Due South: Maleo on Mali.

Ladies and gentlemen good morning good evening good afternoon whenever and wherever you're listening to us from this is the Dear South podcast with me your host Wilfred Mainawi Mary and today I am joined by someone who is an expert on the Sahel someone whose work has appeared in my videos over the past few weeks whenever I cover Mali and you're someone whose

Insights has shaped my understanding of the conflict happening within Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria just generally the entire Sahel region more broadly today ladies and gentlemen I am joined by Mali.

Mali please introduce yourself to the people hello everyone I follow the West African Jihadist conflict since like three years I was pretty about his swap in North Eastern Nigeria but since like one year one year I also follow a lot what happened in Sahel all right thank you Mali you're one of the people who if your people on Twitter are looking to

Understand what's happening in the Sahel I usually direct them to your tweet because your tweets are really really insightful they have a lot of information and you generally seem to have a really good understanding of the conflicts that's happening there and as part of our dedication to bringing the top experts in their field to our audience we are really

Really grateful to have you here today so Mali we're going to start by talking about what is happening in Mali so to give our audience a temporal signpost of where we are at today's the 21st of July 2026 as we are recording this the podcast might come out you know a little later after that because we usually try to record this as early as possible so that we

Have enough content in the bank to make sure you guys don't miss a week you don't go a week without having a podcast so with that out of the way we're going to start by discussing the most recent joint attacks by the terrorist group Jamal Nusrat al-Islamin al-Muslimin or Janim and the Azawad Liberation Front the FLA an ethno-nationalist tour a group that has

Partnered with Janim over the past few months and they've been doing coordinated attacks so the most recent coordinated attack happened a few weeks ago and it was touched touched touched touched hitting Anefes.

Malio, tell us about this.

Yeah, so this is not really the first because there was the previous offensive in April. During this offensive they took Kidal and Thessalites and after this there was a little pause, what I can say, and after this they tried to take over Anefes.

The Anefes battle was lost but still the jihadists Eiffelah and Jnim, this coalition, remained in control in Thessalite and Kidal.

So let's start with Anefes, the battle for Anefes, why, in your opinion, were they targeting Anefes? What were they looking to achieve with this conflict, with this specific fight? So the situation of East Mali is that there is like four K locations, Thessalite, Kidal, Hagelok, Anefes.

Thessalite and Kidal are in Eiffelah Jnim control and there is Aagelok and Anefes. Anefes is the most closed city from Burem or Gao or Gao. So if Anefes would have fallen, Hagelok would have fallen too.

So all the North East Mali would have been in the Jnim Eiffelah control. So it was a strategic move to bring more of North East Mali under their control. So what would have been the impact of these cities falling other than more territory being under their control?

Will they be able to use this as a launch pad to go after more cities? Yeah, exactly. The first consequence will be that this will be used like a launch pad.

Like, yes, I'll take control in 2022 of Aderham Bukan. And this Aderham Bukan has been a launch pad for an attack in Niger. Yeah.

Yeah... for esil this will be the same for anephys or ageloc and this will and this will be the same for tessalite orchidal which is already under a gym or ephela control since city like tombook to bear gomar house or burrem or gao will be under evie menace from jnimo ephela so they already have a number of cities under their control so let's go back to the

Offensive on anephys why did it fail you and a bunch of other accounts were following this really really closely in your estimation why did this assault on anephys fail and we'll use that bridge to talk about the first wave of coordinated attacks that janim and the fla conducted against you know the malian government so why did this attack feel you know the

First day that the offensive wall was launched there was some diversionary attack in central or south mali so the aircraft was forced to attack also and be deployed to this region but after the first day this diversionary this diversionary attack have been more rare so the airstrike the airstrike and the air asset have been concentrated against him and fla

In anephys and there was a lot of attrition against them so this group couldn't afford this loss afford this loss and this is this was this was unstable for them so after like six days they was forced to create anephys and they weren't able to repair the combo that was launched the second convoy thought so because the first convoy was repaired it was in like

The second or the third day but the second cover was couldn't be repelled because there was drone and it's also showed that the even if the aircraft doesn't win a war it also helped a lot because if there weren't all these airstrikes jnima fla could have maintained this blockade on anephys on the russian and malian soldier which was under siege in the

Anephys base.

Let's talk about that siege specifically, because that is one of the strategies that we've seen Janim replicate multiple times. They've even besieged Bamako and prevented fuel trucks from entering to the point where multiple observers were asking whether the capital city of Bamako would fall, and with it, the rest of the country.

So what makes a siege like that so successful for a group like Janim? And what are they bringing to the table that they need the FLA to partner with them? The siege of Bamako was different from the siege of Anephys, because in Bamako, it was more like harassing the oil tankers, the oil bus.

And in September, it was oil. And after April 2026, so after the takeover of Kedal, it was like all the goods. But, you know, it was like harassment.

It wasn't a jihadist around Bamako with their arms blocking all the world. It was like harassment, ambush on the convoy in Anephys. It was most like jihadist and a twiwag encirclements around the Anephys base.

It's two different things. And if you look, the siege of Bamako couldn't be maintained during months. After a certain time, after weeks, after several weeks, the jihadist was forced to leave this siege, because there was too lot of attrition.

And recently, the more recent siege in Anephys was also a fail, but a bigger fail, because the gym couldn't maintain this for a lot. And if you look now, I think that some days ago, there was hundreds of oil tankers who arrived in Bamako, and it is not rare now. So even in the siege of Bamako, Jnime couldn't maintain the siege.

But it was more longer in the first time that the siege of Anephys, because it was more like harassment and go in the bush. So it was a gorilla. There's a gorilla.

Thank you. type of siege where they'd harass vehicles, go into the bush and basically prevent Bamako from receiving any amount of fuel. So why did the first siege end? Because it ran from I believe September of last year to about January.

Why did the siege end?

Because at some point we stopped receiving news that Janim had blockaded the city and instead it seemed like there was a sense of relief because I remember a report from I believe Africa Files, Africa Reports, I can't remember off the top of my head, basically saying that the situation in Bamako looks calmer than it had been previously.

So is it just as you said a situation where they couldn't maintain the siege?

Regardless of how long they had done it before? Or are we looking at a situation where they were most likely planning subsequent attacks and needed to rally their forces? Yeah, so there was a big attrition.

So Janim was forced to stop the siege, but it was always like Janim too close, but months after it can retry this. So this is not like a total defeat, but Janim have a big harassment, but it cannot like control Bamako or maintain a siege, a total siege on Bamako for three weeks.

But they have also a big presence around the South and they can make big value attacks on Bamako and its surroundings.

If you look at the attack that killed the Minister of Defence, Bamako and its dimensions. If you look at the September 2024, the targeted Bamako airport and the gendarmerie school, which killed like 70 Malian soldiers and Russian. So they have the power to attack Bamako and to make high value attacks.

But did they can, they can have the power to attack Bamako. engage in a long war of attrition no the military have the means have the same means so Janim doesn't have the means to engage in a long attritional warfare which raises a very interesting question for me if Janim doesn't have the capabilities to engage in such a long war why are they doing what

They're doing what's the end goal if you know i know and as presumably they know as well as the malian government and of course the russian allies what's the end goal for them if we all know that Janim doesn't have the capabilities to do this what's the end goal i think there's a actually just to correct me this is like a high intensity attrition in fact

This is for more than decades that the name is in attrition war but a high intensity wow jenim couldn't afford this for now because if you look the number of the estimation of the number of militants of nim have doubled in the like years i think that in 20 20 22 the biggest was 5000 no it's like 12 000 something like that but what was the question i can you

Repeat the question i like forget of course i just want to know what is janim's end goal if we all know that they can't sustain an attritional war against the malian government since for now they cannot take over the country they cannot take over bamako they cannot win against the malian army because they don't have the means i think it's more like

Negotiation political negotiation and they haven't ever have they haven't made a lot of statement about this and jenim is no a political actor in mali even because more time more than a pure judges group like esil because there are no transechnik if you look i think it was in september 2025 they released some footage from a training camp and there was

Bambara students but no i think that so no i think that this is not much like a political negotiation that will lead to the establishment of sharia in mali in mali i don't think that actually or in the in the short term they think that they will win military you but if the situation continue maybe they will but actually i think that they are more in a

Political negotiation but the more time pass and the more time jnim will be in a in stronger position during this negotiation that are inevitable the whole military response will not be jnim at least in mali so if a military response is not going to work because for whatever reason janim has been successful enough that it can dig itself in into the trenches

It can cause enough of a crisis for bamako how likely are these negotiations to work because you've said it's almost inevitable that negotiations happen that the government whether it will be led by a semi goita or anyone else at this point because with mali you never really know whose can happen at any point so what's what's that going to look like do you

Foresee a situation where where the malian government actually acquiesces and allows janim to implement its version of sharia law in the areas it controls i don't think that the actual agenda will go into political negotiation which name the agenda all the agenda at least publicity always have the same rhetoric since years it is no negotiation with

Terrorists but if you look at the opposite political party abroad not in mali but abroad because they were forced to flee a lot of them say that no next name negotiation which name are no inevitable so maybe but with the agenda i don't see them negotiate in the short term because even with the siege of bamako one of the goal of jenim was to force the agenda

To go into the negotiation and it failed at least pbc so janim failed to get to get the hunter onto the negotiating table so is this the end of a of any possibility of a peace deal between the two groups because if the hunter says it's not going to negotiate with terrorists and janim can't win that you'd think that the only way to resolve this would be a

Peace deal right you'd think that the only way to resolve this would be an agreement between the two sides that sees them you're crossing the divide and sorting out you the issues they have politically but as you've said you don't see it as a possibility so is this is there no path to a peace deal between janim and the government actually i don't see

Anything because if the gentile remain in its position of no negotiation the war will continue but the malian army doesn't have the capacity to win against him in this vast country you know it's different from burkina faso where the country is more small there is a bigger density population mali offer a lot of bush a lot of a lot of how can i say this a lot

Of free treats for jadis so even if there is a an offensive what did what it will not change anything so the gentile will continue with its strategy and i don't see any pass to peace at least in short term because netter's name netter army will win again we will win against each other at least no because like maybe in like five years name will be much more

Stronger but today i don't see any pass for peace and the more name will be stronger and the more it will be in capacity to impose its points its willing but we can see you know and there is a very influential imam called the mahmud deco which have called to a negotiation with janim so and the fli engine also now are in a political alliance and the military

Alliance so and if you look even so those are hunter which was previously very against name some of their village are forced to negotiate which name in blood like some months ago there was some of them who tried to retake the arm or and retire from the agreement which name and it ended in a bloody massacre but no even the other hunter are forced to negotiate

With janim and to stop the war because it janim is becoming too stronger janim is becoming too much faster all right and we'll we'll get back to a lot of what you just mentioned shortly because you've mentioned the dozo militia you've mentioned the negotiations that these villages are being forced to make with janim it's just a very heartbreaking situation

To see that a situation we thought could be resolved politically given the history of politics being able to resolve tough tough negotiations tough circumstances like this it's difficult to imagine that we can't find a political way forward so instead let's let's talk about something you mentioned earlier the opposition and as you mentioned the opposition is

Currently in exile because the junta has made life difficult for opposition politicians they've banned political parties they're basically doing the exact kind of things you'd expect a military government a government that took power in a military coup to do so during the most recent wave of combined attacks coordinated attacks between and the fla they

Attacked a location called kenya roba which is about 75 kilometers from bamako they targeted a prison where the members of mali's political opposition are reportedly held and according to you according to you according to guys like brandt and hasret the government forces were able to repel janim and the fla from attacking this prison so do you see this as an

Attempt by janim and the fla to gain some sort of buy-in with a political opposition to gain some sort of support some sort of approval with the political opposition yeah probably because it's like some months ago there was a political opposing to the agenda not a jihadist not a pro-jihadist he was event before i don't know if it's i don't think it's always

He's always but he was a former marxist but a political opposition to genta as he legally entered into mali and he met malian soldier hostage of nim and jim as a good willing as a good gesture agreed to release some of them to prove that he's ready for negotiation for political negotiation so probably it was also for this i think jenim just to gain a

Political credibility and this is why yeah he released there's a stage stage for showing that he's not a jihadist group like ESIL, but a more political jihadist to the opposite to Jenta.

And he's ready to enter into negotiation, into discussion, even if he's a jihadist group. And he remains a group that can be very violent.

We have seen this by his recent massacre in central Mali. But he shares to gain credibility, like we have seen in Syria also. But I don't know if it's a good thing to make a parallel between Hayatay Rosham and Jnim.

You wouldn't be the first person to make that comparison between HTS and Jnim, because it's a comparison I drew in my own piece on warfronts very recently.

Because the same moves that HTS made in Syria are the same kinds of moves we're seeing Jnim make in Mali in terms of governing, in terms of presenting itself as a credible political force, in terms of presenting itself to the people as an alternative to the government in Mali.

And for a government that has been exceptionally brutal, I usually like to mention within my coverage of Mali as often as I can, that the government, the Mali government and their Russian counterparts have been almost as bloodthirsty as the militia groups, as the jihadists.

And it's a very compelling case that the jihadists are then able to make as a result of this bloodthirsty behavior from Bamako and their Russian allies. So let's talk about how Jnim is presenting itself to the people. So what kind of organizational systems is it using?

How is it governing in the areas that it is governing? This is very decentralized. It is like the local imam, the local chief, who do the Sharia, Jnim isn't in a centralized government like we have seen in Hidlib for Ayatollah al-Sham.

There isn't really, like we have seen in Syria also or in Libya with Islamic State.

This is much more like decentralized and even the agreements with FLA, if like in Kedah, this isn't a name government or this is very his name isn't in the actually isn't in a centralized governance it really from the local actor and it let them apply what he wants could you expand on that a little bit more give us a little bit more detail so for example

During the agreements with FLA one of the points was that if a city fall to the coalition Znim will not govern the city there is there will not be a towered flag in the in Kidal or in any cities that fall Znim will just say this is our version of Sharia this is how we want to Sharia to apply and but he will not there will not be a Znim judge who will apply

Sharia you know and even the Sharia of NIM I think it's Brent that say this that the hoodood like cut your hand but for example isn't a play no for Jim doesn't happen them no so it is even like a light Sharia I don't know if I can say this but this is a lighter Sharia than the Sharia that we have seen in Syria or any ES held Islamic State held territory you

Know so this light Sharia are people accepting it because one thing I do know about Mali is that it is a majority Muslim country are people accepting of this light version of Sharia that is being implemented not necessarily by Janim but you by their proxies yeah like you know you don't have the choice if you are a rural Malian if you live in a rural Mali you

Don't have the choice to say I don't want what Janim say especially in a central or Northern Mali you don't have the choice so and even if the information you know can be very difficult to get, because there isn't a lot of smartphones, there isn't a lot of things like that, like in Somalia also, but generally the people, the rural people don't have the

Choice, so they just obey to Jnim, to what Jnim wants, and if they don't, Jnim will respond with, generally will respond with Blue-D response, we have seen this recently in Central Mali, where dozens of people were killed, because they wanted to retire from an agreement with Jnim, so you don't have any choice, the army isn't here and will not go here to save

You, like during the previous massacre, there was a garnison a few kilometers away, but it cannot go and stop the massacre, so you don't have a choice, or if really you don't want, you have to go in the city, but it's not a thing that is, that a lot of people are okay with this, you know, to lost everything, we have seen this in Nigeria, where the people are

Forced, where people are forced to live under a swap control, under a swap once, under a swap pulling.

So, from what I'm getting from you, it's a situation where these people genuinely have no other choice but to live under the law, under the thumb of Jnim, they literally have no other choice because, again, there's no alternative, there's nowhere to flee, there's no savior coming for them, because as we already mentioned, the government isn't necessarily the

Best, it isn't concerned with lofty things like human rights more, the major concern is how much can they loot, how much can they take from the coffers before whoever will replace them replaces them, because that's the ultimate reality for many military coups and many military governments.

So, since that's the reality for many people outside Bamako, outside the region where the government has control, what is it like for the people in Bamako, for the places where the government does actually have some semblance of control, and it is trying to exert its influence? Thank you. Thank you.

You know, the people of Bamako or any Yuruban center might have been impacted from a recent event like the siege or even the attack in Gao or Sevai, but the common life is the... I don't think that the Jihadist group have a big influence on the common life of a resident of any Yuruban center.

It can be like one event, two events, but a major part of the year, the reason just do their life and this is the same for the resident of a Jihadist health group, you know.

The common life is here. I don't really know how to explain this in English, but... So life is going on.

People are still going on with their lives, which is basically what... the only thing you can do in such a situation that you do go on with your life, no matter how difficult a situation like this ends up being.

So let's pivot away from the ordinary people back to the government, because at the end of the day, it is the government that will have to fight these guys and hopefully win. And it's such a difficult proposition having to root for a military junta because the alternative is an Al-Qaeda-backed Jihadist group.

So let's talk about the government forces, okay?

Specifically, their inability, their seeming inability to fight back against Janim and to actually defeat them, because one of the promises that the junta made when coming into power, there was a very big complaint, a very big upswell of anger against this idea that the government, the previous government, the one before the junta, that it had failed to

Protect the people, the ordinary Malians, from the jihadists.

And now they, the junta themselves, are actually failing in that same endeavor.

Most recently, Malia, you've mentioned this before slightly, but I want to dig deeper into it. There was a video doing rounds among Sahelian trackers of Janim, either Janim or the FLA, I can't remember for the life of me at this moment, executing captured soldiers from the Malian government.

So tell us about, one, this video, and two, why is the government struggling so much? video came from an ambush a recent ambush i think it was like three days ago the convoy according to rfc was returning from anifice and heading to adgao but it was attacked by your name and fla it there was like 24 my answer who was kidnapped was captured by jenim and fla i

Think it was jenim because in the video where you know the prisoner i text like a white flag and i think it was the shahada flag from jenim the white shahada flag from jenim that we have seen a lot we don't see a lot the black flag and you no i think it's like for distant state it's safe from you don't this distance state it's late it's safe for from islamic

States but there was like 24 prisoners and jim fighter chose to kill them i was pretty surprised by this because you know if you want to make the pressure on the jenta and to have the means to impose your willing you have to have a prisoner we have seen also it is in gaza but it was jenim who executed this at least in this video and it also showed that the

Presence in anifice and agelok will be taught for malian jenta because this convo are constantly arrests and it will be hard for them to supply this base without casualties and recently we haven't seen we haven't seen that jim have no fpv drone at least at least so it will be even more total for them to supply them because here they device are like in the

Soul and you can just detonate them but if nema made a bigger use and of death fpv drone it will be even total for jenta to just resupply this location and never and all remote location because before like i don't know you with a big armor head convoy you can go everywhere well in this in the in the battle of hanefis they the first convo was too light too

Small and it didn't and it didn't reach the location but the bigger armored convo which location but if there is a bigger use of fpv by jnim and the flair all already have this it will be very toaster for them who have seen this in russia are more red against fpv can be disabled very easy very easily and i don't see but it will be very problematic for the

Gentile if the if this drone have will be used a lot more by jnim who previously you used only drone to get this fighter in real time and to drop small bomb it wasn't like chemicals drone like we have seen recently in niger to attack a position all right so there are still some technical limitations in their capabilities in their capacity and basically in

Their ability to improve power so one thing i do want to talk about before we close out this discussion that we have because it's such an interesting discussion once again malio thank you so much for agreeing to be on this podcast with me i again i really really appreciate it is the partnership between janim and the fla because on paper these are two very

Different groups dear listeners as i said earlier janim is an al-qaeda linked jihadist terrorist group and they're very fundamentally they're a fundamentalist islamic terror group you all understand what i mean when i say this you guys are not strangers to that concept the fla on the other hand azawad liberation front they are an ethno-nationalist group that

Wants to break away a section of mali they want to secede from mali and have their own azawad state for the for the twajig people so malio first question before we go anywhere what drove these two sides to power because one of the things that is a very underrated aspect of this entire partnership is the role that i believe his name is ian angali he is the

Leader of janim he is a twareg so there's a tribal link between janim and the fla but beyond that why are these two groups partnering you know i think that's in 2024 twareg very well understand that they cannot win alone And Jnim also, even if he had a lot of men, a political alliance and to prove that he is a mature group and also a moderate group, a more

Moderate group than the Islamic State.

But this alliance isn't new, you know, there was even a trial in 2012 during the almost takeover of the Northern Mali between the Jadis group and the MNLA, which is the ancestor of FLA. And the negotiation within the two didn't succeed. There was an agreement, but it failed to be applied.

In the next 24 hours, it collapsed. And after this, there was a clash and there was a win of Jihadists against Touareg Rebels. But today, I think that both have understood that an alliance is important if they want to win against Argenta.

And FLA couldn't have taken Kidal or Tesalit with Jnim. And Jnim need them first to show that they are okay and that they can negotiate with more moderate actors.

But also because FLR have a more technical knowledge and I even wonder if there's recent PEMICAS drone FPV used by Jnim in Niger, there wasn't some sort of exchange of knowledge with FLA FLA would maybe have helped Jnim to reach it, to reach this technology, to reach this capacity.

So the FLA is a more technically capable group than Jnim, and that could have been one of the leading causes, one of the leading factors allowing them to work so well together because there's an exit, there's a deal happening. So now we know why they're working together. So how well is the partnership surviving?

And do you see it lasting beyond the end of the war? Because at some point, this conflict will end. I don't think it will be a forever conflict.

Do you see this partnership devolving at some point? We don't know the future, but I think that the Touareg rebels now understand that if they want to win, if they want, they give up the independence and Touareg rebels always have been like pragmatic, you know, after there's the defeat against Jihadists because of these failed agreements.

They renounce officially to the independence of Azawad and they also helped French force against Jihadists.

So they are very pragmatic and today I didn't understand that if they want some sort of autonomy and not independence because Jnim is against this independence. But they will have to maintain this alliance against Jnim. They cannot win against the Mayan army, they cannot achieve anything against it because the group is too small.

And it's not small, small, like there is thousands of fighters between maybe two and five. I don't really know. But if they want to have some sort of success, they will have to maintain their alliance.

So, probably because there is a more moderate, the least religious faction from Touareg rebels know that without Jihadists, without Jnim, they cannot success. And for Jnim, if they will try to backstab, to attack FLA, to fail the agreements, they will have, they will send a very a very bad image towards towards the observance. So towards the other country.

So it's 50-50 and I think that both gain something in these agreements and that both will maintain this, but we will see. But I think that it will last, it will this agreement will last. All right.

Completely understand why, you know, you'd say the agreement will last because it is currently working really well for both sides. And they need that.

They need an agreement that works really well for both of them because the alternative is honestly not appealing especially but... from their side, given how effective they are working together as a fighting force.

So I was asking that, I was bringing that up, because there was a recent report from some of the other observers, the other Sahelian observers, about the Russian forces urging the Malian government to go back to the negotiating table and reintroduce the Algiers Accord. So for our audience, we need to give you a little context.

The uprising that the FLA is part of, that the FLA is involved in, that allows them to be partners with Janim, is something that goes back years, back a long time, because the grievances that the Tuareg people have against the Malian government have lasted years.

There's a feeling that Bamako favors the southern and central parts of Mali and ignores the northern parts, that they are left to fend for themselves, that they do not receive as much development, financial assistance, financial aid, as the other regions of the country. So it is a very deeply rooted grievance. It's a very deeply seated complaint.

So back in about, I believe, 2012, there was a really, really big uprising by the Tuaregs against the Malian government. It was one of the most bloody conflicts in Malian history. A lot of violence happened until negotiators came in, brought both sides to the table, and made them agree to sign a peace deal, which is the Algiers Accord.

The peace deal was signed in Algeria in 2015. And the reason why the Tuaregs are back fighting against the government is because the Junta ripped up this agreement, said they were not going to abide by it, because they accused Algeria and basically the FLA, the Tuaregs rather, of failing to live up to their end of the deal.

So with that context in mind, Malio, there were claims by the kinds of people you and I follow on Twitter that Russia was urging Bamako to revisit the Algiers Accord, to bring the Tuaregs back to the table, to negotiate with them afresh.

Do you see that attempt as plausible? One, do you believe the story that Russia is trying to get the Junta to agree, to re-agree to the Algiers Accord? And do you think it will work with the Tuaregs?

I think that if Russia do this, it will be plausible because they are saying that this coalition caused a lot of trouble and that if they want to have some sort of some sort of world success of context of long-term success they will have to topping antagonizing a lot of actor because this quality with this coalition I don't think that name or FLA could have

A takeover he dollar or the salad but if Russia want to ease the situation they will have they will they will have to push for there's a this negotiation between between Tuareg and the Jenta because you know Mali is a great country is a vast country so facing a multiple actor is really very hard you know and since the since 2024 the situation is degraded is

Degrading is a being worse is worsening rapidly for example the south of Mali which was pretty sparse was not that much affected by jihadist activity if you look since 2024 there is a lot of a lot of worsening in the situation for example the attack in September 2024 at Bamako after this in September 2025 there was the blockade which is even more which which

Is a proof of even more bigger capacity from Jnim so if the situation in the north doesn't doesn't improve there will be a nutrition everywhere a worsening situation everywhere so it is positive that Russia say to Jenta that they cannot win with these all to our strategy all right thank you Mario and on that note we're going to end the podcast here the

Situation in Mali is obviously evolving this is responsible while creating this is usually going really really fast and we're trying as much as Now we're trying as much as Now you're waiting possible to keep you abreast of the situation both on our main channel warfronts on fronts.co we have a number of articles published by several of our guest commentary

Experts we also have videos that we publish on the briefing room where we go deep into the crisis more giving you more depth than we can on the main channel because again we are only slaves to the YouTube algorithm so yes this is a situation that we're going to keep covering for as long as we can because we're deeply deeply passionate about providing

Coverage on all the underreported conflicts all the conflicts that we feel do not get the attention they deserve because the conflict might not get the attention that it deserves but at the end of the day people real people are hurting real people are being injured and losing their lives and honestly it's it's not a pretty sight so yeah we will keep shining

The light until something changes with the help of wonderful people like malio who have dedicated their time their knowledge their expertise to covering this crisis and they are gracious enough generous enough to share not only that expertise but their personal time i'm going to give a little behind the scenes info and malio forgive me but malio was actually

On vacation with his girlfriend when i said hey would you be interested in doing this podcast and he was gracious enough to take the time out of his vacation with his girlfriend to be here with us today so yeah i don't take that for granted and something else that i don't take for granted although hundreds of you who have subscribed to our subscriber on the

Website fronts.co you guys are the reason we are able to do this kind of work you guys are the reason we are able to offer the kind of insights we do because of your financial support we are able to retain our independence and we are able to cover under reported conflicts like this because we know you guys have our back financially we don't take that for

Granted we genuinely genuinely do not so i want you guys to know that from the bottom of our hearts from every single person at the fronts team we appreciate you are our rock so yeah thank you so much malio thank you for your time today i hope you have a lovely vacation with your girlfriend looking forward to recording another edition of this podcast with

You because you were such a wonderful guest so yeah i hope you have a lovely day bye thank you all right bye