2026: Somalia’s Greatest Test.

2026 will be a pivotal year for Somalia, with an absolute mess of challenges expected to come to a head, all at once.

The nation is rolling into a highly contentious presidential election cycle. Autonomous Somaliland has just had its sovereignty claim fully recognized by an influential world nation. Semi-autonomous Puntland and Jubaland are increasingly opposed to following Mogadishu’s will, and the terror organization al-Shabaab continues to close in on the capital.

So, in advance of a year that could feature many successive do-or-die moments for the Somali federal government, these are the key threats to the Somalia that exists today.

Election Season.

To its credit, Somalia reached a major milestone last weekend, when, in a set of local elections, Somalis across Mogadishu cast individual votes for the first time since 1969. From 1991 onward, Somalia has employed a clan-based voting structure, and prior to 1991, the nation was under one-man rule, courtesy of dictator Said Barre.

The Mogadishu vote this December was a test case, meant to debut one-person, one-vote politics in a relatively safe, stable environment, before the new system is extended to a set of national elections scheduled for 2026. By all accounts, the local vote went well, with decent turnout, and over 1,600 participating candidates across some twenty political parties.

The vote, however, was underscored by government efforts to lock down the capital, in attempts to ward off violence by al-Shabaab. Over ten thousand troops were deployed across the city to monitor the vote, with the nation’s airport shut down, and many major streets blocked off. The vote also took place in spite of political challenges; it was previously postponed three times, across 2025.

Nor has the move to one-person, one-vote been well-received among Somalia’s political opposition. According to the opposition, Mogadishu’s test vote is meant to debut a system designed to keep the nation’s president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in power, in what analyst Samira Gaid described to AFP as a “stage-managed ” vote with “close to zero civilian participation”.

But although it’s entirely possible—or even likely—that the al-Shabaab threat could be used as pretext to flood Mogadishu with troops and ensure a vote in Mohamud’s favor, al-Shabaab is hardly an abstract danger. The terror group regularly attacks Mogadishu, often in high-casualty bombing and hostage-taking attacks, and was able to directly target Mohamud’s presidential convoy in March of 2025.

Outside Mogadishu, the threat from al-Shabaab is far greater. The organization has captured large parts of Somalia’s territory, including numerous population centers, and its presence is expected to be a major obstacle to a free and fair vote. Mogadishu currently lacks the means to defeat al-Shabaab in the countryside, and as a result, Somalians will need to accept a degree of compromise when it comes time for the nationwide vote in 2026.

Somalia’s national election date hasn’t yet been established, but time is short for Mohamud and other national leaders. Mohamud’s first term will end in April of 2026, while the current Somali parliament will be forced to dissolve in May, when its mandate expires. Unfortunately, it would be all but impossible for Mogadishu to liberate all voters from al-Shabaab territory by that time. Instead, Mogadishu will have a choice to make: either postpone the portion of the vote that would be held in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, or allow those areas to vote with the rest of the nation, and thus, allow al-Shabaab to interfere with the process.

Those election-security concerns, plus the rushed timeline of the upcoming nationwide vote, create a situation that Somalia’s current leaders can exploit. Even if he hasn’t announced his personal ambitions, it’s become clear that Mohamud is taking actions that—coincidentally or otherwise—would make it easier for him to hold onto power.

In the summer of 2025, Mohamud agreed with opposition leaders in parliament that while parliamentary leaders will be chosen in the direct nationwide vote, the presidency will still be decided by a vote of parliamentarians. Mohamud has made clear his intent to run in 2026, and he’s more likely to hold onto power if parliament, not voters, decide the presidency. His administration has appointed hand-picked commissioners to oversee the process, and friendly state governments have a history of vote-manipulation on the regional level.

But the incumbent government’s opportunities for a power grab extend far beyond mere vote-rigging. Mohamud could also take advantage of Somalia’s security crisis to postpone the vote, extend his own mandate unilaterally via emergency powers, and, in a worst-case scenario, allow parliament to dissolve before refilling it with hand-picked loyalists.

Nor are national elites in Mogadishu, or clan leaders across the country, likely to oppose moves by Mohamud that would entrench Somalia’s current political system. Somali elites and clans benefit greatly from the nation’s state of endemic corruption, even despite its security crisis and the broader plight of people far from the capital. Allowing a reformer into office could compromise that comfortable state of affairs.

Finally, experts suggest that even the move to universal suffrage itself could pose an opportunity for Somalia’s current leaders to entrench themselves. As Afyare Abdi Elmi of the City University of Mogadishu explained, **via * Al Jazeera***:

“Pursuing universal suffrage without political consent, institutional readiness, or minimum security guarantees does not deepen democracy or sovereignty; it concentrates power in the hands of incumbents while increasing the risk of fragmentation and parallel authority. Instead of addressing these constraints through consensus, the government is engaged in a power grab, deploying the rhetoric of universal suffrage.”

Somaliland, Jerusalem, and Abu Dhabi.

Outside of Mogadishu’s reach, recent events in the autonomous breakaway state of Somaliland have compounded the nation’s troubles in the coming year. On Friday, December 26, the nation of Israel became the first country to formally and totally recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty claim, as a fully independent world nation.

Somaliland has been pursuing independence for decades, although it’s struggled to gain any level of formal recognition for its efforts. Despite being far more stable and politically free than the rest of Somalia, Somaliland’s independence has been fiercely opposed by the African Union. As a result of the apparent failure of its sovereignty claim, Somaliland has witnessed growing authoritarian backsliding in the last few years.

Internationally, Israel’s move to back Somaliland drew surprise and outrage, not just from the African Union, but from the European Union, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other highly influential nations and regional blocs. The United States, Israel’s main international backer, issued a statement reiterating Somalia’s territorial claim over Somaliland, despite increased interest in recognizing Somaliland in some Washington circles.

But although few nations are likely to join Israel in recognizing Somaliland anytime soon, the move still portends a new wave of problems for Mogadishu, and both opportunities, and real geopolitical risks, for Somaliland itself. According to Israel, the nation recognized Somaliland as an extension of its Abraham Accords, opening diplomatic and economic partnerships with a range of Muslim-majority nations.

Behind the scenes, however, the move likely has to do with another key player in the Middle East: the United Arab Emirates. Although Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi only formally normalized relations in 2020, by way of their own Abraham Accords deal, the nations have a quiet, but fairly deep working relationship across the Middle East, North Africa, and the African Horn. Israel and Somaliland have shared only a limited relationship prior to 2025, but the relationship between Somaliland and the Emirates goes far deeper.

Somaliland plays host to a major Emirati-held port, managed by the UAE company DP World, as well as a key military base. The Emirates views Somaliland as a key component of its international proxy network, affording Abu Dhabi a vantage point to monitor vital trade routes, and an opportunity to counterbalance political Islam in Somalia. For a deeper look at the UAE-Somaliland relationship, we’ve recently published **this article**.

For both Israel and the UAE, an Israeli recognition of Somaliland brings tangible geopolitical benefits. Israel and the UAE share substantial intelligence and quietly coordinate on security objectives, which Israel could further by stationing its own foreign intelligence assets in Somaliland. Specifically, Somaliland is a perfect vantage point from which Israel can monitor Yemen’s Houthi rebels, as Jerusalem entertains the possibility of renewed military action in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran.

President Mohamud addressed the prospect directly in an emergency address to Somalia’s parliament after Israel’s announcement, decrying the move as a “naked invasion” that could lead to the use of Somaliland’s territory as a base for Israeli military action in the region.

Meanwhile, the UAE’s wider proxy network is gathering momentum, between a recent proxy takeover of most of Yemen, the continued work of the RSF in Sudan, and growing signs of imminent action in Libya. Between limited resistance from Saudi Arabia, growing political support in Washington, and an increasing interest in countering Turkey, the UAE is working rapidly to shore up its position as a regional power player.

Unlike the RSF or Yemen’s STC, it’s unlikely that Somaliland would be able to march on Mogadishu at any point, and certainly not anytime soon. Even with joint Emirati-Israeli support, it would take the presence of IDF brigades on the ground, to give Somaliland a fighting chance during an all-out offensive in 2026.

Instead, Somaliland is likely to gain in power during 2026, both because Israel and the UAE are poised to take joint action to build Somaliland as rich international backers, and because Israeli recognition of its sovereignty opens up new possibilities for Somaliland on the world stage. At the very least, Israeli recognition of Somaliland may clear the way for the Emirates to do the same, as well as Ethiopia.

For the federal government in Mogadishu, recognition of Somaliland by /any/ world nation—let alone a powerful and influential country like Israel—is a major blow to Somalia’s legitimacy as a national government. Somalia has already struggled to gain the support and trust of international partners, even before Somaliland began to be legitimized as a political alternative, and now, with Somaliland as a clearly more stable, more dependable, more democratized option, Mogadishu risks a slow, but irreversible loss of international support.

And nowhere will that problem be clearer, than in Somalia’s upcoming elections. Somaliland was already going to sit out the election, but with a discussion on Somalilander statehood playing out in the background, it’ll be even harder for Mogadishu to avoid perceptions that it cannot control its own territory. Factor in Somalia’s other two rogue regional governments, and that problem only grows worse.

Rogue Cousins.

The regional governments in question are Puntland, governing Somalia’s northeastern tip, and Jubaland, governing the bread basket that makes up Somalia’s south. Puntland has governed itself semi-autonomously for years, and has its own regional security arrangements with the Emirates, the United States, and other nations, although it does not pursue a sovereignty claim outright. Jubaland is newer to semi-autonomy, but has clashed with Mogadishu frequently since 2024, and declared itself an independent government in early December of 2025.

The governments of Puntland and Jubaland have each indicated their outright rejection of Somalia’s upcoming electoral framework. Their respective leaders, Said Abdullahi Deni in Puntland and Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islaam (better known as Ahmed Madobe) in Jubaland, each fashion themselves as would-be challengers to President Mohamud.

At present, however, it appears unlikely that either man will get a fair shake in contesting the presidency. Ahmed Madobe has been subject to a federal arrest warrant on charges of treason since late 2024, after a Jubaland judge issued an arrest warrant against Mohamud on charges of treason, inciting a civil war, and more. Deni isn’t barred from running outright, but clearly believes that Mohamud’s control over the federal system will create disadvantages he cannot overcome.

Independently, neither Madobe nor Deni are likely to beat Mohamud in an outright vote, either via a nationwide election or via parliament. Either one of them, however, could quickly become a candidate for the broader Somali opposition to rally behind, with the not-insignificant likelihood that in a free and fair election, voters could elect enough opposition parliamentarians to get a rival presidential bid across the finish line.

While Somalia’s political opposition isn’t unified, it’s been coalescing in recent months, including in a recent meeting in the port city of Kismayo, attended by both men. There, the nation’s key opposition leaders agreed to collectively reject both the recent Mogadishu vote, and a future nationwide vote under the current framework, as illegitimate, and they’ve threatened to hold their own set of national elections.

For Mogadishu, then, a semi-autonomous Jubaland and Puntland pose a real threat. Together, the regions are home to some seven million people, all of whom might not even have the opportunity to participate in Mogadishu’s version of federal elections if they wanted to. And, really, support for Mogadishu isn’t exactly strong in either region; instead, each respective local population would probably prefer to engage in a regional vote.

With Somaliland’s population of about 6.2 million people removed from the equation, Puntland and Jubaland combined are home to more Somalis than the entire rest of the country. That means that if the regions chose to host an opposition-led election, then even if it only took place in Jubaland and Puntland, that election would still represent a greater share of Somalis than Mogadishu’s version—even before accounting for voters in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, who Mogadishu’s election probably wouldn’t reach.

For Somalia’s opposition to coordinate a major election between Puntland and Jubaland would, of course, be quite difficult. Not only that, but it would risk pitting Deni and Madobe against each other, in an election where the larger population of Puntland would tip the scales in Deni’s favor, in a one-person, one-vote system.

But if those issues could be overcome, potentially with a power-sharing or autonomy agreement to benefit Jubaland, then there’s a real chance that an opposition election could be a success—and could even harness the support of international actors. As mentioned, Puntland enjoys a close relationship with the Emirates—like Somaliland—and thus, it’s also got easy inroads with Israel. Not only that, but Puntland and the United States have worked together directly for months, in combined air and ground operations against the Islamic State.

The US, like most of the international community, has built and abided by a certain tolerance for Mogadishu. While Mogadishu’s corruption, its outright repression, its failure to combat al-Shabaab, and other problems make it a less-than-ideal partner, it’s certainly better than anarchy. Somaliland is ruled by a single clan with limited sway across the rest of the nation, and as such, the international community has had few, if any credible alternatives to the current Mogadishu government.

Somaliland is unlikely to participate in any election, especially now that Israel has recognized its sovereignty claim, but it could be the difference-maker if it did choose to take part. With joint Emirati-Israeli-US backing, formal or informal, for all of Somalia’s breakaway regions, Somaliland could conceivably secure guarantees for a vote on its own sovereignty, if an opposition government can take power after an alternative nationwide election.

Adding Somaliland’s population to the mix, an alternative vote could represent over double the voters living in territory under Mogadishu’s control, even when assuming that Mogadishu could coordinate a vote in al-Shabaab territory. Unlikely as Somaliland’s participation may be, the separatist state could have a decisive impact on a future vote that its people did take part in—and, given historical precedent in Eritrea and South Sudan, the backing of a new government in Mogadishu could be the deciding factor in seeing Somaliland’s independence recognized globally.

A coordinated opposition election, held across Jubaland, Puntland, and any other areas that choose to join in, could change the game entirely. The US, the Emirates, and Israel are unlikely to back an outright assault on Mogadishu, if the opposition election were to give them an alternative leader to back, but those three nations alone hold enough leverage over Mogadishu to coerce a relatively seamless, bloodless political transition to new leadership, while ushering Mohamud and his allies toward a quiet post-government life.

All three nations are comfortable with the idea of fostering regime change, at least under their current governments. To that end, see US action in Venezuela, Israeli action across the Middle East, and Emirati action in Sudan, Yemen, and Libya, before even accounting for history. Add even limited support from the European Union, the African Union, or the Gulf Cooperation Council, and a transition to new leadership in Mogadishu could be a relatively straightforward process.

*The Jihadist Threat*****.

Of course, supporting that sort of effort would be unusual for the international community. But after accounting for Mogadishu’s corruption and repression, Somaliland’s de-facto independence, and the prospect of a coordinated opposition election across Jubaland and Puntland, it’s the threat of al-Shabaab that could be enough to tip the scales.

Al-Shabaab has made significant gains across central and southern Somalia in 2024 and 2025, taking back numerous areas that were previously wrested away from al-Shabaab during coalition operations years ago. As of now, al-Shabaab controls major highways, supply routes, and parts of the southern coastline, and their fighters are able to travel freely in other areas.

Although Somali forces have been able to drive a degree of progress in the last few months, reclaiming the coastline north of Mogadishu and taking back towns and villages, their work is far from over. Just in the last few weeks, al-Shabaab has made yet another series of territorial gains, and while Somali forces are often reclaiming areas that al-Shabaab is content to abandon, al-Shabaab continues to take strategic towns and logistical hubs that allow it to threaten the capital.

Speaking of the capital, the heavy troop presence across Mogadishu during last week’s elections may have been unpopular, but it wasn’t unjustified. This year, al-Shabaab has carried out multiple major attacks in and around Mogadishu, and it’s believed to be infiltrating the city and setting up scattered extremist cells, while maintaining the capability to launch standalone attacks despite the presence of Somali forces.

In October of 2025, for example, seven al-Shabaab attackers stormed a major underground prison in a six-hour siege. That attack came just hours after the government had reopened dozens of roads in Mogadishu for the first time in more than a decade—purportedly, because the security situation had improved enough to allow it.

Although it’s not encircled in a conventional sense, Mogadishu is a capital under siege, and from the perspective of the international community, 2025 has given ample reason to be skeptical that Mogadishu can continue to defend itself. The push and pull between Somalia and al-Shabaab this year hasn’t resulted in an outright victory for either side, but al-Shabaab has overperformed expectations. Mogadishu has done the opposite.

And if Mogadishu was to lose the ability to collaborate with its breakaway states, that problem could grow even worse. Jubaland and Mogadishu still collaborate on anti-al-Shabaab operations, and together, they’ve succeeded in bringing a growing share of Jubaland back under control, but even though Somalia has lent its Danab special-operations units to the fight, it’s Jubaland’s Dervish Forces that have done most of the hard work in holding that territory.

Puntland, meanwhile, has been more focused on the Islamic State, but it’s proven its worth to the United States as a fighting partner. If Puntland were able to divert its fighters and resources to an anti-al-Shabaab initiative—especially with Mogadishu’s resources behind it—the US and other backers may believe that Puntland could achieve better results.

Other UAE-backed, non-state actors clearly understand the value of offering themselves as a stabilizing regional anti-terror force. For example, take the Yemeni rebels who, immediately following their takeover of a large portion of the country, immediately got to work in anti-al-Qaeda operations to demonstrate their potential value as a counterweight to the Houthis.

Puntland and Jubaland both benefit from those same Emirati ties, and are likely to receive similar guidance from their Emirati advisors, if they’re able to put themselves in position to seek legitimacy as an alternative to Mogadishu. Conversely, without Puntland and Jubaland’s support, Mogadishu would transparently become an even less potent deterrent to al-Shabaab than it already is.

After a 2025 that brought seismic changes across the globe, 2026 may turn out to be a year of upheaval for Somalia. Its current leadership in Mogadishu risks overplaying its hand in these upcoming national elections, at a moment when Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland, the Emirates, Israel, the USA, and al-Shabaab are all poised to exploit Mogadishu’s weaknesses in their own way.

Putting the finer details aside, the end of 2026 will likely see the international community continue to back a Somali federal government in Mogadishu, against al-Shabaab and the other jihadist organizations on Somali soil. But the Somalia of January 1, 2027 may be fundamentally different from the Somalia of today, depending on actions taken by all sides, in the months ahead.

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