. So they'll tell them that they're on their side.

They'll say, oh yes, we are resolutely committed to whatever is going on at the current time while also cozying up to the other side, telling them the same exact thing they have made for the, and they've been quite good at this. I'm not saying this as a, as like a hit on them, but I also am saying it with the recognition that.

Whenever you think Egypt is on your side, I would just urge a little bit of caution.

I, so there, the whole like Saudi Islamic NATO thing originally, like the whole thing was step. So Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, right. That was not the final result of what actually got negotiated and finalized and agreed upon because I think some of these leaders sort of recognized, okay, I'm not really.

I'm not really sure Egypt is going to be there for us when push comes to shove. So when it comes to like, if Pakistan is pulling a United healthcare situation where it's denied. And here we go.

Yes, yes, I'm sorry, guys. I had it and then I just totally lost it with the United situation, but okay. That's staying in, by the way, we're totally.

Fair enough. But yeah, so if, if Pakistan is pulling that ultimately I have to imagine like Egypt, which didn't even sign on to the accord wasn't going to be too enthusiastic about it. But again, that just sort of leaves Saudi Arabia high and dry.

And that brings in another potential here, something that I have been very interested in.

For the course of the entire Iran war, and that's the relationship that Israel has with the rest of the world and something that I've frequently pointed to, or occasionally pointed to here on this podcast is back in March, I believe, or perhaps early April, the economist ran a piece where it was basically showing the Israeli flag lying on the ground, like

The wind blowing it up.

Yeah.

Yeah. Yeah., blowing it down and then saying Israel alone. And I've constantly been wondering, like, is this going to be something where like the world does move away from Israel or is Israel losing part of the world, but gaining new allies elsewhere?

And so when it comes to this Houthi conflict, in addition to the ongoing situation with Iran, where Saudi Arabia's air force was actually flying with the Israeli. Air Force to conduct strikes for brief periods of time, it's now the Israelis who Saudi Arabia has been meeting with on basically what the heck do we do now?

So Axios reported that Saudi Arabia and Israel with CENTCOM mediating are discussing Israeli ISR and intelligence support for operations against the Houthis modeled specifically on the intelligence assistance that Jerusalem provides to the United Arab Emirates.

The Emirates. Of course, being the signatories of the Abraham Accords and perhaps one of perhaps one of Israel's closest Arab allies. So overall, I have to I do feel like Saudi Arabia is being torn in two different directions here.

So obviously the Gaza Palestine situation front and center to their foreign policy, especially because of domestic opinion on the situation there. But at the same time, if nobody is. Really willing to help them in Israel is also not willing to throw their hat in the ring here just yet, by the way.

But if Israel is willing to provide actionable intelligence, help them coordinate, that's further integration than we saw against Iran. So this is just another step towards them sort of normalizing. But, Evan, I know you have some thoughts on this as well.

Yeah, this is a fascinating situation for Israel, I think, especially on the eve of. I mean, in Israel, the Israelis have a chance to come in and save the day here, right, of everybody else in the Middle East who does seem very reticent to take offensive action, right?

If if you like, say what you will about Israel, say what you will about the government, these are folks where if you show them an enemy of Israel and ally of Iran, you ask them, hey, can you please start bombing over here?

Generally, they're going to be inclined to at least consider the possibility, right? I think we can all at least agree to that at the same time, as you mentioned. Kyle, Israel is pretty overstretched right now, right?

They're looking at the ongoing occupation in Gaza. They're trying to deal with their challenges to be a Hezbollah. They're trying to maintain kind of a pulse on these Iraqi militias that can get involved in this conflict.

And they're trying to remain on guard for escalation in Iran. We're also trying to pivot to their rivalry with Turkey over Syria, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks.

And we're also trying to pivot to their rivalry over Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks.

And we're also trying to pivot to their rivalry with Turkey over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've

Seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks, where we've seen some

Violence in the southern parts of Syria over the last few weeks.

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?

Is Israel able to use this opportunity to get involved kinetically, or is Israel just too overstretched right now to really do anything more than the ISR support that they're offering?