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Due South: Paweł Wójcik on the Sahel Security Crisis.

September 19, 2026 · 1h 38m

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Fronts Staff

Transcript

Note: this transcript was generated by AI and may contain errors or inconsistencies.

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good evening, good afternoon, whenever and wherever you're listening to us from, this is the Daily South Podcast with me, your host, Wilfred Mainoi-Murray, and today we are joined by my friend and yours, someone who we've had on the podcast before, and hopefully in the couple of weeks since our first recording, I've

Finally learned how to pronounce his name right, Pavel Vucic, one of the most interesting observers of terrorism and terror-related threats, not just in the Sahel, not just in the Middle East, but every single place in the world.

This is a podcast that I've been dying to record because Pavel and I have so much to talk about. We were actually supposed to do this about a week ago, so I'm just pulling the curtain back to show you how long in the works this has been, about some scheduling issues, and that this is actually the first thing we've been able to record.

So today is Wednesday, the 16th of September, just to give you a temporal signpost of when we're recording it again. Pavel, please say hi to the people. Well, hello, and thank you for having me again.

Wonderful, wonderful. Pavel, please tell the people what you've been doing in the time since we spoke, specifically about your YouTube channel. I really would love to be able to promote it.

Yeah, I mean, I've had my YouTube channel for a while, but I couldn't really record a lot, especially in English because of microphone issues, because I didn't really have the internet to go with, but now that I have relocated and possessed internet to go with, finally, after many years, I can finally have something going.

So if anyone is interested, as you said, in the matters of the Sahel, the Middle East, well, it depends. I mainly follow terrorism and asymmetrical warfare, so rebels, but mainly terrorism related to the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

And as you know, both groups have spread widely all over the world, so sometimes in very magical places. So wherever they are, I am there. But yeah, these days, it's mainly the Sahel.

So one has to be prepared for many, many different things, a lot of distances to get covered, and how, well, the most powerful affiliate of Al-Qaeda is currently behaving in the Sahel, or quickly catching up, the Islamic State affiliate, and how everyone and their grandmother has, the Islamic State affiliate, and how everyone and their grandmother has,

Problems with them.

And the problems will be going for, well, many years, because there's no stopping it. There's no cavalry to the rescue.

And well, but that's exactly it. Well, last time we spoke, it was about the circumstances around the battle in Anefis. So the beginning of July, two months ago, it was the second stage of a campaign that brings together Al-Qaeda affiliate and JNU, and the two arcs from FLA, fighting the Mali regime allied to the Russians.

So that was when we spoke. And ever since then, there have been many new things. So we will be covering it today.

So we will be covering it today. Certainly. For example, the historically unprecedented mass prisoner swap that included dozens of countries and, well, three main rebel groups.

So the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and that, like, themselves. So it's certainly interesting. Yes, there is.

There has been a lot since the last time you and I spoke, Pavel. So yeah, actually, let's just dive right into it. Yes, there is.

There has been a lot since the last time you and I spoke, Pavel. So yeah, actually, let's just dive right into it. So, yeah, actually, let's just dive in to discuss the prisoner swap.

So if you're unfamiliar with the happenings in the Sahel, just a quick, brief explainer. As Faber has mentioned, Janim Jamal, Muslim and all Muslim, it's a terror group that is affiliated with Al-Qaeda, has been active in Mali for several years now.

And not just Mali, but Burkina Faso, Niger, we've seen tentacles of it spreading throughout the Sahel and throughout Western Africa.

It's a terror group that is generally very interesting to follow because of just how insanely complicated some of its internal dynamics can become. For example, one of the group's leaders, Sadu, who was a brother to another person, you know, very high up within Janim.

He left the organization during the Islamic State because of the sacraments of interpretation of Sharia law.

And his departure created a lot of enmity between the two organizations that were already enemies at the start. So they eventually killed him. And, you know, it was a whole thing.

So, again, it's a very interesting organization to follow because it's Al-Qaeda's most prominent affiliates within the world right now. It's. You know, the one that actually has to progress.

And then there's the FLA. The FLA is the Front for the Liberation of Azawad. It's a Tuareg ethno-nationalist militia group whose sole goal is to ensure that the Tuaregs secede from Mali.

The Tuaregs live in the northern part of the country, and it's an area that has historically been very marginalized. They fought multiple wars with Bamako. The situation between the two was relatively peaceful.

Recently, because of the Algiers Accord, which is a peace deal that was signed between the Tuaregs and the Bamako government in Algeria. The Algiers Accord set up some terms that will grant the Tuaregs more autonomy, greater economic leeway, just better terms in general over what they had received in the past.

And then when the military coups happened, the Junta government, led by Asini Goita, tore up that agreement, and now the FLA and the Tuaregs are just back fighting the government.

So it's a very complicated situation in Mali, but I wanted to get you guys situated before we started talking about, you know, even deeper things in case this is your first time listening. In case it isn't, hey, a refresher never hurts anyone. So we'll start with the first of the prison assaults, right?

On the 3rd of August, Mali announced the release of 82 soldiers. Bamako said they had been held by the armed groups. The armed groups involved in the April offensive, these are the FLA and JEMIM, and the FLA said it had released roughly 80 men for humanitarian reasons, and said it still held around 118 Malian soldiers.

A foreign ministry spokesperson told the AFP that Algeria had mediated this conflict. Again, going back to the role that Algeria plays as a regional mediator, connecting Bamako and the Tuaregs. Then on August the 23rd, another 22 Malian soldiers were released.

This one was much more clear in exchange. The AFP has reported that in exchange, at least eight FLA-linked detainees were freed. Although the FLA characterized the people who had been released by Bamako as Siberians rather than fighters.

And then on the 28th of August, approximately 60 more Malian soldiers were taken to Niger and exchanged for Inkinane Agataha. Both are pronouncing his name right. Inkinane Agataha, a prominent FLA figure, as well as people allegedly linked to JEMIM, security sources told the AFP that the Nigerian government, that's Niger, the country whose capital is Miami.

For anyone who might be confused by the pronunciation, the Nigerian government had directly overseen the arrangement. Agataha is a really big deal. He was being held because of accusations that he had helped organize drone training for the FLA, coordinated attacks, and served as an internal liaison.

Basically, he's a figure within the upper management levels of the FLA. So he is a very interesting figure. And the fact that his release happened in exchange for all those Malian soldiers tells you just how much the FLA valued him.

So, Pavel. Let's talk about all these prisoner swaps, what you think about them, and something quite interesting that I haven't seen a lot of people talk about, the role that Saddam Haftar from Libya played in the war. Yeah, well, I've actually tried to encompass with my mind the whole spectrum of what happened.

And in my idea, it is still happening because of this. It's not an Islamic state, but, well, I will be talking about it a little later. And as you said, the role of Saddam Haftar, so the son of Khalifa Haftar, which is, well, the most known warlord of Libya ever since Muammar Gaddafi was killed, right?

And multiple civil wars happened. What happened since then in Libya and the Haftar family, Father Haftar and his sons, especially Saddam, who is being presented as the main replacement, the main ruler of the Haftar family in the years to come, have taken for themselves a very important role.

A very important role of, well, negotiating brokers, really, for years, for those who may be a bit interested in the affairs of not only Libya, but North Africa at large.

Well, those boundaries between West Africa, North, East, are very, very fluid. It's not really the best. To call it North, East, West, but, well, to at least visualize it for the people.

So, for those who know a little bit more, Haftars were connected to two main regimes throughout the whole split between West and East Libya. And those were, well... Classic.

Russia or United Arab Emirates. Those were the main two players that were seen as allies to the Haftar family. And during Haftar's siege of Tripoli, well, the attempt to retake Tripoli for the East Libya and unify Libya under Haftar's command, well, a few years later, Haftar was defeated.

A few years ago, it was Turkey that was sending troops, Syrian rebels, drones, and aircrafts to stop them. And the Turks successfully stopped them back then. However, in recent two years, it is slowly changing, shifting.

Well, nothing really is permanent. People that like to... Like, with some web of encompassing Russian influence on Chinese might be in for a very, very big surprise.

Because Haftars are clearly shifting their allegiances or alliances back from Russia. Well, they still have that Russian alliance. However, it's clear that to

Very, very... Much more extensive influence is coming now from Turkey, that a few years ago was bombing them, right? The Haftar.

And the United States. The United States under Trump administration, well, has a very, very different vision of what is exactly foreign policy. Nobody is certainly surprised.

But it matters also for Africa because even brutal regimes now in Africa actually have a shot to connect with the Americans, which those regimes are currently exploiting because they don't really like entirely that whole deal with Russia that doesn't really benefit them. That's much. While the Americans really provide some very useful stuff.

So the Haftars are clearly shifting their alliances right now. And regarding Oxford, we are seeing that through well... I've said it many times throughout last month.

I don't like what I see all over the West and North Africa. I don't like what I see all over the West and North Africa. I don't like what I see all over the West and North Africa.

I don't like what I see all over the West and North Africa. And either it is connected to the UK or it is connected to the Haftar. Because as part

Well, there are multiple links of what happened during the giant, huge swap. But the Haftar link is directly connected to the Islamic State. The Islamic State last year, well, Well, the Islamic State last year, well, Well, the Islamic State last year, well, I won't be really reminding everyone what is exactly the Islamic State here in the Sahel.

I won't be really reminding everyone what is exactly the Islamic State here in the Sahel. I won't be really reminding everyone what is exactly the Islamic State here in the Sahel. You have to really jump and read something about it because we don't really have that much time.

You have to really jump and read something about it because we don't really have that much time. You have to really jump and read something about it because we don't really have that much time. However, just know that the Islamic State in the Sahel is really powerful and has gathered a lot of foreign recruits right now.

However, just know that the Islamic State in the Sahel is really powerful and has gathered a lot of foreign recruits right now. However, just know that the Islamic State in the Sahel is really powerful and has gathered a lot of foreign recruits right now.

However, just know that the Islamic State in the Sahel is really powerful and has gathered a lot of foreign recruits right now.

However, just know that the Islamic State in the Sahel is really powerful and has gathered a lot of foreign recruits right now. Why it matters? It matters because right now the Haftars certainly gave them a lot of money.