Paweł Wójcik on the Sahel Security Crisis.

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good evening, good afternoon, whenever and wherever you're listening to us from, this is the Due South Podcast with me, your host, Wilfred Waimiri, and today we are joined by my friend and yours, someone who we've had on the podcast before and hopefully in the couple of weeks since our first recording, I've finally learned

How to pronounce his name right, Paweł Wójcik, one of the most interesting observers of terrorism and terror related threats, not just in the Sahel, not just in the Middle East, but every single place in the world.

This is a podcast that I've been dying to record, because Pawel and I have so much to talk about. We were actually supposed to do this about a week ago, so I'm just pulling the curtain back to show you how long in the works this has been, about some scheduling issues, and that this is actually the first thing we've been able to record.

So today is Wednesday, the 16th of September, just to give you a temporal signpost of when we're recording it, to give you a way to talk about something that might be a little outdated.

It just depends on when the podcast will come out, and in case anything has happened since then, we won't be able to talk about it, because we can't really predict the future. Now, Connie, Pavel, please say hi to the people.

Well, hello, and thank you for having me again. Wonderful, wonderful. Pavel, please tell the people what you've been doing in the time since we spoke, specifically about your YouTube channel.

I really would love to be able to promote it. Yeah, I mean, I've had my YouTube channel for a while, but couldn't really record a lot, especially in English because of microphone issues, because I didn't really have the internet to go with, but now that I have relocated and possessed internet to go with, after many years, I can finally have something going.

So if anyone is interested, as you said, in the matters of the Sahara, the Middle East, well, it depends.

I mainly follow terrorism and asymmetrical warfare, so rebels, but mainly terrorism related to the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. And as you know, both groups have spread widely all over the world, so sometimes in very magical places.

So wherever they are, I am, but yeah, these days it's mainly the Sahel, so one has to be prepared for many, many different things, a lot of distances to get covered and how, well, the most powerful affiliate of Al-Qaeda is currently behaving in the Sahel or quickly catching up the Islamic State affiliate and how everyone and grandmother has problems with

Them and the problems will be going for, well, many years because there's no stop in it.

There's no cavalry to the rescue. And, well, but that's, that's exactly it. Well, last time we spoke, it was about the circumstances around the battle in Anaphis.

So the beginning of July, two months ago, it was the second stage of campaign that brings together al-Qaeda affiliated JNU and the two arcs from FLA fighting the Mali regime allied to the Russians. So that was when we spoke. And ever since then, there have been many new things.

So we will be covering it today, certainly. For example, the historically unprecedented mass prisoner swap that included dozens of countries and, well, three main rebel groups. So this time it's Al-Qaeda and that works themselves.

So it's certainly interesting. Yes, there has been a lot since the last time you and I spoke, Pavel. So yeah, actually, let's just dive in to discuss the prisoner swap.

So if you're unfamiliar with the happenings in the Sahel, just a quick brief explainer, as Pavel has mentioned, Jamal al-Muslim, it's a terror group that is affiliated with Al-Qaeda, has been active in Mali for several years now, and not just Mali, but Burkina Faso, Niger, we've seen tentacles of it spreading throughout the Sahel and throughout Western

Africa.

It's a terror group that is genuinely very interesting to follow because of just how insanely complicated some of its internal dynamics can become.

For example, one of the group's leaders, Sadu, who was a brother to another Faso-Miro, very high up within Janim, left the organization during the Islamic State because of the sacraments of interpretation of Sharia law, and his departure created a lot of enmity between the two organizations that were already enemies at the start.

So they eventually killed him, and it was a whole thing. So again, it's a very interesting organization to follow because it's Al-Qaeda's most prominent affiliate within the world right now. It's the one that actually has to progress.

And then there's the FLA. The FLA is the Front for the Liberation of Azawad. It's a two-agent FLA.

It's a multinationalist militia group whose sole goal is to ensure that the Tuaregs secede from Mali. The Tuaregs live in the northern part of the country, and it's an area that has historically been very marginalized. They've fought multiple wars with Bamako.

The situation between the two was relatively peaceful recently because of the Algiers Accord, which is a peace deal that was signed between the Tuaregs and the Bamako government in Algeria.

The Algiers Accord set up some terms that will grant the Tuaregs more autonomy, greater economic leeway, just better terms in general over what they had received in the past. And then when the military coups happened, the Junta government, led by Asini Goita, tore up that agreement, and now the FLA and the Tuaregs are just back fighting the government.

So it's a very complicated situation in Mali, but I wanted to get you guys situated before we started talking about, you know, even deeper things, in case this is your first time listening. In case it isn't, hey, a refresher never has anyone. So we'll start with the first of the prison assaults, right?

On the 3rd of August, Mali announced the release of 82 soldiers. Barmako said they had been held by the armed groups involved in the April Ascension. These are the FLA and Genium.

And the FLA said it had released roughly 80 men for humanitarian reasons. And said it still held around 118 Malian soldiers. A foreign ministry spokesperson told the AFP that Algeria had mediated this conflict.

Again, going back to the role that Algeria plays as a regional mediator, connecting Barmako and the Tuaregs. Then on August 23rd, another 22 Malian soldiers were released. This one was much more clear in exchange.

The AFP reported that in exchange, at least eight FLA-linked detainees were freed, although the FLA characterised the people who had been released by Barmako as Siberians rather than fighters. And then on the 28th of August, approximately 60 more Malian soldiers were taken to Niger and exchanged for Nkinane Ag Ataha. I hope I'm pronouncing his name right.

Nkinane Ag Ataha, a prominent FLA figure, as well as people allegedly linked to Janim. Security sources told the AFP that the Nigerian government, that's Niger, the country's capital is Miami. For anyone who might be confused by the pronunciation, the Nigerian government had directly overseen the arrangement.

And Ataha is a really big deal. He was being held because of accusations that he had helped organize drone training for the FLA, coordinated attacks, and served as an internal liaison. Basically, he's a figure within the upper management levels of the FLA.

So he is a very interesting figure, and the fact that his release happened in exchange for all those Malian soldiers tells you just how much the FLA valued him.

So, Tavel, let's talk about all these prisoner swaps, what you think about them, and something quite interesting that I haven't seen a lot of people talk about, the role that Saddam Haftar from Libya played in the war.

Yeah, well, I've actually tried to encompass with my mind the whole spectrum of what happened, and in my idea it is still happening because of the Islamic State, but well, I will be talking about it a little later, and as you said, the role of Saddam Haftar, so the son of Khalifa Haftar, which is the most known warlord of Libya ever since Muammar Gaddafi was

Killed, and multiple civil wars happened since then in Libya, and the Haftar family, father Haftar and his sons, especially Saddam who is being presented as the main replacement, the main ruler of the Haftar family in the years to come, have taken for themselves a very important role of negotiating brokers, really.

For years, for those who may be a bit interested in the affairs of not only Libya, but North Africa at large, well, those boundaries between West Africa, North, East are very, very fluid. It's not really the best to call it North, East, West, but well, to at least visualize it for the people.

So for those who know a little bit more, Haftars were connected to two main regimes throughout the whole split between West and East Libya.

And those were, well, classic, Russia or United Arab Emirates. Those were the main two players that were seen as allies to the Haftar family and during Haftar's siege of Tripoli, well, the attempt to retake Tripoli for the East Libya and unify Libya under Haftar's command a few years ago.

It was Turkey that was sending troops, Syrian rebels, drones and aircrafts to stop them.

And the Turks successfully stopped them back then. However, in recent two years, it is slowly changing, shifting. Well, nothing really is permanent.

People that like to sweep some web of encompassing Russian influence on Chinese might be in for a very, very big surprise because Haftars are clearly shifting their allegiances or alliances back from Russia. Well, they still have that Russian alliance.

However, it's clear that a very, very much more extensive influence is coming now from Turkey that a few years ago was bombing them, right?

The Haftar. And the United States. The United States under Trump administration, well, has a very, very different vision of what is exactly foreign policy.

Nobody is certainly surprised. And it matters also for Africa because even brutal regimes now in Africa actually have a shot.

They will connect with the Americans, which those regimes are currently exploiting because they don't really like entirely that whole deal with Russia that doesn't really benefit them that much, while the Americans really provide some very useful stuff.

So the half-nots are clearly shifting their alliances right now. And regarding Oxford, we are seeing that through, well, I've said it many times throughout the last month, I don't like what I see all over the West and North Africa. And either it is connected to the UK or it is connected to the after.

Because as part, well, there are multiple links that have happened during the giant, huge swap. But the after link is directly connected to the Islamic State. The Islamic State last year, well, I won't be really reminding everyone what is exactly the Islamic State here in the Sahel.

You have to really jump and read something about it because we don't really know. We don't have that much time. However, just know that the Islamic State in the Sahel is really powerful and has gathered a lot of foreign recruits right now.

Why it matters? It matters because right now the Haftars certainly gave them a lot of money, a lot of money in exchange for at least one prisoner. And I think at this point there are three prisoners that the Islamic State was bribed with money to exchange them.

So the first prisoner was the American missionary that was kidnapped last year. If I remember correctly, it was September or October. He was kidnapped in a very brazen way in Niyavik, the capital. of Niger, and he was kidnapped just outside the presidential palace, literally outside.

So it was a very telling affair that the Islamic State can state an operation that deep inside Niyavik. Well, it was really a foreshadow of so because they kidnapped him and then a few months later, at the end of January 2026, so at the beginning of this year, they stormed. It was the first storm of the of Niger's capital, military airport.

We had three storms on the same airport this year, one by the Islamic State, second by JNIMS or Al-Qaeda, and third a few weeks ago. By the soldiers who were attempting a coup, right? So we can see how bad of a quagmire it is in New York, that something like this can happen all the time in the capital.

So that American was kidnapped, then transported to Mali, because that's where the Islamic State right now is the strongest, they have almost a whole province of Manaka, they are very, very strong in Israel, but Manaka is where the main strongholds have been for at least four years right now, and only the very city of Manaka, which is the name of the

Province, also is outside the influence of the Islamic State, but in April, when FLI and Zaynim started the whole campaign all over Mali, the Islamic State also entered Manaka and with you the same day, so we see how strong the organization is.

So that's where that American was taken to, and right now we saw him getting released in Mali, not in Mali, I'm sorry, but in Libya.

He was released in Libya in Libya, and while there was propaganda circulated around it that there was some kind of special forces attack, well, the distance itself suggested that it was simply a lie, and well, there are rumors connected to this attempt that at least three or four million, millions of dollars were paid, and we think there is a much higher

Number, and it was paid by the Haftar family, and then, well, the Americans, of course, were very happy.

Trump himself advertised the release of this America, so we can see that Haftar certainly think that it was worth it to pay that way. However, well, it may be worth for them, but it certainly wasn't.

It would be worth it for the Nigerian and Malian regimes and also for the Russia and Africa, the organization that is right now de facto an enterprise that is run by the Ministry of Defense in Moscow.

So they are certainly not happy. That's something like this happened.

And right now there are more people being released by Islamic State and also apparently to Libya because a few months before that America was kidnapped, Islamic State also kidnapped a few European women, an Austrian and a Swiss women that are apparently in the midst of being released to the Haftas as well.

So European governments also may have paid some money. So Islamic State is now getting a huge amount of dollars to their coffers.

And well, it's a whole affair that is connected to the wider net of kidnappings of kidnappings in the South Pole because last year JNIM kidnapped an Emirati prince and for his release, the Emirates paid at least 50 million dollars.

And then we saw what happened this year, the whole attacks and these whole campaigns that were occurring throughout this year and are happening and were returned two weeks ago are clearly also connected to that money. So we see that. The whole kidnapping affair of the Islamic State may also return in the same manner as they did for al-Qaeda.

So to ask the question is a bit of a leading question.

So you've said that, yes, this is something you and I have talked about over our messages, but you've said that there were reports, that it seems a lot like propaganda, and I actually brought some of it up to you when we were talking, that it seemed like the Haftars had executed some sort of special operations, and it wasn't possible because of the distance,

Right?

That was such a wild claim for them to make.

So this money that the Haftars are paying, what are they hoping to get back? Well, they certainly want to have, a more direct influence of a very strong American hand. So there are still a lot of UN-established weapons embargoes on Libya.

There are a lot of misgivings about trade, especially eastern side of Libya, that is still thought as being allied to Russia, right? So, of course, Europe won't like it because of the whole affair with the war in Ukraine and what Russia does to us when it comes to sabotage that kind of stuff.

So by getting Americans on the side of half-tales, they can make it easier for them to reach out to the Europeans and other governments that so far have shunned them, really.

And, well, it may strengthen the half-tales for position right now in the more precarious world, right? Because, well, the whole West Africa war is absolutely gigantic. It seems spreading, as they speak.

Only that the Sudanese war is spreading also. It backfires so much that the Sudanese army, the UN recognizes the Sudanese army is currently bombing inside Trat or Ethiopia because that's where the supply lines of the rapid support forces are.

Well, the wars in Ethiopia in Ethiopia itself are currently being reopened either with the Tigray forces or Eritrea where Ethiopia wants to regain access to the sea.

Somalia is again fragmenting in a very drastic manner. Yemen is fragmenting also. There's a whole wave of wars from West Africa to the East.

And Haftar right now are, well, let's say, that kind of war that they can present themselves to the Europeans that, look, everywhere there is war. We are not at war currently. There is kind of peace.

Well, it's not really a peace, but we are very strong and we are the last war between you and them. You want us to thrive? You want us to continue and to maintain that war?

Well, let's make a deal. So I think that's what is currently happening. And, well, they also see that Russia is a very, very dire situation because Russia clearly overstretched their... applying their strategy.

They are currently... Well, Ukraine war is in itself a quagmire. But the whole thing with Mali and how difficult has it been in the last half a year and that it is quickly becoming something they cannot escape and have to.

Well, it is no longer something they benefit from because... for a few years now, there was a talk that Russia is in Mali, West Africa because it wants to benefit from some resources, connections, and so on and so forth. But it is no longer something they benefit from.

They invest hundreds of millions of dollars into something that is not profitable at all right now.

And they are... They are losing the factor in Mali. And Libya also sees it.

While there may be some talk that here and there, Russia is establishing some rapport, some African regime wants to have that kind of petroliac guard that Africa co-ops stands. Well, we saw a few weeks ago what happened in Niamey. And we think that

Africa co-ops was the ones that stopped the coup from being successful. I think the Xi'an regime would have been overthrown had it not been for the Africa co-ops soldiers that used FPV drones to fight off the mutinied soldiers. So some regimes are certainly

I'm thinking that kind of Petroian guard that is serving as a guard, some kind of protection, personal protection of a dictator is certainly something that is obvious and can be followed by dealing with Russia. However, that's it. The whole affair with Russia is not profitable for the country.

And they see it. That's why... That's why Algeria rushed to the rescue of Niger.

Well, at odds with Algerian policy in the last few decades, that kind of mini-intervention, they sent a few planes and ministers to Niamey the very next day to show their support for the regime. It was completely unprecedented. And the Haftars here in Libya see... that Russia is not enough.

So Turkey is coming in. Turkey that, as I said, was bombing them a few years ago. Turkey is coming in.

Americans are coming in. And the Italians are also coming in. Though there has been some mishap between some European countries and Haftars, however.

This is nothing that cannot be resolved. I think the Haftars... Now we'll be trying to be that kind of a balancing player for the whole North Africa.

And these swaps are one of the many components that are currently ongoing. All right. So let's go back to that coup that happened in Niger.

Because it was one of the most... Well, the attempted coup, rather, that happened in Niger. It was one of the most interesting events that has happened... that happened of late.

Because a lot of the reporting around it indicates that the soldiers who were involved in that, who were doing it, out of a sense of frustration with the government, because the government had failed to live up to its promise that it will be able to protect the people from the terror groups, right?

And they linked a lot of this back to the idea that the government was even willing to conduct these... prisoner swaps with the terror groups. And, you know, that's why we started with the terror groups.

That's why we started with the prisoner swaps, made our way through Haftar's regime, and now we are back in Niger. So, Pavel, take us through that section, the coup in Niger specifically, and, you know, what caused it, what's the situation in Niger right now? Well, I'm thinking of how to go about it.

I have written... at this point, for France, well, that is our sister company here, a few articles regarding Niger this year, and some of them, especially the earlier ones from April, May, June, were kind of foreshadowing the events that would come. Well, because, well, I'm not really that much of a pessimist in everywhere.

However, here, I cannot help but be, because, well, if there is a long-term follower of mine, they could see the writing on the wall.

Well, when I returned in 2023 and started covering Niger, back then, I already wrote that the coup in Niger saw the fact of fifth coup, because, as you remember, in Mali there were two, right? First coup, then second, by Asim Goytan.

Then we had, in 2022, one coup, and a few months later, a second, by Captain Farore, which is the most famous dictator of Africa right now, and the coup in Niger was the fifth, and, well, de facto, also connected to the other two.

However, it was also the most stretched when it comes to justification around it, because while the determination and motivation of soldiers committing the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso were also very, very artificial in manner for the most of them, they also had some kernel of truth.

So France was failing, the governments were, to some extent, corrupt, and security was deteriorating. So these three things were certainly true, well, there were a lot more that were fake, but these three were most important, and that was also followed by Malian and Burkina Faso populations.

Those schools were popular, and the populations thought that the military taking power may actually be a trend. Well, it wasn't a trend, as we can see, five, six, four years after, but at the time, the population couldn't handle that. However, they needed to.

The fifth coup, and it is also connected to, this is why I am repeating this, because it is connected to that coup a few weeks ago. The fifth coup in 2023, in June, if I remember correctly, overthrowing the democratically elected President Basel. At the time, it was a hoax.

It was a complete hoax. Because, well, General Chani repeated what his fellow coup members from Mali, Burkina Faso, also said in their respective coups. That situation was deteriorating for Israel.

And it was a lie. Because at the time, the security situation was improving. And it was visible on the whole map of West Africa that Israel was at one point on the map, as we say in Europe, the last gall village that defended itself before the Roman invasion.

You may remember Asterix and Obelix. So Israel was that kind of village on the map of West Africa with the whole terror that was spreading at the time, and Israel was improving. It was literally a few months before the coup happened that we could see the statistics were improving.

So, well, there was a lie, and the fact of the coup was that because President Basel was about to dismiss President Chani from his role as the presidential guard commander, so it was the presidential guard that started that coup, and then for a few days had to argue with other components of the army elsewhere to get them to agree on their results from this

Coup.

And, well, after some time negotiations, they find that they agree, agreed and created a military government with many people, special forces, military police, and so on and so forth.

So we could see from the very beginning that the army wasn't really that happy with what happened, especially because they knew that a massive threat and also a massive American presence in the bases of Agadez, India, was something that couldn't be replaced.

However, when we go in as NIDRE to the same boots that Mali and Burkina Faso have, well, we must also repeat what they have done, so we have to get the Americans and the French to move out. And they moved out. And ever since then, security absolutely collapsed.

Collapsed to the extent where, well, if someone follows me, has followed me for these two years, I am repeating myself quite often. However, I also, well, have links and evidence behind it that there was a massive, absolutely massive collapse of security. The capital of Niger is in a really precarious place.

It's very, very close to the borders with Mali and Burkina Faso in western Niger, right? And the terrorists, mainly from the Islamic State, were able to bypass the capital. The capital of Giza, and go south.

Go south where they arrived in Nigeria, in northern Nigeria. And that's where the airstrikes by the United States last year in December also happened, because the Islamic State arrived there from Mali to Niger, right? So we could see the consequences of that, well, I admit it was a massive fire by the Nigerian military to do something they did.

And it was visible because of the soldiers that committed the coup a few weeks ago, because the people that were attacking in Yemen at that time were from the exact places the Islamic State is attacking, this year and last year. So they were from... The provinces of Tila Beri, where the Islamic State absolutely struck.

The province of Dosa, that is bordering a province in Nigeria called Sokoto. And Sokoto was a very famous location where the Sahelian caliphs, before the European colonization, were stationed. And so that location has a lot of... historical and religious value to the jihadists, Salafi jihadists, because of Fulani caliphs that were presented there.

And that's where, right now, the main Islamic State invasion is ongoing, between Niger's province of Dosa and Nigerian province of Sokoto. And some of the components of the army that were in Dosa also... Like in Niamey a few weeks ago.

And, well, there were also a lot more causes of that coup. For example, missing days of salary payments, delays massively for a few months, deterioration of help from Niamey, right? Because Niamey

It has to defend itself, so the main protection is to protect the regime, not the soldiers, right? So, well, you can also see that lack of French and American support in the air. You can't just replace them with drones.

It's impossible. Unless you have hundreds and thousands of drones in the air, which is also something very costly.

Drones are not really that cheap, as it is... as people think, because they come with a ground-based electricity, different kind of stuff that has to be replaced, ammo that has to be transported, for example, from Turkey, which is what Turkey is doing currently in Mali, in Severe, in the city of Severe, where the Tuaregs and JNIM is currently bombing them,

Right?

So we can... We could see the coup happening, and it was really close. I think it was really close.

If not for the Russians that answered the call for help from General Chani, we could... We apparently could see a new regime that would have been something completely different. Well, still military regime.

However, it would have... It would have likely been something pro-Eco-Wars. So that

Well, let's say a bloc, West Africa bloc, that is in some places compared to the European Union or... America, right? So that political and economical union with Africa, from which Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, basically, they left the organization.

And at some point, the organization contemplated whether to intervene in New Jersey when that coup happened three years ago. And they fumbled so hard that the prestige of that organization deteriorated quite passively. However, it is still quite a player, well, because its main component is Nigeria, right?

No matter how... how weak the organization may be, Nigeria is still a strong player, that part of the world. And that regime that would have been established in New Zealand would have likely been something pro-Nigeria and by association, pro-Europe. So this is something that Russia absolutely had to prevent.

I have a question about that. So that idea that the coup was something that would have been pro-Nigeria, pro-ECOWAS, and of course pro-Europe, I've seen a lot of people use it to try and imply that the coup was supported by these outside powers. Have you seen anything to that effect or anything that can dispute that?

I'm sorry I cut you off, but I just wanted to get clarification on that. Well, there were... and always have been talks about different foreign interventions in all kinds of crises in Africa, right? It is something absolutely classic.

Well, because many years ago, it certainly happened. The French were not happy, right, in the 60s, in the 70s. So there's special forces and intelligence services certainly had some... blame to absolutely get, and they should get blame for that.

However, in 2036, it's really no longer that obvious. While there may have been some talks, some interests, well, Europe is exhausted by those suspicions because, well, I can say as a member of the European Union, at all, but we are really committed to the Ukrainian war.

It takes 99% of our patience, really, and standing up in Africa, it may be in terms of the French, of Italians, or the Spanish because they have cities, not Africa, but not to the same extent as it was a few decades ago.

Accusations, especially regarding France, are simply a scarecrow.

A scarecrow, they are a very convenient excuse to make because if not for those kind of excuses, there would have been people that accuse Europe of doing something like that would have been forced to see domestically what may be wrong inside their countries instead of what may be imposed from the outset. So there will be a lot of questions.

There will be a gigantic fight against corruption. They will be forced to ask questions. Well, in the case of Israel, why the situation is deteriorating so hard that this year three attacks in Yemen happened and two of them by two different terrorist groups that are not connected to France at all.

So this time it didn't occur. And the third, why the army itself thought that they had enough and they have to, more or at all, the army itself, right? So they would be forced to ask, to answer those kind of questions, but they instead prefer to, well, accuse France because it costs nothing and France doesn't really have a lot to say.

Well, it's funny for also those that recently, which investigated the accusations of General Chen, this is the dictator of Niger, that were said three years ago and also recently because he also blamed Algeria for some kind of tensions.

Mali also blamed Algeria, but now we see Algeria intervention and also Malian government visiting Algeria and now both pretend that they didn't say anything about Algeria interference and opt to blame Trump instead because it costs nothing. However, it points out to the people the direction they have to be busy.

So this is to make people busy because if they again started asking questions, why it's so hard, said Niger and Paris, then the militaries would have really, really some hard questions to answer. So, yeah, it makes sense.

It makes a lot of sense that they will choose a convenient scapegoat in France and, you know, in the wider Europe and, you know, perhaps in the Epochs as something to point towards as, you know, a boogeyman that they can keep saying, they're the reasons why we're not succeeding.

They're the guys who are making us fail. But the fact that, you know, the coup itself happened is indicative, for me at least, of the fact that the soldiers on the ground, especially, you know, the ones who are actually actively fighting the insurgent groups, Janem, the Islamic State, and all the others, they are not really buying this message, right?

So that's why they launched the coup, which leads me to my next question, right?

What is the situation right now on the ground in Niger? What does it look like, you know, one, for the soldiers who were involved in the coup, and two, because a lot of them have obviously been arrested, and two, what about the soldiers who are still left in the field, right?

Because a lot of the soldiers who were involved in this coup were soldiers who were actively fighting the insurgents.

What about the ones who have been left in the field now to fend for themselves? Well, it is a quagmire. A catastrophe, to be honest.

Well, I really have to hold my... Well, I can't really say a lot because it happened only a few weeks ago. However, we will be seeing in upcoming months the direct ramifications of what happened that day because there was a massive movement in Italy.

A lot of different army components were still on the way to Niamey. However, the leaders were already killed or taken captive inside Niamey. So they couldn't really make it in time to rescue them and to force Russia out.

So right now, there is an ongoing purge. And if not done correctly, I say correctly, but it's not really something that can be done without the consequences. There is a massive space being opened right now that was already open very, very wide.

It was, I said, a few minutes ago about the established state arriving from Mali to Nigeria to Niger, right? There was already space. There were already many attacks inside Niamey.

There were kidnappings of foreigners inside Niamey because it wasn't only one kidnapping of that American inside the capital city. There are still assaults of the Islamic State in that province, I said, and other also provinces.

However, one direct consequence I am seeing right now is revitalization of rebel groups, not terror groups like the Islamic State of Jainism, jihadist terror groups, but rebels that are also connected to the toppled in 2023 president.

And they are now leaving their hiding places. And this week, a few weeks, a few days ago, they started advertising a massive, recruitment campaign in northern and northern borders with Chad and Libya. There's a lot of smuggling lines that also connect Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Mali.

And right now, these rebel groups are clearly going in power. And their main message is to restore democracy. We will see how it goes for them, but it's clear that the message that they have, they clearly have money for that.

And they speak in multiple languages also. So that campaign is really something worthy of observation. But that kind of ramification already happened.

However, I expect, well, there are like three months, left to the end of this year. And I expect a fourth attack in Niamey and it will be Islamic State. And I wonder if I will be proven right in the next few months.

We will be back if that happens. But, well, I am really, really hoping that it won't be such a massive collapse of Nira. But at this point, I am really, really not convinced that there is someone who can rescue this regime before the Islamic State collapses.

That would be such a tragedy for Niger to fall completely because every time we talk about this crisis, I want people to really understand that there are civilians on the other end of this. There are people who just want to live their lives. There are people who just want to live their lives.

There are people who, like you and me, they just want to go about their day. They want to go to work. They want to listen to a podcast.

Hopefully, they're listening to this podcast. And, you know, they just want to live a normal life. And if, you know, their nation collapses into the hands of the Islamic State, or even Mali, let's take Mali, for example.

There was a time last year and even during this year when it looked like Mali would collapse into the hands of Janim. If any of those incidences, were to happen, then it would be an absolute tragedy. It would be something that I don't think Africa would be able to recover from.

We already saw what happened after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and the ripple effects that came out of that. Just how much Libya became a transit point for weapons and what are they called? Mercenaries, that's the right word.

Mercenaries and trainers. Every person who could benefit in some way from Libya's collapse has benefited from it. And the continent is much the poorer for it.

The continent is much the worse for it. It's not a good situation. So if Niger were to collapse, considering how large a country it is, how many people live there, and of course there's always the question of, you know, it's Eugenium stockpiles.

That is a very big problem. It's a very big risk that I don't think enough attention is being paid to. Pavel, you've said that you don't see any cavalry coming, riding over the horizon, coming to save Niger from collapsing into the hands of the jihadists.

What about the U.S., right? Even before we get to the U.S., what about Niger's key foreign partner right now, Russia? They played an active role in preventing the coup from going in.

They kept the regime currently in power, and they've done a pretty good job acting as a praetorian guard for all of their flaws. And there are many, many, many flaws when it comes to Russia in any part of the world. We have to admit that they've been very effective when it comes to, you know, keeping the regimes that they promised alive.

And, you know, it's not just in Niger. I've seen something similar happen in Mali when the, when Assimilator's government was on the ropes. Russia came to his rescue.

And then there was a story that I just learned about very recently. Apparently in June this year, Equatorial Guinean authorities say they disrupted an alleged coup attempt after Russia's Africa Corps provided intelligence about a container of weapons arriving at the Port of Bata.

According to the government's account, Russian intelligence had intercepted communication and warned Malabo that the weapons were intended for coup attempts.

Authorities then seized the arsenal and arrested the alleged conspirators. And, you know, this only became public very early in September. So, yes, Russia has acted as a really good Praetorian Guard, but why are they failing when it comes to a counterinsurgency strategy?

Yeah, I mean, well, we have to differentiate between Mali and Israel, right? Because in Israel, it was a very small AfrikaKart component used as a Praetorian Guard. They had some drones, they had some intel, and they had only to fight against small, well, it was an experience, but inequipped soldiers that were rebelling at the time.

And that small component, its role is not to fight an Islamic State insurgency that is currently ongoing in Nisra. However, in Mali, it is different. There, it is committed to fight the insurgency by the FLA, by Zeynep, and also by the Islamic State.

So there are three different insurgencies. Well, two of them connected in April. As you know, FLA and Zeynep are now de facto allies.

However, and the size of continents. But in Nisra, I think it's 200 up to 300 of Russians that are stationed at that Niamat airport. However, in Mali, it's more than 10 times that size.

So there are at least 2,000 rifle soldiers. I think it's more. And it's not for them.

It's them placed in different parts of the country having artillery, drones, and being fortified in bases. I think Mali could have fallen in April because, well, it's hard to estimate what JNIM learned back then.

However, if the JNIM succeeded at the time in seizing the Bamako airport, seizing parts of Bamako, then the Mali's fall would have been certain in the next few months.

So we could see that last effort at the time. However, they come together and it's already massively stressed as it is. They couldn't

Well, that happened. JNIM and FLA, for the first time, this is historically unprecedented, that Russia was forced to withdraw from a province. Well, there are a lot of other provinces, especially in the Churchill Valley, where they cannot be present because they

Because they are already stretched as they are, and they have to keep the watch over Western Mali, where there are borders with Mauritania, Senegal, and Brunia, because that's where the sea lines are, where Africa comes, and thus Russia uses their ports, for example, in Brunia, to supply... in Bamako, in energy supplies, in weapons, in different materials,

So they have to keep that line open in Western Mali.

They have to commit a lot of soldiers there, and they also have to commit a lot of soldiers in the city of Gao, for example, that is close to the region of Kidal, that is right now in the hands of the human. Therefore, they have to be in Timbuktu and other cities.

They don't go in trenches other than that, other than sweeping around these cities because they will fall in ambush of jihadists or Tuareg rebels. So, provided that the Islamic State in Niger tries to occupy a city for the first time, and it's very like, I don't want to, I don't want to foreshadow a lot. I simply have no idea.

Anybody who will tell you that they have certainty that they will do something, it's lying. So, we can only expect something, predict something. However, I think that if the Islamic State tries to see what happens when they seize a city in Niger, they will be unable to stage a rescue because Russia doesn't have a continent that is prepared for that.

And Niger's army is already stretched and they are, as is Russia in Mali. So, in order to stage a defensive operation that would have to prevent that jihadi onslaught of Niger, Russia would have to commit another few thousands of soldiers to Niger itself. And it cannot do.

It cannot simply do. It's a Ukraine war still ongoing where thousands of people die monthly. So, it cannot afford.

There is a limit. They can afford to send their operatives, intelligence services, GRU or SVR that can be sent to Africa, soldiers that can be sent to Africa. There are limits that are already beyond anything that was planned in Mali.

Because I said it at the beginning of our talk today that the Mali affair is already something that doesn't benefit them economically. It's only done because of politics, because Russia doesn't want to collapse its African strategy. And it's Mali where they see that if they don't defend the Mali regime, they are likely to collapse in other places in Africa.

And right now, I think Israel knows this. And they will try to, well, for example, call the Americans in some capacity. Well, Americans already provided some kind of support weapons in May.

We said there were also some kind of enemies was arriving to the capitals of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Israel. However, to commit is still not something we are certain the United States are going to. Well, a few weeks ago, there was a talk that the Pentagon is considering supporting Mali.

And I think Niamey and General Niamey will be attempting very hard to, make the United States interested in what is happening in Saudi Arabia, especially because that's where that American last year was kidnapped. So there was already a precedent for them to arrive again, right? Americans are still hunting Islamic State all over the world.

And this is right now the epicenter of the Islamic State for the whole world, really. The one in Mali and Niger and the sister affiliate of the Islamic State, the ISWAP in Nigeria that connected to the one in Niger.

And well, in May, there was already a special forces, the U.S. special forces that arrived in Nigeria and Malinoki, the famous Islamic State global apparatus was killed.

But it's not enough. And this epicenter is still spreading. So I think, they will be trying to call Trump by making him understand that this is where you can spot and achieve some very good successes if you want to use special forces.

Well, special forces is something the United States in the last two years have been using very often, right? If you are interested. The whole world, a strategy of sorts for the United States and now, so it certainly may be something that may be of interest if the U.S. wants some quick wins.

And I think Myanmar will be very interested to make that happen. So we've discussed some of the alternatives and some of the reasons why Russia is really struggling on the front lines of the insurgency, specifically. The manpower question.

But I have a different proposition for you, Pavel. What about Turkey? So there have been reports that Asini Goita personally prefers Turkey over Russia as a security guarantor.

Do you see Turkey being able to step into the shoes that Russia has left wide open, basically, as a protector, not just of the state, not just as a praetorian guard, but as a country that can guarantee security beyond just the capital city and within the rest of the country and can actually push back the jihadists?

Well, Turkey, we are talking about Turkey, right? Yes.

Well, there is certainly something in that because Turkey is not at war as Russia is, right? So, there is certainly some vampire to spread. And I think if it was last year, then the attacks would have been interesting.

However, this year, there is something very wrong happening in Somalia. They are very, very deep in what is happening in the civil war. They are right now fighting the pirates.

You know, going search of piracy on the Somalia coast. They are fighting jihadists from Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab. They are fighting opponents of Somalian president.

They are in absolute admire. They have been for a few last months. And it seems that it's going to get worse in Somalia.

So I am not really sure if they can commit a lot more resources to state. But because it has to be a very advanced operation if Niger were to be rescued by Turkey. Well, Turkey in some capacity already is in Israel.

According to what I know, there are also Turkish security companies. Protecting some gold mines in the province of Agadez. So Turkey is also in the capacity of delivering advance for the Niger regime.

However, make Turkey more interested. I think it's still possible because, well, then they would have to actually speak to the Italians. Because, well, not many people know, but the Italians are in Niger.

And their military contingent is also at the very same level that was attacked three times this year. However, they didn't take part in defending. But 300 of Italians are there.

And I think if the Turks were to talk with, Prime Minister Meloni or Italy, that there may be something in that. However, these would also have to make peace with the European Union and, for example, stop making France a scapegoat for everything, which will be very, very tough to do. Well, because Turkey also has to have incentives, right?

They cannot really go in without making it beneficial for them, other than delivering drugs, right?

Turkey is already in Libya as a very strong presence, but to make them go to Israel, really, the Huta would have to present some really hard benefits to Turkey otherwise I don't really see Ankara being interested in being a wall before Israel and the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.

All right, so they might not be interested in being a wall or even providing the same sort of security guarantees that Russia is providing.

But what about playing a role in mediation? So there have been reports throughout the past week or so that the FLA is actively courting Turkey as a mediator in its conflict with the Malian state. So these are reports that are coming out from everywhere.

So I'm going to read one from a Turkish news account The Tuaregs in Mali have once again called out to Turkey, urging it to listen to all parties in the conflict. Mohamed El-Miloud Ramadan, I hope I'm pronouncing that, spokesperson for the group said, we want to establish direct dialogue channels with President Erdogan.

Mali's north must not turn into a proxy war between foreign powers.

And, you know, that is obviously a reference to the idea that Ukraine has drone operators, drone channels, working with the FLA right now, and helping them become more adept at using drones. And, you know, that is something that Kamal is writing about, which should come out on Front.co before this episode drops.

So you'll probably have had a chance to read that by then.

So going back to the Turkey news, we see that Turkey has developed its relations with the junta in Bamako, particularly through drone sales. From Turkey, we don't ask you to cut ties with the military junta leadership, instead of looking at Mali one-sidedly.

We wanted to approach the issue in a multifaceted way that encompasses the full reality of the country.

We are not demanding that Turkey take the military side of the Azawad Liberation Front. We are demanding that it first listen and understand. We kindly request its contribution to ensuring that peace is not imposed on Azawad, but rather negotiated with Azawad.

For our cause, we are not seeking external patrons. We are seeking partners who can contribute to a fair and lasting political solution in line with the aspiration of our relevant people. Our partnership with Jenin is not a political alliance, but an operational rapprochement established against common enemies shared in the field.

This is a message that the FLE's spokesperson shared with Middle East Eye and has been syndicated by this Turkish news outlet that I was reading from. So, Pavel, what do you think of this idea of, Turkey being a mediator in this conflict? Well, I saw that because Levan Kemal, my friend, is the co-author of that report.

And, well, it certainly is of interest. However, well, I don't want to brag, but I remember a lot more than people used to do. And this is not the first kind of withdrawal from the Tuaregs to Turkey, but also it wasn't also the Tuaregs making that call because JNM itself has been calling Turkey many times in recent years to stop delivering support to Mali.

And, well, as we see, this is one of many from the series of calls of both groups to Turkey in order to stop. However, so far, it hasn't really borne any significant fruit. But, well, as I say, so far, because I see some kind of window open, well, because it's a very complicated affair.

We know that this alliance between JNM and FLA is really shaky, really, really shaky, because the leaders of both groups were also the leaders of former groups that these groups are made of over a decade ago, when the first Mari War happened.

And back then, if you remember, the listeners remember, there was a huge invasion of the Tuaregs and jihadists from the north. However, at some point, the jihadists stopped that war back and seized the territories from themselves and ousted the Tuaregs.

And the leaders of both of these groups, who the leaders are, the current leaders, so Al-Ghali for JNIM and Antala for FLN, they still remember what happened back then. So there is always in the back of their mind, especially the Tuaregs, that these people, once their initial goals are achieved, may turn their thoughts on us.

So there is a window for other countries to chip in really.

And that's, I think, where the role of Algeria is visible. Mari met with Algeria. Algeria still prefers that the Algerian accords you reminded of at the beginning of this podcast, that Algeria wants both sides to go back to the negotiating table and rejoin that Algerian accord.

Right? So there are certainly networks, the diplomatic corps that are present in Algeria. So that's where that main window is in Algeria.

And that also may be connected to Turkey if it tries to become a stronger player than usual for the Saha. Well, because so far it hasn't really been that strong. It doesn't really have that much influence compared to the other.

However, as we can see from the calls by JNIM, by FLA, or countries in the vicinity of the Saha, Turkey is seen as a player they want to reach out. So if Turkey sees that opportunity and accepts that the rights have to be divided and they have to leave Al-Qaeda, then they will certainly be visible in that war for the first time.

But so far, Turkey has been very, very reluctant to participate more than it does because it has consequences for them also inside the country.

It affects more than they already do. It may have consequences, for example, for terror inside. Turkey, well, Turkey already fights Islamic State, for example, and it's really a tough fight because Turkey is a tough Islamic State.

Globally, that's also about the Sahel. So that diplomatic war is there. I think it's an open vacancy, really, for Turkey.

However, so far, Turkey hasn't responded in any kind to those talks. We'll see how it goes in the next few months, especially after what I think will be a gigantic invasion in October or November again. The scale of April, really, or something similar to what happened last year in Western Mali when 11 cities were assaulted at the same time by JNU.

Something like this is going to be repeated very soon. So we'll see if Turkey then decides to go in some diplomatic capacity. However, they don't really have much time because if the Turks and JNU establish facts on the grounds especially JNU will be very, very, very difficult to separate from the Turks and with all the consequences to both.

That's a very difficult situation to be in. Pavel, I know you promised me you would be here for an hour and we've slightly gone over that.

So I want to take us back to the story we started with at the beginning, right, about the prisoner swaps, about the release of kidnapped people and speak about just how much the kidnapping economy has played a part in the growth of the terror groups within the Sahel.

We've seen all these groups, now even the SLA, have received massive, massive sums of money. The FLA received around 35 million on the lower end for the release of the Russian Wagner troop guys who were caught all the way back in 2024. Janim received 50 million for the release of an Emirati prince.

And, you know, we've obviously talked about how the Islamic State benefited monetarily, getting around a couple of million dollars from Libya's Haftar to release the American missionary. So we're seeing kidnapping become a really big thing. But I don't want to talk about kidnapping in the Sahel.

I want to talk about kidnapping in Mozambique. So there was a story about two or so weeks ago, right, that the Islamic State Mozambique had targeted a camp, a hunting camp, where three Americans were hunting, alongside, you know, other people of other nationalities.

But it was very clear that the target was the three Americans who were safely, thank God, evacuated on a helicopter.

So I did a report alongside Peter Boffin from ARCAD, the Army Conflict Location Event Data Tracking Project, looking at just how the Islamic State Mozambique had changed its financing principles, you know, making kidnapping one of the core backbone pillars of their financing strategies.

So are we seeing other groups learn from groups like Janim and the Etheli and the Islamic State in the Sahel that kidnapping foreigners, kidnapping tourists is a lot more profitable because in Mozambique the Islamic State Mozambique had traditionally kidnapped locals whose family, employers, new friends basically anyone on their contact list could send money

Through mobile money platforms.

Are they now looking at kidnapping foreigners to do the kinds of negotiations that Janim, Etheli and the rest are doing?

Well, Mozambique is certainly different compared to the Sahel. In the Sahel Mozambique, it has monopoly on violence. It doesn't have that monopoly in the Sahel.

And the circumstances, as I said, are very much different. That kidnapping, you mentioned, well, attack and death kidnapping was staged in the province of Nyasa, that is somewhat below that in a province where the Islamic State is so covered in cattle. That's where they have been for the last decade, really.

And that's where their main force in East Africa currently is. Well, we have to somewhat differentiate and explain that kidnapping in itself has always been a very profitable business. And kidnappings in the 60s, 70s, 80s were very, very, very famous in the 90s all over the world, really.

Well, last postcard, last recordings we had a few months ago, I talked about the Philippines and Abu Sayyaf that later turned into Islamist state. And also had that big business of kidnapping of Westerners, of for example, Auselians, Japanese and so on and so forth. And they always demanded millions of dollars at the very least for the people they kidnapped.

So it was always profitable. However, what mattered was usually was that there was no real benefit and it was very difficult to get paid because there were not many options to get money delivered to them. However, it's changed last decade and it's possible now.

Because of how widespread cryptocurrencies have become, how widespread have become mobile apps and phones, all phones themselves. Because that mass of, the spread of mobile phones, cheap mobile phones in Africa, it happened late, last decade. Right now, everyone has a cheap phone, right?

But it wasn't really that present a decade ago. I talked about that for some other media apps during the 9-11 commentary I had for the Polish media. However, a decade ago, no one really had a mobile phone in the Sahel.

Now everyone has. Back then, there were thousands of kilometers of distances between different parts of the world and with no connection whatsoever when it comes to internet. However, now there's TALING.

TALING allows that connection. It's also a big deal in Mozambique because the connection is always somewhat difficult because of massive forests. Forests, so the access is prevented.

However, right now it's not a problem and it's also not a problem to benefit from. Well, there are different stages of kidnapping. It's what I call, there are three.

Well, for me, it's what I, in my mind, have created. It's about local kidnappings, regional kidnappings, and world kidnappings. So world kidnappings are, for example, Americans or Europeans, regionals.

So, well, if you, if you are in West Africa, someone is kidnapped in Mali, so regional would be Moroccans, Algerians, or Senegalese, and so on and so forth, right? And locals are literally locals. And in the case of Mozambique, a decade ago, it wasn't possible because everyone ran with their money at the times.

However, right now, it's very easy for the kidnapped to pay their kidnappers with mobile phone, right? On mobile, and this is what is happening in Mozambique, in that particular case of the Islamic State in Mozambique, they are paid via some kind of mobile app by phone, and this is how they make very, very easy money.

However, well, it's always a big price to kidnap a Westerner because while the government don't really like, at the end of the day, most of them will pay.

For example, Germans will pay those ransoms, right? So, and when it comes to the Americans, it's especially also a political price. It can be extents for massive favor that will influence the ground, the territorial points of the map.

So, if you have an American on hand kidnapped, then it's not only about money. Well, when it comes to the Islamic State, if they kidnap an American, it also can be... a propaganda value, multi-propaganda value, especially if they decide to then execute them.

And it's happened with those famous executions over a decade ago with some famous American journalists that fight against the United States is always in the blood of the Islamic State everywhere.

Well, with the exception of the Sahel, because that Sahelian affiliate, was given some kind of leeway by the Islamic State separatists and it can create violent threats. Well, then that money also, well, this is why it's so difficult because the money that is going to the Islamic State Sahel may happen to find its way to the Islamic State in what?

MSF Africa?

And then, and it happened literally last year, Baghdad in Iraq, discovered that Islamic State West Africa is now financing Islamic State Central Bank.

So people think of jihadists in the forest of Borna, some kind of backward committed people, but out of nowhere, they are financing their most famous Islamic State, the Afrinis, all over the world, or Central itself. This is how the Syrian and Iraqi theaters, have been able to survive also, because of Africa and African affiliates putting money back.

So those kidnappings that are happening right now, may succeed in survival of Islamic State individuals. It's very important. So, well, it's the same money for Al-Qaeda, really.

The United Nations, I suspect that massive drive for that Emirati, the create kidnap last year, benefited the coffers of not only Aqim, so Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, but also especially Aqam.

So Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that is fighting in Yemen and is allied to the Houthis that, well, right now are in the midst of war against Saudi Arabia. You will recognize the government.

So we see how entangled these things are and how a massive amount of money may have ramifications for other parts of the world. When it comes to the Islamic State, it may also result in a terrorist attack. Some kidnappings resulted in money for Islamists.

That means Somalia. Then Somalia sent money to Yemen. Yemen sent money to Afghanistan, Pakistan.

And then we had assaults, the famous in 2021, a terrorist attack on Abbey Gate where multiple Americans were also killed. And above all, the Karbala bombings in Iran two years ago. And a very, very good example.

So the mosque, the Moscow attack by the Islamic State, that was proven to have been sponsored by Islamic State Somalia. So we see that when those kidnappings happen and the Haftars pay that kind of money to the Islamic State, that a terror attack may happen directly because of this kind of money. So this is the actual identity right now.

And I hope I'm wrong, but next year, I'd really be exploring this. So if we connect those partners which are by the Islamic State, what will happen? And with that statement that next year will be really exclusive, we're going to end this podcast here.

Pavel, as always, thank you so much for joining us. It has been an absolute pleasure recording with you again, my friend. And on a very personal level, it's been an absolute pleasure getting to speak with you about these kinds of topics in our constant messages.

Just having someone else to nod out with us about makes me extremely happy. For everyone else, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you so much for giving us your time and listening to this podcast.

And odds are that if you've reached this far, you're one of the premium subscribers over at fronts.co. And if you aren't, please, please give it a try. It's $5 a month or about $50 a year.

I work for the place that I'm subscribed. It's that kind of money, that support that allows people like me and Pavel to be able to do the work that we do and to be able to inform you about terror threats that are happening thousands of kilometers away, but have the potential to ripple into our daily lives.

That support that you guys give us is what keeps us going.

And with that, I'm going to end this here. Please, please make sure to go give Pavel's YouTube channel a check. It's something that I have personally been enjoying recently, and Pavel will hopefully be recording some new content for the channel soon.

So yeah, it's all good on the front's front. Pavel, again, thank you so much. We're going to end it here.

Thank you for letting me. Of course, my friend. Have a lovely rest of your day.