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On The Fronts is the Fronts panel on the wars, politics and diplomacy shaping the world. Evan Moloney and Kyle Moran work through the week's biggest developments, from the Middle East and Ukraine to Washington and beyond, and explain what is driving them and what could come next. Full episodes, transcripts and more reporting at https://fronts.co · 33 episodes

Episode · 19 November 2026 · 54 minFree

The Kerch Strait Bridge is Falling Down...

Transcript

Note: this transcript was generated by AI and may contain errors or inconsistencies.

Hello, citizens of the world and welcome back to On The Fronts. I'm your host, Oliver Carpenter, joined by our resident geopolitical experts, Evan Moloney and Karl Moran.

Today we're talking about I'll see you next Ukraine burning bridges, just the Russian kind, how the Houthis, like a bad smell, just aren't going away, and Israel attempting to form a unity government, starting with the minor obstacle that everyone absolutely hates each other's guts.

Right, I'm going to kick us off here because the Kerch Strait bridge that connects Russia to occupied Crimea has been struck again recently. It connects mainland Russia to occupied Crimea, making it both a supply route and a symbol of Putin's power in eastern Ukraine. and of course of the previous annexation of Crimea back in 2014.

Ukraine around 16th and 17th of November has attacked the bridge collapsing its central road span as far as we know there is also a railway span that goes alongside it and that hasn't been destroyed although it was made somewhat unoperational for a while.

Crimea is not cut off but it does squeeze the logistics on the peninsula very tightly. Russia can still supply Crimea through Southern Ukraine, but good luck with that, with the kill zone. Evan, talk to me on this.

What was that bridge actually used for? What was Russia using it for? And for Russia, what's actually worse is losing the road section or the rail section.

Yeah, so earlier in this war, that bridge was really vital to help send logistical support and supplies toward the front lines in the southern Ukrainian mainland. So that's less the case now. Russia has put in a lot of effort into building what you just mentioned as the highway of death, which that's not what they call it.

That's not what they want it to be. They would like it to be this, like, road and highway network that runs through Donetsk to Luhansk and some of the other last near there kind of resupply Russian front lines using supply routes from neighboring Russia.

So, the Kerch Strait Bridge is not, like, critical in that way anymore, but it is still very important to help support kind of the southern sections of the Ukrainian front line, sorry the Russian front line, and then to additionally support the defense of Crimea itself.

So this is a vulnerable, isolated land mass where you're kind of protecting the Sea of Azov on one side and where you're trying to lock down Russia's control of what it sees as kind of the crown jewel of its Ukraine conquest thus far.

You need air defense interceptors, you need supplies, you need troops, so on and so forth to be able to reinforce, and if you lose the Kerch Strait Bridge, you can't really reinforce that without relying on this highway through the southern Donbas that is very, very dangerous right now.

Now you ask whether it's better to lose the rail or the road bridge to rush up.

It is harder to lose the rail bridge, which is the one that's still standing. So the reason for that is it can just kind of transport much heavier loads. So an average rail car is like hundreds of tons versus the average car is like 40 tons.

So if you lose the roadway, you lose the ability to drive smaller trucks more frequently, but overall you don't lose as much kind of transport capacity. But the issue is the rail bridge.

So we've gotten some videos now from people who have sent their recordings over to Ukrainian intelligence who have been crossing the Kerch Strait Bridge and kind of taking videos the rail bridge was working before last night strikes but the they were only sending passenger trains across going very very slowly because they don't want to rattle the bridge they

Want to put too much weight on it because they really don't know what kind of structural damage is there that's only going to be worse now after this bridge has been hit for the third night in four consecutive days.

So that's the situation right now. Right, okay. Well, that's quite comprehensive in terms of the bridge.

Who knew you could get so much talking out about a bridge, but we're going to talk about it some more. Kyle, I don't know if you know anything about this, but Ukraine obviously had to get through Russia's defences in both the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov in order to strike the Kerch Bridge. So how did Ukraine get through Russia's defenses?

And what has made this attack more effective than perhaps its previous attempts where it damaged the bridge but didn't completely knock it out like it has now? One thing I do just want to say here the ongoing three days of attack three nights of attacks in four non consecutive days here has been really really something to see.

So some breaking ish news, we do have indications that despite the railway coming under attack once again, last night, November 19, 18th into the 19th, there is one track that has reopened.

So again, not like existential damage to it but it's certainly operating much slower and much more restricted than it otherwise would have it is hard to overstate just how much infrastructure and military hardware moscow committed to defending this thing they knew that it was a huge it was going to be a huge target and it has been throughout the war given

How much they invested they were able to really prevent any Ukrainian strikes from actually reaching it for the last few years and whatnot but moving forward I have to say this does not have a great implication for where all of this ultimately goes and of course this comes about at the same time that Xi Jinping Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin were all

Meeting together and I don't know if you gentlemen saw but the handshake between Trump and Putin when she was just refusing to acknowledge boot levels was it for the sea yeah yes that was that was really some high school isn't it but it somehow does tell you a lot about what's going on in the world it's interesting.

Indeed so Polish PM Donald Tusk tweeted out simply God protect us from such friends and I have I will let that speak for itself. Well so guys what are the immediate consequences for Russia from this thing is this from the scale of bad to like oh my God this is really bad how bad is it for Russia?

I'd say tactically, we're at about a 5 out of 10. This isn't going to really hugely disrupt Russia's war effort, but it is going to create a resource sink where now you have to take more risks, spend more money kind of trying to protect what remains of Crimean infrastructure when it's already very vulnerable. Symbolically, we're at like a 9.5 out of 10.

I mean, I suppose that we need to leave room for length. Bombing the Kremlin, bombing St. Petersburg, bombing Putin's resort in Valdai, where we kind of hit the 10 out of 10.

This is about as close as a guess without doing that i'm going to go with for tactical purposes a bit lower i'm going to go with like a three out of ten it's significant it's going to be obnoxious in terms of resupplying certain areas it's not going to be too critical and keep in mind that the fact that the railway side of things is still operational it's

Pretty i mean the i i have a hard time seeing how this is going to be a massive game changer but i definitely agree i would go nine out of ten eight or eight out of ten or nine out of ten in terms of optics keep in mind this bridge was only built back in 2016 a few years after they annexed crimea back in 2014 and putin just this was one of his his crown

Jewels he was so proud of this thing so this is sort of hitting them where it's there it's politically very embarrassing then for Mr. Putin oh very yeah and it is important to keep in mind, you're like, the Russian front is not going to collapse because of this.

This isn't going to really like be some huge setback for Russia elsewhere in its fight in Ukraine. To the extent that this matters tactically, it is just like, this is going to be harder and harder to defend, more and more and more expensive to defend. But there's no breakdown that's coming here.

Tell me, Evan, why is that? Because this Kerch Strait Bridge, we all saw the headlines about it in what, 2022, 2023, when it was being bombarded.

Why is its total destruction now, in terms of the roadside at least, not as significant as back then when it was struck before and completely taken out of action, of course, still, but ultimately referable, which is obviously what the Russians then went on to do.

So why is maybe this not... Because I've seen some people talking about how this could be a real game changer, a real way to switch up the war, the momentum for Ukraine, and why might it not be the huge win for Ukraine that everyone thinks it is? Why is it not as significant now as it would have been?

Yeah, so we're going to answer the area of contingencies. So any military in any conflict doesn't want to rely on just one option for its supply lines. You want to be able to distribute as much as you can, whether that's like different routes or different means.

Maybe you can use like planes or boats or you know, railway cars as well as the trust, for example. So the way that Russia has diversified in this particular sense is by building that high rate of effort that we mentioned before through the occupied territories in kind of mainland Ukraine, away from the Crimean goodness.

That is very, very risky right now to take trust through there because Ukraine has gotten really good at using these like AI enabled mid-range strike drones that basically go and like okay so they have these like inventories of what Russian equipment looks like and the onboard AI basically sees whatever is driving matches it to an approved target and does

The kill camera by itself so you don't need to keep connection you don't need to anything else which is like very dangerous for russian drivers obviously who are well trained like military driving is a difficult task so all of that is to say to me relying on that highway network now like close to 100 because the bridge is compromised is going to be

Logistically difficult it's going to be very costly but it will work like if you put a bunch of trucks on that highway and try to get them to the front lines most of them will make it ukraine is not at like a full you know blockade of that road or anywhere close to it yet although who was to say what 2027 will so for now the answer is that Russia has enough

Contingencies in place that it can lose the Kerch bridge and at least not suffer a complete sideline right now.

Okay. Well, that makes a lot of sense. Here's a tough one for you both.

How do we know if this actually changed is anything with the wall? In time, say in two weeks, three weeks, we see Russia struggling on the frontline, you know, go figure what a shock that would be. Or we see Ukraine advancing and we say, well, is this because of the bridge is, you know, how do we know if this actually will change anything in the war?

How will we know if anything has, I mean, in general, a lot of this is just going to come down to a wait and see approach. The fighting has just been raging on indiscriminately for years at this point.

Again, I put this as a relatively low tactical significance, so I'm not really too optimistic in terms of this shaking out in any, like, hardcore, definable way.

But, Evan, if you have anything you're watching, I'm certainly all ears. Yeah, I think there is the kind of, like, immediate tactical discussion. And then when we talk about symbolic meaning, right, yes, that means, you know, Russian pride takes a hit, propaganda changes, so on.

But it also means that countries that are acting in support of Ukraine have more and more justification to believe that they're on the winning side. Now, recently, one of the US undersecretaries, Elbridge Colby, was visiting with NATO folks and kind of made the argument that Ukraine needs to stop its deep-ring strikes. They're not working.

They're not efficient. They're not worth anything. you know, unbeknownst to him, Ukraine is going to sink if it curbs that same might. So a little bit of egg on his face, right?

But it kind of underscores this idea of like, there is a real messaging war among Ukraine's allies and countries that are frankly looking less and less allied with Ukraine every day with the United States about how and why and where to support Ukraine best and Ukraine by, you know, showing that can do something like this and a really complex multi-day highly

Successful operation shows if you back us on long range strikes, we're going to continue to produce results.

We're going to continue to advance.

And so I'm curious to see in the next few weeks how much confidence this gives to the European Union, whether it changes any of the thinking in Washington, whether we could even see potentially a little bit more distance between Putin and Xi on this, if China believes that Russia is starting to degrade to the point where it really may not be able to protect

Some of its most important economic investments.

On the whole Washington front, though, do you think that this would move the needle? Because I mean, I hear your point certainly on Elbridge-Colby potentially not having comments that aged very well, but overall, the lines seem to just be relatively drawn in the sand here.

I don't think that the Ukraine skeptics in the administration are going to really convert at this point.

And despite the fact that there is significant support for Ukraine amongst congressional Republicans, there, this is still something of something that the legislature just has such limited power over.

Well, I think it's going to be difficult to really know until we get there, but at the same time, as you say, a lot of congressional Republicans would like to see more support for Ukraine, so would incoming congressional Democrats.

It's going to be much, much easier now to put different Ukraine funding packages, different Russia sanctions bills, so on, so forth, on Donald Trump's desk and I think that raises the question how much can he veto right how many times can he look at these requested aid packages and so on and say no I'm not doing that I'm not supporting and we're not gonna

Send aid when a majority of lawmakers make it very fair they would like to see that it said I don't necessarily want to predict an outcome.

I think it's just as feasible that Trump can kind of like, you know, draw his line of the sand and stick to it for the next two years. But at the same time, I think there is a little bit of room for real political machinations there to shift at least the US's stance on Ukraine in the next few years. Right.

That makes a lot of sense to me. One more question before we move on. In less than five words, say, or less than ten words, how would you both sum up what this looks like for Putin on the current world stage meeting with Trump and Xi?

Evan, I'll go to you first. Yeah, I'll give you two words utter humiliation I'm going to find a different approach to that this is a sideshow for him he would he is humiliated by it but he's if he has to choose between the meeting with Trump and having this bridge I think the answer on which is preferable is pretty clear there.

That said, I understand that was way more than five words or 10 words.

Apologies. Yeah. On that one, I'm going to say Evan wins Carl, but that's all good.

Right, pivoting on now, we're gonna be talking about Yemen because the Houthis are winning. They're winning now and they weren't winning before. Listen, you guys know the Houthis.

You know them from their award-winning performances in "Dude, Where's My Cargo ship and yemeni at the gates these guys are an iranian government backed militia whose ties to the area goes back many years especially northern yemen in the end of the 20th century when yemen stopped being two countries and started becoming one a dictator at the time called salah

Was in power yemen united in 1990 under him.

The Houthis then emerged from the north Zayidi Shia community and fought the government for years and years. After the Arab Spring forced Saleh out, he allied with his former enemies, the Houthis, helping them seize the capital in 2014 of Sana'a.

And that is pretty much from after that how the Yemeni civil war has been a total mess so having said all that with after saudi arabia intervening in things like 2015 we had a truce in 2022 but the wars kind of resumed and on november the 15th government-aligned forces announced that they were withdrawing from positions around bab al-mandab which is one of

The most important waterways in the world for trade and that has unraveled a six-week saudi-backed counter-offensive against the houthis so i'm going to go to yukal first for people who know the Houthis mainly for attacking ships, who are they actually fighting inside Yemen?

What do the Houthis actually want? Yeah, so this has been sort of a long-term ongoing situation where the Houthis are a lot more domestic focused than the rest of Iran's proxy groups.

So the Houthis are essentially a separatist group inside of Yemen trying to establish and to a large extent have established their own state within a state there.

By and large the issues that they're focused on are those that concern their own government. so despite the fact that they get all sorts of weapons all sorts of various explosive things from their buddies in the Islamic Republic they do have they have been focused almost exclusively on Saudi Arabia keep in mind Saudi Arabia has imposed a blockade on Yemen

For years because of this and you know, we can get into the nitty gritty of if that was a wise idea or not.

But the idea was to try to cut them off and starve them out.

Obviously, that did not work very well. And thus we are here. Over the summer, the Houthis announced that they would be imposing a blockade on Saudi Arabia.

Something that I have been very focused on in despite all the back and forth going on with the Houthis v Saudi, they there has not been any recent attacks on Saudi shipping. So the blockade with that did look as though it was going to really escalate over the summer really has been kind of lackluster.

And I think that this is something that's going to have pretty major implications for if the energy crisis in the Mideast resumes and kicks back up to previous like the summer levels overall i think that we may be in for some if the hoothies continue to take more territory keep in mind they just took back a broad swath of the coast along the babelmendeb but

Evan is also our resident hoothy expert here so certainly interested to hear his yeah absolutely so to speak on the blockade a little bit so this was a declaration a bit with these made a few months ago basically saying you know we're going to strike ships in the rin sea but only shouting ships head to saudi ports a lot of reasons for that we don't really

Need to get into the background there today but what had happened since then is the houthis struck saudi shipping for a little while and then they pivoted almost completely to striking Saudi targets on Saudi soil within a country.

So that includes pipelines, that includes major cities, that includes, like the oil state company headquarters has been hit several times i believe the reason for that basically is for the houthis this is all a play for international legitimacy they want to take over yemen's territory they want to present themselves as you know people who you shouldn't be

Recognizing as the heads of a sovereign state.

And to do that, especially in the months of uncertainty between the US and Iran and Israel over the broader Middle East conflict, they had been concerned about kind of over striking or over threatening less sea shipping now the bottom end of straight this is the southern entrance of the red sea not only does like 10 to 12 percent of all global shipping

Travel through there but like 30 of the world's container drag goes through there.

This is absolutely vital.

Just for the context for the listeners on that one, the Arabian Peninsula, if you know it's the southern tip of that into the Horn of Africa, which then goes through to the Suez Canal in the north and then into the Mediterranean. So it connects effectively a much shorter straight of territorial waterway between Europe and Asia. Yes, exactly.

Then, so the issue there was, the Houthis, right, if they want to be seen as this, like, you know, this group that can hang out on the world stage and be trustworthy and whatever, they don't want to send the rest of the world into a panic by going and shutting down the street for everybody who were, like, accidentally targeting the wrong people, which they

Had done back in, like, 24, 25.

So when they could shift over to just hit Saudi Arabia and keep things much more constrained without closing the waterway, that was very helpful to them.

That being said, they also have a ton of leverage now, because as Kyle said, this latest offensive from them basically got these Saudi-packed, Yemeni, internationally recognized government forces well away from the Strait.

So if this Middle East war heats back up again these guys are now sitting on one of the world's most important trade routes they're very close to the run they're not necessarily under iran's direct control but they are very closely allied they have a lot of the same priorities a lot of the same strategic vision and if this broader conflict heats up i think

There is a very real chance that we see these reimposable blockade and possibly widen it to other goals.

And for what it's worth, the Iranians have consistently been sending and maintaining advisors in Houthi-controlled areas specifically in terms of giving them a how-to guide on how to set up a more effective blockade.

So the Houthis, they're basically most well-known for what they did back in 2023 and 2024, along with Ali's amazing introduction there with the movie spinoffs.

But overall, the big implications here are if the Houthis actually decide to go for a more expanded blockade, or in my view, what would be more realistic is setting up tolls in the Bab al-Mandeb, then they have all the training materials needed from their friends in Iran.

And I think that we don't have complete confirmation on this, but it's pretty well documented that Iran was pushing the Houthis to do this, to set up tolls so that the two of them could kind of go at it together.

And that way, Iran would be under less pressure and be seen as less of like a rogue state, if you will, even though the Houthis are barely even a state.

But that was the thinking anyway. And the Houthis basically told them no over the summer. This could change and that would be a really big escalation.

That's a good point, Evan, because I think there's something to be said about the fact that this is Saudi Arabia as well, that is the main sort of resisting force from a sovereign nation in this zone. We know that there's something of a Middle Eastern Cold War going on between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

This is how Iran is able to choke off major supply routes from energy exports from the Gulf to the rest of the world.

So in a sense, would it be fair to say that this is actually kind of more about iran than it is about yemen even though it's happening in yemen in this case i would actually push back on that so the kufis or what they are right so like i said you know in california they do get a lot of direct orion support they are in many ways like they're an iranian

Prostitute group a lot with like hezbollah hamas some of the groups in iraq but they are kind of the most free and liberated of those prostitutes you kind of do what they want when they want yeah it's getting paid out and so in that sense, right, certainly they operate in support of common goals with Iran.

And if, you know, if they believe that helping Iran helps them, then they'll happily do whatever Iran asks. But I think that's kind of the distinct fact that there is like, if Houthi leadership believes that a decision that will help Iran also force them, then they will make it.

If they, you know, going back to the decision not to impose like a direct blockade on the Red Sea this past summer, if they believe that helping Iran will hurt them in the long run, then they won't do it.

And they have the internal control in the latitude to be able to tell it on now so the relationship is more is less colonial and it's more sort of I scratched my back you used that's right I've scratched your back you scratched mine kind of what have you done for me lately kind of relationship exactly it used to be much more colonial and now that the

Boothies have kind of like really locked down control of the territory that they have and now that they've been able to like really effectively one hit maritime shipping for the last few years and now to really kick the fight to the saudis they have much more latitude to kind of choose what they want to do that is also worth talking about the fact that Yemen

Has been in this state of just total anarchy really and chaos people are hungry people are starving their landmines everywhere war crimes galore going on there on the ground.

Why has the Yemeni resistance and the anti-Houthi movement been so poor, Evan?

Because especially that Saudi backing, that is a huge financial advantage, you would have thought. Yeah. So a lot of it actually comes down to the logistics of fighting in this area and the terrain issues.

So the Houthis are really strong in the area of Yemen that one, is the most populous, and two, is a lot of mountain highlands. So it's almost like, it's very Afghanistan-ish, if you will. Really easy to hide out as a non-state asymmetric guerrilla fighting force.

Really easy to keep control over the population because there are these isolated pockets where it's hard to get out. The government forces are a city on land that maybe 20% of all Yemenis live in. They control a majority of the territory of Yemen, but not the populated areas.

They also are they suffer from lots of training issues, lots of discipline issues. They rely on a bunch of militias that can't always be trusted to play ball. And even though Saudi Arabia has been able to provide financial backing, there are limitations to that.

Saudi has no intention of putting ground troops into Yemen in any meaningful numbers at this point. They've tried that during the 2010s and it didn't go particularly well for them.

And quite frankly, saudi is not very good at leading this military coalition right now like the rest of the world you know a lot of people are fairly coy about it you know diplomatic speaking all but folks are not very happy with saudi arabia right now saudi was very very set on getting the Houthi portfolio and being able to manage Yemen as kind of their

Their like their own little little vassal state to the south that has completely backfired but there's a reason that no other country wants to step in and support them we've seen a little bit from Pakistan and Turkey now it looks like Syrian troops are going to be deployed on the ground, but that's really it, which is pretty stunning for an area where

There's still an EU naval mission operating in the area.

India's been very heavily involved. And just a couple of years ago, the US and Israel were conducting full-scale bombing campaigns against the Houthis. There's been none of that now.

It's also worth noting there that Saudi forces and Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have basically just been in full retreat here, especially along the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, but Saudi-backed forces have also pulled out of all sorts of other parts of the country, I think, including Marib, where the Houthis are outright threatening Aden, which, you know, I mean,

They do on a pretty regular basis, but I feel like there's a lot more weight to this one this time around.

Kyle, is Aden under threat? That's where currently the provincial, internationally recognized government sits, whilst the Houthis hold the main capital.

So now it's about 300 kilometers, 190 miles north of the city. So it's the territory we're talking about. Isn't really that far apart.

Is Aiden under threat? I'm going to invoke what we did with the bridge here, optically, optically, it may be under a lot more threat than tactically.

I don't think any Houthi annexation of Aiden is coming anytime soon, but if they can start putting Aden under under siege or just causing havoc in the city which I think is a pretty realistic goal for them then the government there would be feeling it a lot more than it currently is.

All right. In just one short sentence, what's next for Yemen? If you could do one thing to fix as many problems as possible in Yemen, what would it be?

Evan, go. Ooh, that is a tough one. Saudi Arabia needs new international backing, I think, is what it comes down to.

Saudi has proven that it can't really handle this or curl the tides by itself. It's trying to do it through airkeeping, which is not enough. So either Saudi can figure out some other outside group to bring in, or this is just going to continue on for our course.

Kyle, how do you make a square peg fit into a round hole? That is a question. Yeah.

So, I mean, it's certainly going to be an uphill battle here the the saudis need to be just more serious on this stuff and they have given how much money these guys have their the state of their military is just abysmal which has been on full display throughout much of this keep in mind the houthis are like i mean for like a random rebel group that people

Don't necessarily hear about that often they're relatively well armed but in the grand scheme of things it's not that impressive so the fact that saudi has just been like perpetually struggling to get its act together here is pretty damning and that speaks partially to the lack of international support, but also to Riyadh's own just blundering of the

Situation.

I was going to say, who does it fall on more, did the international community just abandon Yemen, or was Yemen given promises by the Saudis saying we can fix it, everyone went go on then, now you go, and they haven't been able to? I'd do both with an emphasis on the latter.

Well, that's Yemen. Probably best to move on before it gets any worse in the region, because my god, it's tough for the people out there. And now we're moving on to something far less controversial, and that's Israeli politics.

Israeli election politics to be exact. There ain't no party like an Israeli political party. On the 27th of October, so only a couple weeks ago now, Israel went to the polls and it left Netanyahu's voting bloc without a majority.

He remains the caretaker Prime Minister at the moment, while former military chief Gary Isingcock attempts to form a government. Neither man's existing alliance actually currently has enough seats, which means that the Arab-led parties, who make up a small minority, could provide either candidate with the support that they need to form a government.

The problem is they all hate each other.

Netanyahu's opponents have elected Matan Kahane as a parliamentary speaker, which gives them a bit more influence over legislation, including proposals for an inquiry into October 7th and reversing judicial changes.

But forming a government is a lot harder than just forming one political agreement some of eisenkot's partners really do oppose relying on arab parties for example there are disputes on the netanyahu side as well so carl i'm going to come to you first on this one just to give us a general overview Who is Gadi Eizenkot? What's he about?

Why is he seen as the key opposition to Benjamin Netanyahu?

He spent years as the head of the Israeli Defense Forces, so certainly a long-time security guy and not somebody who's exactly going to be soft on any of the foreign policy issues that Israel is staring down, but he does offer significant differences, which is why he is a leader of he has been tapped with forming the next government by Israeli president

Isaac Herzog following the election and old bully has it gotten so messy there it really is israeli politics are on a different level just for some context here so one of the deputy speakers of the kineset now is the leader of the Joint List and he was asked, this is one of the Arab parties, and so their relationship with Hamas is controversial inside the

Country basically like will they condemn Hamas and there a leak leak who'd MK asked this guy as to the other political parties in his rain once right yeah the Zionist ones yes so Lee could being Netanyahu's party asked TV whether he would condemn Hamas the other day.

And speaking on the floor of the Israeli Knesset, he said, "Of course I do.

Hamas is the one who murdered your son, and your prime minister is the one responsible." So that's a pretty good way to open a conversation about the current state of Israeli politics. To say that they that they hate each other is just I mean it's impossible to really frame here. So nobody has a majority even today.

And if anything, things are looking a little shakier for Eisenkot's coalition than some would like to see the one of the main parties in his coalition led by naftali former prime minister naftali bennett it was just reported that bennett himself spent over two hours meeting with netanyahu the other day now this could be and bennett is saying that this is

Just him trying to discuss security matters with the current caretaker PM.

And you know what? Fair enough.

That could be it. But if Bennett is potentially a defector, that could be all Netanyahu needs in order to start winning over enough support to form a new government, and that would be quite a way to upend all of this. Evan, why is accepting support from Arab-led parties cause such a sticking point in this election?

Well, Kyle can probably speak to it better than i can but israeli politics right now and the israeli public i think are still very rattled by the last few years obviously the international disforcement around gaza and the west bank and so on is very different but in israel right the way that this is kind of thought of and the way that it is remembered is a

Combination of different government failures and scandals, and also just a horrific act of violence after years and years and years and years of collective trauma and collective kind of threat from all sides, and the Arab countries are in a lot of corners in Israeli society, treated with a lot of skepticism as the closest thing in Israeli politics to a

Physical manifestation of that threat, right?

So whether or not the Arab parties are working in good faith whether or not they're you know really willing to play more kind of advance Israeli society as a whole it's sort of a different question than whether or not the rest of the Israeli public trusts them to do that or believes that's the way that they're acting.

And as like so many other things in national politics or global geopolitics, perception often is more important than reality.

And right now, the perception of those Arab parties is that they're not, you know, it is not that they're like playing this fine political game trying to exist in israeli politics but also navigate the very complex realities of being an erudite israeli but that they are kind of like working their way into israeli society as a as a kind of a poison for all

That is tied in ways that the israeli public can't tolerate to these other broader destructive forces and kyle please correct me if i'm wrong about that no that's very well said there is concern especially with the more hardline zionist parties that there is concern basically the concern being like and netanyahu has been just outright accusing the Arab

Parties of both trying to steal the election.

And we can get into that in a moment because there's plenty there, but also of being a threat to Israeli security, as well as his son, Yair Netanyahu, has been posting some of the most just extreme rhetoric. You can imagine that he's outright accusing the next October 7th of saying that the next October 7th will come from the Israeli Arabs.

And this is just really inflammatory stuff.

And so you can see the opposition has really tried to make this a rallying cry against so you there have been protests especially in Tel Aviv where you have Jews and Arabs marching together chanting Jews and Arabs refused to be enemies and this is representative of some of the country at least but unfortunately we do see quite a bit of some darker stuff

Coming out it is worth keeping in mind arab parties have formed israeli governments previously specifically under Naftali Bennett back in 2020 to 2021 2020.

But this problem is just so escalated, escalated since October 7.

It really has become like a kind of a no go area for a lot of parties. And so instead of working with Arab parties, one of Ivan caught strategies has been to win over the two Haredi parties, so that's being Shas and United Torah Judaism, to basically defect from Netanyahu. And there may be progress on that.

UTJ actually abstained in the vote for or in the list of recommendations to Herzog on who they'd prefer as the next PM. So this could work out in Eisenclot's favor. And this would essentially leave the Arab parties as outside the government, but supportive of Eisenkot v.

Netanyahu, certainly. But we also saw in the speaker vote, that was the first big vote. And it cleared with Arab support for the new speaker.

So overall, I think that there is several paths here still, as long as Naftali Bennett doesn't defect. And so just so I understand here, Karl, and for the listeners as well, what is the current feeling in Israel around Netanyahu. Understandably, it's very negative, but what are the reasons behind that negativity?

Is it the way he handled Gaza? Was it the way he handled Iran? Was it the way he handled domestic political issues?

Could he still win? So yes, the golden rule that I have from Israeli politics is never count Netanyahu out. And for what it's worth, he still has considerable support, especially amongst Likud.

Keep in mind, Likud actually outperformed its polling considerably. They did lose a few seats relative to where they were in the last election. But overall, Likud did not have a terrible night.

His coalition had a worse night. But by and large, the situation that he's presenting is a majority of Israelis voted for Zionist parties and that there should be a unity government between them. And on Gaza, the situation is pretty, I mean, they have minor differences, but there's not going to be much difference.

There is meaningful difference in terms of the West Bank. That's an issue that we've been able to dedicate considerable coverage to on war fronts, which I'm very happy about. But on Iran specifically, there is a lot of agreement as well that the Islamic Republic is quite a threat to the Jewish state.

And that action may ultimately be needed, Netanyahu, of course, being more forceful in pushing both for action and for immediate action. Now, some have outright accused him of treason for this in the country, including Naftali Bennett, which really raises some questions as to why he's negotiating with Netanyahu in the first place. But I'll leave that aside.

But basically, the allegation here is that Netanyahu would be trying to restart a war with Iran in order to force a unity wartime government in order to save his political career. And multiple Israeli opposition leaders have accused Netanyahu of this.

The one thing I do just want to add to that is that does not mean that they're opposed to a war with Iran or a renewed conflict with Iran, but they do their point essentially being it doesn't have to be today.

Israel can figure out the next government first, then tackle. And so that's the sort of nitty gritty. I mean, yeah.

And you're, you're, you're really right. I mean, there are people unbelievably maybe to some of our listeners who don't know Israeli politics very well, but there are there are people more hawkish, more extreme than the Netanyahu in these as was a current Israeli government you know, principally Smotrich and Ben-Gavir for their very fiery rhetoric.

And you can see Netanyahu trying to adopt, and certainly his son as well, trying to adopt some of that kind of messaging, especially with just before the election, Netanyahu posting a picture of Tel Aviv being nuked by Iran, effectively saying, this is what's going to happen if I don't win the election.

Of course, that hasn't happened yet, because Iran are two weeks away from a nuclear weapon, as they have been for the past five decades. So we know that Netanyahu can still win.

We don't know if he will still win and at the moment it seems like people are leaning more towards an arab israeli coalition on the eisenkot side evan i'll go to you next is an arab israeli coalition doomed to fail from the start it's what collapsed the last the last governments that brought Netanyahu back is this going to actually help doomed to fail I

Think maybe a little bit extreme but doomed to I think choose between failure or inaction in most cases unless kind of the third outside option would be a new Israeli government that goes about things very, very differently and takes kind of a lot of risks in reforming Israel's domestic approach to its own people, to its international approach as well, which

I don't really anticipate being in the cards.

So unless Israel were to really try and chart a new path forward with also kind of the questionable political mandate due to how this election turned out, I think the other two options are A, that this coalition eventually comes apart, or B, it doesn't come apart, but the price that is paid for that is kind of stagnation, ongoing discontent and disruption of

The Israeli political system and really just a government that does not work for the folks who are living in the United States anyway unfortunately my read on the situation and again Kyle please go for it.

Like you were the Israeli politics guy, I've heard of you on this, but my understanding of this, it seems like this current election result is going to need to be superseded pretty soon by either new elections or something else to that effect, just because the distribution of political parties and so forth and so on and so forth doesn't seem like it can hold

Now.

Maybe if Eisenhower makes you know, is it what this government is able to investigate in Yahoo, investigate Likud, that might shift things for them moving forward, grow some support but right now I struggle to see how this coalition could remain in place if it does form and then achieve any real political result.

But I potentially agree with this the thing I would most push back on. I don't necessarily think that the Arab Zionist coalition would necessarily happen though. Two of the four.

So the Eisen cuts coalition has four parties, two of which are hell no opposed to relying on arab party support so that being biahad and israeli britannia both of which are like not willing at all so especially israel britannia's leader avigdor lieberman has been so opposed to this now this is complicated because every party before in the election had its

Own list of very complicated red lines that on who it would and would not work with.

And essentially, in order to get to a 61 seat majority, somebody has to break their red lines. So this would be more likely, in my opinion, to go via the Haredi parties, so Shas and UTJ, to break for Eisenhower.

And he has really been trying to court them. And the fact that UTJ abstained from that leadership selection process with the president is certainly telling to me that there is progress here and a real chance that could happen.

That raises all sorts of other questions namely about the draft because Haredi Jews in Israel are exempt from service while studying at yeshiva.

This is massively controversial because they have taken up more and more of the population in Israel. But the long and the short of that one is you could reach a situation where you have a government either propped up by or outright including the Haredi parties, as well as from the outside, Ra'am and the Joint List.

So overall, the whole thing is very, very fragile.

It's representative of the fact that Israel is an incredibly divided society right now in terms of where it goes from here.

And I think that we could be looking at a new round of elections, even if Gadi does get to 61 within a year or so, because even if you can get a majority, there's so many issues on where these guys disagree that they could just collapse back again. Now, that's where Netanyahu sees an opportunity.

He's been really clear that he's willing to stay on top of Likud. And so there's been talk, I think Israel-Britannia is actually proposing legislation today to term limit the PM's office to eight years.

But this is only semi-effective because while that certainly impacts this Knesset, the Knesset operates just like the House of Commons in the UK, where it can just override itself with a simple majority.

So if Netanyahu gets a majority with his coalition in the next Knesset, they can just repeal this thing and Bibi's back on top.

And there's something to be said there about people are afraid of the possibility of Netanyahu coming back, especially what it means for the wider questions around the geopolitical issues in the region, mainly Iran, Saudi Arabia, and certainly Lebanon but in this case when they're when the option is between Netanyahu and Eisen can't plus or minus does

Removing Netanyahu even matter because as far as we can tell he's the same on, both candidates are the same on Gaza, they're the same on Iran, you know, they're the same on a lot of these issues where they're very hawkish.

So from an outsider looking in, is it actually going to make much of a difference to what we see about Israel on the world stage if Netanyahu does get swapped out for Eisenhower?

There are substantial differences. Netanyahu has become such a... He's become somebody who's stapled himself to the state of Israel so intensely.

The only comparison I can really make here is, and forgive me, it's not a perfect one, but where Viktor Orban basically, when these guys spend so long at the top of the country. They just get so ingrained in all of these things and they use the state to prop up their own careers.

So even though you may, it may seem from the outside okay well gadi is hawkish on iran bb's hawkish on iran so therefore they're the same but it's not because eisenclot may ultimately decide okay we need to engage iran again and we can get to that point if it comes.

But the point being there, he would be doing so because the Israeli public supported it, and Israel would view it in their interest. Netanyahu may claim that is the case, but the overwhelming majority claim by the opposition parties is that Netanyahu would be doing this ostensibly to prop up his own career. And those are two very different situations for me.

The same thing with the West Bank. And the West Bank has been very sad for me to see.

The settler terrorism that has been going on against Palestinians in the West Bank has been not covered well in mainstream media at all, but has largely just been due to the fact that the man who runs israeli police as national security minister itamar ben-gavir has just been the most ultra hardliner imaginable and because bb was willing to enter into

Coalition and just for what it's worth bb does not like Ben-Gavir.

Ben-Gavir was crying on national television about how offended he was Bibi wouldn't take a picture with him for the national campaign. Likud has their style and Ben-Gavir is not it.

But when it comes to getting to 61 seats, they needed his support and they got it and it came at a price all the of the israeli opposition parties are promising resolutely to crack down on settler terrorism in the west bank and this would be long overdue and I think that would help get started on improving some of Israel's foreign policy issues.

This is such a low bar for me. It really would not take that much.

The settlers just think that they have broad latitude to do whatever they want because Ben Gavir came to office basically saying yes have at it you know we're not going to come after you guys anymore so there that's a whole a whole separate topic but it's there is meaningful differences long and short of that one okay last thing before we finish the show in

Under 10 words or less evan what do you think is going to happen in a few more weeks of deadlock at least all right and carl I'm gonna I'm gonna take the coward's answer here things change so fast here and there's just so many moving parts I will be happy to keep listeners updated as events come in but I'm not calling any predictions on this one we'll call

That one about 50 words shall we all right thank you everybody you have been listening to on the front your one-stop shop for all the geopolitical main stories in the world this week i have been your host oliver carpenter they have been my experts evan maloney and carl moran we'll see you next time

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