What Next for Venezuela? And Other Burning Questions

Well, that was a bit of a week, wasn't it? After the US bombed Caracas and snatched Venezuelan autocrat Nicolas Maduro from his mansion last Saturday, the entire news cycle seemed to go into meltdown.

With the exceptions of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on October 7th, it's hard to think of another recent news event with so much interest or so many ramifications for the wider world.

Here was a raw display of American military might, unencumbered by any niceties or lip service to the post-1945 world order. And that meant there was plenty to discuss for analysis channels like ours.

If you've been following Warfronts, you're probably already aware that we tried to give the fallout from Maduro's capture as much space as possible, coming out video-for-video sacrificing sleep to get you guys the information you need.

And yet, it still wasn't enough. As we saw when we put up a community post asking you for your questions, it's clear that you guys have endless concerns about this, concerns that we didn't find the time to address on the main channel. Hence, this exclusive video available here for free on our subscribersidefronts.co.

An attempt to answer as many of your burning questions as possible about Maduro's capture, America's new embrace of hard power, and what effects it will have on the rest of the world. If you want more in-depth analysis off of the main channel, consider becoming a subscriber.

It's $5 a month, and you get exclusive access to both regular videos and special reaction pieces like this one.

And with that, let's get into our first question. From rocker8900, how do you see the leadership vacuum filling? Now, this was the top-voted question on our initial poll.

And while the world has learned the answer to this question since the time that it was asked, we thought we'd take the liberty of adjusting the question a little bit and giving an answer anyway.

After Nicolas Maduro was whisked away from Caracas last weekend, his own vice president, Delcy Rodriguez, was made acting president, and she's since been sworn in as Venezuela's interim leader.

So, instead of discussing the immediate answer to the question of how Venezuela's leadership gap will be filled, apparently with Delcy Rodriguez, we can ask a different question.

Can Delcy Rodriguez keep her new position? And if not, who might come after? Now, we'll start with some observations in Rodriguez's favor, and most importantly, the observation that Trump administration officials seemed to like her.

Anonymous high-level American sources told international media that they'd been watching Rodriguez for many years and were impressed with her work managing Venezuela's oil industry. Indeed, Rodriguez played a key role in keeping Venezuelan industry viable despite a crush of international sanctions.

Donald Trump has stated publicly that he felt Rodriguez was, quote, willing to do what we think is necessary to make Venezuela great again.

Institutionally, Rodriguez comes with a few key advantages. She was Maduro's chosen successor, at least judging by the order of succession of the Venezuelan government, so she's got a reasonably good chance at keeping pro-Maduro forces in line when those loyalist forces might otherwise attempt to coup d'etat to take back control.

She's long been praised as a defender of the Maduro regime, and-... she's continued to hold that line publicly even after being installed into the presidency she's got close ties with the military and perhaps even more important she's got close ties with cuba venezuela's most important backer in the western hemisphere even more specifically she's got close

Ties with cuban intelligence although we'll let you read into those connections and the rumors that regime officials may have been in on the plan to capture maduro however you will but rodriguez has also got to deal with some major problems not least of which is the fact that donald trump has both praised her and not so subtly threatened to kill her if she

Doesn't do what the united states asks right now it appears that she will do what washington tells her to do so in that sense she might be safe but the dangers of falling out of favor with washington cannot be overlooked she also faces internal threats from powerful members of maduros in a circle who may seek to overthrow her minister of defense vladimir

Padrino lopez and interior minister dios dardo cabello there's also the venezuelan people to consider long disgusted by the maduro regime but now demonstrably displeased with the role of american gunboat diplomacy in bringing maduro down according to the venezuelan opposition the country's most recent election should have resulted in the victory of

Opposition candidate edmondo gonzalez and either he or ultimate opposition leader maria carina machado are venezuela's rightful rulers rodriguez is facing the specter of potential popular revolt with some likelihood that a successful uprising could bring down the entire regime each of those outcomes could see rodriguez ousted but each of them would probably

Result in the installation of a different new leader if trump decides rodriguez no longer suits america's needs he could choose any one of venezuela's influential regime figures to replace her although according to recent insider reports u.s intelligence has determined that top regime members are their preferred choice to lead venezuela in the short term if

Rodriguez is threatened by a coup then the coup leader would probably take office although they'd have to quickly demonstrate their friendliness to the united states in order to avoid falling victim to new raids or even airstrikes in the event of a popular uprising machado or gonzalez could conceivably take power though as we've noted in prior episodes

They'd probably be at acute risk of being deposed or physically harmed by loyalist factions regardless tensions are very high in caracas right now on monday night an apparent miscommunication about a friendly drone mistaken for a threat by security forces led to hours of gunfire and chaotic street clashes before the situation was brought back under control

In a situation where everybody is this jumpy things could go sideways for rodriguez fast and if they do then there's no telling who could take a place next up this one from jordan cox v7z how likely is it that this is just the starting steps to a pull-out war with china or russia with the u.s consolidating all the americas under its power and setting up

Continental style defense and resource extraction to block out other superpowers before a global war setting.

Honestly, not as unlikely as you might think. For all the talk from Trump that this was about oil, making Venezuela bend to America's will has the added bonus of removing a potential obstacle in case of all our war with China. For those who want the longer in-depth answer, we published a piece on Monday on this very website laying out the rationale.

But the TLDR version is that a hostile Venezuela is almost uniquely well-placed to cause trouble should a conflict blow up between Washington and Beijing. That's because Venezuela is close to one of the world's most important shipping lanes.

Although a US-China war would take place in the Pacific, it would almost certainly involve America rushing naval assets from the Atlantic to help bolster its forces.

That means taking the Panama Canal, something that becomes a lot harder if Beijing has pre-positioned assets in nearby Venezuela with the explicit goal of disrupting access to the canal. Then there's the potential for Venezuela to be used as a staging ground for medium-range missile strikes on the US mainland.

Or to take things down a notch, the mere fact that having a China-aligned nation in America's backyard represents a strategic headache that Washington wouldn't want to be troubled by should World War III kick off.

Now, that's not to say that any of this was the forefront of Trump or Rubio's mind when the decision was made to capture Maduro. It could just be a second-order benefit, or perhaps a case of us reading way too much into things.

But it is noticeable that most of Trump's goals in the Western Hemisphere align with either reducing Chinese and Russian influence or bolstering defense of the United States.

Dominating Venezuela, letting Cuba collapse, blocking Chinese companies from access to the Panama Canal, even threatening Colombia's China-friendly leader, all help to ensure the US is surrounded by stable, pliant states in the event of a great war.

Meanwhile, taking Greenland could ensure access to critical minerals and give Washington an easy staging post for defending the Arctic. Of course, there are holes in this theory, where Greenland is concerned that the US already has all the military access it wants, so annexing the island would antagonize close allies for zero strategic gain.

And the days since Maduro was captured haven't suggested that Caracas is about to become an obedient US client state, although, as per our last answer, we wouldn't write off more major changes to come.

In short, you could see the operation in Venezuela as a standalone thing related to drugs and democracy that just so happens to improve America's position ahead of a great war. Or you could see it as a deliberate pre-game move, or one which Beijing may now be desperately trying to figure out how to counter.

And speaking of China, here's another question about how Maduro's overthrow will be affecting calculations in Beijing. And here's the question from Colin Walker 6804.

Do you think China's response, or lack thereof, is an indication that they might view this as tacit permission by Washington that if they apply the same tactics on Taiwan just as quickly, that they can control it?

And to that one, yes and no. Yes, in that this US... action in Venezuela absolutely sends a signal to China about what it can get away with in Taiwan, but no, because replicating this sort of attack in Taiwan would be both nearly impossible and functionally meaningless.

In terms of the message conveyed to China, Beijing is probably feeling very pleased with the way that the Caracas operation went down, and more specifically, the way that it's being discussed by the United States in the aftermath.

While China does purchase most of Venezuela's oil exports, that oil is a small price to pay if it means that China can watch the U.S. justify its actions through a claim that America can and should act unilaterally within its sphere of influence.

America is the only world nation that's even in China's league from a raw power perspective, and if America is now following a set of rules that entitles powerful nations to act as they see fit within their spheres of influence, that's fantastic news for Beijing. After all, where in the world is within China's sphere of influence if not the nation of Taiwan?

Of course, the U.S. and Taiwan remain close allies, as evidenced by Taiwan's recent receipt of the largest military aid package that America has ever sent to Taipei.

But it's not that Beijing would ever expect Washington to be fair about this whole thing. Washington is going to insist that China shouldn't attack its close ally, regardless of what the U.S. did in Venezuela.

Instead, the more important point is that China can go to the rest of the world and say, don't let the United States draw you into hypocrisy, especially around an island that China considers to be its own sovereign territory.

If the U.S. could leverage its close alliances with the most powerful economies on Earth, it could inflict real pain on China in retaliation for an offensive action against Taiwan.

But if those other nations don't want to reward U.S. hypocrisy or don't feel that it's worth the domestic or international pain of doing so, then China can turn a confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan into a simple matter of force concentration and military action, instead of a global diplomatic and economic dispute.

Once that happens, China just has to concentrate enough military force that the U.S. can't quite get to its ally, just like the U.S. concentrated enough military force around Venezuela that China couldn't have helped it if it wanted to.

As for an operation like the one that Washington carried out in Caracas, well, it's highly unlikely that China would be able to do something similar in Taiwan.

Taiwan's intelligence-gathering capabilities, its air defenses, the quality and number of its fighting forces, and the parity of its military against its adversary are all far superior to what Venezuela could offer.

If a Chinese surprise attack were to rely on 150-odd warplanes, a couple of dozen warships, and a convoy of helicopters filled with special operators, Taiwan would stand a very good shot at repelling that attack outright.

And even if China did manage to capture Taiwan's president, Lai Qingti, Taiwan's broader government is far stronger, far more resilient, and far less easily bought off than Venezuela's. If China somehow captures Lai Qingti successfully, he'll be replaced by one of many Taiwanese leaders who will be exceptionally pissed off by what's just happened.

So while China is probably very happy with America's choice of rhetoric around the capture of Maduro, it almost... certainly understands that the tactics of America's operation will not transfer easily to Taiwan.

We should mention, of course, that some international experts have suggested that even with the benefit of America's recent endorsement of multipolarity, China will still avoid attacking Taiwan outright.

But that logic is based on the idea that China ultimately wants to coerce Taiwan into compliance instead of attacking it outright, and honestly, that might be a distinction without a difference. America's endorsement of multipolarity doesn't mean that countries attack whoever they want, simply for the fun of it.

It means that countries are empowered to act unilaterally, however they see fit, using a maximal expression of their own power in pursuit of their goals. If China wants to leverage its power to coerce Taiwan rather than invading it, that's China's choice. But the broader point, that China is more likely to get away with it, is true regardless.

Now, before we get on to the next question, sneak preview that concerns Russia, just a quick reminder to say that if you're enjoying this, you can get loads more videos just like this by becoming a subscriber.

Here at Frontz, we publish two brand new videos every single week, and while we've decided to make this one free to everybody, those videos are normally behind a paywall. The good news, that paywall is less of a Great Wall of China and more of one of those little red velvet VIP ropes, one you can have moved smoothly aside for just five bucks a month.

So yes, for $5 a month or $50 a year, you'll get access to two exclusive videos each week, plus two articles written by the Frontz team. This week, as we mentioned earlier, we've covered the ways the Venezuelan operation may be a pre-game move for war with China, as well as publishing an in-depth autopsy on the death of the post-1945 global order.

And this is only the start.

As 2026 gets underway, we've got exclusive podcasts in the works as well. So look, if you're enjoying this or enjoy War Frontz or our sister-channel Political Frontz, you'll love Frontz.co. It's just $5 a month, as we said, and it gets you access to a growing library of cool-ass shit.

And now let's get back to the questions. Next up, from Ashutosh Gupta, 1999. How do you see this action of the US will impact the current situation in Ukraine?

Will this give Russia more courage to strike with more intensity? Can Putin also capture Zelensky like this in the future? To some extent, it's reasonable to expect that the United States' actions in Venezuela will influence Russia's conduct in Ukraine, for the same reasons we've laid out regarding China.

Now that the US has more overtly endorsed a spheres of influence-based, might-makes-right approach to geopolitics in the 2020s, it's going to have a much harder time condemning the actions of other nations, much less getting the world to join in those condemnations while ignoring American conduct elsewhere.

There are, however, a few important limits to what Russia will be able to do as a reaction to the United States.

For one thing, Russia is already heavily committed in Ukraine, and while it does appear to have a growing number of troops held back from the fight, those troops seem to be put aside... other reasons the reason that russia isn't throwing them into the meat grinder probably isn't because it appears international criticism more broadly russia is already doing

Most of what it's able to do in ukraine short of the over use of weapons of mass destruction it's already bombarding civilian targets almost daily it's already engaging in the torture and execution of pow's and the reason that vladimir zelensky remains alive today is because ukraine has done a really really good job of keeping him alive not because russia

Hasn't tried to kill him on many occasions moreover it's worth noting that the united states really isn't pressuring russia in the way that it used to trump is of course pushing for peace and sometimes he's had to begrudgingly admit on certain issues that russia is the problem but trump has made clear that in his ideal world negotiations between russia and

Ukraine would essentially come down to might makes right with ukraine forced to accommodate and accept whatever terms russia is strong enough to impose really it's europe that's levying most of the criticism against russia right now and judging by europe's reaction to the venezuela operation there doesn't seem to be much change in europe's posture of course

Russia wasn't really being deterred by europe anyway but to the extent that criticism has deterred russia at all that deterrent will probably remain stable as for whether putin can capture zelensky like trump capture maduro no at least not right now russia has tried to assassinate zelensky on numerous occasions according to ukraine's security service the svu

And while some of those attempts are murky at best some are very well known in february of 2022 russia dispatched some 400 bagner group mercenaries to try and take zelensky out in kiev at the start of the full-scale invasion around that time multiple groups of chechen forces and the mercenary company radart were independently charged with the same mission

All of them clearly failed and according to zelensky people were even killed inside his own office during one botched attempt in may of 2024 the spu claimed to have foiled a plot to hire zelensky's own colonels to assassinate him and the heads of ukrainian intelligence craters gotten very good at keeping zelensky alive he's constantly moving between secure

Locations under guard from multiple layers of security and intelligence overwatch and even when he pops out in public news of whereabouts is typically embargoed until he's already gone suffice it to say that if russia could kill or capture zelensky it already would have and let's be very clear if russia gets close enough to take a shot zelensky is not going

To merely be captured and now this from andrew brown 1695 did the us just set the tempo of geopolitics for 2026. now for all of the talk of how china and russia will react to this there's a bigger worry about maduro's capture but it will inspire many other states to undertake similar high-risk high-reward operations and while very few nations possess the

Capabilities of u.s special forces that doesn't mean their leaders won't be inspired to roll the dice on more homes spun operations on the basis that the world's policeman is now seemingly cool with this stuff.

We already know that humans are natural copycats. High-profile mass shootings or suicides inspire other suicides and mass shootings. The same can also be true on a nation-state level.

The last few years have seen Africa's Sahel region hit by coup after coup, starting in Mali in 2020 before spreading out into Chad, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger.

And while each of them shared common factors around security concerns and a weak civilian leadership, a perhaps underrated element was military men seeing their counterparts in nearby countries pull off an armed takeover and thinking, that's an idea, isn't it? The same is true for conflicts.

In the last couple of years, the world has watched Russia invade Ukraine without becoming a total international pariah, watched Israel neutralize its enemies with military action in Lebanon and Iran, seen Azerbaijan decisively conquer the unrecognized state of Nagorno-Karabakh, and now it's watching the US sprint away from an uncooperative foreign leader

With far less blowback than might be expected.

That sort of direct evidence of the advantages hard power can offer is difficult to ignore. Already in the 2020s, there was a feeling that states were less restrained regarding armed conflict.

Just look at the India-Pakistan or Thailand-Cambodia clashes of last year. Now they may be even more willing to take the chance on force projection. This goes double if the capture of Maduro is just the first of many such operations that Washington is planning.

After bombing Iran and Nigeria last year, the Trump administration is already hinting at more action against the Islamic Republic, plus potential action against Cuba, Colombia, Mexico's cartels, and even Greenland.

Should any of these take place, and especially if they're successful, we should assume that other states will be taking notes and will attempt their own crew diversions against their enemies. And that will mean both a far less stable 2026 and another year in which the war front's team barely sleeps.

A nabbit of history from WJD23104. I've seen the removal of Noriega being mentioned as a comparison point for Maduro. I would like to know more about Noriega's removal and the aftermath.

Well, the Noriega here in question is Manuel Noriega, a Panamanian general who was in late 1989 the de facto leader of all of Panama. Noriega was ousted by US forces under the command of George H. W.

Bush and was captured by the US and arrested on charges of racketeering and drug trafficking, similar to the arrest of Maduro on charges of narco-terrorism. Now, Noriega was very much the product of cloak-and-dagger CIA activities across Latin America, and had been a US intelligence asset since 1967.

But he also had close and enduring ties with Latin American drug cartels and organized crime syndicates whose leaders could basically get protection from American law enforcement because they were Noriega's friends.

Starting in the mid-80s, Noriega's relationship with the US deteriorated rather quickly. And while US defense leaders had advocated for him to be deposed under Ronald Reagan, that decision was postponed until George Bush Sr., himself a former CIA director, took office.

Starting in 1988, Noriega managed to beat back several known or alleged coup attempts, and he kept control of his country despite a disputed election that opposition parties claimed they'd won.

Again, another parallel to Maduro. As the situation deteriorated, the US surged troops to the Panama Canal, where America in jurisdiction. Panama declared war on the United States, and after the shooting death of a US Marine, the United States launched a full-scale invasion.

Now, unlike the operation to snatch Maduro, the Panama invasion was a relatively protracted affair. It ended up taking a bit less than a month and a half, and resulted in the deaths of 314 Panamanian troops, 23 American troops, and a disputed number of Panamanian civilians generally agreed to be in the multiple hundreds, along with 300 American civilians.

Like the operation to apprehend Maduro, the Panama invasion ended with the capture of Noriega, and, like the Venezuela operation, the US's actions were roundly condemned across the globe, including by America's longtime close allies.

But while the US justified its actions against Maduro as essentially a US law enforcement operation, law enforcement formed just one part of America's justification for pursuing Noriega. The US also claimed self-defense and cited a need to restore democracy while ensuring the safety of the Panama Canal.

Like the Venezuelan operation, however, the legality of America's actions in Panama would be the subject of fierce debate.

The aftermath of the operation is where things really seem to differ, at least judging by America's current trajectory in Venezuela. In Panama, the nation was handed over to Guillermo Endara, the opposition candidate who was recognized as having won that disputed election.

The US took back control of the Panama Canal, but didn't really do a ton of other resource extraction, certainly not on the level of what Washington currently seems to be planning for Venezuela's oil.

Panama transitioned into an elected, democratically-led government, and while the US didn't exactly want to pay reparations for its actions, it ultimately did end up doing so. As for Noriega, he attempted to argue immunity from prosecution because of his status as a foreign leader, which Maduro also appears as if he'll attempt to do.

The approach didn't work for Noriega, but it got him the chance to wear his military uniform while on trial and got him some nice accommodation in prison.

He served 17 years of a 40-year sentence before being released on good behavior, extradited to France, imprisoned again, extradited to Panama, incarcerated again, moving to house arrest, and ultimately dying during brain surgery in 2017 at the age of 83. And now, after that historical rollercoaster, our final question.

From lie2268, it must have been a mad scramble.

Please let the writers and producers know that we appreciate them. And very well. Writers, I appreciate them.

No, you guys have worked really hard. It's awesome. We've done weekends.

We've done evenings. We're all working pretty hard. So shout out to the writers who you know.

Also, shout out to the video team, Jen and Jose specifically. Also, one of our other writers who you hear about less, Wilfred, he wrote that Saturday episode in just four hours. So kudos.