Due South: Yale Ford Talks DRC

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good evening, good afternoon, whenever and wherever you're listening to us from. This is the Deep South podcast with me, your host, Wilfred Miner, Africa correspondent for Fronts.co. And today I am joined by Yale Ford, who is a member of the critical threats project team, the Africa team on critical threats.

And if you're a regular viewer of warfronts, you might have had his name come up in a recent piece I did on the DRC, talking about how the Ebola crisis is just making everything in the DRC a lot worse. Yael, say hi to the people. Hi, Wilfred. Thanks for having me. It's a pleasure to be on today. Thank you so much, Yael.

So, Yael, tell us a little bit about yourself. What do you want the people to know before we get into the discussion on Africa, basically, because that is what you're going to be covering today. Sure. Yeah, so my name is Yael Ford. I'm the Great Lakes Analyst. here at CTP, the Critical Threats Project.

The Critical Threats Project is part of the American Enterprise Institute, which is a think tank here in Washington, D.C. At CTP, we cover Africa. We cover pretty much all of the major conflict areas, hot spots on the continent, and sort of also from a lens, a perspective of how that intersects with U.S. foreign policy and U.S. interests on the continent.

My focus is the Great Lakes region. So that is mostly the DR Congo, the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda, and also the M23 rebellion in the eastern part of the country. And I also kind of dabble in other areas as well, in Central and Southern Africa, mostly Mozambique, Tanzania, and a little bit of the Central African Republic. All right.

Thank you for that.

So for anyone who's unfamiliar with the term the Great Lakes in relation to Africa, it's just a collection of lakes within the Eastern African part of Africa that include Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Malawi, Lake Tokana, Lake Kivu and Lake Albert and Lake Edward, which are all interconnected. and most of them occur within the rift valley just some

Random geographical knowledge that you can only get on front.co's premier due south podcast so yale as you mentioned well before that before that i am very sure our listeners will be wondering yale ford any relation to yale university or ford the car company anything we need to know no that's a that's a great question but unfortunately not.

Both of those names are unrelated. Unrelated name, but still wonderful. So as I mentioned, we recently did a piece on war fronts talking about the crisis in the DRC and how the Ebola situation is just basically making everything worse. So if you haven't watched, here's a very brief rundown of what happened.

In around early May, the Congolese authorities authorities detected what I believe is the 17th Ebola outbreak in the DRC. This is a hemorrhagic fever that spreads through contact with bodily fluids. And the current strain of Ebola that's spreading through the DRC has no approved vaccine and has no known treatment.

The best that medics are doing is basically isolating people who've been infected, keeping them away from the communities doing contact tracing, something that people will be intimately familiar with after the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, doing contact tracing and just basically trying to find the people who have come in contact with those who have a confirmed

Case of infection and you're trying to stem the spread from happening.

So at the moment, today is on the 16th of June, can't believe time has flown that much. There are about 782 confirmed cases of Ebola within the DRC. This is a number we got from the Center for Disease Control. So just those figures might not seem like much, but just given how rapidly Ebola can spread in certain situations, it's a really concerning situation.

Yale, talk us through how the Ebola outbreak has, you know,

Ituri province specifically, because one thing I forgot to mention earlier is that the outbreak began in Ituri province, which isn't necessarily what most people think of when they think of the DRC conflict, because Ituri doesn't really have a significant M23 presence, if at all.

Ituri is instead home to two groups, CODECO and the CPF, which you represent two small ethnic groups that are fighting for control of the province. Yael, take it away. Sure. Yeah, the Ebola crisis is definitely something to watch and has something that has been going on now for a few weeks.

As you mentioned, in early May was when it sort of drew international headlines. And I believe on May 15th is when it was declared an international emergency. But there's actually evidence and probably more will come out over time. But there's evidence that the Ebola outbreak have been raging probably since earlier this year, even even that early.

Maybe around January or February is when the first case, the patient zero, was. And so that means that, you know, this virus has been circulating mostly in Eteri, in these very rural areas with very limited government presence for a few months now.

And the government just has been very slow to respond and has suffered from many issues that have hindered that response. Logistically, financially, coordination has been pretty poor. And so, yeah, it's a big problem. The WHO has said that they believe that it will probably get worse before it gets better.

It's something that we're probably likely going to continue to see and the cases will continue to climb throughout the summer.

And these challenges about the response, contact tracing, encouraging people to adopt better health practices, encouraging people to maybe socially distance a little bit or whatever the correct term is there is going to is going to continue to be a challenge.

On the, on more of the conflict side of things in Eturi it's correct that M23 does not have a presence in Eturi Eturi is dominated or characterized by a proliferation of armed groups along with the government and government aligned militia groups.

The main groups in Ituri are CODECO, which is a very loose coalition of militias that claim to defend the Lindu community, which are mostly a farmer community. And CODECO also has ties to the Congolese army and has been accused of collaborating with the Congolese army in military operations throughout the years.

And then, as you mentioned, you also have the CRP, which is a rebel group that was founded by Thomas Lubenga, who was a longtime warlord in the DRC. And his group operates there, mostly along the coastline and also deep in this area of the Churi called Jugu Territory.

And the CRP has alleged links to the Ugandan government, although it's not exactly clear what the extent of those links are. Yeah, so that's mainly the security landscape.

There also is another group that is the Islamic State affiliate there, which is the ADF, the Allied Democratic Forces, which operate in parts of Eturi as well. they are a little bit different in the sense that they are motivated by a religious agenda to impose a caliphate on areas that they control so yeah ituri is definitely grappling with a series of

Interlocking crises right now security health-wise and political you're exactly right here it really is grappling with some of the most complicated challenges i have seen so one incident that i want to bring to our readers our listeners attention rather happened towards the end of april so around that time fighters from kodeco killed about 70 people in an

Attack that appeared to be a retaliation for an attack on the congolese army by the crp what can you tell us about this yes i have seen that i've been i've been tracking that i believe that that figure that that figure has sort of bounced around between 70 and higher unfortunately it is just another example of of the conflict that

Rax Ituri, the conflict that is so often characterized and tainted by ethnicity, by allegiances to ethnic groups, and retaliation.

And so, like I mentioned, Codeco claims to protect the Lindu community there in Ituri, which is mostly a farmer-based community. and against what would be the HEMA in Eturi, which is more of a pastoralist community of people who raise cows, who are pastoralist, things like that.

And I would have to circle back on the exact motivations around that attack, but I recall that it was motivated around those lines. So, yes. I want to latch on to one thing that you've mentioned there, the idea that one of these groups is a patrolist group and the other is a farming community.

This is something that clears itself out across multiple African conflicts. Why do you think that is? That's a great question. It definitely has been a feature of conflicts in Africa for the last couple of decades, really since the end of the last century.

I do know that in West Africa, for example, there is a similar thing going on between people who mainly farm and then people who mainly raise cattle and are pastoralists.

I think really at the end of the day, it comes down to it's a very, it's, it's political in the sense of, for example, at Eturi the HEMA and HEMA associated groups are often viewed as being favored by Congolese, by, by authorities and by colonial authorities in the past as well.

And many of the, the farmer communities feel disenfranchised and feel like they've sort of been boxed out of power a little bit and influence. And so there's definitely some of, some of that grievance there. And then it's also just about land.

It's about, you know, having, having being a pastoralist, for example, requires a lot of land and requires people to sort of branch out and search for new land. And, you know, also with farming, farming is also a very land intensive thing. And so I think there's long histories of conflict over land and over territorial control that plays into that.

So let's speak about this idea of the HEMA being favored in terms of development, just favored by either the colonial government or the modern-day Congolese government, because this is something that plays out again. And if you're covering African conflicts, This is something that we have come to realize is that there are a lot of repeating patterns.

So in the DRC, we have in Nitori province specifically, we have the Hima community, which is being favored by the government, by successive governments, both the colonial and the present day one. And it's leading to resentment with other local communities. And that has led to an outbreak of violence.

And similarly, in Mozambique, in Cabo Delgado province, there's a community whose name I cannot remember. Yale, if you can help me out here, that is favored by the government. And that has also bred some level of animosity and contributed to the violence there. That's right.

Certainly, I think there are historical linkages with perceived favoritism by some of these groups. Many believe that since they have, you know, have not had access to power and to influence and to government positions, for example, that one of the ways to remedy that is through force or through armed conflict.

I will say, I do think, although it is a factor, it's just one of the many factors that contribute to conflict. The conflict, I think, especially in the Congo, can't be chalked up only to these ethnic conflicts. There's also a lot of other motivations why actors have reason to take up arms and to fight the government.

And I think that that also applies in Turi as well. Yes. Before we continue on Ituri, I just want to say, I remember the name, had to go through my notes a little bit. It's the Makonde. And we'll circle back to Mozambique in a moment. So back to the point that Yale was making about communities and inter-communal violence within places like Ituri.

Yes, it definitely just can't be.

Chalked up to these ethnic tensions. There are also a lot of other factors, but one I want to really focus on is the minerals. Ituri is renowned for its mineral wealth, specifically gold, tin, tungsten, and tantalum. So, Yale, talk us through how the conflict is shaping the extraction of these minerals. Hmm. That's a great question.

You're right that Eturi is very wealthy in natural resources, like the most of the Congo and like the most of the Congo basin. Most of the, the, the mining that goes on in Eturi is, it's my understanding is artisanal. So it's very small scale. It's done by, it's hand dug.

There's not industrial processes to extract these minerals on a super large scale to be exported. The biggest, I would say the biggest mineral that is extracted in Eturi that plays a role in shaping conflict is definitely gold. Eturi is very rich in gold deposits throughout the province.

And a lot of that gold is mined by these armed groups, including Codeco and also the The Ugandan army, the Ugandan army, which has been deployed in Eturi since late 2021 against the ADF to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the ADF.

And the Ugandan army has been accused of having a financial motive, at least partially, in being deployed in Enturi to extract gold and essentially ship it back to Uganda, where it can be processed and refined on a very large scale and shipped abroad. But, yeah, so the minerals play a role in the conflict.

But at the same time, I'm just always cautious to not want to place one single factor as sort of the driving cause as a very complex political and security economic situation. But the minerals are definitely one of those factors.

I completely agree with that idea of being cautious when it comes to apportioning blame for what has sparked a conflict, because sometimes people disagree and it can escalate into something really tragic, something that lasts for a really long time and is really, really difficult to manage.

So all those converging factors just means that Ituri is one of the provinces in the DRC that is seemingly dealing with crisis after crisis after crisis. But Ituri is not the only province that's dealing with all this crisis.

Let's move on to the keywords, the provinces that almost everyone is familiar with when it comes to the DRC, almost everyone who follows this conflict.

So one thing I want to mention is that the conflict that is raging right now between M23, which is a Rwandan-backed militia group, and the Congolese government is, for all intents and purposes, an extension of the first and second Congolese war.

If you're interested in learning why I say this, we have an entire one hour length documentary on war fronts that I did about an year ago going deep into the history and connecting it with a modern day conflict. So, you know, just a little plug out there because Yale's colleague, Liam, told me it's always great to plug your own work.

And I'm sure Yale believes the same thing. So the conflict has been raging. The most recent iteration of this conflict has been raging for a little bit now. Yale, talk us through the conflict itself, right? What sparked it and where do we stand at this point in time?

So I think, as you mentioned, the conflict definitely does have roots in the 90s, in the 1994 World London genocide, which led to the first and second Congo Wars, and then also the post-2006 democratic transition that the country has undergone, which has had many, has had some successes, but many challenges.

The most recent, this iteration of the conflict really began in late 2021 when direct negotiations between M-23 and the Congolese government in Kinshasa collapsed and M-23 took up arms again. M23, after the first iteration in 2012-13, after they had been defeated by the UN and Congolese forces, had retreated.

And the group had been splintered into two separate factions. And one of those factions retreated to Uganda. And long story short, in 2017, that faction returned to the Congo. And then a few years later, after these talks had collapsed in 2021, they took up arms again and began capturing villages and started making real gains in the middle of 2022.

And in 2022, according to the UN is when Rwanda started to really beef up its support militarily for, for M23 covertly to to accomplish really its, its political, its own political and security objectives.

Throughout 2020, the rest of 22 and 23 as well as 24, so about two and a half years, M23 steadily expanded its territorial control over North Kivu with Rwandan military support. And in late 2024 and early 25, so about 18 months ago M23 conducted with Rwandan support, a major offensive to capture the two biggest towns in North and South Kivu.

That is Goma and Bukavu. It was a huge escalation. There were many people who died and M23 really sort of solidified itself as a, as a major threat to the Congolese government. And throughout 2025, we saw M23 enter into a peace process with the Congolese government called the Doha process, which was mediated by Qatar.

And at the same time Washington and the, and the United States stepped in to mediate a peace framework deal between DRC and Rwanda.

So you had sort of the state-to-state issue being addressed between DRC and Rwanda that was backed by significant economic incentives, so billions of dollars of U.S. investment to sort of revitalize and bring prosperity and tie security to economic prosperity in the region.

And then you also had this internal political dialogue that was supposed to resolve the grievances essentially that M23 has with the Congolese government in Kinshasa. And these two processes are meant to work together.

Long story short, they made a good amount of progress in 2025, but there are still some major challenges that blocked a full deal, especially in the Doha process, unfortunately.

And meanwhile, M23 has consolidated its control over a very large area of territory and has essentially established a parallel state and has become sort of the de facto authority in that part of the country.

And we're now at a point, and the last thing I'll say is that we're now at a point where the peace process, both of them have, and this is something that we can, I'm sure, talk about in a little bit, but has effectively stalled.

The Washington process has faced real challenges in implementing the security, the core part of the deal, which is the security obligations. And then also the Doha process has effectively stalled as well, including without a durable ceasefire. So there are some huge challenges that have blocked progress and continue to be a challenge.

Now, as Gail has just wonderfully described, it's one of the most complicated situations you'll ever hear. Just a Rwandan-backed rebel group is still wreaking havoc in the DRC. The group itself has its own objectives and their backers in Rwanda have their own objectives.

So first, before we go any further, I want to talk about Rwanda's involvement in this conflict or why they're doing it. So Yael, take us through that. Yeah, it's a great question, Wilford. It's one that many people debate. And the Rwandans, I would say, have not been very open and willing to talk about why they are intervening in the Congo once again.

So really, any kind of the answer to your question is more about an assessment and more about sort of making making our own judgments about why we think what exactly is that they want in the DRC. I think it is if you could boil it down, it would be two things. So one one is security. So Rwanda does have legitimate security claims in the eastern DRC.

And one reason why is because the, because of the FDLR, the FDLR is an ethnic Hutu militia group that it's.

Remnants and leaders in that group participated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. They were members of the Rwandan army that instigated that crisis and the genocide, and then they fled into the Eastern DRC in the 90s, and they've been there ever since.

So Rwanda views its enemies in the FDLR being in the Eastern DRC and using the DRC as a rear base for attacks on Rwanda to destabilize Rwanda. And ultimately the FDLR's goal is to retake power in Kigali. It, Rwanda views that as a major threat. And then on top of that, the FDLR receives support, state support from the Congolese government.

So they receive money, they receive weapons, support from Kinshasa throughout the years, which is kind of ebbed and flowed. now the, the question is whether or not the, the existence of the FDLR in the Eastern DRC is justification for the scope and scale of what Rwanda has done.

That's honestly a very complex question and that would probably take another podcast to, to, to dissect. But I think the other part of what Rwanda wants is political influence as well. Rwanda sort of views the Kivu provinces and specifically North Kivu as sort of its backyard.

So Goma and Misisi and Roturu territory are really only about 90 miles from Kigali, the, the Rwandan capital. And Rwanda in the last three decades has really sort of viewed it as its sphere of influence.

And it sees M23 and especially the establishing of this parallel state as a way to project that influence and also accomplish those objectives through peace process via M23. So that's another big part of it as well.

And I think the regional competition is something that is overlooked so where rwanda sees its its spirit influence in the kibus burundi and uganda have a do the similar thing so burundi and you got burundi views south kibu as its backyard uganda views eturi as its backyard both of those countries which have sort of shaky relations with Rwanda, have troops

Deployed in their respective spheres of influence.

And so there's an argument to be made that Rwanda sort of feels like it needs also to be able to have free reign in its sphere of influence to protect its interests as well. So that's another part of it. That single answer has given me a lot of questions that we have to dig into. Okay, so let's start with FDLR.

This was a little while ago, and it's a report from Royce. This came out on the 30th of March, just 30th of March this year, in case anyone is wondering.

And it's a report that says the Congolese army has announced the start of a disarmament push against a militia linked to Rwanda's 1994 genocide in what would be a key step towards implementing a U.S.-brokered peace deal with the neighboring Rwanda. So the group in question is obviously FDLR.

So what do you make of the fact that Kinshasa is pushing on with this disarmament push, even though the FDLR has historically been a group aligned with Kinshasa? Yeah, it's a great question.

To sort of just take us back to the the Washington Accords, which was signed a year ago, the key, the most important part of the Washington Accords, the peace agreement between DRC and Rwanda is the security obligation. So there's a plan for the Congolese government to conduct military operations, to neutralize the FDLR, to try to do it peacefully.

And if they don't stand out, stand down to conduct military operations and then repatriate them back to Rwanda to sort of solve the FDLR issue, which has been one of the reasons why Rwanda has said it is involved in the Eastern DRC.

And on the other side, Rwanda committed to lift what it calls its defensive measures, which really means to withdraw the troops that it has deployed alongside M-23 and also its military equipment completely from Congolese.

In late last year, the Congolese Army initiated the initial stages of that campaign against the FDLR with an awareness-raising campaign. And it's just faced challenges. One of the things that we've assessed is that the Congolese Army and the FDLR still collaborate very closely.

And one of the reasons why that is is because the FDLR is an important fighting force. Some have even called it the spearhead of the DRC's coalition against M-23 on the ground. That is to say that the FDLR still occupies a very important position militarily in the war. And Kinshasa can't really afford to turn on its allies in that sense.

So the, the, the close collaboration has been an issue. Rwanda has accused Kinshasa of dragging its feet on those obligations and has basically said that we won't withdraw our troops unless there's progress made on this part of the Washington Accords obligation.

As you mentioned in March the Congolese army officially announced, announced operations, imminent operations against the FDLR. Unfortunately, we have not seen any announcements since then. So about three months ago, we have not seen the start of those military operations. We have not seen reporting on that campaign commencing.

And there's not a whole lot of information on why that is. But it is likely that the Congolese Army is continuing to collaborate with the FDLR, which is a big reason why they can't conduct these military operations. And there has been recent reporting to support that.

But I will say the last thing is that the Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a hearing with the U.S. House of Representatives recently that he expects that this dual-sided commitment for the FDLR to be neutralized, and Rwanda to withdraw its troops to make significant progress by next month, so July.

So we'll definitely be watching to see whether or not the dual-sided plan can finally get moving. There's so much I want to talk with you about, but will you, Andy, but this is a little scoop for anyone who's listened to us this long.

Will you be interested in coming back on the podcast in, you know, sometime in late July, once we see whether there's any progress on the FDLR front. Sure, I'd love to. And I hope there is progress. So yes, let's move back to the FDLR. We'll figure out scheduling later. So you'll call them the spearhead of the Congolese armies, your initiatives against M23.

So one thing that most people don't really realize when we talk about these groups is that they're not lining up, you know shoulder to shoulder fighting these massive battles you know the way battles are usually portrayed in movies these are fundamentally groups that are fighting guerrilla style warfare they hit they run they use the cover of the of the

Thick dense congo forest they basically try and use whatever advantage they can and the congolese government the congolese government's isn't necessarily the best equipped to handle such kind of warfare because a lot of military doctrine doesn't focus on that kind of warfare.

It focuses on army-to-army battles. That's why the Congolese army has teamed up with groups like the FDLR and the Wazalendo militias. Wazalendo is a Swahili word, which means Patriot. So the Patriot militias to try and stem M-23's So, Yael, what is your assessment? How likely do you think this armament process will be?

We've already said we haven't seen any progress since the March announcement. It's been up in the air, and we're looking for updates next month in July.

So, how likely do you think it is at this point in time? it's a great question i think it it is one of the things that we believe is that it is it still remains unlikely that this campaign is going to succeed because of the reasons i laid out about there is close collaboration the fdlr is a very important part of the drc's coalition and and part of the

Reason that is is because the fdlr which sometimes is embedded into the Congolese army, which they will actually wear Congolese army uniforms, but they'll maintain separate chains of command.

And also the pro-Congolese government Wazalindo fighters, which are essentially

Militia fighters who don't have formal training and are from different areas in the Kivus that are formally allied with the Congolese government by law and receive monthly, receive money on a monthly basis and also weapons and shipments from the Congolese army. The FDLR and these militia fighters, they form the first line of defense against M23.

So they are always really the first contingents and militants to engage with M23. They're the ones who are conducting the ambushes, the attacks. They're the ones to attack first when there are coordinated operations. The Wazilando fighters are the ones who go on the ground first to try to capture villages and et cetera. So they're an important part.

And I think for those reasons, it's unlikely. However, I do think that Washington and the U.S. seems like they are, especially recently, pushing for Kinshasa to uphold its side of the deal to neutralize the FTLR.

Yeah we we've seen we've seen washington put a lot of pressure on rwanda and m23 lately especially since march we've seen several rounds of sanctions against rwanda and m23 basically for not upholding their side of the deal and so i think washington needs to make sure that that kinshasa is going to hold up its side of the deal as well so i do think it's

Unlikely it's going to be hard but i do hope for progress in the next couple weeks hopefully we do see some progress because if there's one thing a lot of us who cover these sort of things for a living world want to see is you know some pathway towards peace because one thing most people don't get is that when we cover these events we get to see some of the

Worst things that human beings can do to each other so we we really do hope that there's a peaceful there's a path towards peace It's just horrible to think about.

So let's go back to the FDLR briefly before we move on to something else. You mentioned that the FDLR hopes to retake Kigali. How likely do you see this as happening?

And do you foresee a situation where Kinshasa can use its influence within the FDLR and its support for the group to push it to retake Kigali and install a government that's friendly to Kinshasa? I think it's unlikely. I think FDLR really only has a couple thousand.

The latest estimates show that they really only have a couple thousand militants, commandos that operate in the DRC.

Rwanda has a very large military that is forward deployed. a big a big bulk of their their army is sort of positioned towards the eastern drc to sort of head off any kind of threat in that way and rwanda is of course one of the most lethal and best best trained and equipped armies in africa so i think that it's unlikely that that that would occur that that

There could be any kind of campaign to retake the country however i do think that fdlr possesses the capacity to sort of wreak havoc and do some of these cross-border raids and also just target especially Congolese Tutsi, which they have done in the past, and foment hate speech and hate rhetoric in the DRC and basically just kill and target Congolese Tutsi.

So, you know, that's definitely, I think, a concern for them.

Also, I will say that the FDLR issue is a concern for Rwanda because they don't just view, even though it's probably true to say that the FDLR is a spent force, the Rwandans view the ideology, the genocide ideology that has its roots in the 94 genocide and the persistence of that ideology as a threat as a real concern they view it as a system.

So it's not just that they have a few thousand militants, it's that they have a particular worldview. They have a particularly racist worldview. They are, there are many people who fled Rwanda who had that worldview have sort of been absorbed into the DRC and into state structures.

They get concerned when FDLR political figures show up in Kinshasa and have meetings with Congolese authorities. They view that as a threat and as evidence that this ideology is still alive and still a threat. And then they say that

That their military action is in proportion, is in response to that. But to your question, I do think it's unlikely at this moment. All right. It might be unlikely. However, you have highlighted a threat that I don't think a lot of people really think about when it comes to the DRC.

Not as much as I think they should. the fomenting of hate speech and the proliferation of an ideology that by all accounts is very racist, very discriminatory. So is this something that the critical threats team is tracking?

How do you track the spread of such an ideology, especially given how much racist ideologies are just permeating throughout the world right now?

Yeah, it's something that we do track or that we that we do follow because it's just part of the conflict i think one of the things that we're we're thinking about is just how how that when that does show up how is that affecting the peace process so there you know for example there was there's been several incidents where actors political actors and

Commentators have gone on congolese national television in the last year and have said some pretty inflammatory remarks about Tutsis, about anybody who's perceived to pretty much be linked to M23 or Rwanda.

And, you know, just understanding how that undermines trust among the many other things in the peace process. So I think that's sort of one of the ways that we're tracking that. All right. So just focusing on how it's affecting the peace process. I want to talk about something we just mentioned. People are confident enough to do this on national TV?

Yes, it's been a problem.

And in fact, last year in September, the Congolese army spokesman made pretty overtly, I would say, racist and discriminatory remarks towards tootsies tootsie women in in specifically that's and sort of the talking points that he used were talking points that were part of talking points that were used in the rwandan genocide to foment hate against tootsies

So but yeah thankfully the in that case the congolese government did remove him and replaced him and he hasn't been heard of heard of since but it is it is an issue that is honestly really scary to think about because how many people you know in the west in even outside of congo are monitoring congolese tv you know other than you guys so the art of

Information when it comes to how it spreads it's it's something that's just very fascinating to me so let's go back to something said a little bit earlier, the idea that members of the FDLR are wearing uniforms belonging to the Congolese army.

Rubio made a somewhat similar point when he was talking about Rwanda keeping its commitments as part of the peace deal to withdraw its troops. He said that the U.S. will be monitoring Rwanda's troops to see whether they were actually withdrawing or just, you know, donning M23 uniforms and calling it a day.

So how widespread is this as a phenomenon where actors don't, what's the right word to put? The uniform of, if it's the Rwandan troops, they wear the uniforms of M23.

And if it's, you know, groups like the FDLR or Wazalendo or, you know, any other local militia that's aligned with the Congolese government, they wear the, you know insignificant uniform of the Congolese army? Yeah, it's, it's a great question. it's it's, it's one of the issues. It's one of the, one of the problems speaking to, to Rubio's comment.

I, I obviously don't have access to classified intelligence. So I'm sure that, you know, he, he made that comment I'm sure based on information that he has received recently about that occurring. We do know, I think the UN has reported that that has occurred before, that Rwandan soldiers have donned M-23 uniforms.

But we also do know that regularity of soldiers have deployed in their uniforms alongside M-23 throughout the last few years. so it's definitely possible and I'm sure that they're going to be watching for that to make sure that Rwanda has actually implemented its agreements and pulled out on the on the DRC side of things it's I would say honestly even more

Complex because there are just the

The Congolese Army itself is just so disorganized and disjointed. And as I mentioned, separate chains of command. You have different commanding officers. You have all of these militia groups who are sort of fighting alongside the Congolese Army that are honestly not that much different in some cases, aside from the special force units.

And then you have, you have the FDLR issue as well, which you know, many, many FDLR fighters are Hutu. They, they, they may have actually grown up in the Congo. And so some of, some of the things that you would think distinguish them are not really there as much.

And then, of course, when they're wearing Congolese uniforms or they're integrated into these units, it makes it even harder to recognize them and distinguish them. So it's definitely a problem. That sounds like such a complicated issue to try and track. And you guys at CTP do a lot of monitoring.

So how would you monitor whether something like this is happening?

I have to admit that in the open source it's it's hard it's it's it's very hard to to understand when that's occurring most of the the information on that and the phenomenon of that occurring is coming from like un reports or like investigative outlets who are reporting that that this this is happening or journalists on social media who are very well

Connected that might have sources that are indicating that this has happened.

I, I remember, I recall back in a few months ago, there was a claim that from a journalist on, on social media that Angola had deployed troops alongside the FARDC and South Kivu and, and these Angolan troops were also, were, were wearing FARDC uniforms.

So those reports are, you know, unverified and hard to confirm but could you know are likely yeah in terms of like the actual like reporting and and our methodology we mostly just you know the the the reporting is pretty pretty i would say standard about who is fighting who so sometimes we get specific information on maybe which was a lindo groups because

There are several that have their different spheres of influence which was a lindo fighters are fighting in 23 or maybe even which congolese army units are deployed in certain areas and are fighting in 23.

But it can be hard to distinguish most times. Again, that sounds really difficult. And I just want to say, as someone who is very reliant on the kind of work you guys do, we're really grateful. A lot of the content that we produce over at Warfronts, Homefronts, Fronts.co wouldn't exist without the kind of work you guys do. So thank you for that.

I want you to talk about the Angola deployment a little bit, Because it's something that I had had as well, I have been trying to develop contacts within the DRC as well, going as far as going into the country, trying to really make roots and build a connection with the people on the ground just so that I can have a better understanding of the conflict

Itself.

So back in, this was in 2023, a little while ago at this point, in March, Angola deployed about 500 troops to help the Congolese government fight M23. And the fact that Angola has historically been willing to support the government against M23, I think there's a kernel of truth there that they would send troops into the DRC again to help.

Again, I don't know about whether they actually dressed up in the uniforms of the Congolese army. But again, we're not here to litigate that. We're here to discuss what's happening in that one of the world. So, Yael, there's something you've said that has really stuck with me, that the DRC army is disorganized and it's a mess, basically.

And there's something you've also said earlier, that the government has been slow to respond to the Ebola crisis. So let's tie these two points together.

How do you see that idea of the government being, by all your intents and purposes, inept and unable to really contain this crisis, affecting the Ebola response, particularly in North and South Kivo, where M23 is active and has captured vast swaths of territory? Yeah, that's a great question. It's one that we're continuing to think about, too.

I will just caveat what I'm saying about the Congolese army does have major issues, but they also, they're not completely inept. They are able to mount military operations.

They have special force units. They have effective units that can accomplish their military objectives. So they're not completely disorganized in that way. On, on the Ebola side of things yeah, I mean, the, the, there are several sort of compounding pressures that the Congolese army is facing. So there's good research.

There's been good research done on, on how the Congolese army basically with trying to fight M23 and also trying to fight ADF and contain ADF in Eturi province, really sort of especially as the M23 conflict got worse in early 2000. 2025 when they captured GOMA, that it really stretched the FARDC and sort of pulled them away and didn't allow them to have an

Effective response to ADF, which allowed ADF to kind of go crazy and commit more violence.

So they already were facing these capacity issues with these several of these conflicts. And now you have this Ebola issue, which is sort of just added on to that. I know that the Congolese army has sort of been the main way that logistics have been facilitated for the Ebola response in Eturi.

So that's, you know, that's just another sort of drain on their resources and their manpower that adds to it. So it's a drain on the Congolese government's resources, basically. How do you see that playing into M23's hands? I ask this because in my piece on how the Ebola crisis is making everything in the DRC worse.

My analysis was that this is paving the way for M23 to make the case that it's able to govern more effectively than the Congolese state. I said this because M23 had been touting its ability to conduct tests, its ability to conduct contact tracing and isolating people. How do you see that helping M23 make its case? Yeah, I think you're spot on.

I don't know if M23 will necessarily be able to exploit the FARDC's weakness during the Ebola outbreak. I do think that M23 has largely been on the defense in the last few months, so they have not taken any territory. I don't think it's likely that there's a big offensive coming this summer.

And part of that is because the pressure from Washington has just been so great. And you know, with these, these sanctions on Rwanda and also M23 and also just the political pressure that basically it just makes any, any kind of another big M23 offensive very unlikely.

But I do think that you are you're spot on about about the Ebola, the Ebola crisis and how M23 is going to use that. It's just the Ebola crisis has been one of the issues that's just been politicized already.

And M23, I think I think you nailed it about how they are going to try to use this to gain governing legitimacy and sort of sort of show the population.

It's kind of the first real big test for them, governance-wise, to show the population that they can be a better alternative to the Congolese government and that they, as they claim, they actually care about the population. Leah, sorry, Yale, we're going to end it there. We're out of time. Is there anything else you want to let the people know?

No, I think that's it. I really appreciate you having me on.

This was fun. thank you so much and we're going to discuss having you on the podcast again was our first ever true time guest and i would really appreciate having you you as the second person to appear on this podcast twice so yale how can the people find you or we go walk or we on cloud yeah so you can just find our work at critical threats.org that's where

We where our content is and then And you can also follow us on X at just Critical Threats is our handle, where we also post our content, including all of our Africa-related stuff.

Awesome. Thank you so much for your time today, Yael. I can't wait for the next podcast. Great. Thanks so much, Wilfred. All right. Have a lovely rest of your day. You too. Bye-bye.